Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 21h-C-10, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 1 August, 1944. Objective: Search for Barges, Shipping North Coast of CERAM ISLAND.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Search for barges and shipping - North coast of CERAM ISLAND.
      Secondary: None.
      Bomb load: Two A/P's - 3 x 500 lb demos, 4/5 second delay.
      Two A/P's - 12 x 100 lb demos, 4/5 second delay.
      Altitude: Minimum (for attack).
   (b) Formation: Formation of the four A/P's of this Squadron - only Squadron on mission - was made East of MOKMER A/O. The targets were to be attacked in elements of two planes.
   (c) Attack: Only three A/P's reached the target sweeping the North coast of CERAM ISLAND from CAPE BALANSOI to PIROE BAY and returning along the same route.

At CAPE BALANSOI a barge with personnel aboard was strafed and left smoking while ten miles to the West, two lugger were heavily strafed - one was probably sunk. Continuing along the coast a sailboat at CAPE BOTI was strafed with unobserved results. Four miles West of SELINA 6 x 100 pounders were dropped at two lugger - also heavily strafed - one of which was sunk.

Approaching PIROE BAY two lugger and one Sugar Charlie was sighted just off PIROE VILLAGE. Six x 500 pound demos were dropped at these vessels definitely sinking the Sugar Charlie by bombing and probably sinking one of the lugger by concentrated strafing. Returning Eastward along the North coast of CERAM six 100 pounders were dropped at a loaded barge, five miles West of SOAHOMKE. The barge was heavily strafed also but extent of damages inflicted couldn't be determined. At WABAI, the village and a large well constructed jetty with supplies on it were strafed with nil observed results.
   (d) Time and location of:
      Takeoff: MOKMER A/O at 0930/K.
      Attack: North coast of CERAM ISLAND and PIROE BAY at 1230/K to 1330/K.
      Landing: MOKMER A/O at 1610/K.

2. FORMATION
   The four A/P's of this Squadron were led by Capt Mortensen with elements as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 055 - Capt Mortensen</td>
<td>A/P 278 - Lt Truman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 237 - Lt Bagshaw</td>
<td>A/P 372 - Lt Myers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
Narrative Report, PPO 21h-C-10, continued.

However, Lt Myers turned back at 1024h at the South tip of ROEMBAERON ISLAND enroute to the target with his left engine smoking slightly. At the time of writing this report, no word has been received of his whereabouts as he failed to return to base.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. Capt Mortensen led the Squadron through MACKLIER GULF direct to the target. The three A/P's started their run at CAPE BAIAHUNO where Capt Mortensen strafed a personnel laden barge leaving it smoking. Ten miles West of CAPE BAIAHUNO he strafed two luggers, one of which was probably sunk. Proceeding to the West he strafed two luggers four miles West of SELINA and at PBOE dropped his three 500 pound demos on a Sugar Charlie scoring a direct hit on the stern and definitely sinking it. Doubling back he strafed a camouflaged barge filled with supplies five miles West of SOAHOUNE and WAIHAI VILLAGE, both with unobserved results.

   2. Lt Bagshaw followed Capt Mortensen throughout the sweep, strafing the barge at CAPE BAIAHUNO and the two luggers ten miles West of the Cape. At BOTI CAPE he strafed a sailboat with nil results observed. He dropped 6 100 pounders at one of the luggers four miles West of SELINA definitely sinking it. At PBOE he heavily strafed the Sugar Charlie which Capt Mortensen sank with his bombs. His remaining six bombs were dropped at the loaded, camouflaged barge five miles West of SOAHOUNE with nil apparent damage.

   3. Lt Truman also flew the same route as did the flight leader strafing the same barges and luggers sighted until he reached PBOE where he attacked one of the luggers dropping three 500 pounders, probably sinking it. Flying North he strafed the camouflaged barge West of SOAHOUNE and also strafed WAIHAI VILLAGE and a large well-built jetty which had supplies on it extending out from the village. Nil results observed.

   (b) A/A consisted of medium, moderate and fairly accurate fire from a four-pit position on a slope just West of PBOE TOWNSHIP and slight, inaccurate W/G fire from a position on the Northwest shore of PBOE BAY.

   (c) 1. Nil interception.

   2. Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.

   3. Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.

   4. Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.

   (d) The following personnel are missing:

      Pilot  ROLAND F. MYERS  1st Lt  0-663765
      Co-Pilot WILLIAM J. KAPITZE  2nd Lt  0-768331
      Bomber-Nav JAMES N. QUINN  1st Lt  0-664815
      Engineer MANUEL J. GARZA  S/Sgt  18105315
      Radioman ELMER L. BARLOW  S/Sgt  36417457
      Gunner JOSEPH (WW1) MELE  Sgt  13087947

   (e) A/P J1-30372 is missing.

4. CITATIONS

   On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

   Bombs dropped - 6 x 500 lb demos and 12 x 100 lb demos, both types 4/5 second delay fuse.

   - 2 -
Narrative Report, FFO 214-C-10, continued.

5,600 X .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

At SELEMAN BAY two smoke columns were seen 100 ft apart approximately two miles Southeast of SELEMAN and a white smoke column was seen in the center of a square cleared area just South of PANCI in SELEMAN BAY.

WAHAI VILLAGE on the North coast of CERAM appears to be a staging area as the town and jetty is well stocked with supplies, and the jetty is long (150 ft) and well constructed. There is a high "pagoda" type structure possibly an observation tower there.

Three miles South of PIROE on the Eastern shore of PIROE BAY a very large, well built jetty and numerous warehouses with much activity suggesting a staging area was sighted.

A three masted schooner was sighted ten miles South of PIROE in PIROE BAY and a 40 ft two masted schooner was spotted on the West coast of SELEMAN BAY.

Much livestock - cows and goats - were seen along the North coast of CERAM.

A M/G (water-cooled type) in a sand-bagged position was seen just inland from BENGOI.

BESAR ISLAND, North of SELEMAN BAY, has many European type buildings and several jetties.

Two columns of black smoke was seen at BOELA and two fires were noted at CAPE KARAKRA in MACCLUER GULF.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

K-21 photos were taken, but prints have not been received at the time of submitting this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
A/Ps followed same route to and from target.

Legend:

500th Bomb Sq/In., 345th Bomb Group

Only planes on mission.

Altitude of attack: 50 to 100 ft

Time of attack: 1230/K to 1330/K

Map reference:

KAI

AROE

NORTH

GEOVINK

GEELINK

MACCABERG

ERAM

ERAM SEA

GUINEA

LEGEND

AUG 21-Go-10

1st August, 1944

500th Bomb Sq/In., 345th Bomb Group

Only planes on mission.

Altitude of attack: 50 to 100 ft

Time of attack: 1230/K to 1330/K

Map reference:

KAI

AROE

NORTH

GEOVINK

MACCABERG

ERAM

ERAM SEA

LEGEND

AUG 21-Go-10

1st August, 1944

500th Bomb Sq/In., 345th Bomb Group

Only planes on mission.

Altitude of attack: 50 to 100 ft

Time of attack: 1230/K to 1330/K

Map reference:

KAI

AROE

NORTH

GEOVINK

MACCABERG

ERAM

ERAM SEA

APL "B"
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

2 August 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on FPO 21h-C-6, Performed by 500th Bombardment Squadron, 1 August, 1944. Objective: Search for barges and shipping - CAPE TEGIN to UTAROM.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Search for barges and shipping - CAPE TEGIN to UTAROM.
      Secondary: None.
      Bomb load: 12 x 100 pound demolition bombs, 4/5 second delay fuse.
      Altitude: Minimum (for the attack).
   (b) Formation: To consist of one element of two A/P's.
   (c) Attack: Two A/P's searched the northern shore of MACCLIVER GULF to CAPE TEGIN to SERAKOR BAY, overland to MACCLIVER GULF with nil shipping sightings.

   Villages from CAPE NAMBOEMBI to CAPE KARAKRA were strafed on route out and these same villages were bombed with 16 x 100 lb demo bombs on the return. Bombing was excellent with direct hits being scored on 2/3 100 ft long, two-storied, native type buildings that appeared to have supplies in them in KINARA VILLAGE starting several fires, one with black smoke 100 ft high.
   (d) Time and location of:
      Takeoff: MOKMEM A/D at 0747/K
      Attack: CAPE NAMBOEMBI to CAPE KARAKRA at 0908/K to 1105/K at 50/100 feet.
      Landing: MOKMEM A/D at 1230/K.
   (e) Route: MOKMEM - GEELVINK BAY - MACCLIVER GULF - SERAKOR BAY - MACCLIVER BAY - MOKMEM.

2. FORMATION
   The two ship formation was led by Lt Barney in A/P 592 with Lt Pohlman in A/P 048 on his wing.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   Lt Barney led the two planes along the northern shore of MACCLIVER GULF strafing villages from CAPE NAMBOEMBI to CAPE KARAKRA. Proceeding south to CAPE TEGIN he continued the search for shipping to SERAKOR BAY, but finding none, led the flight back North overland to MACCLIVER GULF. Returning to the villages he had strafed on the route out, he dropped eight 100 pounders on KINARA VILLAGE scoring direct hits on several 100 ft, two-storied native-type buildings. Several fires were started, one with black smoke to 100 ft. At CAPE KARAKRA he dropped his remaining four bombs with unobserved results.

   Lt Pohlman followed along with Lt Barney dropping three bombs at KINARA and one at CAPE KARAKRA. His bombs at KINARA also landed among the
Narrative Report FPO 21h-C-3, continued.

long native buildings.

Both planes strafed all targets thoroughly.
(b) Mil A/A encountered.
(c) 1. Mil interception.
   2. Mil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
   3. Mil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
   4. Mil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.
(d) Mil personnel injured.
(e) Mil A/P's damaged.

4. CITATIONS
   On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   16 X 100 lb demo bombs, 4/5 second delay fuse, dropped.
   8 X 100 lb demo bombs, 2/5 second delay fuse, returned to base.
   2,500 X .50 calibre and mil .30 calibre amm. expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   A well used road was sighted in the vicinity of OTAWIRI A/D. A 25 ft motor launch seen near Cape HAMBOKarri.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   K-21 photos were taken, but prints have not been received at the time of submitting this report.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

1 - Incl
Route and bomb assessment
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

4 August 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Armed weather Recco - AMBON AREA.
       Secondary: None.
       Altitude: (For attack) Minimum.
       Bomb load: 3 X 500 lb demolition bombs, 4/5 second delay.
   (b) Formation: Single plane.
   (c) Attack: The weather recco portion of this mission was only 80% complete. Due to instrument weather enroute the plane did not reach AMBON, but turned back just North of the BANDA ISLANDS, at 0810-12050E. Radio contact could not be made with the ground station, owing to faulty radio receiver equipment.

   On returning through the MACCLUER GULF three 500 pound demolition bombs, 4/5 second delay fuse, were dropped. BIRA VILLAGE was straffed and one bomb was dropped there destroying at least two European-type houses near the jetty. At TAPAS, on the coast nearby, another 500 pounder was dropped scoring a near miss on what appeared to be a barge-building yard with two slipways. The third bomb scored a near miss on two barges at KENERA in MACCLUER GULF, which were also straffed. An unnamed large village on the East bank of the ESTAMANT RIVER, 5 miles North of the river mouth, was heavily straffed with unobserved results.

   (d) Time and location of:
       Takeoff: 0330/K from MOKMER DRIVE.
       Attack: 0710/K to 0825/K - Villages and barges in the MACCLUER GULF AREA.
   Landing: 0930/K at MOKMER DRIVE.

   (e) Route: MOKMER - GHELVINX BAY - MACCLUER GULF - East tip of CERAM - 0810-12050E - MACCLUER GULF - GHELVINX BAY - MOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   Lt Cates in A/P YB-8 flew this mission.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. Lt Cates, flying instruments most of the way, reached a point just North of the BANDA ISLANDS in an effort to get through to the AMBON AREA. Due to faulty radio receiver equipment he was unable to obtain acknowledgement of his radioed weather reports.

   2. Returning through the MACCLUER GULF he straffed and dropped three bombs on targets of opportunity on the North shore of the Gulf. At BIRA VILLAGE he straffed and dropped one bomb destroying two European-type houses near the jetty there. At TAPAS a near miss with a 500 pounder was scored on a barge-building yard and slipway. At KENARA another bomb scored
Narrative Report PPO 216-C-9, continued.

a near miss on two barges. He then strafed an unnamed village on the East bank of the METAMANI RIVER, five miles North of the river mouth with unobserved results.

(b) Mil A/A encountered.
(c) 1. Mil interception.
   2. Mil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
   3. Mil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
   4. Mil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.
(d) Mil personnel injured.
(e) Mil A/F's damaged.

4. CITATIONS

On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 3 x 500 pound demes, 4/5 second delay fuse. 2,800 x .50 calibre amm expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

A blinder light was operating at BOGLA. A well used road was spotted running between BIRA ANCHORAGE and unnamed village on the East bank of the METAMANI RIVER.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

Mil photos taken.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

1 - Incl
Route and bomb assessment.
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND
FPO 216-C-9  3 August 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp
Only plane on mission
Attack altitude: 50 to 100 ft
Attack time: 0710/K to 0825/K
Crew report of bomb hits

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920
CAS/rpb
5 August 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 217-C-19, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 4 August, 1944. Objective: Armed Recce, North Coast of MACCLUDER GULF.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Primary objective: Armed recce - North coast of MACCLUDER GULF.
Secondary: JEF KASIM and KIAMONO OILFIELDS.
Bomb load: 4 X 500 lb demo bombs, 4/5 second delay, per A/P.
Altitude: Minimum.
(b) Formation: Formation of the four planes participating took place shortly after takeoff.
(c) Attack: (1) Four A/P's searched the North coast of MACCLUDER GULF for shipping with nil sightings except for a native canoe which was strafed with unobserved results. The planes then hit the secondary target.
(2) Two of the ships struck the JEF KASIM area dropping a total of eight 500 pound demoes and heavily strafing the jetty and warehouse area. Several direct hits were scored on sheds in the jetty area and one of the bombs fell on the N/T road rendering it unserviceable. Three tanks - possibly locomotive boilers - three feet in diameter and fifteen feet long were damaged and an arm was knocked off a crane nearby by strafing.
(3) The other two A/P's turned North on the BERAGER RIVER and attacked the KIAMONO OILFIELD area strafing heavily and depositing eight quarter tonners with generally unobserved results. A near miss was scored on two barges loaded with oil drums lying in a small creek to the East of the KIASAFET RIVER; barges were also strafed. Another bomb fell close to a storage tank, approximately 30 feet high and 10 feet in diameter, which was strafed heavily but with no apparent damage. Several bombs fell among large European-type buildings around the oilfield area but due to the density of the forest results were unobserved.
(d) Time and location of:
Takeoff: 0908/X from NOKMER DROME.
Attack: 1105/X to 1150/X - KIAMONO and JEF KASIM areas.
Landing: 1335/X at NOKMER DROME.
(e) Route: NOKMER - GEELVINK BAY - MACCLUDER GULF - BERAGER RIVER - SECONDARY TARGETS - MACCLUDER GULF - GEELVINK BAY - NOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
Lt Dick led the Squadron in two elements of two planes each as follows:
FIRST ELEMENT
A/P 669 - Lt Dick
A/P 237 - Lt Bagshaw
SECOND ELEMENT
A/P 592 - Lt Bissell
A/P 034 - Lt Pohlman
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. Lt Dick led the Squadron on this mission. The four
       planes swept the North shore of MACCLUER GULF from the Eastern extremity
       in BENTONI BAY to SELE STRAITS. No shipping or barges were sighted al-
       long the route, and at the mouth of the BERACER RIVER the second flight
       turned North, while the first element composed of Lt Dick and his wing-
       man, Lt Bagshaw, continued around SELE STRAITS attacking JEF KASIM, the
       secondary target. Eight five hundreds were dropped in this area - one
       hit on the M/T road to the oilfields, causing a large crater which
       immediately filled with water. Two ships were destroyed by bomb hits
       also. Three tanks, 15 feet long and about three feet in diameter were
       strafed on the jetty, where both planes strafed a crane knocking the
       arm off. This flight then proceeded seven miles inland and strafed
       SELE Nos. 1 and 2, villages where the oilfields were supposedly located.
       2. The second element, led by Lt Bissell, with Lt Pohlsen
       as wingman, turned North on the BERACER RIVER, following it to the KIA-
       MONO OILFIELD region. Eight 500 poundsers were dropped here and the
       area was thoroughly strafed on at least 12 passes. Results, however,
       were generally unobserved due to the density of the rain forest, but
       several bombs were seen to fall among large European type buildings.
       Two barges loaded with oil drums on a small creek to the East of the
       KIASHATY RIVER were strafed and one bomb was dropped, scoring a near
       miss. Another bomb scored a near miss on a 30 ft high, 40 ft in dia-
       meter storage tank, which was heavily strafed also.
       (b) Mil A/A encountered.
       (c) 1. Mil interception.
       2. Mil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
       3. Mil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
       4. Mil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.
       (d) Mil personnel injured.
       (e) Mil A/P's damaged.

4. CITATIONS
   On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this
   report there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions
   which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 16 x 500 lb dems, 4/5 second delay fuse.
   7,550 x .50 and 2,300 x .30 calibre ammunition expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   (a) Lt Dick's and Lt Bagshaw's crews reported the following
       sightings in the JEF KASIM area: The M/T road from JEF KASIM to SELE 1
       and 2 appears in good condition and well used with 3/4 good bridges a-
       long the road. A round six foot cylindrical tank, well camouflaged,
       was seen near SELE 2.
   (b) Lt Bissell and Lt Pohlsen's crews made the following
       sightings in the KIAMONO OILFIELD area: Many large warehouse, 8/10
       barracks type buildings and several houses were seen in the area. A
       small gauge railroad track, lumber piles, a jetty in good condition with
a crane which appeared recently used since the rigging was still present were all noted. A probable pump house was seen at the end of the tracks to Klamono Wells.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
    K-21 photos were taken but at the time of submitting this report, no prints have been received.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
FFO 217-G-19 4 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Only planes on mission
Attack altitude: 50 to 200 feet
Attack time: 1105/K to 1150/K
† Took photos
† Other planes
Map reference: A-6 Aero Chart
6 August, 1944.

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission 770 218-C-6, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 3 August, 1944. Objective: RAMLEA DROMES and TOWNSHIP. Secondary: (which was hit) Barge Sweep, North Coast of CERAM.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Primary objective: RAMLEA DROMES and TOWNSHIP.
   Secondary: Shipping and targets of opportunity - North coast of CERAM.
   Bomb load: 12 x 100 lb paras, 1/5 second delay, per A/P.
   Altitude: Minimum.
(b) Formation: Formation consisting of one element of three planes and one element of four planes was affected shortly after takeoff.
(c) Attack: 1. There were seven of our planes on this attack. They reached the West end of CERAM ISLAND, but due to weather fighters turned back, and the Group attacked the secondary target, which was a barge and shipping sweep of the Northern CERAM coast. Coast was thoroughly searched, strafed, and bombed with 76 x 100 lb paras which were dropped with excellent results. A large lugger, a smaller camouflage lugger and a possibly serviceable barge were definitely sunk. A sailboat was heavily strafed as was a partially sunken barge which was loaded with supplies. NAHAI VILLAGE, a staging area, was heavily hit as was an island in the TOENDJEN GROUP where a large black smoke fire up to 3000 ft was started. Villages all along the coast were bombed and strafed and many small fires were started and buildings destroyed.
(d) Time and location of:
   Takeoff: 0710/X from MOKMER DROME.
   Attack: North coast of CERAM ISLAND at 1100/X to 1150/X
   Landing: 1352/X at MOKMER DROME.
(e) Route: MOKMER - MACCLUER GULF - PHSANG ISLAND - West end of CERAM - North coast of CERAM - MACCLUER GULF - MOKMER.

2. FORMATION - PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
(a) Group formation: The Group was led by Capt. NEUMANN, Group Operations Officer. The Squadron order was 501st, 500th, B99th and B98th.
(b) Squadron formation: The Squadron was led by Capt. Mortensen with flights as follows:

   FIRST ELEMENT                      SECOND ELEMENT
   A/P 055 - Capt. Mortensen          A/P 051 - Lt. Whitsett
   A/P 048 - Lt. Zimmerman            A/P 237 - Lt. Pohlmian
   A/P 669 - Lt. Dick                 A/P 592 - Lt. Landon

3. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:
(a) 1. The Squadron led by Capt. Mortensen attacked the targets in two ship elements. Starting the attack in the BOANO STRAITS a wooden sailboat was strafed particularly heavily and was damaged. Four bombs were
dropped on a large loaded lugger - possibly a Sugar Charlie - scoring a
direct hit amidships, setting it afire and definitely sinking it. At WAHAI
four were released hitting buildings and starting small fires. At CAPE
BALABSOI four bombs scored near misses on two sailboats which were heavily
strafed and left in a sinking condition.

2. Capt Mortensen's wingman, Lt Zimmerman, dropped two of
his 100 pounders at a camouflaged lugger at SOKKARADJA scoring one direct
hit amidships and sinking the craft. At LISABATA he flipped out four more
bombs at a possibly serviceable barge but all were too long. His remaining
six parades were dropped among buildings at SELIHA with unknown re-
results.

3. Lt Dick dropped four bombs at LISABATA destroying several
European-type houses with well aimed hits. At a small island East of RESAR
he toggled out four more scoring a direct hit on the mission building and
his last four destroyed several small native huts at WAHAI.

4. Lt Whitsett scored near misses with four bombs on the
first lugger, then scored a direct hit on the lugger just beyond SOKKARADJA
which exploded. Small fires were started in a village in the SELIHA BAY
area when four bombs were dropped there.

5. Lt Pohlsan held his bombs until reaching the small island
East of RESAR in the TEND-JORG GROUP where he dropped four starting a fire
with billowing black smoke up to 3000 feet. At WAHAI he dropped two de-
stroying a large European-type building. Near SELIHA as he was opening
his bomb bay doors, the shits blew off one of the parades in the rack.
Lt Pohlsan immediately salvoed the six remaining bombs and they fell among
houses in SELIHA with nil results.

6. Lt Landon dropped four bombs on a possible serviceable
barge at LISABATA which was left sinking. Six bombs were dropped at
villages in SELIHA BAY scoring direct hits on large well-built buildings.
His two remaining bombs hung up and were brought to base.

7. Lt Thomas started several small fires among native shacks
in NANDA where he strafed and dropped four bombs. He dropped four more
at TANIWEL starting other gray smoke fires in the underbrush and native-
buildings. His remaining four bombs were flipped out at SOKKARADJA scoring
direct hits on buildings there.

8. Villages and all barges mentioned were heavily strafed
all along the Northern coast of GERRAN ISLAND.

(a) Nil A/A encountered.
(b) Nil interception.
(c) 1. Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(d) 2. Nil Allied planes observed destroyed in the air.
(e) 3. Nil enemy planes observed destroyed in the air.
(f) 4. Nil enemy planes observed destroyed on the ground.
(g) Nil personnel injured.
(h) Nil A/P's damaged.

4. CITATIONS

On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this re-
port, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which
would justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT ANDORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 76 X 100 lb parades, 4/5 second delay.
Narrative Report, FFO 218-C-6, continued.

Bombs salvaged - 6 x 100 lb parachutes, 4/5 second delay fuse.
Bombs returned - 2 x 100 lb parachutes, 4/5 second delay fuse.
12,750 x .50 calibre and 3,000 x .30 calibre arms expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
The following sightings were reported: two columns of smoke, 1500 ft high, at BOHLA; a sailboat on the East coast of BAMO ISLAND; a possible barge at KARA in BAMO STRAIT and another at CAPE KARAKROI in MACLUTER GULF.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
K-15, K-20 and K-21 photos were taken but at the time of submitting this report no prints have been received.

For the Squadron Commander:

2 - Incis
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route

CARL A. STRONG
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

LEGEND

PPO 218-C-6  5 August 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Gp
Second in Group formation
Altitude of attack: 30 to 200 ft
Time of attack: 1100/K - 1150/K

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command
Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 221-C-6, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 8 August, 1944. Objectives, Primary: Shipping, WAIKIKI BAY; Secondary, Jetty Area, WAIKIKI BAY; Tertiary, North Coast of WAIKIKI ISLAND. Tertiary target hit.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary Objective: Shipping, WAIKIKI BAY.
       Secondary: Jetty Area, WAIKIKI BAY.
       Tertiary: North Coast of WAIKIKI ISLAND. This target hit.

   (b) Formation: The three squadrons of the Group were to form on course over SORIDO DROME. Rendezvous with the fighters was to be made at RAM ISLAND.

   (c) Attack: Six A/P's turned back at 1315/X at approximately 0130N-12930E when only a few minutes away from the primary target as fighter escort called they were returning. The tertiary target was hit with a total of 5 X 1000 pounds and 11 X 500 lb bombs. Of these, six 500 pounds and two half-tenners were dropped in village at SARIKA BAY destroying native shacks. Three 1000's and two 500's were deposited at LAMAN VILLAGE demolishing native shacks and starting a fire with black smoke to 200 feet. At KAMARI BAY, three quarter-tenners hit in a village at the Southern end of the Bay destroying 5/6 native huts and starting a black smoke fire. Villages from SARIKA BAY to CAPE LAMARCHE were strafed.

   (d) Time and location of:
       Takeoff: 1030/X from NOKNER DROME.
       Attack: 1355/X to 1430/X - North coast of WAIKIKI ISLAND.
       Landing: 1625/X at NOKNER DROME.

   (e) Route: NOKNER - RAM ISLAND - 0130N-12930E - WAIKIKI ISLAND - NOKNER.

2. PILOTS AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   The Group was led by Capt Mortensen, Operations Officer of the 500th Squadron. The Squadron order was 500th, 499th, 501st.
   The Squadron was composed of two elements of three as follows:

   FIRST ELEMENT
   A/P 055 - Capt Mortensen
   A/P 051 - Lt Zimmerman
   A/P 237 - Lt Bagshaw

   SECOND ELEMENT
   A/P 669 - Lt Dick
   A/P 592 - Lt Landon
   A/P 018 - Lt Bissell

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. Once again, after so many attempts, the Group was unable
to reach the primary target - the shipping which had been reported for the past few days in EAGE and WASILI BAYS. It was a bitter disappointment when weather finally forced the fighters to call in that they were turning back. At 1315/K at approximately 0130W - 14930E, the Group turned back - just off the MALANHERAS.

2. Returning the Squadron bombed the tertiary target - the North coast of MAINEO ISLAND. Targets were far from lucrative, and most of the crews agreed that the bombing had been a waste. In all, five 1000 lb demes (h/5 second delay) and 11 X 500 pounders were dropped. Capt Mortensen dropped a 500 pounder at SARIPA BAY, a 1000 at LAMIAN VILLAGE, where huts were hit and a fire was started with black smoke to 200 feet. His third bomb, a 500 pounder, hit at KABARI BAY among huts.

3. Lt Zimmerman, Capt Mortensen's No. 2 man, dropped a 500 pounder on the village at SARIPA BAY, a half-tonner at LAMIAN VILLAGE and the last bomb - a quarter-tonner - at KABARI BAY.

4. Lt Bagshaw, left wingman, released a 1000 pounder and a 500 at SARIPA BAY and a 500 pounder at LAMIAN.

5. Lt Dick and his flight consisting of Lt Landon and Lt Bissell bombed the same areas. Lt Dick dropped his 1000 pounder at LAMIAN VILLAGE and his two 500 lb demes at KABARI BAY. Lt Landon released a 1000 and a 500 at SARIPA BAY and a 500 at LAMIAN. Lt Bissell dropped one 500 at KABARI BAY, and brought his 1000 and 500 pounder remaining back to base.

6. All bombs hit among native huts and destroyed many of them. Villages from SARIPA BAY TO CAPE LAMARCHE were strafed as well.
   (b) Nil A/A.
   (c) Nil interception. Nil Allied or enemy planes observed destroyed.
   (d) Nil personnel injured.
   (e) Nil A/P's damaged.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 11 X 500 lb and 5 X 1000 lb demes, h/5 second.
   3 250 X .30 and 3 .250 X .50 calibre ammu expended.
   Bases returned - 1 X 500 and 1 X 1000 pounder.


7. K-20 and K-21 photos were taken but at the time of submitting this report no prints have been received.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
FFO 221-G-6

8 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Group
First in Group formation
Altitude of attack: 100 to 200 ft
Time of attack: 1355/K to 1430/K
Bombing efficiency EX
T Took photos
T Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Australian Aero. Chart - A-6
8 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqn, 345th Bomb Group
First in Group formation
Time of attack: 1355/K to 1430/K
Altitude of attack: 100/200 ft.

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies West
V Bomber Command
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 920

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

10 August 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFG 222-C-7, Performed by 500th Bombardment Squadron, 9 August, 1944. Primary Objective - Shipping, WASILE BAY; Secondary - WASILE BAY, Jetty Area; Tertiary - North Coast of WAIHEKO ISLAND.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary Objective: Shipping, WASILE BAY (Target hit).
       Secondary: Jetty Area, WASILE BAY (Also hit).
       Tertiary: North Coast of WAIHEKO ISLAND.
       Altitude: Minimum.
       Bomb Load: Four 500 lb demos, 4/5 second delay, per A/P.

   (b) Rendezvous:
       (1) Group - On course over SORIDO at 2000 ft at 1015/K.
       (2) Fighters - At AJOE ISLAND at 2000 ft at 1200/K.

   (c) Attack: Six A/P's of this Squadron reached the target - WASILE BAY, coming over the LOLOBATA PENINSULA on a heading of approximately 190°. We were the third squadron over the target. The BAY was jammed with shipping, and the Squadron took excellent advantage of it. Twenty-four (24) X 500 lb (4/5 second delay) demolition bombs were dropped and that the majority accomplished their purpose is evidenced by the following excellent results.

       One Sugar Baker (possibly Fox Tare Charlie), three Sugar Charlies, three luggers and one Class "A" barge were sunk; one Sugar Charlie and one lugger were probably sunk and a Sugar Baker was damaged.

       Direct hits were scored on jetty "B" starting fuel fires with black smoke to 2000 feet. Approximately 15 barges around jetty "B" and 6/8 at TJEKALI VILLAGE were bombed and strafed. BIANG and TJEKALI VILLAGES and an estimated 30 Japs in the water around one of the Sugar Charlies were strafed. Several small fires were started at BIANG.

       (d) Time and location of:
           Takeoff: 1008/K from WOKMER DROME.
           Attack: Shipping and jetties - WASILE BAY, 1320/K to 1352/K.
           Landing: 1720/K at WOKMER DROME.

       (e) Route: WOKMER - AJOE - WASILE BAY - AJOE - WOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) The Group was led by the 501st Squadron, with the 499th and 500th following in that order.

   (b) Lt. Whitesell led the 500th with flights as follows:
       FIRST ELEMENT
       A/P 034 - Lt Whitesell
       A/P 669 - Lt Bagnall
       A/P 068 - Lt Bissell

       SECOND ELEMENT
       A/P 275 - Lt Gates
       A/P 051 - Lt Zimmerman
       A/P 592 - Lt Landon
Narrative Report, FPO 222-C-7, continued.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. After numerous attempts the Group was finally successful in reaching this "juicy" target. Hope had almost been given up that the Nip would continue to keep the Bay "loaded" with shipping as had been so often reported. However, as has happened so often in the past, the Nip was once again caught "pants down." Lt Whitson, leader of our Squadron, came over the LOLOMATA PENINSULA and spotting the shipping in the vicinity of "B" jetty headed for that target. The jetty was swept with .50 calibre bullets and a large fire resulted due to the fact that the jetty was loaded with fuel drums. South of the jetty he dropped two bombs on a Sugar Baker, scoring a hit amidships starting a fire and damaging it to an unknown extent. He strafed a lugger in the Bay and dropped one bomb at it, scoring a near miss. Next, a Sugar Charlie, probably loaded with ammunition, 10 miles East of KAOE was so heavily strafed that it blew into pieces and was destroyed. His last bomb was dropped on a lugger just North of BOEBALE ISLAND, scoring a near miss and strafing it also.

2. Lt Bagshaw flew No. 2 in the first element and dropped two 500's at a Sugar Charlie North of "B" jetty, scoring near misses. He strafed a lugger in the bay, then proceeding to the KAOE AREA he strafed BIANG VILLAGE, starting a fire in fuel drums there. His remaining two "quarter-tonners" scored near misses on the lugger North of BOEBALE ISLAND, which was also strafed.

3. Lt Bissell, left wingman, gets credit for the destruction of a Sugar Baker, which was anchored just off jetty "B." Two 500's were dropped on it with telling accuracy, scoring direct hits amidships and toward the stern. A fire was started and crew members of the second flight attested to the fact that the ship was burning furiously, the plates were buckling, and that it can be definitely considered sunk. South of the jetty, a large barge (possibly Type "A"), which was moving, was hit by a bomb and was seen to sink. Out in the bay a camouflaged lugger was hit by his remaining bomb and this vessel was also seen to be destroyed. Continuing, Lt Bissell strafed BIANG VILLAGE, seven miles North of KAOE.

4. Lt Cates, leading the second element, took his flight in across jetty "B" on the same heading as the first flight. He dropped two bombs at the end of the jetty, blowing up supplies and fuel drums and a portion of the jetty itself, and destroying two luggers alongside. Tremendous black smoke fires were seen in this area as our planes left the target. Seeing that the Sugar Baker, hit by the first flight, needed no further attention he proceeded around the edge of the Bay in search of more Nip vessels. Just off TUGKALI VILLAGE he scored a direct hit on a Sugar Charlie which sank almost immediately. In the center of the Bay he heavily strafed a Sugar Charlie and dropped his remaining bomb which skipped, knocked off the stack and exploded in the water on the far side for a near miss. Approximately 30 Japs in the water around this vessel were strafed. The Sugar Charlie was burning as our planes withdrew - considered probably destroyed. Making a 360° turn in the Bay, Lt Cates again crossed the point at TUGKALI strafing barges there, before leading his flight from the target.

5. Lt Zimmerman, flying on Lt Cates right wing, dropped two bombs at a Sugar Charlie just West of jetty "B," scoring one direct
Narrative Report on FFO 222-C-7, continued.

hit and a near miss, definitely sinking it. A few hundred feet farther Southeast he scored a near miss on a lugger with one bomb, considered probably sunk. His remaining bomb missed a lugger in the central part of the Bay, falling considerably over the vessel. At TJEKALI, he strafed barges and the village with unobserved results. He also thoroughly strafed the Sugar Charlie - and Japs in water - in the center of WASILE BAY.

6. Lt Landon, Number 3 in Lt Cate's flight, dropped two bombs at the Sugar Baker hit by Lt Whitwell - one missed completely, the second was a near miss. His third bomb was dropped among barges off TJEKALI with unobserved results. He trained his forward firing guns against A/A positions there which were throwing up a moderate amount of light and medium fire, temporarily silencing them, but not before his plane had been holed five times by the nip sharp shooters. His remaining bomb missed the Sugar Charlie in the center of WASILE BAY.

7. All planes strafed the vessels attacked with excellent results.

(b) A/A: Medium and heavy, moderate and inaccurate from known positions half way between jetties at WASILE BAY. A/A bursts were too low with many exploding in water beneath planes. Light and medium, moderate and accurate from point of South shore of WASILE BAY, eight miles South-Southwest of jetty area.

(c) Nil interception. Nil Allied or enemy planes observed destroyed.

(d) Nil personnel injured.

(e) A/P 592 received five holes from A/A - two in fuselage, one in the left wing and two in left engine nacelle.

4. Pending photo confirmation, in the opinion of this Officer an award should be recommended for Lt Bissell and his crew for the sinking of the Sugar Baker and other awards to Lts Whitswell, Cates and Zimmerman and crews for their excellent results in this brilliant attack on Japanese shipping in the heavily defended WASILE BAY AREA.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bomb dropped - 2 x 500 lb demos, 4/5 second delay fuse.
13,500 x .50 and 3,500 x .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

Many barracks-type buildings and a command post seen in village just South of HATSTABAIO DROME. Numerous supplies and oil drums spotted in WASILE BAY jetty area and approximately 15 barges and luggers were also seen there. One crew reported four SSF on LOLOBATA DROME.

7. K-20 and K-21 photos were taken but at the time of submitting this report no prints have been received.

For the Squadron Commander:

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
9 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Third in Group formation
Time of attack: 1320/X - 1352/X
Altitude of attack: 35 - 300 ft
T Took photos
T Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Photo - 713B  V Bomber Command
ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO 222-C-7  9 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Group
Third in Group formation
Time of attack: 1320/K to 1352/K

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies West
V Bomber Command
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
3145th Bombardment Group
APO 920

12 August 1944

CAS/rpb

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 2244-4, performed by the 500th Bomb Squadron, 11 August, 1944. Objective: Shipping - WASILE and KACE BAYS; Secondary - TERNATE.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Shipping - WASILE and KACE BAYS.
      Secondary: TERNATE.
      Altitude: Minimum.
      Bomb load: Four (4) 500 lb demos, 4/5 second delay fuse, per A/P.

   (b) Rendezvous:
      1. On course over SORIDO at 2000 feet.
      2. Fighters: Two squadrons of P-38's at AJOE ISLAND at 1135/K.

   (c) Attack: Six A/P's of this Squadron "recooed" BULLI BAY, crossed over to the South portion of KACE BAY, up the East coast of the BAY, then turning to the West, attacked shipping along the West coast of KACE BAY between MALITOT BAY and HATOBOELA POINT. (Map reference: MOLUCCAN ISLANDS, 1:125,000, KACE, Sheet 7). Twenty one (21) 500 pound (4/5 second delay) bombs were dropped with good results, but heavy strafing accomplished more than the bombing. The results were as follows:
      1. A near miss on a midet SS which was so heavily strafed by all planes that it was thought to have been rendered unserviceable.
      2. A lugger received a direct hit from a 500 pounder, and was seen to sink on a second pass.
      3. Four luggers and a barge were sunk by strafing. It is thought these vessels were loaded with ammunition, since when strafed they exploded with a bright orange flame, then gray smoke, and then yellowish smoke.
      4. A near miss was scored on a lugger, near the stern, classifying this vessel as a "probable."
      5. A barge was damaged by a near miss.
      6. A fuel barge next to the SS was heavily strafed by at least three planes, and oil was seen to be coming out of it.
      7. An additional 10/12 barges in this area were strafed with extent of damages inflicted unknown.
      8. A fuel fire with smoke to 100 feet was started on shore 1¼ miles South of MALITOT BAY, and villages and supplies were strafed along the shore. In all, 15,850 X .50 calibre and 2,300 X .30 calibre ammo were expended.

   (d) Time and location of:
      Takeoff: 0935/K from MOKMER DROME.
      Fighter rendezvous: 1135/K over AJOE ISLAND.
      Attack: 1250/K to 1320/K at WASILE and KACE BAYS.
      Landing: 1610/K at MOKMER DROME.

   (e) Route: MOKMER - AJOE - BULLI BAY - TARGET - AJOE - MOKMER.
2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
(a) The Group was led by the 499th Squadron, with the 500th and 501st following in that order.
(b) The 500th Squadron was led by Major Dougherty, the Squadron Commander. Major General W. E. Lynd flew with Major Dougherty as observer. Flights were as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 068 - Maj Dougherty
A/P 031 - Lt Zimmerman
A/P 059 - Lt Bissell

SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 278 - Lt Gates
A/P 161 - Lt Whitsett
A/P 237 - Lt Bagshaw

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
(a) Major Dougherty, with Major General W. E. Lynd acting as observer, led his Squadron on this strike which is to be his last, since the Major is now grounded, having completed 70 combat missions. His career, at least in the 500th Squadron, can be said to have ended in a "blaze of glory". Coming up the East shore of KAEO BAY he spotted shipping on the West coast of the Bay, Southwest of KAEO A/D and led the Squadron to that target. His first 500 pounder scored a near miss on a midget submarine which was near shore and one mile West of LOLAO POINT. He strafed the sub as well as a fuel barge moored close by. His remaining three bombs had to be salvaged due to track malfunctions, but the Major continued strafing heavily and with excellent results. Three tuggers and a barge were seen definitely to explode. It is thought these vessels were loaded with ammunition due to the nature of the explosions.

2. Lt Zimmerman, flying No. 2 in the first flight, made numerous strafing passes on eight barges and tuggers grouped together in this same area. One of his quarter-tonners scored a near miss on a barge damaging it. His other bombs dropped at barges were either "short" or "over."

3. Lt Bissell, No. 3 in this flight, dropped his bombs on the same vessels, scoring two near misses out of his four bombs. He strafed one large barge, the stern of which blew up. Coming back for a second pass, the barge was seen to be settling in the water and is considered definitely sunk. The fuel barge was heavily strafed as was the sub. Oil was seen to be seeping from the fuel barge. A small oil fire, with smoke to 100 feet, was started on shore, 1½ miles South of MALITOET, by strafing.

4. Lt Gates, leader of the second flight, followed the first flight over the shipping targets. His four bombs, of which two were close, were dropped with unobserved results on the barges and tuggers, which were strafed also; as was the sub and fuel barge.

5. Lt Whitsett, flying No. 2, dropped his four 500 pounders in the same area, scoring a "close" near miss on a lugger, which is considered probably sunk. Numerous strafing passes were made on the various vessels, and this crew reported that in their opinion at least eight had been sunk when they left the target.

6. Lt Bagshaw, No. 3 in the second flight, scored a direct hit with one of his quarter-tonners on a lugger, which was seen definitely to have sunk on the second pass. The fuel barge and sub were also strafed.

(b) A/A was reported as heavy, moderate and fairly accurate from known positions South of KAEO STRIP; as light, moderate, also fairly

accurate from vicinity of MALITOST and KAPITA VILLAGES. A coastal defense position, thought to contain three guns, fired a moderate amount of rounds from the KAPITA VILLAGE area. Bursts were seen to hit in water.

(c) Mil interception. Mil enemy or Allied planes observed destroyed.

(d) Mil personnel injured.

(e) Mil A/P's damaged.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 21 X 500 lb desmos, h/5 second delay fuse.
   Bombs salvoed - 3 X 500 lb desmos, h/5 second delay fuse.
   15,850 I .50 calibre and 2,300 I .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   Many buildings along the shore between LOEBO POINT and KAPITA.
   Four large fires with smoke to 6500 feet in vicinity of TOBALIEN POINT.
   Large flashes, possibly coastal defense gun, at MADJID.
   One Sugar Charlie, a barge and two luggers near jetty in GOEBOEA BAY.
   Right barges between NATOBBOELA POINT and MADJID.

7. PHOTOS
   K-20 and K-21 photos were taken but at the time of submitting this report no prints have been received.

   For the Squadron Commander:

   CARL A. STRAUSS
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
11 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp
Second in Group formation
Time of attack: 1250/X - 1320/X
Altitude of attack: 50 - 200 ft.
7 Took photos
7 Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Moluccan Islands (Map) 1:125,000
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND

FFO 224-A-4  11 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Second in Group formation
Time of attack: 1250/K - 1320/K
Altitude of attack: 50 - 200 ft.
† Took photos
‡ Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Photo: 7138 V Bomber Command

ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET

FFO 224-A-4  11 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Second in Group formation
Time of attack: 1250/K - 1320/K
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

13 August 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 225-A-10, performed by 500th
Bomb Squadron, 12 August, 1944. Objective: Armed Weather
Recco - Sector "L".

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Armed weather recco - Sector "L".
      Secondary: None.
      Altitude: Minimum (for attack).
      Bomb load: Four (4) 500 lb. 5000lb, 5/5 second delay fuse.
      (b) Formation: Single plane.
      (c) Attack: One A/F searched Sector "L" for shipping with nil
      shipping attacked. The route followed was from BIAK to MOROTAI ISLAND to
      SANQUIE ISLAND to SAIOM ISLAND to TANHOIISLAND ISLAND to TERNAE to KACE
      BAY to BULLI BAY to MIDDLEBURG ISLAND to KAMIRI to BIAK.
      Four (4) 500 lb (5/5 second delay) demolition bombs were
      dropped. A Southwest to Northeast bombing and strafing run was made on
      TERNAE dropping three bombs, one of which scored a direct hit in the
      power house area starting a fire with grayish black smoke to 1000 feet.
      One bomb was dropped at DODIMA VILLAGE on the Northeast coast of DO-
      DIMA BAY with unobserved results. Weather was reported twice hourly as
      directed.
      (d) Time and location of:
         Takeoff: 0700/Z from MOKMER DROME.
         Attack: 1230/Z to 1235/Z at TERNAE.
         Landing: 1720/Z at MOKMER DROME.
      (e) Route: BIAK - MOROTAI ISLAND - SANQUIE ISLAND - SAIOM IS-
      LAND - TANHOIISLAND ISLAND - TERNAE - KACE BAY - BULLI BAY - MIDDLEBURG
      ISLAND - KAMIRI - MOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   Lt. Whitseal in A/F 051 flew this mission.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) Lt. Whitseal, by flying this mission, has the distinction of
      having gone within 100 miles of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. He recced the
      SANQUIE ISLANDS, searching for shipping - and noted several good anchor-
      ages. Unable to find suitable shipping targets - he attacked the town of
      TERNAE. Coming in from the South, he achieved complete surprise and
      dropped three quarter tonners in the Southern portion of the town, one
      hitting in the power house area and causing a fire with grayish black
      smoke up to 1000 feet. He saved his remaining bomb for possible shipping
      at the wharf, but seeing none, he released this last one on the village
      of DODIMA on the Northeastern shore of DODIMA BAY. Returning, Lt
      Whitseal was running low on gas and circled MIDDLEBURG ISLAND strip but
      was unable to land there. He then landed at KAMIRI to refuel and then
      landed at BIAK.

   - 1 -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(b) M11 A/A encountered.
(c) M11 interception. M11 Allied or enemy plane losses reported.
(d) M11 personnel injured.
(e) M11 A/F's damaged.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 4 X 500 Ib dense, 1/5 second delay fuse.
   1,200 X .50 calibre amo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   A large ten miles East of FITCH, another at DOI ISLAND and six between CAPE BAKOE and CAPE GERONIMO.
   Two Sugar Charlies at PARA ISLAND; a possible Sugar Charlie at SIAKE ISLAND. Both of these islands had excellent anchorages.
   Twelve large (35' X 100') warehouses seen in addition to those already shown on CIU Photo A-108 in the government wharf area at TERNATE.

7. Photos were not taken due to camera malfunction.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

1 - Incl
Incl 1 - Route and bomb assessment.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
3d5th Bombardment Group
APO 929

1st August, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 929.

1. GENERAL

(a) Primary objective: Supplies and stores -- WASILE BAY. Secondary: TERNATE.
(b) Bomb load: 12 x 100 lb parabolas, 5/5 second delay, per A/P.
(c) Rendezvous:
   - Group: Three squadrons en route over SORIDO A/B.
   - Fighters: Three squadrons of P-38's, 1050/K, 2000 ft over AJOE ISLAND.

1. Our Squadron led the Group and approached the EALMSHERAS with the intent to cross the pass between BULI BAY and WASILE BAY. However, clouds were built up to 9000 feet over this pass, so that the leader chose an alternate approach around CAPE LOKAI, BOROLO BAY and across LOLOBATA PENINSULA, approaching the target on a heading of approximately 120°. Seventy-two 100 lb parabolas, 5/5 second delay fuse, were released with at least 90% of the bombs hitting in the Northern part of the target among warehouse buildings and loose supplies piled in the area. A large explosion with white smoke up to 1000 ft was started - thought to have been an ammunition dump. Small fires were started in this part of the target. The entire target, which was 1/2 miles long, the A/A position at 28° and several barges near jetty "A" were all thoroughly strafed on a single pass, and all crews agreed that the target had been well covered by bombs.

2. Withdrawal was made to the right through WASILE and KACE BAYS and around the LOLOBATA PENINSULA. When the Group leader was informed that one of the k99th planes had gone down in the Bay, just off the target, the leader, Lt Cates, returned to WASILE BAY, circled, and then hastened toward BULI BAY to contact Catalina rescue planes. He made successful contact and Cates reported they would return to WASILE BAY to endeavor to pick up the crew. Later reports state that the Cates, as well as a search mission that returned to the area, made no sightings of the downed crew.

1. Time and location of:
   - Takeoff: 0850/K from NOKNER DROME.
   - Rendezvous with fighters: 1100/K over AJOE ISLAND.
   - Attack: 1220/K to 1225/K -- WASILE BAY.
   - Landing: 1615/K at NOKNER DROME.

2. Route: BIAT-AJOE-BULI BAY-BOROLO BAY-TARGET-KACE BAY-BIAT.

2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING

(a) The 500th Squadron, led by Lt Cates, was first over the target, followed by the 501st and the k99th Squadrons in that order.

(b) Flights of the 500th Squadron were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 08 Lt Gates</td>
<td>A/P 278 Lt Heissell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 051 Lt Hughes</td>
<td>A/P 034 Lt Pohlmann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 592 Lt Zimmerman</td>
<td>A/P 059 Lt Bagshaw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. Lt Gates had a "red letter" day, since he was promoted to 1Lt, received an Air Medal and this was his first mission as Group leader. Approaching BULLI BAY he was unable to get over the pass between there and NASILE BAY, and thereafter turned to make the alternate approach which was around CAPE LEHAI, then across ILOCARITA PENINSULA to the target - the stores and supplies at the jetty area at NASILE BAY. He approached the target on a heading of approximately 120°, strafing as he went, and toggled his twelve parades out over the northern and central portion of the target, where they fell among warehouses and lines of supply causing a large explosion with white smoke up to 1000 feet. It is thought to have been ammunition dump that was hit. On withdrawing, a large South of Jetty "A" was strafed, after which, Lt Gates flew North with the intention of reassembling the Group at ENOLE BAY. Just North of ILOCARITA A/D he received a report that a 499th plane was down in the Bay; he returned to NASILE BAY, searched the area, and then hastened to try to contact the Cats at BULLI BAY. He succeeded in contacting them and they replied that they would return to NASILE BAY.

2. In No. 2 position, Lt Hughes covered the area along the shore. He released his bombs near Jetty "B", and saw that at least 75% of them hit in the warehouse area - the remainder were probably in the water. He strafed barracks in the area, saw several small fires started, and strafed several barges on withdrawal to the right.

3. Lt Zimmerman, flying No. 3 position in the first flight, released his bombs a short distance North of the target, but the bombs were seen to hit among buildings there. Lt Zimmerman paid particular attention to the heavy A/A position 2N (VBC Target Map; NASILE BAY - 15 20,000) strafing it viciously as he flew directly over it.

4. Lt Heissell, leading the second flight, followed the first flight across the target. Strafing heavily, he toggled out his twelve bombs through the center of the target covering the eastern half. Several of his bombs were seen to fall among warehouses but due to the delayed action fuse, the ships were away before the bombs went off. Several small fires were started by strafing.

5. Lt Pohlmann, right wingman in the second flight, dropped two bombs among buildings slightly West of the designated target and his remainder throughout the target with unobserved results.

6. Lt Bagshaw, No 3 man in the last flight, also dropped a set of two bombs just West of the target and ten along the Northern portion of the target.

7. All planes heavily strafed the entire target area.

(b) That the Japs consider the NASILE-KACE BAY area an important staging and supply base is evidenced by the heavy defenses of the area.

Heavy A/A detected, described as "moderate to intense" was reported from position 2W, while medium of like intensity and accuracy was seen coming from a position approximately 2000 yards Northwest of 2W.

As the Squadron withdrew to the right across the Bay towards KACE, heavy, very accurate and intense A/A came from known positions at GOEREA POINT. Crews stated that the Jap gunners tracked them very carefully, despite our violent evasive action and change of altitude. Two of our A/P's were holed by fire from this position. Proceeding past LOLOBATA A/D, the heavy gun positions at 2W "opened up" and fire of moderate intensity and inaccurate was received from there.

(c) Kill interception. Although our Squadron did not see the 499th plane go down, we received radio message from the 499th to the effect that one of their planes had crash landed in NASILE BAY. Kill other plane losses reported.

(d) No personnel injured.

(e) Two of our A/P's received one hole each from A/A - minor damage.

4. On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 72 X 100 lb parasasos, 4/5 second delay fuse. 7,900 X .50 calibre and 1,200 X .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   Six to ten barges and luggers in jetty area - serviceability undetermined.
   A Sugar Charlie at PEDINANG VILLAGE on East coast of KACE BAY. Possible camouflaged barge three miles Northeast of LOLOBATA A/D.

7. PHOTOS
   Photos seen confirm crews reports of bombing results.

For the Squadron Commander:

C. A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route
FFO 226-A-11  13 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 365th Bomb Group
First over target.
Time of attack: 1220/K to 1225/K
Altitude: 100 to 200 feet.
Bombing efficiency OK
• Crew report of bomb hits
• Took photos
• Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Vicinity of LOLOBATA - VBC # 719
FFO 226-4-11
13 August, 1944
500th Bomb Squadron, 345th Bomb Grp
First over target
Time of attack: 1220/K to 1225/K
Altitude of attack: 100 to 200 ft

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 920
CAS/rpb

15 August, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Primary objective: Barge sweep - West side of HALMAHERAS. Secondary: TERMINATE.
(b) Altitude: Minimum.
(c) Bomb load: Four X 500 lb demes, 4/5 second delay, per A/F.
(d) Rendezvous:
   (1) Group: Two squadrons, 501st leading, on course over SORIDO DROME.
   (2) Fighters: Two squadrons of P-38's at 2000 feet over AJOE ISLAND at 1045/1.
   (e) Attack:
      (1) A large explosion and fire with smoke rising to 2000 feet and several smaller fires were burning in the warehouse area of TERMINATE as our A/F's withdrew after a bombing and strafing attack on this important Japanese supply base by three B-25's of the 500th Squadron. Direct hits were scored on several warehouses sending debris flying high into the air.
      (2) After an unsuccessful search for shipping of some size along the West coast of the HALMAHERAS - villages, native boats and two sailboats were strafed with unobserved results - the Squadron proceeded to the secondary target, TERMINATE, where twelve 500 pound demes were dropped with the results noted above.
      (3) One of our A/F's was haled in the tail section - source of fire undetermined. Minor damage inflicted.
   (d) Time and location of:
      Takeoff: 0907/X from MONKER DROME.
      Rendezvous with fighters: 1135/X at AJOE ISLAND vicinity.
      Attack: 1230/X to 1310/X at TERMINATE and West coast of HALMAHERAS.
      Landing: 1617/X at MONKER DROME.
   (e) Route: MONKER - AJOE ISLAND - West coast of HALMAHERAS - TERMINATE - KAOK BAY - BULI BAY - AJOE ISLAND - MONKER.

2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING
(a) The 501st Squadron led the two squadron formation.
(b) The 500th Squadron was led by Capt. Mortensen, Operations Officer and consisted of flights as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/F 055 - Capt. Mortensen</td>
<td>A/F 058 - Lt. Bissell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F 059 - Lt. Hughes</td>
<td>A/F 051 - Lt. Gray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F 278 - Lt. Zimmerman</td>
<td>A/F 592 - Lt. Bagshaw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to difficulty encountered in fuel pump operation, Lt. Hughes.

-1-

C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

in A/P 059 was unable to takeoff. Near CAPE WAGOS on the "birdsmouth" of NEW GUINEA, Lt Bagshaw (A/P 592) experienced mechanical trouble and was forced to return to base. According to a set procedure, Lt Gray turned back with Lt Bagshaw to escort him back to base. This left only three planes on the mission - Capt Mortensen, Lt Zimmerman and Lt Rissell.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. Capt Mortensen led the Squadron across the lower tip of the HAMMARAS and proceeded north along the west coast searching for shipping. Finding no vessels of any size he strafed several large villages along the coast and a sailboat at BATELA with unobserved results. Skirting the eastern edge of TIDORE ISLAND he proceeded to TERNATE where he bombed the southern portion of this target crossing it on a south to north heading. Four 500 pounders were dropped among warehouses through the center of the target scoring direct hits and sending debris high into the air. He also heavily strafed this area. Turning east he crossed BOEIMA BAY, the southern portion of BAI BAY and then strafed BOELI-SERANI VILLAGE in BULI BAY. Results unobserved.

2. Lt Zimmerman, flying on Capt Mortensen's right wing, followed the flight leader up the west coast of the HAMMARAS strafing native canoes and large villages along the shore with unobserved results. He dropped four bombs and the flight leader shot two to the right of Capt Mortensen's and although they were seen to fall among buildings all results of hits were observed. He heavily strafed the target as well as BOELI-SERANI VILLAGE on north coast of BULI BAY.

3. Lt Rissell, trailing the first two planes, strafed the villages along the coast and also a sailboat at BOEINA POINT on BATJAN ISLAND with unobserved results. He dropped his bombs near the shore at TERNATE and his third one caused a large explosion with a resulting fire sending smoke to 2000 feet. He also strafed BOELI-SERANI but noted no damage.

4. Upon landing, Lt Zimmerman discovered several small calibre holes in the tail section of his A/P. Source of fire which caused these holes is unknown, although it might have come from possible light A/A at an unnamed village at 0035N-12758E.

(b) Possible light A/A, slight, from an unnamed village at 0035N-12758E.

(c) No interception. No Allied or enemy plane losses observed although P-38's were seen strafing 3/4 float planes at CAPE JANAI, results of the strafing unknown.

(d) No personnel injured.

(e) A/P 278 received several small holes in the tail section - minor damage.

4. CITATIONS

On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 12 X 500 lb demos, 4/5 second delay fuse.
Bombs returned - 8 X 500 lb demos, 4/5 second delay fuse.
5,900 X .50 and 3,850 X .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   Three large drums at MELOKOE VILLAGE at 0010S-127°W.
   Personnel with white shirts - not natives - at Semo.
   Two barges in a cove at the Northeast tip of TIDORE ISLAND - one
   loaded, the other beached.
   Well constructed wharf and buildings at TIDORE VILLAGE, which
   appeared as large as TERNATE.
   Five barges at TERNATE Government wharf.
   Two large barges or luggers in DOLAKA BAY at the Southwest end
   of DOLAKA BAY.
   Supplies and a new jetty 1500 feet long at the East end of DO-
   DINIA BAY.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   K-20 and K-21 photos received confirm crew reports of excellent
   bombing.

   For the Squadron Commander:

   CARL A. STRAUSS
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Intelligence Officer

2 Incis
   Inc1 1 - Bomb assessment
   Inc1 2 - Route
LEGEND

FFO 227-A-5  14 August 44
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp
Second over target
Time of attack: 1230/K-1310/K
Altitude of attack: 100/500'
Bombing efficiency EX
Crew report of bomb hits
† Took photos

MAP REFERENCE
TERNATE & HIRI 1:20000

CONFIDENTIAL
FFO 227-4-5  14 August 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp
Second over target
Time of attack: 1230/K-1310K
Altitude of attack: 100/500'

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Barge Sweep - West side of HALMAHERAS. Secondary: Warehouse area - Termina. (Dropped bombs here.)
   Altitude: Minimum.
   Bomb load: Four X 500 lb deme, h/5 second delay, per A/F.
   (b) Rendezvous:
      Group: Three squadrons, 500th Leading, on course over SORI-DO A/D.
      Fighters: Two squadrons of P-38's at 2000 feet over AJOE ISLAND at 1005/K.
      (c) Five B-25's of the 500th Bomb Squadron completed an unsuccessful shipping search up the West coast of the HALMAHERAS - villages and several native canoes were strafed with unobserved results - and then bombed the secondary target, Termina warehouse area, with 19 X 500 pound demolition bombs, h/5 second delay fuse. Two warehouses were destroyed by direct hits, as were several shacks in the vicinity. Two barges South of the South jetty were probably damaged by two 20 to 25 ft near misses. A well used road in the area was cratered by a bomb. A lugger, next to the South jetty, as well as the entire target area, was thoroughly strafed but results were unobserved. Black smoke covering the target was visible for 35 miles as our A/F's withdrew across DOININA and KAGO BAYS.
   (d) Time and location of:
      Takeoff: 0801/K from NOOMER DROME.
      Rendezvous with fighters:
      Attack: 1220/K to 1230/K - Termina.
      Landing: 1555/K at NOOMER DROME.
   (e) Route: BIAK - AJOE ISLAND - South tip of HALMAHERAS - TIO-DORE - Termina - DOININA BAY - KAGO BAY - AJOE ISLAND - BIAK.

2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) The 500th Squadron, led by Lt. Bissell, led the Group with the 501st and 499th following in that order.
   (b) The 500th Squadron consisted of flights as follows:
      FIRST FLIGHT  SECOND FLIGHT
      A/P 068 - Lt. Bissell    A/P 068 - Lt. Zimmerman
      A/P 059 - Lt. Hughes     A/P 051 - Lt. Gray
      A/P 592 - Lt. Landon     A/P 237 - Lt. Bagshaw
      Lt. Gray (A/P 051) turned back at 0934/K from 0005E-13238E - turret guns out - and landed at NOOMER at 1100/K.
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
(a) Lt Bissell led our Squadron of five B-25's up the West coast of the HALMARERAS from 0050H-1200E to TASKO VILLAGE at 0021H-1275H6, searching in vain for barges and luggers or larger vessels. Finding none and choosing the alternate target, the Squadron leader made a minimum altitude bombing and strafing run on the TERMATE warehouse area, releasing four 500 pounds at the target, one of which scored a direct hit on a warehouse, completely destroying it. One of the four missiles missed the target falling short on land.

2. Lt Hughes, in right wing position of the first flight, strafed TASKO VILLAGE, also a sailboat lying offshore, with unobserved results. He dropped his four bombs in the TERMATE target destroying a warehouse.

3. The second flight, led by Lt Zimmersan with Lt Bagshaw on his right wing, strafed a few villages on the West coast of the HALMARERAS before attacking TERMATE. Lt Zimmersan dropped four 500 pounds, one scoring a 25 ft near miss on a barge located one-half miles South of the South jetty. The remaining three bombs crashed into the warehouse area, scoring a direct hit on a 30' X 100' building.

4. Lt Bagshaw released three bombs scoring a 20 ft near miss on a barge close to the shore South of the South jetty with one of these and causing smoke, dust and debris to rise in the air over the warehouse area with the other two. A fourth bomb failed to release and was returned to base.

5. Lt Landon flew on Lt Bissell's left wing until approaching TERMATE. He strafed several small villages and native canoes on the sweep up the West coast of the HALMARERAS. At TERMATE he dropped behind and made a single ship run behind Lt Bissell's and Lt Zimmersan's elements, releasing three bombs in the TERMATE target. One bomb badly cratered a well-used road but smoke obscured any evaluation of other bombing results. His fourth bomb fell in the water to the North of the target.

6. All A/P's strafed the warehouse area at TERMATE with unobserved results.
(b) Crews observed flashes of possible ground fire in the TERMATE area, however, no bursts were visible.
(c) Nil interception.
One B-25 of the 501st Squadron of this Group was seen to crash and explode on land between DOMINO BAY and BOBAKE BAY at 0050H-1273R.
(d) Nil personnel injured.
(e) Nil A/P's damaged.

4. CITATIONS
On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
Bombs dropped - 19 X 500 lb demons, 1/5 second delay. Bombs returned to base - 5 X 500 lb demons, 1/5 second delay. 10,700 X .50 and 3,300 X .30 calibre ammo expended.
Narrative Report, FFO 228-A-h, continued.

6. SIGHTINGS
   A large serviceable, unloaded barge close to shore at 0040-1200Z.
   Two barges in cove on Northcentral shore of TIDORE ISLAND -
camouflaged and appeared to be serviceable.
   Two serviceable barges near shore in throat of DODINOA BAY.
   A column of dense white smoke to 2000 feet, rising from ware-
house area after withdrawal.
   Target still smoking from previous day's bombing - warehouses
appeared gutted in many instances.
   Three inch gun, pointing to sea from FORT ORANGE at TERNATE -
gun painted white.
   Small warehouses at end of jetty at East end of DODINGA BAY.
   Four or five barges and luggers in BORAGOE BAY at the Southeast
end of KACE BAY

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   K-20 and K-21 photos received confirm crew reports of excellent
bombing.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
FFO 228-A-4 
15 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp.
First over target
Time of attack: 1220/K to 1230/K
Altitude of attack: 100/1,000 ft.

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies West
V Bomber Command
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

17 August 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Grounded A/P's at MITI A/D. (ATTACKED)
       Secondary: Grounded A/P's at KAOE A/D.
       Tertiary: AJOE ISLAND.
   (b) Rendezvous:
       Group: Three squadrons, 500th leading, on course over
       OKMER at 1500 ft at 0615/K.
       Fighters: Two squadrons P-38's over AJOE ISLAND at 2000' at
       0835/K.
   (c) Attack:
       Six A/P's of the 500th Bomb Squadron reached the target and
       were the first squadron over, coming in on a heading of 320 degrees.
       A total of 1400 23 lb parafraggs were dropped, of which 38 hit through
       the center of and entire length of the dispersal area, while 36 hit in the
       water beyond the target due to failure of the automatic release. The bomb-
       ing was excellent with results as follows:
       Two twin-engine A/P's, serviceable, on the west side of the runway towards
       the North end, received direct hits. One burned fiercely, and the landing
       gear and wing of the other was seen to collapse.
       A fire with black smoke rising to 200 feet was started in the eastern
       dispersal area, 600 yards East of the Southern end of the runway. This was
       thought to be a burning A/P.
       A bomb was seen to hit 10/15 feet off the left wing of a camouflaged
       SSF on the southern dispersal lane 400 yards East of the South end of the
       runway. A SSF in this same vicinity was strafed with unobserved results.
       A large house at the Northern tip of the island and shack at the South-
       eastern end were strafed.
       Two slender columns of smoke, 400/500 feet high, on the East side of the
       runway towards the Northern end were started by strafing and were thought
       to be possible A/P's.
       A thorough strafing run was made over the entire target.
   (d) Time and location of:
       Takeoff: 0710/K (delayed)
       Rendezvous with fighters: 0930/K over AJOE IS.
       Attack: 1045/K to 1047/K - MITI A/D.
       Landing: 1155/K at OKMER.
   (e) Route: BIAK - AJOE ISLAND - CAPE LELAI - MITI. Return:
       CAPE LELAI - AJOE ISLAND - OKMER.
2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) The 500th Squadron, led by Lt. Dick, led the Group with the 501st and the 499th following in that order.
   (b) The 500th Squadron consisted of flights as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 669 - Lt Dick</td>
<td>A/P 278 - Lt Zimmerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 068 - Lt Gray</td>
<td>A/P 051 - Lt Hughes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 592 - Lt Landon</td>
<td>A/P 034 - Lt Pohman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) Lt Dick led the Group as well as the Squadron on this strike which was of primary importance not only from a standpoint of future operations but also due to the fact that the new R-2 parachute rack was being used for the first time by our Group. Lt Dick approached the target from the Southeast and went over the dispersal areas on a heading of 320 degrees, six A/P's abreast. Due to a delayed takeoff, the " heavies" had just finished their bombing run when our squadron came on the target. Lt Dick started releasing his bombs as his plane came over the Southern end of the dispersal area, "stringing out" 60 in all through the target. Twelve (12) of his bombs hung up and were returned to base. Strafing was accomplished on the entire run over the island, and two slender columns of smoke, possibly burning A/P's, on the Eastern side of the runway were seen from the rear of Lt. Dick's plane, as a result of his strafing.

2. Lt Gray, flying in No. 2 position, abreast Lt. Dick's plane, released all 72 of his bombs over the target with unobserved results, and strafed the area, including a large house on the Northern tip of the island, thoroughly from South to North.

3. Lt Landon in No. 3 position, covered the extreme Western portion of the target. Thirty-six (36) of his bombs were released over the target, one of which was seen to land 10/15 feet off the left wing of a camouflaged SSF on the Southern dispersal lane 400 yards East of the South end of the runway. A SSF in this same vicinity was strafed with unobserved results, as were snags in the Southern part of the island. Lt Landon was forced to release his remaining 36 bombs over the water due to failure of his automatic release.

4. Lt Zimmerman led the second flight of 3 planes which flew abreast the first flight. His 72 bombs were well "stringed out" through the Eastern portion of the dispersal areas, although his results were unobserved. The area was strafed as well.

5. Lt Hughes, covering the Eastern side of the target dropped all 72 of his bombs and started a fire with black smoke up to 200 ft in the dispersal area 600 yards East of the Southern end of the strip.

6. Lt Pohman in No. 3 position of the second flight, dropped his full quota of 72 bombs in the target and saw two twin-engine A/P's on the West side of the strip hit by his bombs, one catching fire and burning fiercely, and on the second one the wing and landing gear were seen to collapse.

7. The target was thoroughly strafed by all planes, and all crews agreed that their bombs had covered the area very well, but due to the parachute and the delay on the bombs, it was difficult to observe results.

   (b) One burst of medium A/A burst in front of Lt Gray's plane as he crossed the Southeastern shore of the island. Light, moderate, accurate fire was received from unknown positions as our planes withdrew from the North end of the island.
3. (c) Mil interception.
   (d) Mil personnel injured
   (e) One of our A/P's was holed by light A/A. Damage was slight and of a minor nature.

4. CITATIONS
   On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 1 x 20 x 23 lb parafrags.
   Bombs returned - 12 x 23 lb parafrags.
   6,800 x .50, and 800 x .30 caliber ammunition expended.

6. SIGHTINGS (For exact location refer to Bomb Assessment Map attached)
   Large fires up to 500 ft. on the NE corner of island, result of B-24's bombing.
   3 SSF, 2 of which were burning.
   1 SSF, appeared to be intact.
   A fire, 200 ft. high black smoke, in unoccupied A/A pit.
   Large fuel fire, probably dump, 2000 ft from center of island.
   Fire on SW shore of island, result of heavyes bombing.
   At least 200 fuel drums along shore under palm trees at Northern end of island.
   One burning A/P in North center of island.
   2 SSF in central dispersal area, serviceability undetermined.
   1 u/SSF at South end, slightly East of strip.
   1 SSF with tricycle landing gear East of South end of strip.
   Fuel drums (approx. 20) on Southeastern shore.
   1 barge in vicinity of Tobe & Village.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Photo prints received give a good coverage of our run, but do not show many results of the attack. Most of the bombs were still in the air when the photos were taken. The photos show, once again, many serviceable planes which are standing in long grass with no apparent tracks leading to them. Two burning planes are seen in the photos in the central dispersal area.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb Assessment
Incl 2 - Route
FFO 229-A-4
16 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sq., 315th Bomb Grp. (M)
First over target.
Time of Attack: 10h5/K to 10h7/K
Altitude: 125/200 feet
Bombing efficiency: OK.
Took photos
T Other planes
MAP REF. Miti A/D Specials
Target Map 1:20000

Note: 38h X 23 lb parafrags dropped in area outlined by red dotted line.
Results denoted by:
Sightings by:

MITI ISLAND

large house
struck
fire
fuel drum
direct hits on
2 T/F A/F

large fuel fire

air near

Miti

fire

fuel drums

Nasaka Island

Gosamuris 1.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

18 August, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on FFO 230-A-1, Performed by 500th Bomb Squad-
ron, 17 August, 1944. Objective: Grounded planes - NAMLEA
TOWNSHIP DROME. Secondary: BOELA Oil storage area.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Primary objective: Grounded planes, NAMLEA TOWNSHIP DROME.
       Secondary: Oil storage area - BOELA.
       Altitude: Minimum.
       Bomb load: 72 X 23 lb parafrag per A/P.
   (b) Rendezvous:
       Group: Three squadrons of the 345th Group and one squadron
       of the 38th Group on course over SCINDO A/D.
       Fighters: Two squadrons of P-38's, 2000 feet over PISANG
       ISLAND at 1100/K.
   (c) Attacks:
       1. Six A/P's of our squadron reached the target - NAMLEA
          TOWNSHIP A/D, cutting over the Eastern end of the strip, six ships abreast
          on a Southwest heading. We were second over the target dropping a total
          of 132 X 23 lb parafrag, of which, 110 covered the dispersal areas and
          the strip in the Eastern half of the A/D. The remaining 22 parafrags
          fell in the water, ten East of the target and 12 just offshore at NAMLEA
          TOWN. Bombs were seen to land among shacks in the Northeast dispersal area
          but further specific damage could not be ascertained due to the relatively
          slow descent of the type bombs employed.

       2. A personnel area and small native type sailboat as well
          as the target area was thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. A
          tarpaulin-covered shack on a lone unnamed island just offshore at NAMLEA
          TOWN, was peppered by a short burst from one strafner. Grayish-white
          smoke rising to 100 feet covered the A/D area as our A/P's withdrew,
          ample proof of the excellent coverage attainable with the new R-2 frag
          rack.

   (d) Time and location of:
       Takeoff: 0905/K from MOKMIR DROME.
       Rendezvous with fighters: 1005/K at 1500 feet over PISANG.
       Attack: 12h6/K to 12h7/K - NAMLEA.
       Landing: 1610/K at MOKMIR DROME.
   (e) Route: BIAK - WARREN - CAPE BIRI - PISANG ISLAND - NAMLEA -
       BIAK.

2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) The 99th Squadron led the Group with the 500th, 501st and
       a squadron of the 38th Group following in that order.
   (b) Lt Thomas, veteran combat pilot, led the 500th Squadron
       which consisted of two flights composed of three airplanes each as
       follows:

   - 1 -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 669 – Lt Thomas</td>
<td>A/P 278 – Lt Zimmerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 161 – Lt Gray</td>
<td>A/P 051 – Lt Hughes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 059 – Lt Pohlsan</td>
<td>A/P 237 – Lt Bagshaw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. Lt Thomas in A/P 669 led our formation to the scheduled fighter rendezvous at PISANG ISLAND and then to NAMLEA TOWNSHIP AIRDROME, where the A/P's pulled into a line abreast for the bombing-strafing attack. Our planes crossed the target on a Southwesterly heading at 12h6/E at about 100/200 feet. K-20, K-21 and K-22 cameras went into action to assure photographic record of the attack.

   2. Lt Pohlsan, on the extreme left of the six ship front, deposited his 72 parafraggs across the extreme South Eastern tip of the A/D. He strafed a tarpaulin covered shack located on a small island just off shore. The shack was peppered with bullets.

   3. The next three A/P's to the right in the formation, piloted by Lt Thomas, Gray and Bagshaw dropped a total of 216 parafraggs in three parallel rows of 72 bombs each, attaining excellent coverage in the Northeast dispersal area. Lt Gray strafed the personnel area near the shore of CAPE KARBAU, but no results were noted.

   4. Lt Zimmerman, second flight leader and piloting the A/P second from the right in the attack formation, started releasing his bombs early and ten of them fell in the water East of the target. However, the remaining 62 units thumped into a personnel area on the East coast and continued to fall into the dispersal area in the Northcentral sector of the drone. A number of bombs were seen to sligate among shacks in this area, but specific damage could not be defined by the crew. Lt Zimmerman strafed the personnel area North of the drone and a small native sailing craft offshore at NAMLEA TOWNSHIP. Occupants of the craft were dressed in white and fell to the bottom of the vessel during the brief attack.

   5. Lt Hughes dropped 60 of his bombs ripping a path through the Western extremity of our assigned half of the airdrome area. Several parafraggs were seen to fall among shacks just North of the center of the strip. Twelve bombs fell out considerably later and dropped in the water off NAMLEA TOWNSHIP.

   6. Crews agreed the bombing coverage was the best they had seen in this theatre but smoke and distance attained after release of the slowly descending parafraggs made observations of specific damage practically impossible. All A/P's strafed the target area with unobserved results.

   (b) Light, slight and inaccurate A/A came from 031600E - 1270700E. Medium, slight, inaccurate at A/P level bursting 1500 feet North of the center of the strip. Medium, moderate, inaccurate fire received from CAPE WAT on the South side of KAJILLI BAY.

   (c) Nil interception. Nil Allied or enemy planes observed destroyed.

   (d) Nil personnel injured.

   (e) Nil A/P's damaged.

4. CITATIONS
   On the basis of details available at the time of preparing this

report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 632 X 23 lb parafrags.  
   8,600 X .50 and 1,300 X .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   (All map references are to NAMLEA SPECIAL TARGET MAP, 1:20,000)
   Bevetsmens in area all well camouflaged blending with the terrain.
   Strip appeared serviceable, although area looked deserted.
   Unidentified wrecked A/P in water just offshore of CAPE KARBAU.
   One serviceable Tonky two SSF, serviceability undetermined, two
   T/E engine bombers and a light, green A/P, type unknown were seen in the
   drome area. Buildings in town area appeared in good condition
   An A/A pit with two guns, possibly dummy; one pointing North-
   east the other to the West, not firing at 12705x3x - 031620x.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   K-20, K-21 and K-22 photos were taken. However, photographs re-
   ceived by this Squadron fail to reveal any actual damage inflicted by the
   attack. Considerable underground excavation in the vicinity of the South
   side of the strip is visible. The buildings in NAMLEA TOWN appear to be
   in good repair, as reported by the crews

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment.
   Incl 2 - Route.
FFO 230-A-1 17 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 315th Bomb Group
Second over target at 100/200 feet
Time of attack: 12:14 E to 12:17 E
Bombing efficiency EX
- Took photos
- Other plane

MAP REFERENCE
NAMLEA SPECIAL TARGET MAP, 1:20,000
LEGEND

FFO 230-A-1  17 August 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Second over target

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West,
V Bomber Command

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Three squadrons of six planes each of the 345th Group, and one six-plane squadron of the 38th Group, leading, were ordered to attack NEO and BAINIS VILLAGES in the TALAUD ISLANDS, August 20, 1944. Two squadrons were instructed to bomb and strafe in three-ships abreast formation at minimum altitude, warehouses in BAINIS VILLAGE, while the remaining two units of our group were assigned NEO VILLAGE and the warehouses there.

The secondary target was HALLIFORD VILLAGE, 5 miles South of KAOE, in the HALIFORD ISLANDS. The 500th Bomb Squadron's load was twelve (12) 100 lb parado bombs, 8/15 seconds delay fuse. Alerted at 0555/K for takeoff at 0655/K, the squadron was to assume second place in Group formation and proceed direct to the target, returning via the same route.

(b) The squadron and group assembled shortly after a 0700/K takeoff and proceeded direct to the target area - TALAUD ISLANDS. One A/P of this squadron failed to takeoff because of mechanical trouble. The remaining five A/P's completed the mission.

(c) NEO VILLAGE and jetty were hit hard with 50 X 100lb parado bombs, 8/15 second delay fuse. A large lugger or Sugar Charlie at the East end of the jetty was probably damaged by a 20/25 foot near miss by one of those bombs. Buildings in the North end of NEO were probably damaged by the 16 bombs exploding in that area and a 20 X 60 ft. warehouse received a direct hit there. A small explosion at the North end of NEO, 100 yards East of the jetty, sent white smoke and glittering pieces of sheet metal about 100 feet into the air. The aforementioned lugger (or Sugar Charlie) at the jetty, another possibly serviceable barge nearby, and warehouses and buildings in NEO VILLAGE thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. NEO was enveloped by gray-white smoke, 100 feet high, as our A/P's withdrew. One A/P experienced radio trouble over the target, dropped ten bombs later on huts in ADAMIT VILLAGE, 1 mile South of NEO, with unobserved results. K-21 cameras were turned on over the target.

(d) As our squadron turned West across TALAUD I., one unidentified, twin engine, double rudder A/P made a half-hearted pass from 8 o'clock from 1000 yards, under one of our A/P's. The gunner, unable to identify the markings of the A/P as Allied, fired a warning burst. No enemy or Allied A/P's were shot down.

(e) Takeoff: FROM MOKMER at 0650/K to 0700/K. Rendezvous: NIL. Attack: 1118/K to 1122/K at 50 to 200 feet. Land: 1530/K to 1550/K at MOKMER, BIAC.

(f) Route: MOKMER direct to TALAUD ISLANDS. Return: TALAUD ISLANDS direct to MOKMER.

CONFIDENTIAL
2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) Our Group was led by the 823rd Squadron of the 36th Group,
       followed by the 500th Squadron, 499th and 501st. Lt Bissell led our Squadron
       which was second over BEO. The squadron was composed in flights as follows:

       **FIRST FLIGHT**                         **SECOND FLIGHT**
       A/P 040 - Lt Bissell                    A/P 878 - Lt Zimmerman
       A/P 034 - Lt Hardwell                   A/P 592 - Lt Landon
       A/P 237 - Lt Bagshaw

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) Lt Bissell led our squadron direct to the East coast of
       KARAKELANG ISLAND, of the TALAUD Group. Following the 823rd Squadron of the
       36th Group in our group formation, our squadron cut across to the West coast of
       KARAKELANG ISLAND, about 20 miles North of BEO on the west coast, then on a
       Southerly heading, in three planes and two planes abreast formation, cut across
       the target at minimum altitude at 1118 feet. The second flight of our squadron
       was composed of two planes abreast. Both flights, with the exception of one A/P,
       released their bombs in an area bordering both sides of the road running
       Southeast through the town and extending from the jetty at the North end of the
       town to the Southeast corner of the village. The bombing was excellent. Lt
       Hardwell, flying right wing position, first flight, dropped two bombs on a
       large lugger or possible Sugar Charlie at the east side of the jetty, scoring an
       approximate 20/25 feet near miss, probably damaging the vessel. His remaining
       ten bombs were strung across the village with unobserved results.

       Lt Bissell, squadron leader, flying center position in the first flight,
       released two paradesos ineffectively in the water near the jetty, after which
       his release failed to function. Continuing a strafing attack across the target,
       Lt Bissell finally parted with the remaining ten bombs over TABIT VILLAGE, 4
       miles South of BEO, but results were unobserved.

       Lt Bagshaw, flying the left wing position, first flight, dropped his
       twelve paradesos among buildings in the North end of the town just South of
       the jetty but results were generally undetermined.

       Trailing the first flight by a short distance, Lt Zimmerman, in right wing
       position, released twelve bombs across the small town, scoring a direct hit on
       the corner of a 20 x 60-foot warehouse just South of the jetty. Further
       observations were not made.

       Lt Landon, in left wing position and completing the second flight, dropped
       his bomb load in the same general area. One of his bombs caused a small
       explosion under the tree cover in the Northern part of the town and about 100
       yards East of the jetty. Pieces of glittering sheet metal, debris and white
       smoke rose approximately 100 feet in the air as a result of the explosion.
       Foliage, white-gray smoke to 100 feet, and dust hindered crews in making observa-
       tions of their bombing results. All A/P's thoroughly strafed the target area,
       and Lt Bagshaw observed his bullets scoring direct hits on the lugger at the
       jetty and another possibly serviceable barge near the jetty.

   (b) As the first flight approached the jetty area at the North end
       of BEO VILLAGE, flashes of what was classified as slight and inaccurate machine
       gun fire, were observed in the immediate beach vicinity of the jetty.
   (c) Nil enemy interception. Nil enemy or Allied planes observed
       destroyed.
   (d) Nil personnel injured.
   (e) Nil A/P's damaged.
h. CITATIONS
   On the basis of details available at the time of writing this report, there were, in the opinion of this officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 60 X 100 lb parademo bombs, 8/15 seconds delay fuse. 7,100 X .50 and 3,200 X .30 calibre ammo expended. (per armament)

6. SIGHTINGS
   An A/P, probably a Topsy, painted green with red roundels on wings and fuselage, was seen lying in shallow water in coral reef approx. 900 yards due South of BEO jetty.
   Four large buildings at North section of BEO, approx. 250 yards due East of the South end of the jetty.
   Seven warehouses-type buildings on Western side of BEO, South of the jetty, and approx. 50 small shacks or houses scattered under trees throughout the area.
   BEO appeared well-kept but no other signs of military activity were observed.
   White smoke and bomb dust were seen rising from target from preceding squadron's bombing.

   At 110/8 from 1000 feet as our A/P's approached BEO from North, one crew observed a twin-engine A/P, identified as a Topsy, approaching RAINIS on a heading of 180 degrees. Simultaneously the crew sighted an unidentified SSF flying just below cloud level on a Northerly heading toward RAINIS. As these two A/P's approached one another, Topsy made a 180 degree turn, SSF effected a 360 degree turn, then both A/P's in relatively close formation, proceeded North.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATIONS
   K-21 prints confirm crew reports of an abandoned Topsy on beach South of BEO.

   For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

2 Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb Assessment
   Incl.2 - Route
LEGEND

FFO 233-A-1 20 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Second over target at 50/200 ft.
Time of attack: 1118/K to 1122/K
Bombing Eff. EX.
T Took photos
Tother planes
Crew report of bomb hits
MAP REFERENCE
Beo and Vicinity sketch plan
(TALAUD ISLAND)

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

(a) Three squadrons of the 345th Group and one squadron from the 38th Group were ordered to bomb and strafe targets on KAOE AIRDROME in the BALMAHERAS on the morning of 21 August, 1944. There was no secondary objective. The targets assigned were grounded A/P's and a possible fuel dump. Carrying a load of 72 x 23 lb parafrags in the R-2 racks, the bombs were to be released at an altitude of 100 feet, our planes were to proceed to AJOE ISLAND, rendezvous there with the fighters - two squadrons of P-38's - then proceed direct to the target. Alerted at the planes at 0710/K for an 0810/K takeoff, the 500th Squadron was to assume lead of the Group formation.

(b) The Squadron and Group assembled shortly after takeoff and proceeded to AJOE ISLAND, where rendezvous was made with the fighters at 1020/K at 2000 feet. From there, the formation proceeded direct to the target.

(c) Six A/P's reached the target, coming overland South of DORO VILLAGE and making a bombing and strafing run from North to South. Flying across the target, six planes abreast, the first flight of three A/P's dropped 216 x 23 lb parafrags on its assigned target - dispersal areas of Runway 2. Starting at a point 1500 feet North of the runway over the known A/A positions, 1/4 of these bombs were dropped from there through the dispersal area on the Western side of the strip falling near the A/A positions and among sheds near the tower. Seventy-two (72) bombs of this flight were dropped on the Eastern edge of the strip. Other than bomb bursts there were no observed results. The strafing run was likewise started North of the target, and continued down the length of the drome, with the control tower on the West side of the strip, an unserviceable SSF and a twin-engined A/P South of the tower all receiving their full quota of 50 calibre "slugs."

Meanwhile, the second flight of three A/P's made their run farther to the East - covering a coastal strip which included a reported fuel dump at GOROED and the village of KAOE. A total of 216 parafrags were dropped; 180 of them covering an area from a point 500 feet North of GOROED, through villages both sides of the M/T main road, to a point 2000 feet South of the village along the main road to KAOE. A small oil fire was started approximately 1500 feet South of GOROED and 300 feet East of the KA0E road. Two grass sheds at the North end of GOROED received direct hits. Thirty-six bombs fell out North of KAOE VILLAGE with unobserved results. A lugger tied to the North side of the jetty at KAOE was strafed as was the entire target area, including GOROED and KAOE villages, with unobserved results.
Narrative Report, FFO 234-A, continued.

(d) Time and location of:
Takeoff: 0810/K from MOKMER DROME.
Group assembly: 0828/K, South of MOKMER DROME.
Fighter rendezvous: 1020/K at AJOE ISLAND.
Attack: 1140/K to 1142/K at KA05 A/B.
Landing: 1500/K at MOKMER DROME.

(e) Route: MOKMER - AJOE ISLAND - North of CAPE LEILAI - TARGET - CAPE LEILAI - AJOE ISLAND - MOKMER.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING
(a) The 500th Squadron led the Group formation, with Capt Mortensen as Group leader. The 501st, 499th and 823rd squadrons followed in that order.
(b) Flights of the 500th were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 055</td>
<td>A/P 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt Mortensen</td>
<td>Lt Zimmerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 068</td>
<td>A/P 034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Bardwell</td>
<td>Lt Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 237</td>
<td>A/P 592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Bagshaw</td>
<td>Lt Landon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
(a) Capt Mortensen, leading the Group, carried as turret gunner, Captain den Ouden of the NEI Airforces. As leader, he made an excellent approach to the target, first making a feint toward LOLOBATA, then turning West, coming over the coast just South of DORO VILLAGE. Beginning his strafing run as he approached from the North, he released his first bombs approximately 1500 feet North of Runway 2, trying to hit the heavy A/A position there, then continued to toggle out his bombs as he made a slightly diagonal run toward the West side of the runway. No fires were started but bombs were seen to drop in the vicinity of shacks near the tower on the West side.

2. Lt Bardwell, in No. 2 position, flew a tight formation on Capt Mortensen's right wing, covering a similar path and toggling his bombs in approximately the same locations. This crew, too, could see no fires started, but did strafe the control tower and adjacent shacks and saw their tracers enter these buildings.

3. Lt Bagshaw in the No. 3 slot, flew down the Eastern edge of the strip dropping his 72 parafrag in this area - also with results unobserved. He strafed down the length of the strip in an attempt to knock out the medium A/A position reported there.

4. The second flight was led by Lt Zimmerman and its assigned target was a reported fuel dump in and around GOROEA VILLAGE - along the coast just North of KA0E. He released his parafrag 500 feet North of GOROEA and strung them through the reported dump area to a point 2000 feet South of the village. A small oil fire was started 1500 feet South of the village - 300 feet East of the KA0E road.

5. Lt Thompson, in No. 2, covered approximately the same area as did Lt Zimmerman. He did, however, score direct hits with his bombs on two grass shacks at the North end of GOROEA.

6. Lt Landon, Number three man, released half his bombs (36) near GOROEA and his remaining 36 at KA0E VILLAGE. He strafed a lugger at the jetty in KA0E.

7. All planes in the second flight strafed throughout the run, then continuing South, reformed with the first flight over KA0E BAY, turned to the left, passing the LOLOBATA PENINSULA on withdrawal.

(b) There were four to five bursts of heavy A/A, behind and 500 feet above our planes as they withdrew through KAOE BAY — probably coming from known positions.
(c) MIL interception. MIL Allied or enemy plane losses reported.
(d) MIL personnel injured.
(e) MIL A/F’s damaged.

4. CITATIONS
On the basis of details available at the time of writing this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
Bombs dropped — 432 X 23 lb parafrag.
1,800 X .30 calibre and 9,200 X .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
A probably serviceable Topay in clearing on BEOBALE ISLAND, 11 miles North of KAOE — red roundsels clearly visible.
Target area: Heavy A/A revetment, 1500 feet South of target, looked abandoned; guns in heavy A/A position North of Runway 2; two dumps trucks in dispersal area near North end of strip; two graders on West side of strip near North end; one SSF in revetment at center of dispersal area West of Runway 2; one truck and one car on East side of strip near center; a gas truck on East side on South end of Runway 2; one parked N/T, loaded with large boxes, just West of KAOE VILLAGE on main road to Runway 1.
Ten to 15 barges and luggers in WASILE BAY.
One T/E A/F parked in woods at East end of LOLOBATA DROME.

7. Excellent photo coverage of the run over Runway 2 was obtained. Bombs are seen to have probably hit in an A/A position North of the strip. While other bombs are seen to be hitting in the vicinity of the control tower in the center of the West side of the runway, no definite results of damages are shown. The runway appears serviceable, and trucks and a roller indicate activity there.

For the Commanding Officer:

Carl A. Strauss
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route
21 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Group
First over target at 50/150 feet
Time of attack: 11h00 to 11h20
Bombing efficiency EX
T Took photos
T Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
KACE No. 601 Target Sketch - V Bomcom
Scale: Approx 1 inch to 1000 feet
East Indies West - A Bomber Command

MAP REFERENCE

TIME OF ATTACK 1140/1 to 1142/1
First over target at 00/100 L.T.
500lb Bomb Sg. 250th Bomb Gp
PPO 234-4-1 31 August 1944
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (V)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

PAH/rpb
25 August 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Three squadrons of six B-25's each of the 345th Bomb Group were ordered to attack an enemy convoy Northwest of MANADO, CELEBES, 24 August, 1944. In the event contact with the convoy could not be made, the secondary target was to be the Southermost warehouse area at LEMBEH STRAIT. The 500th Squadron bombload was four X 500 lb demolition bombs, 4/5 second delay fuse, per A/P. Staging from NOEMFOOR ISLAND for this particular mission, our Squadron was alerted there at 0700/K for a 0800/K takeoff. The Group was to pass over SANSAPOR to alert two squadrons of fighters, the Group's cover, for takeoff, then the entire attacking force was to rendezvous at MAJEE ISLAND, West of the HALMAHERAS. Continuous listening watch was to be maintained by the Group for FBW's position reports on the convoy. In the event the convoy could not be contacted the Group was to attack the secondary target from minimum altitude. Shipping on the West side of the HALMAHERAS, opposite GALEIA was assigned as tertiary. All planes were to return directly to MOKEWE A/D at BIAK, the Group's base.

   (b) The Squadron led by Captain Mortensen, took its position at the head of the formation shortly after an 0800/K takeoff from NOEMFOOR, and leading the 501st and 494th Squadrons in that order, proceeded direct to MAJEE ISLAND making rendezvous with two squadrons of fighters as ordered. After an uneventful sea search from 0930N-12520E to North of BANGKA ISLAND, the Group swung to a southerly heading along the West coast of BANGKA in preparation for an attack on the LEMBEH STRAIT target, Northeast coast of the CELEBES.

   (c) 1. A Sugar Charlie was encountered in BANGKA STRAIT between BANGKA ISLAND and the mainland of the CELEBES. Our Squadron strafed the boat, releasing one bomb which was thought to have bounced off the vessels deck carrying away some of the superstructure. However, photographs of this attack show that this bomb entered amidships and went through the vessel, causing a large hole in the hull at the water line which would have definitely sunk the ship.

   2. Our planes broke formation to pair up and then cut across CAPE POSLISAN, strafing and setting afire a very spacious house two miles North of RINONDORAN VILLAGE. A certain element of confusion apparently existed in the pilots minds for 16 X 500 pound demolition were dropped on buildings in RINONDORAN by four A/P's, scoring direct hits marked by heavy white smoke as our A/P's withdrew. The town was thoroughly strafed with no further results reported.

   3. The Squadron, flying two ships abreast in trail, approached the assigned secondary target, warehouse areas at LEMBEH STRAIT,
after completing a strafing attack along the coast from RINONDORAN to the PRANO RIVER mouth. At this point the leading pair of A/P's, sighting a mine layer in the middle of the strait, but finding the terrain making any approach on it impossible, veered sharply to the west then South across LEMBEH STRAIT at its Southwestern entrance. Six bombs were dropped by these two A/P's, four missing the Southermost warehouse area and two missing a large Sugar Charlie or possible Sugar Baker, anchored offshore of LEMBEH ISLAND at the Southwest entrance to the Strait. Both targets and two luggers there were strafed, possibly damaging the SB.

4. Meanwhile, the remaining four A/P's of the Squadron charged over the Northernmost built-up area on the CARLEBES shore at the North entrance to LEMBEH STRAIT, strafing the entire area. All A/P's veered sharply to the East over LEMBEH ISLAND.

5. The Squadron encountered heavy, slight, inaccurate fire from a position 5000 feet North of the target at LEMBEH STRAIT and from the CM in the Strait. Slight inaccurate W/O fire was received from the Sugar Charlie in BANGKA STRAIT. One A/P received a few holes of approx. 30 calibre fire through the bombardiers crawlway and a two man life raft temporarily stored there was punctured in several places. Numerous white puffs were noted just at tree level along the East side of LEMBEH ISLAND.

6. One bomb was returned to base. All A/P's returned direct to WOKKER.

(d) There was no interception and no Allied or enemy planes were lost.

(e) Takeoff: From NORMFOOR at 0330/K to 0305/K.
Rendezvous: With two squadrons of fighters at MAJOE ISLAND at 2300 feet at 1115/K.
Attack: Approximately 1210/K to 1230/K at minimum altitude.
Landing: At WOKKER from 1610/K to 1700/K.

(f) Route: NORMFOOR to MAJOE to 0030N-12520E to BANGKA ISLAND to RINONDORAN to LEMBEH STRAIT to WOKKER.

2. PILOTS, PILOTS OF THE SOUTH IN THE ATTACK

Captain Mortensen, veteran leader of many S/P raids, led our Squadron and Group to the target. The 50th was composed of two flights of three A/P's each as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 055 - Capt. Mortensen
A/P 592 - Lt Lay
A/P 273 - Lt Thompson

SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 051 - Lt Barney
A/P 161 - Lt Bardwell
A/P 065 - Lt Hughes

For the attack the A/P's broke off in two ship elements as follows:

FIRST ELEMENT
055-Capt. Mortensen
278-Lt Thompson

SECOND ELEMENT
051-Lt Barney
161-Lt Bardwell

THIRD ELEMENT
592-Lt Lay
065-Lt Hughes

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. Capt. Mortensen led our Squadron and Group to the scheduled fighter rendezvous point, then West to 0030N-12520E, North to BANGKA ISLAND and finally on a southerly heading to BANGKA STRAIT, CAPE POULISAN, RINONDORAN VILLAGE and LEMBEH STRAITS.

2. Capt. Mortensen and Lt Thompson, the first two ship element of the striking force, bore down on a Sugar Charlie at BANGKA STRAIT.

Capt Mortensen dropped one 500 pounder on the vessel's deck and although crews reported that the bomb bounced off, photographs of the A/P's bombing taken by Capt Mortensen and Lt Thompson's ships, prove beyond a doubt that the bomb penetrated the Sugar Charlie's deck, tearing through the vessel's port side leaving a gaping hole at the water line, surely causing the boat to sink, as was reported later. Both A/P's proceeded South to CAPE POKILAN where Capt Mortensen strafed a large European type house, setting it ablaze. Both planes encountered some heavy inaccurate A/A from a reported light cruiser (later identified by photo interpretation as a minelayer) in the center of LEMBEH STRAIT, as they approached the Southernmost warehouse area at the Southwest entrance to the Strait. Terrain was not suitable for an effective minimum altitude attack and after considerable difficulty Capt Mortensen finally cut across the target on a Southerly heading dropping three bombs, all of them missing the Southernmost warehouse area. Lt Thompson dropped one bomb at the same area but it also missed, falling in the water. In a matter of seconds Lt Thompson was attacking again, dropping two 500 pounders at a Sugar Charlie lying off LEMBEH ISLAND, at the Southwest entrance to LEMBEH STRAIT. Both bombs fell over skipping onto the island's shore and exploding with nil apparent results. All targets mentioned and the coastal area from RINONDOoran to the PRANG RIVER mouth were thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. The SB or SC was possibly damaged by strafing.

3. The remaining four A/P's, paired in two ship elements, strafed the disabled and sinking Sugar Charlie in BANGKA STRAIT and saw it sink beneath the surface as a result of the bombing. They continued South to RINONDOoran VILLAGE where Lts Barney and Bardwell, piloting planes of the second element of the Squadron, released eight 500 pounders in the town area, scoring direct hits on buildings and starting several small fires with dense white smoke to about 200 feet. Lts Hughes and Lay in the last element dropped another eight quarter-tonners on the same village with unobserved results. The four A/P's continued South strafing the coastline to the PRANG RIVER mouth. At this point the minelayer in LEMBEH STRAIT opened fire. Both elements then cut across the Northernmost built up area at the Northeast entrance to LEMBEH STRAIT and strafed installations there. All four pilots strafed RINONDOoran VILLAGE but results of all the strafing were unobserved.

4. Capt Mortensen gathered his Squadron East of the North CELEBES coast and the Group proceeded direct to base at WONDER. All planes landed safely.

(b) A/A was classified as heavy, slight and inaccurate from a heavy position 5000 feet North of the target at LEMBEH STRAIT and from the minelayer. Slight, inaccurate to accurate W/G fire was noted coming from the Sugar Charlie in BANGKA STRAIT.

(c) Nil interception. Nil Allied or enemy planes losses observed.

(d) Nil personnel injured.

(e) A/P 276, flown by Lt Thompson, was holed in the fuselage by W/G fire causing minor damage. Several bullets entered the fuselage at the bombardier's crawl way puncturing a two man life raft temporarily stored there.

4. CITATIONS

On the basis of details available at the time of submitting this

report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 23 x 500 lb demo, 4/5 second delay fuse.
   Bombs returned - 1 x 500 lb demo, 4/5 second delay fuse.
   1,000 x .50 and 7,300 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS
   Two Sugar Charlies at PASIR POETH jetty and one barge moving North nearby at Southwest end of KAOE BAY.
   Two serviceable barges, excellent jetty and many red-roofed buildings at RINONDURAN.
   One minelayer (reported in final as light cruiser), a possible DD, a Fox Uncle, a Fox Dare Charlie and a small unidentified vessel, a fire, in LEMBEH STRAIT.
   Four float planes on CELEBES shore in LEMBEH STRAIT.
   Tents, numerous piles of stores and well-used roads indicating heavy activity in LEMBEH STRAIT AREA.
   Well used road, lined with supplies, running Southeast from target to KATOKAMBO VILLAGE.
   Three very large camouflaged barges next to jetty at BOBANE BAY at the Southwest end of KAOE BAY.
   A very large fire with black smoke up to 5000 feet at LOKOBAT PORTICUSA.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   K-21 photos cover a/P O55's attack on the Sugar Charlie at BANG-KA STRAIT. A jagged hole, amidships, at the waterline on the port side of the vessel is clearly visible.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

2 - Incis
   Inc1 - BOM assessment
   Inc2 - Route
LEGEND

FPO 237-A-1 24 Aug 44
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Group
First over target at 50/150 feet
Time of attack: 1210/K - 1230/K
Bombing efficiency EX
I Took photos
O Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
MANADO, CELEBES 1:200,000

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

(a) Three squadrons of the 345th Group and one squadron of the 386th Group, each with six A/P's, were ordered to attack KAOE TOWN and Target LX (KAOE Target Map) in the HALMAHERAS on 29 August, 1944. The secondary target was MAREKA VILLAGE, on the mainland just opposite MITI ISLAND, also in the HALMAHERAS. The target was to be strafed and bombed at minimum altitude with 12 x 100 lb paradesmos per A/P. Our Squadron was alerted at 0730/1, for a 0740/1 takeoff from MOOKER A/D. There was to be no fighter cover for this strike.

(b) The Squadron and Group assembled shortly after a 0740/1 takeoff two miles South of MOOKER DROME and proceeded direct to the target area - the HALMAHERAS. Our squadron was in fourth position in the Group formation, which was led by the 501st, then the 459th and 822nd (38th Group).

(c) Six A/P's of this Squadron reached the target and on a heading from North to South made a single bombing and strafing pass. Our particular target assigned was a reported fuel dump in the vicinity of GOROEKA, designated as Target LX on the KAOE Target Map, 1:20,000. Seventy-two (72) x 100 lb paradesmos were trailed over this area, starting just North of GOROEKA and extending through the length of the village area. Five or six small separate columns of grayish-black smoke up to 200 feet were started, causing the crews to think there might possibly be motor oil stored in the area. The pilots of the second flight, who flew through the bomb dust of the first flight, reported their windshields covered with an oily film; but they also reported seeing no signs of the heavy black smoke that usually denotes fuel. Bombs were seen to fall among five huts at the Northeast end of GOROEKA, probably destroying them. In general, however, the results, other than burst, were unobserved.

2. Starting North of GOROEKA VILLAGE, the area from there through KAOE TOWN was thoroughly strafed. Shacks Northeast of GOROEKA and near h/2 were strafed, as were several European-type barracks buildings 1200 feet Northwest of the KAOE jetty. Three buildings, each approximately 35' X 25', were strafed and set afire 1000 feet South of the jetty. A possible radar installation, consisting of one shack, an observation tower, and one four-legged frame with two antennae poles, located at the extreme tip of ELLIA POINT was strafed with unobserved results.

3. Two of our A/P's were halted by A/A over the target - one in the center of the left wing, necessitating at least a week's repair work, and in the other a hit just aft of the radio compartment.

(d) There was no interception and no Allied or enemy planes were lost.

(e) Time and location of:
Takeoff: 0745/1 from TUKMA DROME.

Fighter rendezvous: Kil
Attack: 1105/K to 1110/K at KACE at 50/150 feet.
Landing: 1130/K at MUMER BOMER.
(f) Route: MUMER - AJOE ISLAND - TARGET - AJOE ISLAND - MUMER.

2. PILOTS, PLANES PARTICIPATING
(a) The group formation was led by the 501st Squadron, with the 83rd, 82nd, and 300th following in that order.
(b) The 300th was led by Lt Thomas with flights as follows:
FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 061 - Lt Thomas
A/P 066 - Lt Hardwell
A/P 592 - Lt Pohlman
SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 669 - Lt Barney
A/P 068 - Lt Bagwell
A/P 237 - Lt Hughes

3. DETAILS OF MISSION
(a) 1. Lt Thomas, as leader of the squadron, as well as the first flight, brought his three ship element over the target area from North to South, strafing as he approached the target. His twelve paratroopers were trained through the assigned area, and started six small columns of greyish-black smoke up to 200 feet. Several European-type barracks buildings 1200 feet Northwest of KACE jetty were strafed, as this plane continued on its course Southward.
2. Lt Thomas’ wingmen, Lt Hardwell in No. 2 position and Lt Pohlman in No. 3 position, each dropped their twelve paratroopers in the target area, with resultant damage unobserved. Lt Hardwell and his crew strafed a shack in the Eastern side of the No. 2 R/W. Lt Pohlman strafed the target and KACE TOWN.
3. The second flight, led by Lt Barney, at an interval of 30 seconds followed the path of the first flight, and dropped all their bombs in the target. Lt Barney, as well as Lt Bagwell, flying through the bomb dust of the first flight’s bombs, reported that their windshields were covered with an oily film, but that they saw no heavy black smoke – the usual indication of burning fuel. Lt Bagwell strafed and set afire three 35’ X 25’ buildings which were located 1000 feet South of KACE jetty. Lt Hughes, No. 3 man, and Lt Barney both strafed a possible radar installation at BOLEO POINT with unobserved results. This installation was described as consisting of a shack, an observation tower and a four-legged frame with twin antennas poles.

4. Withdrawal was made through KACE BAY, past LOLOBATA PENINSULA, then passing CAPE LEILAI and direct to MUMER.
(b) A/A was reported from various points and was in some cases accurate. Ten to twelve bursts of heavy was reported from known position at the South end of R/W 2. A slight amount of heavy, inaccurate fire was also received from the known position at the North end of R/W 2. Light, slight and inaccurate A/A was received on A/P level from Northernmost wrecked Fox Tare lying North Northeast of KACE.
(c) Nail interception. Nail Allied or enemy plane losses observed.
(d) Nail personnel injured.
(e) Two of our A/P’s were damaged by A/A. A/P 669 received a fragment in the left inboard center section of the left wing in the front main spar necessitating at least a week’s repair work. A/P 592 received a hit, with no serious damage, in the lower left side of the fuselage aft of the radio operator’s compartment.

4. CITATIONS
   On the basis of details available at the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 72 x 100 lb paradano bombs
   3,200 x .30 and 6,700 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS
   An orange flash from vicinity of LOROBATA DROME as L/F's approached target.
   Bomb from plane of another squadron seen to fall on a 20/30 ft steel tower 750 feet South of KAGB jetty.
   Town area and reported fuel dump area covered with light smoke up to 200 feet as Squadrons withdrew. However, no fuel drums, personnel or stores were seen.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Excellent oblique coverage of the target area confirms the bombing as reported by crews. Bombs are seen bursting in Target B as well as in KAGB TOWN. The photos also reveal several prepared defense positions along the beach at KAGB TOWN and also along the beach West of BOLGO POINT.

For the Squadron Commander:

Carl A. Straus
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incis
   Inc 1 - Bomb assessment
   Inc 2 - Route
PF0-242-A-1  29 August, 1944
500th Emb. Sq. 345th B.G.
Fourth over target at 50/150
Time of attack-1105/K-1110/k
Bombing EFF. EX.
†Took photos
†Other planes
MAP REFERENCE
Kaue Target Map
Scale 1:20,000
LEGEND

FPO 2h2-A-1 29 August, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdm, 315th Bomb Grp
4th over target at 50/150 feet
Time of attack: 1105/K-1110/K

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Three squadrons of the 345th Group, totaling 14 A/P's were ordered to bomb and strafe from minimum altitude, A/P's grounded at LAN-GOAN A/D, Northeast CELEBES on 2 September. The secondary target was to be the Southernmost built-up area at the Southwest entrance to LEMBEH STRAITS. The tertiary choice was GOERBCEA VILLAGE on the East shore of KAOE BAY in the Halmaheras. The 500th Squadron's bomb load consisted of 72 parafrags per A/P carried in the new R-2 racks. Crews were alerted at the line at 0530 I for a 0630 I takeoff. The Group was to proceed to SANSAPOR, signaling alerted fighter cover, then proceed to TIFOU ISLAND, the rendezvous point with the two squadrons of P-38's from SANSAPOR, thence to the chosen target. The Group was instructed to hit the secondary or tertiary target in the event contact was not made with the fighter cover. All planes were to make one pass, reform as a Group and return direct to MIKMER.

   (b) After a 0630 I takeoff, the 500th Squadron composed of six A/P's, under the able leadership of Capt. Mortensen, its Commanding Officer, took its position as lead element, followed by four A/P's of the 501st and four of the 499th Squadrons. The Group flew over SANSAPOR to alert the fighters and proceeded directly to TIFOU ISLAND. Contact with the two squadrons of P-38's could not be made, so Capt. Mortensen headed the Group for LEMBEH STRAITS, the secondary target.

   (c) 1. Six A/P's of the 500th Squadron, in two flights of three A/P's in shallow V's, approached the target flying through a maze of A/A originating from a minelayer located at the Southwest entrance to LEMBEH STRAIT.

   2. The two wingmen of the second flight were shot down over the target, presumably by A/A although two Zekes were seen in the area. However, from the four remaining A/P's of the Squadron a total of 144 parafrags covered the assigned target from end to end, with unobserved results. Two A/P's failed to drop bombs because of rack malfunctions and one of these A/P's jettisoned bombs and racks in the water five minutes away from the target while the other crew carried their bombs back to base. All four A/P's strafed the target and a Sugar Charlie and Fox Tare in LEMBEH STRAITS were also attacked with results unobserved. A four gun light A/A position located approximately 100 feet inland from a jetty 3000 feet North of the middle built-up area at LEMBEH STRAIT was strafed. Tracers were seen entering the position which ceased firing as the strafing began. Two A/P's were seriously damaged by intense A/A from the minelayer in LEMBEH STRAITS.

   (d) Our Squadron reported no interception. * See Note, page 5.

   * As A/P 592, right wingman in the second flight, withdrew from the target, black smoke trailed from the right engine. The pilot made an
excellent water landing approximately five miles East of BANGKA ISLAND and North of LEMBERG ISLAND at 01h58'—1251Z. Other planes of the Group circled the ill-fated A/P, reporting five survivors. An enemy fighter, identified as a Zeke, started to strafe the survivors but simultaneously a B-25 of the Group attacked the Zeke scoring hits. The Zeke withdrew from the scene joining another Zeke on a Southerly heading at approximately 5000 feet over BANGKA ISLAND.

A/P 278, in left wing position of the second flight, was missing just after the bombing. At 1120/Z a crew from another squadron reported an unidentified B-25 at 150 feet, losing altitude, and flying a Southeasterly heading dangerously close to the Northeast slope of MT TUNG-KIKO. This A/P was being pursued by two enemy SSF’s. See Note, page 5.

(e) Time and location of:
Takeoff: 0630/Y to 0635/Y from MOKMER A/D.
Boulevard: No fighters observed.
Attack: 1107/Y to 1112/Y, secondary target—LEMBERG STRAITS—at minimum altitude.
Landing: 1420/Y to 1425/Y at MIDDLEBURG. Two A/P’s remained for repairs. Four crews took off in remaining two planes for MOKMER.

(f) Route: MOKMER—BANGAPORE—TIFOU ISLAND—secondary target (LEMBERG STRAITS)

Return: Four A/P’s direct to MIDDLEBURG ISLAND (landing to refuel) and two A/P’s continuing to MOKMER.

2. A/P’s OF 500TH SQUADRON IN ATTACK
(a) Capt Mortensen, Commanding Officer of the 500th Squadron, led our Squadron and Group over the target followed by the 501st and 499th squadrons.

(b) Our Squadron was composed of two flights of three A/P’s each.

FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 055 - Capt Mortensen
A/P 034 - Lt Daker
A/P 161 - Lt Symington

SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 051 - Capt Fruman
A/P 592 - Lt Bardwell
A/P 278 - Lt Lay

3. DETAILS OF MISSION
(a) Capt Mortensen led our Squadron and Group to TIFOU ISLAND then in the absence of fighter cover to LEMBERG STRAITS, the secondary target, approaching the Southwest entrance of the Straits from a Southwesterly direction. Six A/P’s pushed through intense A/A to reach the assigned target, the Southwestern built-up area on the CELEBES shore of the Strait’s Southwest entrance, at 1107/Y on an approximate heading of 45 degrees at 100/200 feet. K-21 cameras were set in motion as the bomb bay doors opened.

2. Capt Mortensen in A/P 055, leader of the first flight, was disappointed when all 72 of his bombs failed to release. However, he thoroughly strafed the target and a stationary Sugar Charlie in the middle of LEMBERG STRAITS, North of the target. He returned his bombs to MOKMER.

3. Lt Daker, in right wing position of the first flight, dropped 72 bombs in the target and strafed the area, as well as the Sugar Charlie in the Strait. Continuing further he strafed a four gun light A/A position that was firing. Tracers entered the pits and the position ceased firing. At this time Lt Daker noticed that his right rear engine
Narrative Report, FPO 2h5-A-1, continued.

Macellis had been hit, and his wheel doors on that side were flapping freely. Lt Dakar believes damages were sustained from the intense A/A thrown up by the minelayer at the Southwest entrance of LEMBEH STRAIT.

4. Lt Symington, in left wing position, first flight, wedged his way in to the target dropping 72 parafrares in the target and strafing the entire area. Suddenly his ship was hit by A/A, thought to be from the minelayer. He stated that the forward movement of his control column past the neutral point was jammed but he kept his ship under control with elevator trim tabs.

5. Capt Truman, leader and sole survivor of the second flight, strafed piles of stores and warehouse type buildings in the target after his bombs failed to release. He later salvaged racks and 72 parafrares in the water five minutes out from the CELEBES coast. Captain Truman and his crew could not say whether or not the two wingmen, Lts Lay and Bardwell, dropped their bombs before they were shot down.

6. Bombing and strafing results were generally unobserved by all crews.

7. Capt Mortensen withdrew from the bombing attack up the middle of LEMBEH STRAIT emerging at the Northern entrance. The remaining three A/P's of our Squadron followed and after some circling in the vicinity of Lt Bardwell's water landing site, the Squadron reformed and returned direct to MIDDLEBURG ISLAND landing at 1120/I.

8. Lt Dakar in A/P O3had his right main wheel tire blown out over the target and made an excellent emergency landing at MIDDLEBURG. Lt Symington brought his ship in successfully at MIDDLEBURG in spite of a seriously damaged horizontal stabilizer and partially jammed controls. Both A/P O3h and A/P 161 were held at MIDDLEBURG for future repair. After refueling, A/P's 055 and 051 returned to KOMMER carrying the crews of O3h and 161 and both ships landed safely at KOMMER at 171h/I.

9. Crews reiterated the unsuitability of this target for strafer, due to ideal defensive nature of the terrain.

(b) The target was very well defended and seasoned veterans participating in the raid stated that the A/A was the most intense they had seen since RABAUL. The following A/A was reported:

Light, intense, accurate from five positions on hill just North of Southernmost built-up area and from 10/15 positions along main road on the West side of LEMBEH STRAIT between the Southern and Northern built-up areas.

Medium and heavy, intense, accurate from minelayer.

Medium, intense, accurate to inaccurate from four gun position at Northeast tip of Northernmost built-up area.

Heavy, moderate to intense, inaccurate from two gun position 4000 feet North of Southern built-up area.

Several white puffs at tree-top level on Western shore of LEMBEH ISLAND opposite the target, indicating possible medium positions.

(c) 1. 11 interception. *See Note, page 5.

2. A/P 278 crashed at MT TOMOKO, Northeast of target. Crew of six carried as killed in action.

3. A/P 592 made a successful water landing seven miles North of LEMBEH ISLAND. Five survivors were seen to have gotten out of plane and cling to a partially inflated life raft, but as the last circling A/P left the scene the life raft had vanished and only three men were seen struggling in the water.

- 3 -

(d) Nil personnel injured. (On four returning crews)
(e) A/P 161 damaged as follows: Large hole through horizontal stabiliser. Rudder holed in several places. Control column jammed when pushed forward past neutral.
A/P 034 damaged as follows: Right rear engine macelle blown apart. Brake bleed line and fuel drain line severed. Right main wheel tire punctured.

4. CITATIONS

Sighting the survivors of A/P 592, Lt Irving Wesser of the 499th Bomb Squadron circled them and observing a 2ke pressing in to strafe the stricken crew members, jockeyed his A/P into position, scoring hits in the fuselage of the enemy SSF with his nose guns, causing him to pull up and away from the area.

Lt Jacobsen, leader of a 501st Squadron flight also noted the survivors of A/P 592 and in spite of the precious little gas left to complete his mission and the proximity to the target and enemy A/D's, circled them dropping a life raft, a dinghy radio and rations. Lt Ereskin and Lt Billig, his wingmen, when given the opportunity to return to base, volunteered to remain at the scene of the landing with the flight leader.

For these outstanding examples of devotion to duty and regard for fellow flyers in trouble while endangering their own safety, awards will be recommended as follows:

Silver Star — — — — Lt Hilding L. Jacobson, 501st Sqdn.
Silver Star — — — — Lt Irving H. Wesser, 499th Sqdn.
Distinguished Flying Cross — Lt Harold L. Billig, 501st Sqdn.
Distinguished Flying Cross — Lt Robert N. Ereskin, 501st Sqdn.

It is obvious that Lt Lay broke formation to give aid to Lt Bardwell who, at the time, was barely keeping his A/P under control. While in his turn he was attacked by two enemy SSF and shot down. For this outstanding example of gallantry in action, Lt Lay and crew are recommended posthumously for the following awards:

Silver Star — — — — Lt Allen W. Lay
       (Lt James O. Burgess
       (Lt Arthur L. Greger

Distinguished Flying Crs. — 3/Sgt John (WMI) Turner
       (3/Sgt Raymond A. LaBoy
       (3/Sgt Ray S. Walker

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 1hh X 23 lb parafrags.
Bombs returned - 72 X 23 lb parafrags.
Bombs jettisoned - 72 X 23 lb parafrags and one R-2 rack.
Bombs expended - 1hh X 23 lb parafrags in two A/P's which crashed.
8,800 X .50 calibre ammo expended by four A/P's which returned.
6,000 X .30 calibre and 10,000 X .50 calibre ammo expended by two A/P's which crashed.

6. SIGHTINGS

Numerous piles of stores, one parked sedan and many serviceable warehouse type buildings in target area. Camouflaged Sugar Charlie near shore of LEMBEH ISLAND and camouflaged Fox Tare Charlie at shore of LEMBEH ISLAND. Three barges 1000 feet South of jetty as well as three serviceable F/P's there. Smoke coming from Southernmost small island in LEMBEH STRAITS.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

K-21 photographs received confirm reports of two crews that our bombing attained excellent coverage, however, a few landed in the water just North of the target. A two-gun medium position, occupied, can be seen alongside the main coastal road 1000 feet North of the Southermost built-up area, as well as a possible medium position located on a hill in the Northern built-up area of LEMBEH STRAIT. A possible enemy airborne fighter is visible headed in a southerly direction down the Strait. Numerous puffs of black smoke are clearly visible over the Southwest entrance to LEMBEH STRAIT.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route

*Note: Information received from additional interrogation of crew of another Squadron revealed that Lt Lay's A/P was shot down by two enemy SSF, rather than by A/A as earlier reported.
Scale: 1:14,000
A Bomber Command
Photo (Tobemah Strait)

Map Reference

Time of attack: 1107 to 1118/in.
First over target at 100,000 ft.
500lb Bomb 150-155th Bomb Gp.
450-455th Bomb Gp.
5 Sep 1944

END
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

3 September, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 246-A-1/2, performed
by the 500th Bomb Squadron on the night of 2-3 September,
1944. Objective: Shipping in DAVAO HARBOR. MINDANAO.
Secondary: BEO VILLAGE, TALAUD ISLANDS.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

(a) Six A/P's of the 345th Group were ordered to attack
shipping in DAVAO HARBOR on the night of 2-3 September. Of the
six planes, two were to be from the 500th Bomb Squadron. A/P's
were to stage from MIDDLEBURG ISLAND A/D, take off from there as
near 1800/1/2 as possible, proceed individually or in two-ship
elements to the target, then return to MIDDLEBURG, refuel and
return to MOKMER A/D. There was to be no fighter cover. The attack
was to be at minimum altitude, each plane carrying three (3) X
500 lb demo bombs, 4/5 seconds delay.

(b) Only four A/P's proceeded to MIDDLEBURG ISLAND A/D
to take off on the strike. Two planes were from the 500th Squadron
one from the 501st and one from the 498th Squadron. A/P #237 of
this squadron left MOKMER A/D at 1550/1/2 and landed at MIDDLEBURG
at 1637/1/2. He took off from there at 1745/1/2 for the strike.
A/P 669 of this squadron took off from MOKMER at 1645/1/2,
landed at MIDDLEBURG 1815/1/2, and then took off for the strike
at 1800/1/2. The two planes of the 501st and 493rd squadrons took
off from MOKMER at approximately 1500/1/2, landed at MIDDLEBURG
at about 1630/1/2, then took off for the strike at approx. 1745/1/2.

(c) Only one A/P of the four to take off reached the
target. This was A/P 237 of the 500th Squadron. The plane of
the 498th squadron returned due to trouble with the fuel transfer
system. The plane of the 501st squadron returned because of
weather, and the remaining plane of the 500th squadron returned
from the vicinity of AJOE ISLAND at 1930/1/2 due to the fact that
the flight indicator was out of commission. This plane returned
direct to MOKMER, landing at 2125/1/2.

A/P 237, piloted by Lt. Whitsell, taking off from MIDDLEBURG,
proceeded direct to the target area unaccompanied, and thus gained
the distinction of having been the first 5-25 to make a low level
attack on the Philippines, on our return route through there to
the Japanese mainland.

Lt. Whitsell approached DAVAO GULF from the South, came into the
Gulf midway between CAPE SAN AUGUSTIN and the Western shore of
the Gulf, and then turning to the left, began his search for ship-
ing at SANTA CRUZ. (Visibility was poor at the target. There
was a rain squall in the vicinity of MALALAG BAY, and a smaller
squall just South of SANTA CRUZ) He proceeded from that point in
a Northeasterly direction, passing along the coast, South of
DAVAO city, then turned in a Southeasternly direction toward
TALLKUD ISLAND.
Spotting a Sugar Charlie which was heading for shore at the North-Northwest tip of TALIKUD ISLAND, he maneuvered into position for an attack. Three (3) X 500 lb, 4/5 second delay bombs were dropped at the ship, one bomb was short, one scored a very near miss just aft amidships on the starboard side, and the third was over. The vessel is considered probably damaged due to nearness of the miss and the direction of the attack.

The plane then proceeded across TALIKUD ISLAND, across the tip of SAVAY ISLAND, and withdrew down the Gulf to the South.

(d) There was no interception and no Allied or enemy planes were lost.

(e) Takeoff of A/F 237 from MOKMER A/D at 1605/1/2
   Landed: Middleburg A/D at 1637/1/2
   Takeoff Middleburg: 1745/1/2
   Attack Davao Harbor: 2125/1/2 - 2130/1/2.
   Landed Middleburg: 0123/1/3
   Takeoff Middleburg: 0627/1/3
   Landed Mokmer: 0406/1/3.

(f) Route: MOKMER - MIDDLEBURG - Northeast tip of MOROTAI ISLAND - DAVAO - MOROTAI - MIDDLEBURG - MOKMER.

2. PLANKS, PILOTS OF THE SOUTHER SQUADRON IN THE ATTACK

   Lt Whitseell was the pilot on this one-man "first" to the Philippines in A/F 237.
   Lt Barney was pilot of A/F 669 which turned back due to instrument failure.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

   (a) Lt Whitseell approaching from the South into DAVAO GULF, swung to the left and began his search for shipping at SANTA CRUZ on the west coast. The visibility was poor on this side of the Gulf due to a rain squall in MALALAC BAY and just South of SANTA CRUZ. He proceeded up the West coast, passing DALIAO and MATMA airdromes, continued South of DAVAO CITY, then across the PAKIPUTAN STRAIT to FORUM POINT. Turning Southward, Lt Whitseell spotted a Sugar Charlie headed toward the North Northwest tip of TALIKUD ISLAND. He swung slightly to the West and made his attack diagonally from stern to bow, dropping all three of his 500-pounders on this target. The first fell short, the second scored a very near miss just aft amidships on the starboard side of the vessel, and the third fell long. Due to the nearness of the miss and to the direction of the attack, the vessel is considered probably damaged. Because of darkness and visibility no exact estimation of the damage could be made. Lt Whitseell then continued over TALIKUD ISLAND, across the tip of SAVAY ISLAND and then due South. He landed at MIDDLEBURG to re-fuel, and then returned to MOKMER.

   (b) There was no A/A fire, however two searchlights were turned on just South of DAVAO city. The A/F was picked up by the lights for approximately two (2) seconds on two occasions. In all the searchlights remained on 20/30 seconds. By banking his plane to the right, Lt Whitseell avoided being blinded by the lights.
3. (c) Nil interception. Nil Allied or enemy plane losses observed.
   (d) Nil personnel injured.
   (e) Nil damage to our aircraft.

4. CITATIONS
   The men designated below are felt to be worthy of commendation for their skill and determination in carrying through
   an unprecedented attack by this type aircraft against this strongly defended enemy bastion. This entire mission, which was of eight
   hours duration, was carried out at night through questionable weather and was successful due to the daring and the devotion to
   duty of this pilot and his crew.
   Lt Whitesell
   Lt Swallop
   Lt Wilson
   S/Sgt. Goege
   S/Sgt. Burrows
   S/Sgt. Del Buono

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped: 3 x 500 lb demo bombs, 4/5 seconds delay. Nil ammunition.

6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS
   One Sugar Charlie just off SANTA CRUZ.
   20/25 luggers and barges along coast between SANTA CRUZ and
   DALIAC and between TALOMC and DUKALAG ISLAND. Five or six small
   vessels offshore in PAPUAN STRAIT between SANTA ANA and POMUN PT.
   Three small vessels (possibly inland) in cove on west shore of
   SAVAI ISLAND between POMUN PT. and SAN JOSE. A light was seen
   flashing on and off five miles Southeast of SANTA CRUZ. A large fire
   sighted on hill approx. ten (10) miles Northwest of LAVAO CITY.
   Lights and possible personnel area seen three miles South of SANTA
   CRUZ. LAVAO CITY was blacked out. A possible submarine net stretched
   across the bay from the vicinity of the mouth of SISULAN RIVER to
   SAN JOSE on SAMAL ISLAND. Lights were blinking on TALIKUD ISLAND.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATIONS
   No photos were taken.

   For the Squadron Commander:

   CARL A. STRAUSS
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Intelligence Officer
A Bomber Command Log

MAP NOT BOUNDARY

Time over Target: 2351 to 2350/1/6
First over Target at 100/200 FE.
South bomb 300, catch bomb dp.
Dy-846-A-1-3 Sept 1944

L to R on D
6 September, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

I. GENERAL

(a) Objective
The primary objective was a strike against possible airplanes on the DJAILOLO strip. If there were no A/P's there, supply and personnel areas Northwest of the A/D were to be attacked. The secondary target was MALIFOET, 5 miles West of KAOE in KAOE BAY. The target was to be attacked at 100 to 200 feet altitude by four planes, three carrying 72 X 23 lb parafrag bombs and one carrying 12 X 100 lb paradesms. The 501st with five A/P's, and the 499th with six A/P's, and the 498th with four A/P's were to participate in the mission.

(b) Rendezvous
The group formed just South of MOXMER A/D and proceeded direct to the target area. There was no fighter cover assigned.

(c) Attack
Only two of four A/P's of this squadron taking off reached the target. The other two planes turned back in the vicinity of SAJANG ISLAND (at point 0015N-13020E) at 1010/I, the one with engine trouble, the other to escort. The attack was made from East to West on a heading of approx. 270 degrees. The bombing was excellent with 12 X 100 lb paradesms (8/15 seconds delay) and 72 X 23 lb parafrag being trained through the dispersal area West of the runway and through the Northwest supply and personnel area on both banks of the LANO RIVER. An explosion was started in the supply area 1900 feet due West of the center of the runway, with flame, then rolling heavy white smoke up to 200/300 feet. The area was strafed on this first pass, and then a second strafing pass was made, starting at a village (possibly KOKOEKOEKIE) approximately three miles South of the A/D, and continuing from there to the West shore. Several small fires up to 75 feet resulted from strafing of buildings in the village. Scattered European-type houses and barracks-type buildings, which were not of native construction, were strafed on this second pass.

CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L

Narrative Report on FFO 249-A-2 (continued)

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
(a) The two planes which reached the target were led by Lt Dick. His course - on a heading of about 270 degrees - took him over the Southern end of the A/D. When he was over the Western dispersal area, he began to tossle his 72 parafngs which trained through that area, and continued through the supply and personnel area on the LANO RIVER bank. Other than bomb bursts, Lt Dick and his crew could see no damage.

Lt Daker, flying on Lt Dick's right wing, covered a course to the North of Lt Dick's. His bombs, 12 X 100 lb parabolas, were trained West of the runway and continued through the Northwest supply and personnel area. An explosion resulted in the area 1900 feet West of the center of the runway, with heavy rolling white smoke up to 200/300 feet.

Both planes then continued West, then South around the peninsula and returned to the area for a second strafing pass. The target for this attack was a village three miles South and slightly East of the South end of the airstrome. Numerous buildings in this village, thought to be HOKOHECKOKEKE, were strafed and several small fires up to 75 feet were started. Continuing on to the West shore, houses and barracks-type buildings which were numerous were strafed by both Lt Dick and Lt Daker.

(b) A/A
There was no A/A fire reported.

(c) Interception
1. Nil interception.
2. Nil Allied or enemy plane losses.

(d) Personnel Casualties
Nil

(e) Damage to Airplanes
Nil.
Narrative Report on FFO 249-A-2 (continued)

4. CITATIONS
On the basis of details available at the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this officer, no individual achievements which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped: 12 x 100 lb paradesms, 4/5 sec. delay.
   72 x 23 lb parafrags.
   Bombs returned: 144 x 23 lb parafrags.
   Ammunition expended: 3200 x .50 calibre.
   500 x .50 calibre.

6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS
   DJAIILOLO runway was difficult to see, possibly camouflaged. Strip looked "grassy" and blended with surrounding fields. Supply and personnel areas West of the strip were well concealed by trees.
   Twenty (20) or 30 European type houses and barracks-type buildings were seen at village thought to be HOKOHOKOKEKIE.
   Several well constructed and well kept villages on the East shore of DJAIILOLO BAY were sighted.
   A large mission building with twin steeples was seen at DOWORA POINT on the West coast of KAOE BAY.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Limited photo coverage shows the target heavily wooded with bombs bursting as described by crews.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.

2 Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment chart.
   Incl 2 - Route sketch.
SECRET

LEGEND

FOO-249-A-2  5 Sept. 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Third over target.
Altitude: 100/200 ft.
Time over target: 1100/I to 1121/I

MAP REFERENCE

East Indies West: V Bomber Command

[Map showing a route marked with various place names and directions]
500th Bomb Sq., 345th Bomb Group
Third over target.
Altitude: 100/200 feet.
Time: 1100/1 to 1121/1
Bombing efficiency: EX.
Took photos
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 920

FAH/rpb

7 September 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) 1. Two squadrons of six planes each of the 315th Bomb Group were ordered to attack a motor pool and a shop area at BUAYAN, MINDANAO on September sixth. One squadron was to make two bombing-strafing passes on the motor pool area, approximately 2 1/2 miles due West of the center of BUAYAN runway, observing equipment therein and obtaining the best pictures possible. The second squadron was assigned a large hangar located just East of the South end of BUAYAN STRIP and for their second pass they were to hit the same motor pool area West of the Strip that was assigned the first squadron. There was no assigned secondary target.

2. The two squadrons were to rendezvous with one squadron of P-38's over the target. The two squadrons were to take off from MOKMER at 0430/I, refuel at MIDDLEBURG and after a 0730/I takeoff, proceed direct to SARANGANI BAY. Return was to be by the same route.

3. The 500th Squadron's bomb load was 12 x 100 lb paradesmos per A/P.

(b) After an early morning takeoff from MOKMER A/D at approximately 0430/I, the two squadrons proceeded to MIDDLEBURG ISLAND, landing there to refuel. By 0730/I all A/P's were airborne again and proceeded direct to the target, where they rendezvoused with a squadron of P-38's at approximately 1030/I. One A/P of the 500th Squadron was forced to return to base shortly after takeoff from MIDDLEBURG ISLAND because of fuel transfer failure.

(c) 1. The motor pool area, shops area just to the North, and a small concentration of buildings just west of the Northern half of BUAYAN STRIP were gutted by a total of 52 x 100 lb paradesmos, dropped on two passes by the 500th Squadron's planes on its first two flight mission to the PHILIPPINES. A long barracks-type building was completely destroyed in the small concentration of buildings west of the Strip. In the motor pool area direct hits were scored on at least six single story houses and a 2 1/2 ton truck parked on the main road at the Eastern end of the area.

2. Three large warehouses, one of which blew up in a violent explosion, received direct hits in the shops area just North of the motor pool area. At least 8/12 small fires were started in the area smiting small columns of black and olibnish-gray smoke. All the above targets, an A/A position 1300 feet North of the shops area, another A/A position just North of BUAYAN VILLAGE and a burning Victor Able lying stationary off TINICO VILLAGE, at the Southwest entrance to SARANGANI BAY, were strafed with unobserved results. A road leading into the motor pool area just to the West was strafed and five or six small oil fires were started as a result.

- 1 -
3. Our A/P’s received light, moderate to intense A/A from the motor pool area and as they withdrew from the target, heavy, moderate to intense A/A over the BUAYAN RIVER mouth causing minor damage to one of our A/P’s.

4. A total of eight bombs were jettisoned in SARANGANI BAY because of release malfunctions and twelve bombs were returned to base by A/P that failed to reach the target.

(d) Mill interception.

Mill Allied or enemy plane losses reported.

(e) Takeoff from MOKMER - 0420/I to 0430/I.

Landing at MIDDLEBURG - 0545/I to 0555/I.

Takeoff from MIDDLEBURG - 0710/I to 0715/I.

Rendezvous - One squadron of P-38’s at 1032/I, at 1000 ft over the target area.

Attack: 1032/I to 1045/I at 20 to 200 feet.

Landing at MIDDLEBURG - 1125/I.

Takeoff from MIDDLEBURG - 1305/I.

Landing at MOKMER - 1712/I.

(f) Route: MOKMER - MIDDLEBURG - BUAYAN A/D, at head of SARANGANI BAY - MIDDLEBURG - MOKMER.

2. A/P’s OF 500TH SQUADRON IN ATTACK

Capt Mortensen, our Commanding Officer, led the 500th Squadron and the 499th Squadron, in that order, over the BUAYAN AREA in the first bombing-strafing attack on the PHILIPPINES by a B-25 Group since the Jap occupation. The Squadron was composed of two flights of three A/P’s each as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 055 - Capt Mortensen</td>
<td>A/P 068 - Capt Truman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 776 - Lt Eick</td>
<td>A/P 051 - Lt Zimmerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 237 - Lt Barney</td>
<td>A/P 813 - Lt Symington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Symington in A/P 813</td>
<td>turned back at 0155H-1290L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>at 0816/I when he</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>discovered the fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>transfer system failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to function.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. Capt Mortensen led our Squadron to the target where both flights spread out in line abreast formation, the second flight having only two ships, and on a heading of approximately 190° initiated the bombing-strafing attack at 1032/I at approximately 100 feet. K-20, K-21 and 35 mm cameras were recording the attack and P-38’s hovered over the area providing excellent protection.

2. The second minimum altitude pass over the target was from a Northwesterly direction to a Southerly direction and the A/P’s withdrew down SARANGANI BAY on a Southerly heading. On the first pass Capt Mortensen released four bombs in a small concentration of buildings just West of the strip at BUAYAN, blowing up one barracks type building sending white smoke to 2000 feet. About a mile further West he dropped four more paradesmos in the assigned target, a motor pool area 2 1/2 miles West of the strip, with unobserved results. Swinging to the North and West of this target, Capt Mortensen made a second strafing run on the motor pool, this time on a Southerly heading. As the Squadron Leader withdrew he jettisoned four bombs in the Bay because of release failure and strafed a burning Victor Baker off TINOTO VILLAGE in SARANGANI BAY. Strafing results were unobserved.

- 2 -

3. Lt Dick, in right wing position of the first flight, strafed on the first pass and on the second dropped twelve bombs in the motor pool area destroying six houses and a 2 1/2 ton truck with direct hits. Results of the strafing were unobserved.

4. Lt Barney, another veteran combat pilot, flying on the Squadron Leader's left wing, dropped eight bombs on the first pass, causing a small fire in the motor pool area. He strafed on both passes, scoring hits on a motor truck and hitting its driver who was running for cover in the target area. As Lt Barney withdrew, a heavy A/A position near the BUAYAN RIVER mouth put up intense, accurate fire, a fragment of which, hit the stabilizer of Lt Barney's A/P causing minor damage. The pilot jettisoned his remaining four bombs in SARANGANI BAY because of release malfunction.

5. Capt Truman with Lt Zimmerman on his right wing composed the second flight and he chose to attack the shops area just North of the motor pool West of BUAYAN STRIP on their first pass. Four bombs dropped by the flight leader covered the target destroying one long warehouse-type building. Lt Zimmerman also dropped four bombs destroying two similar buildings in the same area. A second pass was made on a Southeasterly heading across the motor pool area, now marked by 8/12 small fires with black and blue-gray smoke about 200 feet high. Capt Truman dropped eight bombs in the motor pool as did Lt Zimmerman but results of their bombing were unobserved. Both pilots strafed the targets and surrounding area on each pass but results were unobserved.

6. Bombing was excellent and the element of surprise was very satisfactory as evidenced by numerous Japs seen running for shelter. Capt Mortensen gathered the two squadrons in Group formation and returned to MIDDLEBURG, refueling there and continuing to HÖNNER, all planes landing safely there at 1712/1.

    (b) The target was well defended by A/A reported as follows:
    Light, moderate, inaccurate from motor pool area.
    Heavy, moderate to intense, accurate from two positions on coast West of the BUAYAN RIVER mouth.
    Light, slight, inaccurate from four or five positions along South side of main road to the West of the motor pool area.
    M/G fire, moderate, inaccurate from shacks on West bank of SARANGANI BAY from vicinity of BUAY.

    (c) One squadron of P-38's provided excellent fighter cover.
    Nil Allied or enemy A/P's shot down in combat.
    (d) All personnel injured.
    (e) A/P 237 was hit by a fragment in the horizontal stabilizer causing minor damage.

4. CITATIONS

At the time of submitting this report, there were in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would warrant an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

    Bombs dropped - 52 X 100 lb parademos.
    Bombs jettisoned - 8 X 100 lb parademos.
    Bombs returned - 12 X 100 lb parademos.
    2,650 X .30 and 6,900 X .50 calibre ammo expended.

- 3 -
6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS
Fire with smoke to 5000 feet (possible A/F) in area just east of the central part of the strip.
Large hangar, just east of South end of strip seen to blow up from attack by another squadron, sending black smoke to 4000 feet.
Numerous puffs of medium A/A in vicinity Northwest end of strip.
One shiny sedan, apparently new, in motor pool area.
Nil sightings of reported vehicles.
One 2 1/2 ton truck loaded with lumber seen in area in and around Buanan Village.
Eight M/T's in a motor pool area near shore just east of Buanan Village.
No indications of products repaired or manufactured in shops.
General area under cultivation and at least 200 horses and as many sheep on plains west of the target.
Buildings were two-storied, European type.
Several Japs in water around the burning Victor Able.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
Photographs received at the time of writing this report confirm crew reports of the fine condition and construction of buildings in the area. A motor pool is visible and several small caterpillar-type tractors parked in the yard. The burning Victor Able in Sarangani Bay is clearly visible in two photographs.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer

2 - IncI 1 - Bomb assessment
IncI 2 - Route
LEgend

FFO 2504-1 6 September, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Group
First over target at 20-200 feet.
Time of attack: 1032 to 1045/I
Bombing efficiency EX
/ Took photos
/ Other plane

REFERENCE

Photo - BADJANGAS to SEROKEN, 3/9/44
Photo - 101 (2/7-8-1) (T. 274891) (24-10-44)
(ARRS-6PG) (S3-155)
CONFIDENTIAL

6 September 44
500th Bomb Sqdn, 315th Bomb Gp
First over target at 20/200 ft
Time of attack: 1032/I-1045/I

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)  
345th Bombardment Group  
APO 920  
CAS/rpb  

9 September 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 2524-1, Performed by 500th Bomb Squad, 8 September, 1944. Objective: GALEIA. Secondary: MOROTAI.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

(a) Objective: The primary objective was a strike against personnel in the GALEIA A/O area. The targets assigned were: (1) an area on the West bank of LAKE NOIDINO (designated IX); and (2) an area on Northwest bank of GALEIA LAKE (designated IX). (Ref: GALEIA SPECIAL TARGET MAP 1:20,000). The secondary target was the peninsula and DOROSA VILLAGE in the PINKS A/O area on the Southwest tip of MOROTAI ISLAND. The targets were to be attacked at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 X 100 lb paradesos (8/15 second delay). In addition to our Squadron the 499th, 498th and 501st squadrons were to participate in this mission.

(b) Rendezvous: The Group formed South of MONEM A/O and proceeded direct to the target, as there was no fighter cover assigned.

(c) Six A/P's reached the GALEIA AREA, but due to an approach too far to the West, the first target - on the West bank of LAKE NOIDINO - was not hit. The Squadron approached the target from the North, on a heading of approximately 175°, and came in over the Northwest end of No. 1 Runway. Seventy-two (72) X 100 lb paradesos were dropped through the area starting in the dispersal area West of Runway 1 and continuing South and East through targets IX, IX and IX, through target IX on the Northwest shore of GALEIA LAKE. Of this number, 15 bombs were released at the Northern and central portion of the dispersal area West of Runway 1, starting a small fuel fire with black smoke in that area, and doing further damage to an already unserviceable SSF at the North end of Runway 1 by scoring a direct hit on the tail. Also in this area the wind-tee was hit and destroyed.

Twelve (12) bombs hit in target IX; three in IX and three just South of IX, all with unobserved results. Twelve paradesos fell in the Western end of target IX and twelve in the Eastern end of target IX. The remaining twelve paradesos were dropped in the area just South of Runway 1 and East of Runway 2. Results were generally unobserved due to the heavy vegetation and to the speed of the planes over the target.

The planes strafed throughout their entire run, scoring hits on an unserviceable SSF just West of Runway 1 and on a medium A/A position, which was returning the fire, 3000 feet Southeast of the end of Runway 1. SOAKONOA, FOEIJI and the South end of GALEIA VILLAGE were raked with .30 and .50 calibre bullets. In all, 8,000 .50's and 900 .30's were expended in strafing.

One A/P was holed by an explosive shell which burst in forward bulkhead necessitating several days repair work and injuring the Navigator slightly.

Bombing considered poor as assigned targets received but 12 bombs.

(d) Time and location of:
   Takeoff: 0738/1 to 0740/1 from NOKMER.
   Rendezvous: Group South of NOKMER. Mil fighter cover assigned.
   Attack: 1053/1 to 1105/1 at 50/200 feet at GALEIA.
   Landing: 1420/1 to 1423/1 at NOKMER.

(e) Route:
   NOKMER to AJOE to GALEIA to NOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) Group: The 497th Squadron led the Group, followed by the
       498th, 501st and 500th in that order.
   (b) Squadron: The 500th Squadron was led by Capt Truman. Pilots
       were:

       FIRST FLIGHT
       A/P 068 - Capt Truman
       A/P 051 - Lt Symington
       A/P 059 - Lt Thompson

       SECOND FLIGHT
       A/P 766 - Lt Zimmerman
       A/P 663 - Lt Daker
       A/P 238 - Lt Bagshaw

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. Capt Truman, leader of the 500th, followed the other
       squadrons Westward across GALEIA BAY, then over the TIABO RIVER
       mouth, and then swung South towards the target. As he approached
       he noted that he was too far to the West to be able to hit the target
       area West of LAKE NGIDINO and at the same time, with all six planes
       abreast, it would have been impossible to swing over far enough for all
       planes to remain in formation. Capt Truman, therefore, came over the
       Northwest end of Runway 1 and made his run on a heading of approximately
       175°, and then turned East over GALEIA LAKE. His bombs were dropped - six
       in the dispersal area West of Runway 1 where a small fuel fire was started, and
       six in target 8X. An 8/8 SSF was strafed with hits scored - plane was situated
       on the West side of Runway 1 - and a medium A/A position 3000 feet South
       East of the South end of Runway 1 was heavily strafed.

   2. Lt Thompson flew on the East end of the six-plane formation. He dropped six
       of his bombs at the North end of Runway 1, scoring a hit on the tail of an
       U/S SSF. His remaining six were trailed through target 7X - three hitting in the
       area, and three just South of it.

   3. On Capt Truman's right, Lt Daker dropped six paratroopers
       in target 8X, and toggled his remaining six in target 2X, just North and
       West of LAKE GALEIA. Results other than the bursting of bombs were un-
       observed.

   4. Next in position in the six-planes abreast formation
       was Lt Bagshaw who dropped six bombs in the dispersal area West of Runway
       1 and six just South of the Runway. The Southern end of GALEIA VILLAGE
       was strafed as Lt Bagshaw left the target.

   5. Lt Zimmerman, leader of the second flight, released his
       first six bombs in the Eastern end of target 11, and then toggled the six
       remaining in target 2X. He strafed POEMI VILLAGE on withdrawal.

   6. Lt Symington flew on the Western end of the formation
       and dropped six of his bombs just South of the North end of Runway 2 and
       six in target 1X; South of GALEIA LAKE he strafed SOKONORA VILLAGE.

   7. Due to the heavy foliage as well as the speed flown across the target, results of the bombing were generally unobserved.

(b) \textit{A/A}

Anti-aircraft fire was the only indication of enemy activity in the area. It was reported as follows:

Medium, intense, accurate from five gun positions thought to be on BONGHO POINT.

Ground fire from BIG TARAKAMI MOUNTAIN.

Light, moderate, inaccurate from South shore of GALELA BAY, East of POENNI VILLAGE jetty.

Light, slight to moderate, inaccurate from SOAKONORA VILLAGE and from South end of GALELA VILLAGE where A/D and Lake road enters village; also from Northern part of target 86.

Heavy, moderate, inaccurate from position 4100 feet East of South end of Runway 1 and from position 4500 feet East of center of Runway 1 near small unnamed lake.

Medium, moderate, inaccurate from POENNI VILLAGE.

(c) \textit{Interception}

Mil interception.

Mil Allied or enemy planes observed destroyed in aerial combat.

(d) \textit{Damage to A/P}

One A/P - No. 663 - was hit by a 20mm shell, which burst just to the rear of the pilot's seat. The main bulkhead was cut in two at Station 151, and the radio wires were severed on both sides of the bulkhead. The A/P was turned over to a Service Squadron, necessitating three days' repair work.

(e) \textit{Personnel Casualties}

Lt. Stewart, Navigator in Lt. Daker's plane, was slightly injured when the 20mm shell burst in the Navigators compartment.

4. \textit{CITATIONS}

At the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would warrant awards.

5. \textit{ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE}

Bombs dropped - 72 x 100 lb. paradomes, 8/15 second delay fuse.

900 x .30 calibre and 8,000 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. \textit{SIGHTINGS}

Many small grass huts throughout area.

Five to ten SSF of doubtful serviceability and several T/E bombers thought to be unserviceable, in dispersal area North of Runway 2 and West of Runway 1.

Four to five possible SSF but probably dummies, in dispersal area East of Northern half of Runway 2. Four camouflaged planes in same area.

A schooner, with sails furled, offshore at GILITORA VILLAGE.

Possible Jap Headquarters with flag pole, 1000 feet East of North end of Runway 1.

Buildings on West end of GALELA LAKE in bad condition. New buildings on South side of the lake towards the Western side.

An occupied two-gun position 1000 feet East of Runway 1, approximately 2000 feet North of the South end.

- 3 -

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION
Excellent coverage was obtained and confirm the pilot's reports of the bombing.

For the Commanding Officer:

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -
LEGEND

FF0 252-A-1 8 September, 13/1
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp
Last over target at 50/200 ft.
Time of attack: 1053/1105/1
Crew report of bomb hits.
Took photos
Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
GALELA SPECIAL TARGET MAP
1:20,000
LEGEND
FPO 252-A-1  9 September, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 315th Bomb Grp
Last over target at 50/200 feet
Time of attack: 1053/I - 1105/I

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies West
V Bomber Command

NEW GUINEA

INCL 2

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Objective

   The primary objective was a strike against personnel and supplies in the NAMLEA TOWNSHIP area. The secondary target was the BOELIA Oilfields area. The target was to be strafed and bombèd at minimum altitude by six planes, each carrying 12 x 100 lb demo bombs (8/11 second delay). In addition to our Squadron the 498th, 499th and 501st squadrons were to participate.

   (b) Rendezvous

   The Group formed South of MOKAER A/D and proceeded direct to the target, as there was no fighter cover assigned.

   (c) Attack

   (1) Six A/P's reached the target and on a heading of approximately 225° made a single bombing and strafing pass, dropping 72 x 100 lb demolition bombs in the area. Of these, the first flight, covering the Eastern portion of the Town, dropped twenty nine (29) bombs in that area, scoring direct hits on 2/3 small buildings and starting several small fires. One bomb chalked up a near miss on a TOWN, probably 0/S, in the Southeastern dispersal area, while four bombs were dropped just North of the Town and two hit in the water just off shore, South of the Township.

   (2) The second flight, meanwhile, covering the Western part of the Town area, dropped twelve bombs in the Northwestern end of the Town causing an explosion with white smoke, turning black, approximately 500 ft high. Twenty-three (23) bombs hit just Northwest of the Town scoring direct hits on six shacks, while one bomb hit just North of the central portion of the strip.

   (3) The area from a point 2750 feet North of CAPE KARBAU through the Town was heavily strafed. Several hits were seen to be scored on shacks and two or three small fires were started in the area North of the Town. W/o positions in the vicinity of the Southeast end of the strip were strafed with unobserved results.

   (4) All crews reported the target well covered with dust, debris and heavy white smoke to 3000 feet, fifteen minutes after leaving the target.
FFO 254-A-2, 500th Sqdn, continued.

(d) **Time and location of**

Takeoff: 1031/I to 1033/I from MOKMER.  
Rendezvous: No fighter rendezvous, as no fighter cover was scheduled.  
Attack: 1108/I to 1113/I at 50/150 feet - NAMLEA TOWNSHIP.  
Landing: 1745/I to 1747/I at MOKMER.

(e) **Route**

MOKMER to MIOS WAAR to CAPE VAIM (North shore of MACCLUER GULF) to CERAM to NAMLEA to CAPE VAIM to MOKMER.

2. **PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING**

(a) **Group**

The 501st Squadron led the attack, followed by the 500th, the 1499th and 1498th in that order.

(b) **Squadron**

The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Zimmerman with flights as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 766 - Lt Zimmerman</td>
<td>A/P 237 - Lt Bagshaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 068 - Lt Bagwell</td>
<td>A/P 051 - Lt Rasmussen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 861 - Lt Thompson</td>
<td>A/P 059 - Lt Daker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **DETAILS OF THE MISSION**

(a) 1. Lt Zimmerman, Squadron leader, led the planes on to the target coming in approximately 3000 feet North of CAPE KARBAU, on a heading of 225°. His flight hit the Eastern portion of the Town. He started to strafe as he came overland and continued throughout the run, hitting several shacks and starting small fires North of the Town. Two of his bombs dropped just North of the Town, while the remaining ten hit well within the target, where small fires were started.

2. Lt Bagwell, in No. 2 position, dropped his bombs in the central portion of the Town, scoring direct hits on two or three buildings.

3. Lt Thompson in No. 3 position had rather "slim pickings" since he covered the most Eastern and narrowest part of the Town. Three of his centuries hit North of the target, where one scored a near miss on an unserviceable Tony; seven in the target, and two in the water South of the Town.

4. The second flight was led by Lt Bagshaw, who flew abreast of the 1st flight and covered the Western part of the target. His twelve bombs hit just West of the Town itself, but scored direct hits on three shacks dispersed in the area.

5. Lt Rasmussen, in No. 2 position of the second flight, released his bombs to the West of the Town, where they fell among scattered shacks scoring hits on two or three of them.
6. Lt Daker in No. 3 position dropped his twelve bombs well within the target area, and started an explosion with white smoke turning to black smoke up to approximately 500 feet.

7. All planes of the second flight strafed throughout the attack, and all crews reported the target well covered with bomb hits. Fifteen minutes out from the target, a heavy pall of dust and white smoke up to 3000 feet could still be seen.

(b) A/A fire was principally directed at the squadrons coming over the target after our attack. However, the second flight reported slight, heavy and inaccurate fire from the 9/6 position (1W) Northwest of the A/D. Medium, moderate and inaccurate fire came from a previously pinpointed position 3/4 miles Northeast of NAMLEA TOWN on the shore of KAJELI BAY. Light, moderate and inaccurate from positions in vicinity of Southeast end of strip.

(c) Interception

Mil interception. Mil Allied or enemy planes observed shot down in aerial combat.

(d) Personnel Casualties

Nil

(e) Damage to A/P's

Nil

4. CITATIONS

At the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 72 x 100 pound demos, 8/11 second delay fuse. 1,000 x .30 calibre and 1,550 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

At 1205/I from 1800 feet a crashed A/P, thought to be a B-25, in cleared area at approximately 01455S-13225E. There were four white markers forming an 800 yard square designating area - markers thought to be pieces of parachutes. Tail was separated from plane, which was believed to have crashed in a Southeastery direction. Grass in and around the crash path of the plane appeared burned.

At 1208/I from 1800 feet an oil derrick or beacon in a village at 01555S-13215E.

At 1408/I to 1113/I at minimum altitude, dispersed oil drums, in pairs in area North of NAMLEA TOWN; a large fire on ridge between Town and A/D sending flame 45 feet high, then black smoke to 300 feet, visible for
FFO 254-A-2, 500th Sqdn, continued.

fifteen minutes after leaving target.

At 1610/1 from 2000 feet (seen by two planes) in a village on the KAIS or INGRI RIVER at approximately 0150S-13210E, white flags tied to long poles were seen waving frantically. One crew member reported seeing four white men waving the flags, the other crew saw the flags only. The village was composed of approximately six houses, one of which was oblong and large.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Good oblique photos of the area show heavy smoke over target, but many buildings are still in good condition. Bombs are seen to be hitting in the A/D area.

For the Commanding Officer:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
LEGEND
FFO 254-A-2  10 September, 1h
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Group
Second over target at 50/150 feet
Time of attack: 1408/1 to 1413/1
Bombing efficiency EX
* Crew report of bomb hits
† Took photos
⊥ Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Special Target Map - NAMLEA, 1:20,000
LEGEND
FPO 254-A-2 10 September, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Second over target at 50/150 ft
Time of attack: 1408/I - 1413/I

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

PAH/rpb

13 September, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

(1) Four squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group were ordered to attack GALEIA personnel areas from minimum altitude on September 12, 1944. The lead squadron was to make a run across the target approaching from the North, while the remaining squadrons would attack from the South. This maneuver was designed to surprise and confuse enemy personnel manning the A/A guns. Squadrons were to split up in flights, some attacking the personnel area on the Northwest shore of GALEIA LAKE in DONRA and DONORI and others the personnel area on the Southeast shore of LAKE WIDHO. There was no secondary target assigned.

(2) The 500th Squadron's bomb load was twelve X 100 pound demos (6/11 second fuse) per A/P.

(3) Procurement of good low oblique photographs of the surrounding terrain and of the target was stressed.

(b) Alerted at 0700/I for a 0800/I takeoff, the 500th Squadron was to assume the lead position in the Group formation with the 498th, 499th and 501st squadrons trailing in that order, and once assembled, proceed direct to the target with no fighter cover. The return route was to be direct.

b. Rendezvous

After an 0800/I to 0810/I takeoff the 500th Squadron led the other three squadrons of the Group direct to the target, as no fighter cover was assigned, arriving at 1125/I. One of the six A/P's of the 500th turned back at a point South of SOKIPIRI ISLAND at 0835/I because of top turret failure, and landed at MOLMER at 0920/I.

c. Attack

(1) A total of 60 X 100 pound demos were dropped by five A/P's of the 500th Squadron in a minimum altitude attack on personnel in the GALEIA area on the morning of September 12. Targets 2X and 2X (Map reference: GALEIA SPECIAL TARGET MAP, 1:20,000) were showered with a total of 4X 100 lb demos, destroying a few shacks which were visible through the heavy tree cover. Two bombs fell into the West end of GALEIA LAKE and two among scattered shacks 4,000 feet East of the North end of Runway No 2. Eight more demos destroyed five huts at SEWI VILLAGE at the East end of GALEIA LAKE.
FFO 256-A-3 - 500th Sqdn - continued.

(2) All A/P's strafed from the mouth of the ARPKE RIVER through the target area and all villages along the South shore of GAELLA LAKE including GAELLA TOWNSHIP East of the Lake. An unsevered SSF at the North end of Runway 1, machine gun pits 800 feet East of the South end of Runway 1, scattered shacks, and a grass-roofed building, approximately 300 feet long, at the Northcentral edge of DOMKA TOWN, were strafed with unobserved results. An A/A position East of the center of Runway 1 (F.I. Position 13) was strafed and silenced. An 8/9 second burst in the revetment forced operators to take cover.

(3) Our planes encountered heavy, slight and inaccurate A/A from position 2V and medium, slight, inaccurate from BONGO POINT. Light ground fire, all inaccurate was received from GAELLA TOWNSHIP, SOAKONORA and SEMI VILLAGES. Light, slight and accurate fire from GAELLA TOWN hit one A/P in the left engine and although the A/P returned to base on both engines the left power unit will have to be changed.

d. Interception

(1) There was no interception.
(2) No enemy or Allied A/P's lost.

e. Time and location of

Takeoff - From MOKMER at 0800/I to 0805/I.
Rendezvous - Mile.
Attack - GAELLA at 1125/I to 1130/I at 25/150 feet.
Landing - At MOKMER at 1500/I to 1510/I.

f. Route

MOKMER to GAELLA, Northern SALMAHERAS, direct; to MOKMER.

2. A/P's OF 500TH SQUADRON IN ATTACK

Captain Truman, veteran combat pilot and flight leader, led our Squadron and the Group over the target. Our Squadron, first over the target and only one to approach on a Southerly heading, was composed of two flights of three and two A/P's, respectively, as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT                      SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 766 - Capt Truman           A/P 237 - Lt Whitsell
A/P 861 - Lt Rasmussen          A/P 864 - Lt Bagwell
A/P 059 - Lt Thompson           A/P 864 - Lt Daker

A/P 059 turned back shortly after takeoff because of top turret failure. A/P 864 pulled up from No. 3 position in the second flight to fill the gap.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

A. (1) Capt Truman led our Squadron of five A/P's direct to the target followed by the remaining three squadrons of the Group. In the vicinity of SOEPICRY ISLAND, Lt. Thompson in A/P 059, turned back at 0835/I because of top turret failure and landed at MOKMER at 0920/I.
(2) While over the Northern section of GAELLA BAY, Capt Truman and our Squadron broke away from the Group formation, preparatory to
making the only run across the target on a Southerly heading. The other
squadrons, hoping to surprise and confuse the Japs, continued down GALEIA
BAY South of GALEIA TOWN in order to effect an attack on the A/D area on a
Northerly heading. The 500th flights went across the target at 1125/I on
Southerly headings at altitudes varying from 25 to 150 feet. K-20 and
K-21 cameras were turned on to record the attack and surrounding terrain
features.

(3) Capt Truman, leader of the first flight, dropped twelve
demos in the Western section of a personnel and supply area on the North-
western shore of GALEIA BAY at DOKOELAMO VILLAGE. Two small shacks were
blown up and small fires biased momentarily. In the vicinity of GALEIA
TOWN Capt Truman's left engine was hit by a 20 mm explosive shell, damag-
ing it, but causing no loss in power.

(4) Lt Rasmussen, in right wing position, released ten bombs
in the target just East of the flight leader's bombs but results were un-
observed. His remaining two bombs fell into GALEIA LAKE South of the tar-
get. The pilot strafed an unserviceable SSF at the North end of Runway 1,
several machine gun pits 800 feet East of the South end of the same runway,
both with unobserved results, and several scattered shacks and a 300 feet
long grass-roofed building at the northern edge of the target, tracers be-
ing observed entering these buildings.

(5) Lt Bagwell dropped two bombs on some scattered shacks
approximately 4000 feet East of the North end of Runway 2, two more in the
Western part of the assigned target and after being crowded off the target
completely, finally chose to release his remaining eight demos in SEWII
VILLAGE. At least five shacks were destroyed at SEWII but other results
were unobserved.

(6) Lt Whitsell, with Lt Baker on his wing composing the
second flight, smashed the personnel target on the Southeast shore of
NOIDHO LAKE with twelve demos from each A/P and several huts were defi-
nitely destroyed. Heavy tree coverage prevented further observations.
Lt Whitsell strafed an A/A position East of the center of Runway 1, si-
lencing the guns and causing the operators to scramble for shelter.

(7) All A/P's strafed from the mouth of the AROE RIVER
through the target areas and villages along the Southern shore of GALEIA
LAKE, including SEWII and GALEIA with unobserved results. Capt Truman
gathered the Group in formation and proceeded directly to base, all A/P's
landing safely at 1500/I.

b. A/A

Heavenly, 6/8 puffs and inaccurate, probably from position 2W.
Medium, moderate, inaccurate from position East of Runway 2.
Medium, slight, inaccurate from BONO POINT.
Light ground fire, slight, inaccurate from SOAKONORA and SEWII.
Light, slight, accurate from GALEIA TOWN.

c. PERSONNEL INJURED

N11
d. A/P's damaged

A/P 766 was hit by an explosive shell in the left engine and although A/P was able to return to base on two engines, the damaged one will have to be replaced.

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this Officer at the time of submitting this report there were no individual actions which would warrant awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 60 x 100 lb demoes, 8/11 second delay fuse.
Bombs returned - 12 x 100 lb demoes, 8/11 second delay fuse.
1,400 x .30 calibre and 4,600 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

A SSF, possibly serviceable, at North end of Runway 2.
A large oil storage tank, approximately 65 feet in diameter, in tree covered area between two clearings 300 feet North of un-named lake North of NGIDIHO LAKE.
Two small fuel fires with black smoke in target 2X.
Three or four T/3 bombers, unserviceable, East of Southeast end of Runway 1.
Three men in a native canoe, three miles Northeast of the mouth of the TIABO RIVER.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

Photographs received failed to cover the bombing. Numerous shacks, apparently in good condition, are visible through a rather heavy tree cover, as crews had reported.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls

Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route
LEGEND

FFO 256-A-3  12 September, 44
500th Bomb Sqn, 345th Bomb Grp
First over target at 25-150 ft.
Time of attack: 1125/T - 1130/I
• Crew report of bomb hits
T Took photos
T Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
GALELA AIRDROME - V Bomber Command
A-2 Section 706
LEGEND

FFO 256-A-3  12 September, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Gp
First over target 25 to 150 ft
Time of attack: 1125/I - 1130/I

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

CONFIDENTIAL   INCL 2

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

Three squadrons of the 345th Group were ordered to hit the warehouse area at GORONTALO in the northeast Celebes on 16 September, 1944. This was to be a "virgin" target, as the reconnaissance photos had only been obtained the previous day. According to the photos, this was also to be a particularly "juicy" target - large, well built warehouses, crowded into a small area; ship building facilities, and numerous barracks and residential type buildings. There was no secondary target assigned - the primary was to be strafed and bombed at minimum altitude by six planes of this Squadron, each carrying four 500 (4/11 second delay) demo bombs. The first two squadrons - the 498th and 500th - were to carry demo bombs and the last squadron - the 501st - was to carry 500 pound incendiaries.

b. Formation

The squadrons were to take off from MOKMER A/D at 0400/1, proceed by individual planes to MIDDLEBURG A/D to refuel and take off from there at 0730/1 for the target. Rendezvous with the fighters was to be on course from MIDDLEBURG. The formation was to proceed directly to the target, then return again for gas at MIDDLEBURG before returning to MOKMER.

c. Attack

(1) The strike was particularly successful, with all operations proceeding exactly as scheduled, all of which was reflected in the excellent results. Only five A/P's of this Squadron reached the target and dropped 20 X 500 pound demoes there. Although each plane did not hit the exact target assigned, the bombing was excellent, since the majority of bombs hit in targets in the area.

(2) Direct hits were scored on at least six warehouses in the main warehouse area on the West bank of the BONE RIVER. Violent explosions resulted sending flames to 200 feet followed by heavy dark grey smoke to 3000/3500 feet. Volume of smoke and flames was increasing as planes withdrew. Two bombs dropped in the Township area, one-half mile Northwest of the fork in the BONE RIVER, scored direct hits on two long warehouse type buildings sending debris flying into the air while two other 500's scored hits in what appeared to be a Headquarters building 1350 feet Northwest of the river fork. One bomb fell among residential buildings on the West bank of the river 1300 feet South of the fork. One quarter-towner cratered the road along East bank of the river approximately 1800 feet South of
the shipbuilding area and two others flipped into the buildup area. 2900 feet South of the ship building area started a small fire. Three bombs, out of the 20 dropped, missed their mark and went off with a bang in the water.

3. The entire area from one-half mile North of the river fork and through the warehouse areas on both banks of the river was thoroughly strafed.

4. One A/P did not reach the target due to failure of fuel transfer system - plane turned back from the equator at 12:30E at 1096/I.

5. The fighter cover, provided by a squadron of P-38's from the 13th Air Force, was excellent, as was the Catalina Rescue Service. The "Cat" was at the target when our planes arrived.

d. **Time and Location of**
   - Takeoff: At 0615/I from MOKMER.
   - Landing: At 0550/I at MIDDLEBURG.
   - Takeoff: At 0719/I from MIDDLEBURG.
   - Landing: At 11:20/I at GORONTALO.
   - Takeoff: At 11:20/I at MIDDLEBURG.
   - Landing: At 1455/I from MIDDLEBURG.
   - Takeoff: At 1555/I from MIDDLEBURG.
   - Landing: At 1720/I at MOKMER.

e. **Route**
   - MOKMER - MIDDLEBURG - HALMAHERAS - GORONTALO - MIDDLEBURG - MOKMER.

2. **PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING**

a. **Group**
   - The 496th, led by Capt Brigham, Asst Group Operations Officer, was leader of the Group, followed by the 500th and the 501st.

b. **Squadron**
   - The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Dick, Operations Officer.
   - The flights over the target were:
     - A/P 669 - Lt Dick
     - A/P 861 - Lt Symington
     - A/P 664 - Lt Rasmussen
     - A/P 668 - Lt Cates
     - A/P 862 - Lt Zimmerman

3. **DETAILS OF THE MISSION**

a. (1) Lt Dick, leading the Squadron, made an approach from the Northwest, coming in over LAKE LIMBOTO and the well populated and cultivated valley surrounding it; then over GORONTALO TOWNSHIP and, following the West fork of the BONE RIVER, to the target, lying on the East and West banks of the BONE RIVER mouth. The past tense is preferable when speaking of this main target, as evidenced not only by the crews' reports but photographs taken during the attack.

   (2) Terrain at the target was very precipitous, as hills
rose sharply from the river on either bank, and made it difficult for anything but a single ship attack.

(3) Lt Dick began his strafing attack over the township and continued along his entire course. He dropped his first bomb toward the Central portion of the main warehouse area and his next two towards the Southern part of the area. At least two direct hits were scored on warehouses as debris was seen to fly followed by flames, which were starting to spread as his plane pulled out over the Bay. His remaining bomb hit just beyond the warehouses and skipped into the water. As Lt Dick withdrew the smoke was starting to rise and when he was over the Bay the smoke had risen to 3000/4000 feet and was still climbing.

(4) To the rear and on Lt Dick's right wing, Lt Rossmann dropped one bomb among residential buildings on the West bank of the BONE RIVER, 1300 feet South of the fork. Two were dropped in the main warehouse area scoring direct hits with 250 ft flames and explosions resulting. His fourth bomb hit in the water just South of the target. Lt Rossmann's navigator, Lt Sloan, was slightly injured when it was necessary to make a steep bank to avoid the hill just North of the main warehouse area.

(5) Lt Sydington dropped his bombs early but with telling effect. The first two quarter-tonners hit among warehouses one-half mile North of the main river fork, where direct hits were scored. His remaining two, released 1300 feet Northwest of the fork, hit in what appeared to be a Headquarters building.

(6) Lt Cates, whose target was the ship building area, was unable to hit there due to the terrain. He, therefore, attacked targets along the East bank of the BONE RIVER. His first bomb was short, falling in the water; his second cratered the road approximately 1800 feet South of the ship building yard and his last two started a fire in the built-up area in the cove 2900 feet South of the shipyard.

(7) Lt Zimmerman, "tail-end Charlie" of our Squadron, picked out the main warehouse area as his target. His four bombs hit in the Northern part of the area just West of the main road, causing an explosion with flame to 200 feet and black and gray smoke.

(8) The Squadron did its usual thorough job of strafing all along its entire run, expending 5000 .50's and 1300 .30's on the attack.

(9) As our planes made their 360° turn in COROMALAY BAY to reform the Group, they looked back to see the heavy smoke towering above the mountains, evidence of a job well done.

b. A/A
   Mil

c. Interception
   Mil

d. Personnel Casualties

Lt Sloan, Navigator on A/P 80h, will be recommended for the award of the Purple Heart for injuries received in action.
Narrative, 770 260-a-h - 500th Sqdn - cont.

(a) Damage to A/P's

2. CITATIONS

It seems will be recommended for the award of the Purple Heart for injuries received when the plane he was riding in was violently rocked up to avoid a steep hill just North of the target.

3. ARMAMENT AND ORDANCE

Bombs dropped - 20 X 500 lb demes, 6/11 second delay fuse. 
Bombs returned - 4 X 500 lb demes, 6/11 second delay fuse.
1,100 X .30 calibre and 5,000 X .50 calibre amm. expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

A 150/200 foot long dam, thought to be concrete, across river 1/2 mile Northwest of the Eastern end of LAKE LIBERTO.
A well constructed bridge two miles East of this dam and across the same river.

Entire area well populated. Town of approximately 5000/7000 population just Northwest of fork in BONE RIVER. Town had many large stores, all European-type modern buildings, and at least six buildings marked with Red Cross on roof. Roads were in excellent condition and very white, possibly concrete.

A circular body of water, possibly a reservoir, just North of built-up area at town on East bank of the West branch of the BONE RIVER.
One nearly completed double-end hull, approximately 60 feet long, and a heel of the same length, in the ways at the ship building area.

Personnel seen just North of main warehouse area.

East piles of newly cut lumber around warehouses on both sides of the river and in the ship building area.

Observation tower, approximately 100 feet high, of steel, painted green, on East shore of mouth of BONE RIVER just South of Southermost warehouse.

Warehouses in main area had metal corrugated roofs and appeared to be newly constructed and as yet unpainted.

7. PHOTOGRAHIC INTERPRETATION

Photo coverage of our attack was excellent, and more than confirms the crews' reports of the bombing. Fires, explosions and heavy billowing smoke are seen coming from the Northern portion of the main warehouse area. Fires are seen in area North of the fork in the BONE RIVER, and near misses are seen scored on buildings on the East bank of the river.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

-4-
PFC-250-4 16 Sept. 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gr.
Second over target at 50 t 100 ft.
Time of attack 1110 to 1120.
Bombing efficiency XX
* Crew report of bomb hits
† Took photos
‖ Other plane

REFERENCE
Photo, 11000 ft, 25 PS.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group (M)
APO 920

19 September, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission PFF 262-A, performed by the 500th Bomb Squadron, 19 September, 1944. Objective: Grounded A/P's in northeast dispersal areas at LANCOAN AIRDROME. Secondary: None.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

Four squadrons of the 315th Bomb Group were ordered to strike grounded airplanes in the northeast dispersal area at LANCOAN airstrip on September 19. There was no secondary target assigned. The 500th Bomb Squadron's bomb load was 72 parafrags per A/P. Alerted at 0515/1 for a 0615/1 takeoff, the squadron, second in group formation, was to proceed to LANCOAN, returning direct to base if fuel permitted. One squadron of P-38's from SANSAPOR was to furnish area cover, and a Catalina was to be in the area.

b. Formation

The squadron assumed its assigned position in group formation shortly after a 0615 - 0618/1 takeoff and proceeded direct to LANCOAN in the northeast Celebes, cutting across the east Celebes coast at BENTHEM ISLAND and approaching the A/D area from the southeast.

c. Attack

The northeast dispersal loop and small areas adjacent to the target's southeast and northwest boundaries, were well covered by the excellent bombing by five A/P's of the 500th Squadron. Our planes, second over the target, were practically unopposed during the one bombing-strafing attack, with only a few, inaccurate bursts of light A/I observed. A total of 300 parafrags bombs were dropped in the target. Two small fires were started in the southwest end, and two small huts were destroyed in the central section of the northeast dispersal area. Parafrags dropping near the taxi lane and approximately 300 feet east of the extreme north end of the runway caused a rather large explosion with red flame to about 20 feet. A/P's strafed the area covered by the bombing run, with unobserved results. An unserviceable twin-engine A/P was strafed and left burning at the southeastern end of the assigned dispersal area. One A/P failed to reach the target, turning back at 0043/13d12z, because of top turret failure. During the return trip to base the two A/P's of the second flight re-fueled at MIDDLEBURG ISLAND and the first flight stopped at HAMURI A/D on NORMPOOR ISLAND. All A/P's landed safely at NOKHER. A total of 132 parafrags were returned to base because of rack malfunctions and the failure of one A/P to reach the target. Area fighter cover was excellent and a "Cat" was seen in the area.

-1-
Narrative Report on FFO 262-a-4 (continued)

d. **Time and location of**

**Takeoff:** From MOKMER 0618/I
**Landing:** First Flight at NOEMFOOR at 1135/I
      Second Flight at MIDDLEBURG at 1330/I

**Takeoff:** From NOEMFOOR at 1529/I
      From MIDDLEBURG at 1645/I

**Landing:** At MOKMER 1600/I (First Flight)
      At MOKMER 1610/I (Second Flight)

**Rendezvous:** Over target with one Squadron of P-38's area cover.
**Attack:** 1037/I to 1040/I at 100 feet.

f. **Route**

MOKMER to LAGOAN A/D to MIDDLEBURG (Second Flight) to NOEMFOOR (First Flight) to MOKMER.

2. **PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING**

a. **Group**

The 501st, 500th, 499th and 498th proceeded to the target in that order.

b. **Squadron**

Lt Whitsett, veteran flight leader, led our squadron, which was second over the target. Flights were composed as follows:

**First Flight**

A/P 766 - Lt Whitsett
A/P 769 - Lt Stewart
A/P 688 - Lt Daker

**Second Flight**

A/P 237 - Lt Zimmerman
A/P 804 - Lt Symington

Lt Rasmussen in A/P 068 originally in #2 position in the first flight, turned back at 00425-13125 because of turret trouble, landing at MOKMER at 0800/I. Lt Stewart in A/P 769 moved up to fill the vacancy.

3. **DETAILS OF THE MISSION**

a. (1) Lt Whitsett led our squadron to LAGOAN A/D area, cutting across the Northeast CELEBES coast in the vicinity of BENTENAN ISLAND and approaching the A/D area from the Southeast. Our planes, in five-A/P's abreast formation, crossed the Northeast dispersal area on a 330 degrees heading at minimum altitude at 1037/I. K-21 cameras were turned on to record the bombing.

(2) Lt Whitsett, Stewart and Daker in the first flight released a total of 204 parafrag across the Southern section of the Northeast dispersal area and the adjacent area between the target and the extreme North end of the runway. Lt Whitsett's bombs started two small fires with light smoke to about 30 feet in the Southwest end of the area, while Lt Stewart's string of bombs definitely destroyed three small huts just South of the main road in the central part of the dispersal loop. Lt Baker's bombing caused a rather large explosion.

CONFIDENTIAL
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION (continued)
with red flames to approximately 200 feet, and heavy black smoke to 200 feet, on a taxi strip at a point approx. 300 feet East of the extreme North end of the runway. Lt Stewart returned 12 parafrags that failed to release over the target.

(3) The second flight of two A/P's, piloted by Lt. Zimmerman and Symington, dropped 96 parafrags across the south-central section of the Northeast dispersal area with unobserved results. Lt Symington returned 48 parafrags to base after they failed to release over the target. Lt Zimmerman strafed a previously unserviceable, twin-engine A/P and left it burning in the Southeastern end of the Northeastern dispersal area. Both flights strafed across the A/D area on the bombing run, but results were unobserved.

(4) Lt. Whitesell led the squadron away from the target, breaking to the North and joining the group formation just off the East coast of the Celebes, a few miles North of the Langogan area. The first flight landed at Kamiri A/D, Borneo, to re-fuel while the second flight re-fueled at Middelburg I. All A/P's landed safely on Nohker at approx. 1600/1. Lt. Rasmussen in A/P 068, originally in the first flight, failed to reach the target, turning back at 0040-13h12z because of turret failure. He landed at Nohker at 0800/1.

b. A/A
Light, slight, with 4 to 6 bursts, inaccurate, at 150-feet altitude, was received from known position at South end of the West-central dispersal area. A/P's were practically unopposed during the entire attack.

c. Interception
N/A. No enemy or Allied A/P's were shot down in combat.

d. Personnel Casualties
N/A.

e. Damage to A/P's
N/A.

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this officer at the time of writing this report, there are no individual actions which would seem to warrant an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped: 300 parafrags
Returned base: 132 parafrags
5200 X .50 Caliber ammunition expended.
6. **SIGHTINGS**

Three or four small reddish flashes were seen in center of a volcano-type hill, 5000 feet Northwest of the South end of the runway.

An A/P "graveyard" sighted at Southeast and Northwest ends of the Northeast dispersal area.

One possibly serviceable twin-engine A/P seen in Northeast dispersal area.

7. **PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION**

Photos received confirm crew reports relative to the devastation wrought by previous bombings. As reported by the crews, one A/P "graveyard" is visible in the Southeast end of the target.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer.

2 Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment sketch
Incl 2 - Route sketch
LEGEND
PP0 252-A-4  18 Sept., 1944
500th Bomb Sq.  345th Bomb Gp.
Second over target at 100 ft.
Time of attack: 1037/1
Bombing Eff. EX.
T Took Photos
T Other Planes

MAP REFERENCE
photo - V BOMBER COMMAND
(EASTERN CELEBES)
LEGEND
KFO 262-A-4 19 Sept., 1944
500th Bomb Sq. 345th Bomb Cp.
Second over target at 100 ft.

MAP REFERENCE
EAST INDIES, WEST. V BOMBER COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

20 September, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

The primary objective was a strike against personnel areas South of the SIDATE A/D in the Northeast Celebes. There was no secondary target. The target was to be strafed and bombed at minimum altitude by six planes, five carrying 12 x 100 lb demos and one plane carrying 9 x 100 lb demos, all 8/11 second delay fuses.

b. Rendezvous

Four squadrons of the 345th with the 500th in the lead, followed by the 499th, 498th and 501st in that order, formed the Group South of MOKMER A/D and proceeded direct to the target. Fighter rendezvous was to be made at the target, as the fighters were covering the AMOERANG VILLAGE area strike and our own.

c. Attack

(1) Six planes reached the target, approaching from the Southeast to the Northwest and the Nips this time were hit with everything including the kitchen sink. On the run a total of 69 x 100 lb demos (8/11 second delay) and a kitchen sink were released. The bombing was excellent with 33 bombs dropped in dispersal and personnel areas South of the center of the strip. Several of these bombs are thought to have scored near misses on a SSF in the dispersal lane, 1500 feet Southeast of the center of the runway. Several small fires, thought to be burning huts or buildings were started in this same vicinity. Twenty-seven (27) bombs were trained from the "huts area" at the Southeast end of the runway, North across the Eastern flight gap to the shore, with results other than bomb bursts unobserved. Nine bombs hit just offshore in the water, due North of the East end of the R/W.

(2) A gun position along the shore 1000 feet East of "A/P parking area" on North side of the R/W was strafed and temporarily silenced. All planes strafed throughout their bombing run, concentrating on the areas South and Southeast of the R/W. Circling out in AMOERANG BAY, the planes returned to strafe the area 2000 feet East of the R/W as they withdrew. (Photo Ref.: OD-2; Intell. Summary No. 211)

(3) Return to base, a Victor Able, heavily camouflaged in PAFAI BAY in the HALMAHERAS (0030W-1270OE) was strafed. Hits were scored but no fires started.

- 1 -
d. Time and location of
   Takeoff: At 0620/I to 0622/I from WOKNER.
   Rendezvous: Fighter rendezvous at target.
   Attack: 1055/I to 1110/I at SIDATE.
   Landing: Six A/P's at MIDDLEBURG at 1444/I to 1420/I.
   One A/P took off from MIDDLEBURG at 1510/I, landed at WOKNER
   at 1650/I.
   Five A/P's took off from MIDDLEBURG at 1510/I to 1520/I, landed
   at MAR at 1518/I to 1528/I.
   Five A/P's took off from MAR at 0745/I/20, landed at WOKNER
   at 0930/I/20.

e. Route
   WOKNER - HALWAHERAS - SIDATE - PAJANI BAY - MIDDLEBURG -
   MAR - WOKNER.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

a. Group
   The 500th, led by Captain Mortensen, Squadron Commander, led
   the attack, followed by the 499th, 498th and 501st in that order.

b. Squadron
   The 500th Squadron was comprised of the following flights:

   **FIRST FLIGHT**                                    **SECOND FLIGHT**
   A/P 055 - Capt Mortensen                              A/P 766 - Lt Cates
   A/P 237 - Lt Rasmussen                                A/P 769 - Lt Stewart
   A/P 304 - Lt Symington                                A/P 068 - Lt Baker

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. (1) Capt Mortensen, Squadron Commanding Officer, led the
   Group to the target, across the WOLUCCA SEA, making landfall near the
   north of the MOLUCCA RIVER, then coming over the mountain pass followed
   the main road to AKEMANG. He approached the target from the Southeast,
   making his attack on a heading of approximately 340°. His nine bombs were
   trained through an area 3500 feet South of the center of the R/W. Several
   of these bombs were dropped near a SSF in the dispersal lane 1500 feet
   Southeast of the R/W. Capt Mortensen had a special load for the Nips on
   this strike. Tired of hearing that the Japs had been "hit with everything
   but the kitchen sink", the Squadron decided to include that item of plumbing
   as the last word in suitable missiles. Capt Mortensen, therefore,
   with "unerring accuracy" toggled out the sink just South of the Strip,
   while the cameras clicked. Capt Mortensen strafed again position 1000 feet
   East of the A/P parking area and temporarily silenced it.

   (2) His wingmen, Lt Rasmussen in No. 2, and Lt Symington in
   No. 3 position, each dropped their 12 bombs South of the strip in the
   personnel areas starting several small fires, which were thought to be
   huts or buildings.
(3) The second flight led by Lt Cates covered the extreme Eastern portion of the target. Ten of the flight leader's bombs hit South and East of the Eastern end of the strip, while two hit just offshore. In No. 2 position, Lt Stewart toggled six of his bombs South of and through the Eastern flight gap, with the remaining six hitting just offshore. Lt Daker, left wingman, dropped eleven of his bombs in the "nuts area" and the twelfth in the "drink".

(4) All planes of the Squadron circled out in AMOERANG BAY after their bombing run; then returned and strafed an area 4000 feet East of the R/W.

(5) On the return trip several of the planes strafed a Victor Able in PAJAH BAY in the HALAHARAS (0030N-12740E). Hits were scored but no fires were started.

b. A/A

Slight, light inaccurate from position on shore 1000 feet East of A/P parking area on North side of R/W. Flashes only were seen.

c. Interception

Nil. No enemy or Allied planes were shot down in combat.

d. Personnel Casualties

Nil.

e. Damage to A/P's

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

At the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 69 X 100 lb demos, 8/11 second delay fuse.

30 X 500 lb, 13,100 X 50 calibre ammo expended.

6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS

Three loaded H/T, approximately one and one-half miles Southeast of SIDATE R/W on well-used road. Seven or eight 30 X 30 ft buildings in trees 3000 feet Southeast of R/W and several small huts along shore Northeast of center of R/W. Two A/P's in parking area at West end of the strip on Northern side, serviceability undetermined.

Three large fires, dark gray smoke to 3000 feet at AMOERANG.

A column of dark gray smoke to 3000 feet in MANADO vicinity.

Two camouflaged, loaded Victor Ables or Sugar Dogs in PAJAH BAY, between GITA-ISIAM and TASEHU.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photo coverage of the target was incomplete, however, it did
give an indication that the bombs hit in the area Southeast of the A/D.

For the Squadron Commander:

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
LEGEND

FFO 263-A-2  19 September, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 395th Bomb Group
First over target at 100 feet.
Time of attack: 1055/I to 1110/I
Bombing efficiency EX
Crew report of bomb hits
Took photos
Other planes

REFERENCE
Photo: SIDATE A/D 2 Sept, 44
Hqs, Allied Air Forces
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND

FFO 263-A-2 28 September, 1944
First over target at 100 feet
Time of attack: 1055/I-1110/I.

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

CONFLICT I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

INCL 2
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group (M)
APO 920


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

Four squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group were ordered to strike personnel areas at SIDATE A/D on the Southwest shore of AMOKERANG BAY, Northeast CELEBES on September 23. In the event of bad weather over the inland mountain areas blocking an overland approach from the East coast, a secondary plan was set up whereby the group would circumvent the Northeast tip of the CELEBES and approach SIDATE from the West. Two personnel areas approximately 2500 feet South of the center of SIDATE runway and the town of TENGA ROEMOONG were assigned as targets.

Under plan "A", the approach from the East coast, the first flight was to hit TENGA ROEMOONG village while the second flight would strike the personnel area bordering an East-West road in the Southern dispersal area. Under plan "B", the personnel areas would be hit on a different heading, governed more or less by the nature of terrain encountered. There was no secondary target assigned and the group was to proceed to the target without fighter cover.

The 500th Squadron's bomb load was 12 X 100 lb (8/11 sec.) para demos per A/P. Alerted at 0430/I for a 0530/I takeoff, the squadron was to assume third place in group formation and proceed direct to the target, returning to base direct if gas permitted.

b. Rendezvous

The Squadron assembled shortly after a 0600/I takeoff and continued, third in group formation, to the East shore of the Northeast CELEBES. Weather was good over the mountain ranges so Plan "A" approach was used. Crossing the East coast at TOTOK BAY, the striking force approached SIDATE vicinity on a Northwesterly heading.

c. Attack

Bombing was excellent. A personnel area bordering both sides of an East-West road that runs through the Southern dispersal areas 2500 feet South of the R/W, TENGA ROEMOONG village, approximately 8500 feet South of the center of SIDATE R/W and a small huts area approx. 7000 feet Northeast of this village, were hit with a total of 72 X 100 lb para demos dropped by six (6) A/P's of the 500th Squadron. Six (6) of these para demos started several small fires in the huts area, and in the personnel area, a fire with black smoke to about 200 feet resulted from 36 demos dropped there. The remaining 30 demos struck home at TENGA ROEMOONG Village and in adjacent area extending 8000 feet Northeast. The personnel area and an area lying between it and the shore of AMOKERANG BAY to the Northeast, were strafed with unobserved results, as was the village.

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Narrative Report on FFO 267-4-2 continued

c. Attack (continued)

After the attack the squadron assumed its proper position in group formation and returned direct to MIDDLEBURG I. to refuel. A/P's then continued on to MOKMER, all landing safely at 1630/I.

d. Time and location of:

Takeoff - 0558/I to 0605/I from MOKMER.
Rendezvous - Group assembly after takeoff. Nil fighter cover.
Attack - 101h/I to 1017/I at 100/150 feet.
Landing - 1340/I at MIDDLEBURG.
Takeoff - 1502/I from MIDDLEBURG.
Landing - 1630/I at MOKMER.

e. Route

MOKMER to SIDATE. Return: SIDATE to MIDDLEBURG I. to MOKMER.

2. PILOTS AND PLANE PARTICIPATING

a. Group

Lt Dick, operations officer of our squadron, led our two flights of three A/P's each, third in group formation, over the target. Flights were composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 669 - Lt Dick
A/P 864 - Lt Stewart
A/P 804 - Lt Bagshaw

SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 663 - Lt Barney
A/P 861 - Lt Rasmussen
A/P 769 - Lt Hughes

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. (1) Lt Dick led our squadron to the Northeast CELEBES East shore at TOTOK BAY and crossing the peninsula at that point approached SIDATE on a Northwesterly heading. The bombing run was made on an approximate Northwesterly heading at 100/200 feet, three A/P's abreast, at 101h/I - 1017/I. The first flight chose TENGA ROEMOONG Village, 6500 ft. South of SIDATE R/W as their target and the second flight bombed and strafed the personnel area 2500 ft. South of the center of the R/W.

(2) The first flight of three A/P's, piloted by Lts Dick, Stewart and Bagshaw, dropped a total of 30 X 100 lb para demos on TENGA ROEMOONG Village with unobserved results. Lt Stewart dropped his remaining six (6) bombs in a small huts area 7000 ft Northeast of TENGA ROEMOONG Village, starting a few very small fires. All A/P's of the first flight strafed the Village, and approx. 8000 ft Northeast of the village with unobserved results.

(3) The second flight of three A/P's, piloted by Lts Barney, Rasmussen and Hughes, dropped a total of 36 para demos in the personnel area along both sides of the East-West road in the dispersal area, 2500 ft. South of the runway.
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION (continued)

This bombing started a fire with black smoke to approximately 200 feet in the Western section of the area, just South of the West end of the R/W. All A/P's of the second flight strafed the personnel area and the area extending Northeast of the target to the shore of AMOERANG BAY, with unobserved results.

(i) Lt Dick re-assembled the squadron over AMOERANG BAY and, after assuming his proper position in group formation, proceeded direct to MIDDLEBURG I. where all A/P's landed at 1340/I to refuel. Taking off at 1502/I from MIDDLEBURG, the squadron returned to WOKMER, all A/P's landing safely at 1630/I.

b. A/A

Light to medium, moderate, inaccurate on and above A/P level, was received from two known positions in the Southern dispersal loop and from a possible position on a ridge just South of the dispersal loop.

c. Interception

Nil. No enemy or Allied planes were shot down in combat.

d. Personnel casualties

Nil.

e. Damage to A/P's

Nil.

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this officer, at the time of writing this report, there is no individual action which seems to justify an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bomb dropped: 72 X 100 lb (8/11 sec. delay fuse) para demos.
Ammunition expended: 4000 X .50 calibre and 1500 X .30 calibre.

6. SIGHTINGS

At 0950/I from 3000 ft. - two apparently serviceable barges, camouflaged with palm fronds, at TUTOK BAY.
At 1000/I from 4000 ft. - One fire with black smoke to 1000/1500 ft. at KEMA VILLAGE.
A road running East-West thru TENGA ROEMOONG VILLAGE appeared well used.
At 1016/I from 200 ft. - At a point 5000 ft. East of the East end of SIDATE strip, just offshore, two floating and loaded Type "A" barges.
At 1015/I from 200 ft. - At a point 750 ft. South of junction of flight gap and strip at East end of SIDATE R/W, a fire with black smoke to 1000/1500 ft.
At 1025/I from 1000 ft. - One serviceable steel spanned bridge across the RANOTAPO RIVER at AMOERANG VILLAGE, also three fires with black smoke to 1000 ft. in AMOERANG VILLAGE.
7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Photographs of the attack show a rather large gray-black smoke column rising from the coconut trees on the South side of the strip at the Eastern taxi lane which leads to the dispersal area. This is apparently the fire reported as a sighting by our crews. The strip appears to be short and unserviceable as our crews reported. A heavily camouflaged A/F, probably a fighter, is present in one of the hardstandings, although our crews did not report any grounded aircraft. TENGA ROEMOONG VILLAGE appears to be in excellent condition while bomb bursts and falling para dems are visible just East of the center of the village.

For the Squadron commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer.

2 Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment chart.
Incl 2 - Route sketch.
AIR 8271A

A. Bomber Command

Map Ref. - SITATE (Formerly Calder Stewart) photo

other planes

bombing instructions

ALT: 100/150 feet

Time: 1001 to 1017

Third area target

500lb bomb 9g. 34th bomb group (M)

PRO 267-4-23 September, 1944
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

1 October, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 275-A-2; Performed by the 500th Bomb Squadron, 1 October, 1944. Primary Objective: BOLAANGOOKI; Secondary (which was hit) KAKAS VILLAGE, Northeast CELEBES.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   a. The primary objective was a strike against warehouses and shipyard installations at BOLAANGOOKI in the Northeast CELEBES. The secondary target, which was hit, was KAKAS VILLAGE, near LAMOAN A/D, on LAKE TONDANO. The target was to be strafed and bombed at minimum altitude by four squadrons, three of them carrying 12 X 100 lb paradesmes (8/15 second delay fuse) per A/P, and one 1 X 500 lb incendiaries per plane. Each squadron was to have six A/Ps on the strike.

   b. Rendezvous

      Four squadrons of the 345th Group with the 499th in the lead, followed by the 500th, 501st and 498th in that order, formed the Group South of MOKMER A/D and proceeded direct to the target. The planes were to refuel at SAMAPCR on return. There was to be no fighter cover.

   c. Attack

      (1) Five planes (one having turned back due to fuel transfer failure) of this Squadron reached the Northeast CELEBES area, made landfall at PEMANGO on the South coast and then crossed overland in order to attack the primary target. The Group leader, however, did not seem to be able to locate the target, and after making numerous circles, proceeded to the secondary target. Although our squadron saw the primary target, it was necessary, according to order, to follow the lead squadron. Making a wide circle around the LAMOAN A/D area, the Squadron attacked KAKAS VILLAGE from Northwest to Southeast.

      (2) Bombing was excellent with 60 X 100 lb paradesmes dropped in the target, starting at the Northwest edge of the town and continued through it. Thirty six (36) of these bombs fell on the North side of the main East-West road, and 21 on the South side of the road. Direct hits were seen scored on several houses, one of them two-storied, with debris flying and smoke beginning to rise. A fifty-foot explosion with fire and debris also resulted. All crews reported the target well covered with bomb bursts and smoke was rising to 300/400 feet as the planes withdrew.

      (3) KAKAS VILLAGE was thoroughly strafed, as was a 30 ft wooden tower, with a small shack on top and larger shack at base. This tower was located on a hill one and one-half miles East of KAKAS.
(4) One A/P was holed by M/G fire, damaging the fuselage, and destroying a radio receiver.
(5) The 501st and 506th attacked the primary target, the 499th and 500th the secondary.

d. Time and location of
   Takeoff: From MOKMER at 0550/T to 0652/T.
   Fighter rendezvous: Nil
   Attack: KAKAS VILLAGE at 1112/T to 1114/T at 100/150 feet.
   Landing: Five A/P’s at SANSAPOR at 1400/T to 1405/T.
   Takeoff: From SANSAPOR at 1527/T to 1530/T.
   Landing: At MOKMER at 1700/T to 1702/T.
   (One A/P turned back at 0810/T at AJOE ISLAND; landed at MOKMER at 1018/T)
   e. Route: MOKMER to HALMAHERAS - BOLAANGONGOKI vicinity - KAKAS - HALMAHERAS - SANSAPOR - MOKMER.

2. Pilots and Planes Participating

a. Group
The 499th Squadron led the Group, followed by the 500th, 501st and 506th in that order. Lt Col Caltharp, Group Commander, flew with the 499th Squadron.

b. Squadron
The 500th Squadron, led by Lt Gates, comprised flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT                        SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 46B - Lt Gates                  A/P 051 - Lt Barney
A/P 769 - Lt Stewart               A/P 80U - Lt Landon
A/P 86U - Lt Baker
The sixth plane, A/P 766, flown by Lt Hughes turned back due to fuel transfer failure.

3. Details of the mission

a. (1) Lt Gates, leading the Squadron, after circling in vain waiting for the lead squadron to attack the primary target, "followed the leader" to the secondary target - KAKAS VILLAGE.
(2) Coming in from Northwest to Southeast, with five A/P’s in shallow "V" formation, Lt Gates trained his twelve bombs from the Western edge of the town along the North side of the main East-West road. His flight, consisting of Lt Stewart in No. 2 position and Lt Daker in No. 3, each successfully dropped their load of centuries in the target. Direct hits were scored on several houses, including a large two storied building, and debris and rising smoke resulted.
(3) Lt Barney, leader of the second flight, with Lt Landon in No. 2 position, maneuvered so that both dropped their bombs South of the road with telling effect. Scoring a direct hit on a small building,
Narrative, FF0 275-A-2 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

A 50 ft explosion was caused by Lt Landon. Debris was seen to fly. Lt Barney strafed a tower 1/2 miles East of KAKAS, with unobserved results.

1. All planes strafed heavily throughout the target area.
2. On leaving the target, smoke was seen to be increasing in volume and had already risen to 300/400 feet over the town area.

b. A/A

Slight, light, accurate from KAKAS TOWN was received by Lt Barney's plane.

c. Interception

Nil

d. Personnel casualties

Nil

e. Damage to A/P's

Lt Barney's plane No. 051, received a hit in the radio compartment damaging the fuselage and destroying a radio receiver.

4. Citations

At the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would justify awards.

5. Armament and Ordnance

Bombs dropped - 60 x 100 lb parademos, 8/15 second delay fuse. 4,300 X .50 Calibre ammo expended.

6. Additional sightings

Three M/7's, similar to weapons carriers, on road 15 miles SE of BOLAANGONGEI.

A clearing in a level valley, possibly a strip at BAKOKETANG VILLAGE (0105N-12410E), approx 3500 ft long and oriented SSW-NNE, just West of road.

7. Photo Interpretation

Photographs received show numerous bomb bursts in the town area - with smoke coming from a church or mission building in the Northern part. Two, what appear to be dummy gun positions, are seen in the Eastern area, near the shore of LAKE TONDANO. Town area is considerably wrecked by previous bombings.

For the Squadron Commander:

2 - Incls

Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND
FFO 275-A-2  1 October, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Second over target at 100/150 ft
Time of attack: 1112/1 - 1114/1
Bombing efficiency HX
- Crew report of bomb hits 60
  - Took photos

REFERENCE
LANGOAN A/D Flakstellung, 15/8/44
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Subject: Narrative Report on FPO 278-A-2, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron
4 October, 1944. Objective: BOLANOGEXI, Northeast Celebes.
Secondary: Power Plant at TONDANO, Northeast Celebes.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, SEABees Officer.

2. Inc1a. GENERAL Assessment
   Inc1b. Route
   Inc1c. Objective

Two squadrons of the 315th Bomb Group were ordered to strike BOLANOGEXI on the North coast of the Northeast tip of the Celebes. The other two squadrons of the Group were assigned SIDATE A/D dispersal areas as their primary target. Photos of BOLANOGEXI, taken by a squadron of the Group on a previous mission, revealed a saw mill in excellent condition, four large warehouses, one of which is afire, and several smaller buildings, all intact, within the target. Four ships of the 150 ft. type, in the early stages of construction, were on the way near the shore and a long pier with a high crane at its head was still intact. All these installations made the target a particularly fine one for strafers. A small number of serviceable A/F's at SIDATE A/D provided the other two squadrons with a suitable target. The secondary target, assigned to all four squadrons, was a power plant and adjacent buildings at TONDANO VILLAGE approximately two miles North of LAKE TONDANO in the Northeast Celebes. BOLANOGEXI was to be bombed and strafed on a number of passes from 10,000 ft. to 11,000 ft. by six planes of the 500th Squadron, followed by six of the 499th Squadron. The 501st and 498th Squadrons, in that order, were to make one bombing and strafing pass on SIDATE between 10,000 ft. and 11,000 ft. No fighter cover was provided.

b. Formation

The 500th Squadron, carrying 12 100 pound para-drops per A/F, was to take off at 0600/1 and proceed alone direct to BOLANOGEXI, striking in two ship elements. The 499th, hitting the same target, was to follow at 0630/1. The 501st and 498th Squadrons were to take off for SIDATE at 0615/1 proceeding on a direct course. In the event all squadrons were unable to hit their primary targets, they were to assemble as a Group, with the 500th leading, followed by the 499th, 501st and 498th, and strike TONDANO VILLAGE on one pass from the North. All squadrons were advised to land at SAMPAOR on the return route to refuel, then proceed to MOEMBER.

c. Attack

(1) Takeoff was executed as ordered and all planes were able

Six A/F's of the 500th made four passes on the main shipyard and droped 275 500-lb high-explosive bombs in the warehouses and ship building area, including a 250 ton jetty. The attack was made in two planes from a height of 1500 feet with the exception of a few which fell in the water near the jetty, fell in the target area. Nine large warehouses on the North side of the East-East road in the target received direct hits and the center two were left burning fiercely. At least five other small fires with light smoke to 300 feet high started. Seven ships under construction near the shore were probably damaged or at least ten near misses. Two direct hits were scored on the main U-boat base and a nearby target. Two smaller warehouses on the North side of the road near the shipyard and the Northern extremity of the target, were damaged by near misses and one was set afire. The crane on the head of a jetty at the target was probably damaged by near misses scored on the end of the jetty which was also probably damaged.

(2) The target was thoroughly strafed on four passes and traces were seen entering the saw mill buildings as well as warehouses throughout the area. A new camouflaged lugger in the second large area East of the target was damaged by strafing.

(3) No A/A or other enemy defense tactics were encountered during the attack and none of our planes were damaged or personnel injured.

Two E-22 and four E-21 cameras recorded the progress of the attack.

On the return, all planes refueled at MAR and later returned to NCMER without incident.

d. Time and location of

Takeoff: 0600/1 to 0602/1 from NCMER.
Attack: 1000/1 to 1052/1, Primary.
Landing: 1410/1 to 1413/1 at MAR.
Takeoff: 1630/1 to 1633/1 from MAR.
Landing: 1755/1 to 1800/1 at NCMER.

2. Planes and Pilots Participating

a. Group

The 500th and 499th Squadrons took off at separate times and proceeded separately to their primary target, BOLAARAIKI while the 501st followed by the 498th proceed together to their assigned primary, SIDATE.

b. Squadron

The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Whitsell, veteran pilot in this theatre. The Squadron attacked in two planes elements as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 766 - Lt Whitsell</td>
<td>A/P 804 - Lt Symington</td>
<td>A/P 851 - Lt Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 663 - Lt Reed</td>
<td>A/P 051 - Lt Stewart</td>
<td>A/P 769 - Lt Bagshaw</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 5 -
- 2 -
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. (1) Lt Whitesell, leading our Squadron, crossed the South shore of the Northeast tip of the CELEBES at PODANDI ISLAND and on a Northwesterly heading approached BOLAANKOEI BAY. When just South of the bay, the Squadron split up into the attack formation of two ship elements and at 1000, on an approximate heading of 280°, Lts Whitesell and Reed initiated the first bombing and strafing attack. Lt Whitesell dropped four bombs on his first pass, six on the second and his remaining two on the third pass, partially destroying the second large warehouse from the East end of the target on the shore side of the main road. The first or most Eastern of these four warehouses had been destroyed by a previous strike. Several near misses on the ships under construction on the shore probably caused considerable damage there.

(2) Lt Reed, on the Squadron leader’s right wing, dropped twelve parades in the Eastern half of the target, releasing four on each of the first three passes. Direct hits were scored on the second and third large warehouses West of the saw mill and on the shore side of the road. The second small warehouse on the North side of the road and West of the saw mill was set afire by near misses. Both pilots of this element broke away from the target to the Southwest after the first pass, and flew a tight 340° turn over BOLAANKOEI BAY, attacking the target on the same heading on all four passes. Lt Whitesell and Lt Reed strafed the target on each pass and tracers were seen to enter the saw mill and warehouses in the area.

(3) Lts Symington and Stewart, piloting the second two ship element, followed approximately the same flight path as the first element on all four passes. Lt Symington dropped his twelve bombs along the shore line of the target, releasing four on each of the first three passes, scoring near misses on the jetty and ships under construction. Lt Stewart dropped his bombs in the same order, scoring two direct hits on the saw mill and one direct hit on the last warehouse at the West end of the target, on the shore side of the road. Both pilots strafed the target on all four passes as well as a new camouflaged lugger located in the second depression to the East of the target. Results of strafing were generally unobserved although tracers were seen entering the lugger.

(4) The third and last two ship element was guided by Lt Rasmussen with Lt Bagshaw on his wing. Following the same pattern as the previous elements, Lt Rasmussen dropped twelve parades, releasing four in the North end of the target on the first pass and the remaining eight along the base of the ridge on the North side of the road on the second pass. Results of his bombing were generally unobserved, although a near miss was reported on the large building in the Northwest corner of the target at the base of the ridge. Lt Bagshaw dropped his twelve bombs, four on each of the first three passes, along the remaining three warehouses on the shore side of the road. Several direct hits and near misses were scored on the western-most warehouse setting the grass roof afire. All installations in the target were strafed on the four passes made by Lt Rasmussen and Lt Bagshaw and tracers were seen entering the saw mill and warehouses.

(5) The enemy offered no opposition to the attack and as our

Squadron withdrew, the target was covered with white and gray smoke approximately 250 feet high. At least five small fires had been started in the area.

(6) The Squadron reformed into two three ship flights and Lt Whitmill led them direct to MAR STRIP at HANSAPOR. After refueling, the Squadron returned to NOKESI, landing safely at 1800/I.

b. A/A
   Nil A/A reported.

c. Interception
   Nil.

d. Personnel Casualties
   Nil.

e. Damage to A/F's
   Nil.

4. CITATIONS
   At the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped = 72 X 100 lb paradoons, 8/15 second delay fuse. 8,300 X .50 calibre and 1,100 X .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
   A total of five luggers, two schooners, two barges and five smaller craft, all appearing to be serviceable, camouflaged and recently constructed in KOLAMBOGI BAY. (See attached sketch for exact location)
   Lack of signs of activity in immediate vicinity of ships in ways indicates work might have been abandoned on them.
   Numerous long and well constructed buildings at KOTAMOAGAI VILLAGE at O0h25m-12h12s.
   Four or five connecting warehouses, each over 100 ft long and a large factory type building at O0h50m-12h12s.
   A possible strip, oriented approx East-West with several portable appearing buildings on it, at SOLCH at O0h60m-12h05s.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Photographs of the bombing reveal that the large warehouse nearest to the sea wall at the Eastern end of the target was totally destroyed by a previous strike as were practically all the buildings on the point of land just West of the warehouse area. Bombs can be seen scoring near misses on the jetty although definite signs of damage are lacking. The derrick seems to have escaped damage. The bomb coverage appears excellent, as crews had
Narrative, FTO 278-4-2, 500th Sq., cont.

reported, although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of damage.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 = Bomb Assessment
   Incl 2 = Route

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

The primary objective was a strike against an unidentified installation three miles West of LANGOAN Township in the Northeast Celebes. The target, which had been first photographed on the 12th of September and again on October 1, consisted of seven buildings as follows: one large "L" shaped building, a long (370') warehouse-type building, and five small sheds or residential-type buildings. These installations, according to photo interpretation, were protected by 2100 feet of trenches, as well as "strong points" at the various entrances. The secondary target was the power house at TONDANO Township, situated at the North end of Lake Tondano. The target was to be bombed and strafed at minimum altitude by six A/P's of the 500th Squadron and six of the 499th Squadron, each plane carrying 12 X 100 lb parabolas.

b. Formation

Two squadrons only, of the 345th Group, were to participate in this strike - the 500th and the 499th - the former leading. They were to form South of MOKMER, proceed direct to the target, and on return to refuel at SANSAPOR. No fighter cover was assigned.

c. Attack

1. Approaching from the SouthEast over BENTENAN ISLAND, the target, the exact location of which was not known, was found to be just beyond the ridge of mountains about three miles Southwest of LANGOAN TOWN. Two passes were made over the target. Bombing of the installations was excellent, with 36 bombs hitting in that area. Of these eight (8) scored direct hits on the 370-foot building, partially destroying it. There were two direct hits on the long "L" of the "L"-shaped building, causing an explosion with orange flame and grayish smoke to 400 feet, and causing a portion of the roof to collapse. Six (6) direct hits and two (2) near misses on the short "L" of this building complete the destruction of this section. The installation was thoroughly strafed on both passes.
c. Attack (continued)

2. Twelve (12) bombs were dropped on a row of 12 houses in a small village at the base of KAWATAK mountain (V 43-23) destroying six of them, and causing three small fires with black smoke to 75 feet. These houses were strafed also, and tracers entering one of them were seen to cause a large white flash.

3. Twelve (12) bombs were dropped in TOMPASO VILLAGE (V 41-29) with unobserved results. These bombs, however, were jettisoned over the village, a fact that was only revealed in subsequent interrogation.

4. Four (4) bombs were dropped at a truck on the road 300/400 feet South of the target, scoring near misses. This truck was heavily strafed and very probably damaged. A Jap was seen to abandon the truck and run for cover.

5. Six (6) bombs were dropped on a village on the Southeast slope of Mt. KAWATAK at (V 47-25).

6. Two (2) bombs were dropped at sea just off BEREMAN ISLAND due to difficulty of toggling the bombs out over the target.

7. Three Jap trucks on the road in the vicinity of TOMPASO VILLAGE were heavily strafed, and one was set afire. The other two were probably damaged.

8. Warehouse-type buildings, camouflaged with palm fronds, in TOMPASO and TOEMAHAPAS VILLAGES, and in villages in the foothills South of the target were thoroughly strafed, but with generally unobserved results.

9. A medium A/A position thought to be in TOMPASO Village was strafed also.

10. Though A/A fire was received, there was no damage to planes and no personnel was injured.

(All map references are to AMOERANG, CELEBS 1:200,000)

d. Time and Location of:

Takeoff: 0535/I to 0537/I from MOKMER.

Attack: 1005/I to 1015/I at primary and vicinity.

Landing: 1259/I to 1301/I at SANSAPOR.

Takeoff: 1405/I to 1407/I from SANSAPOR.

Landing: 1535/I to 1537/I at MOKMER.

e. Route

MOKMER across HALMAHERAS - vicinity of LANGOAN - SANSAPOR - MOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING

a. Group

The 500th Squadron led, formed with the 499th South of MOKMER, then proceeded directly to target.

b. Squadron

Our squadron was led by Capt Mortensen, Squadron commander. The squadron attacked in two-plane elements.
2. PLANES, PILOTS PARTICIPATING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Element</th>
<th>Second Element</th>
<th>Third Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>085 - Capt. Mortensen</td>
<td>227 - Lt Zimmermann</td>
<td>264 - Lt Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>089 - Capt. Bassel</td>
<td>048 - Lt Hughes</td>
<td>237 - Lt Dakar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. (1) Capt. Mortensen, both Group and Squadron leader, made landfall in the Southern coast section of the Northeast Gelebes at BENTHEAN ISLAND, then proceeded overland on a northeasterly heading toward the target. He circled Mt. KAWATAK and, spotting the target just on the Northern side of the mountains, he attacked from approximately Southwest to Northeast. He released six bombs on the first pass, scoring hits on the 570-foot long building, then turning slightly to the left, made a wide circle to the right. On this circle TOMFASO VILLAGE was strafed, as was medium A/A position on the outskirts of that town. Also in this town three (3) trucks were strafed, one being set on fire and the other two probably damaged. Continuing on the circle the village of TOMBARAPAS was strafed, as were the villages East and Southeast of the target. All these villages contained warehouse-type buildings which were camouflaged with palm fronds. Capt. Mortensen then made another pass at the target, once again dropping six bombs in the long 570-foot building and again scoring hits there. A circle similar to the first pass was made and again buildings in the various villages were strafed. Withdrawal was made East of Mt. KAWATAK, out over BENTHEAN ISLAND.

(2) Capt. Bassel, No. 2 in the first element, spotted a loaded truck just South of the primary target and released four bombs at it, scoring several near misses. This truck was heavily strafed also, and it is thought to have been damaged. A Jap was seen to abandon the vehicle and run for cover. Capt. Bassel, then, had difficulty releasing his bombs over the target, but continued strafing on the two passes in the valley. Six bombs were dropped on a village on the Southeast slope of Mt. KAWATAK at point (V 47-25). His remaining bombs were dropped at sea just off BENTHEAN ISLAND.

(3) Lt. Zimmermann, leader of the second element, was unable to attack the target on the first pass due to the terrain. On his second pass, however, he released twelve bombs, which fell in train across the angle of the "L"-shaped building, scoring two direct hits on the long "L", and causing a portion of the roof to collapse. Lt. Zimmermann strafed the smaller buildings of the installation as well as the two main buildings.

(4) Lt. Hughes, No. 2 in the second element, was also unable to release on the first pass, but dropped twelve (12) bombs on the second pass, scoring six direct hits and two near misses on the short "L", causing an explosion with orange flame and grayish smoke to 400 feet, and destroying a good portion of this section.
3. DETAILS (continued)

(5) Lt Thompson, leader of the third element, could not release his bombs over the target, and, therefore, jettisoned his twelve bombs over TOMPAKO VILLAGE. This was due in part to the co-pilot's unfamiliarity with the bomb switch, since this was a new type A/P. However, the target and the surrounding villages in the area were thoroughly strafed.

(6) Lt Baker, No. 2 in the third element, due to the smallness of the primary target was unable to drop his bombs there, and therefore selected a row of 12 houses in a small village at the base of Mt. KAWATAK at (V 43-25), destroying at least six of them, and causing three small fires with black smoke up to 75 feet. He strafed these houses also, and tracers entering one of them was seen to cause a large white flash.

(7) In all, 11,850 rounds of .50 calibre and 1300 rounds of .30 calibre were expended in strafing.

d. A/A

A/A fire was medium, slight to moderate, accurate to inaccurate from the vicinity of TOMPAKO VILLAGE. Although no A/P's were holed, one plane was shaken by a burst, but on the whole not too close. In addition, ground fire, moderate, inaccurate to accurate, was encountered along the roads in the villages in the vicinity of the target.

c. Interception

Nil

d. Personal Casualties

Nil

e. Damage to A/P's

Nil

4. CITATIONS

At the time of submitting this report, there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual actions which would justify awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 40 X 100 lb parademos
Bombs salvoed - 12 X 100 lb parademos
Ammunition expended - 11,850 X .50 calibre, 1300 X .30 calibre.
6. SIGHTINGS

Buildings in target which had straw roofs appeared empty. Trenches were evident, but nil signs of activity noted. TOMFAFO VILLAGE had numerous camouflaged warehouse-type buildings loaded with lumber and supplies. Supplies were seen also along main road leading into and out of village. This road was being widened, as several graders (one camouflaged) were seen just off the road.

Three possible machine gun positions on outskirts of village thought to be TOMMARFAS. A dummy gun was seen in one of these positions.

Livestock seen throughout the valley North of target.

Truck loaded with lumber or crates on road two miles North of target.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

Photo coverage of the target was excellent and one photo reveals a large section of the "L"-shaped building destroyed. Supplies are seen stacked as well as well as scattered in the short "L". In the remaining photos of the target, smoke and dust make further damage assessment impossible. The small cluster of buildings North of the main installation appear intact. A possible A/A position is seen with the gun possibly concealed in a straw shack, which is in a revetted position. Piles of lumber and a truck loaded with lumber give indication of building activity in the area. An excellent photograph shows a very large and well-constructed building, possibly a school since a playfield is seen in the background. A camouflaged water tower is evident in the foreground.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
FFO-279-A-3 Oct. 5, 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
First over target at 50/200 ft.
Time of attack: 1005/1 to 1015/1
Bombing Eff. EX.
Crew report of bomb hits
Took photos
Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
Amoerang, Celebes
Scale: 1:200,000
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

8 October, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFQ 281-A-5, Performed by 500th
Bombardment Group 7 October, 1944. Objective: Large White House
Approximately four miles Southwest of LANGOAN. Secondary:
Power Plant just North of TOMIANO VILLAGE.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective

Four squadrons of the 345th Group were ordered to strike tar-
ggets in the Northeast CEIBUK on October 7. The 500th and 499th Squadrons
were to bomb and strafe in two plane elements and on one pass, a large
white house located approximately four miles Southwest of LANGOAN TOWN.
Photos of this installation revealed little of its military significance.
The one-story structure, reflecting typical Dutch architecture, a rambling
series ofells, featured many tall multi-paned windows similar to these
incorporated in a US school building. Landscaping had been completed with
many flower beds, shrubs, and spacious lawns surrounding the building. A
small athletic field and some related buildings are located a short dis-
tance in back of the main installations. What appeared to be a tall,
camouflaged, cylindrical tank, permanently installed, was in an upright
position in a revetted base approximately 100 feet in front of and to one
side of the house.

The remaining two squadrons of the Group were ordered to bomb
and strafe on one pass a personnel section in TOMASO VILLAGE, located
just West of LAKE TOMIANO. Previous sightings in this area indicated con-
siderable enemy activity in the area.

As a secondary target, the four squadrons were assigned a
power plant and nearby buildings in a ravine North of TOMIANO VILLAGE.
One bombing-strafing attack was to be made by each squadron in two plane
elements and on a Southerly heading.

The large house Southwest of LANGOAN VILLAGE was to be bombed
and strafed by six A/F's of the 500th and 499th Squadrons, each plane
carrying 12 x 100 lb paradesmos. The 499th was to initiate the attack
followed by the 500th, while the 498th Squadron, leading the 501st, was to
strike TOMASO.

b. Formation

The 499th Squadron, followed by the 500th, was to takeoff
from NOKMER at 0600/I and proceed direct to the target. Ten minutes after
the last plane of the 500th Squadron left the ground, the 498th and 501st
Squadrons were to take off and proceed direct to TOMASO.

There was no fighter cover assigned and after hitting their
respective targets the squadrons were form up as before and return to NOK-
MER, after refueling at SANSAPOR if necessary.

Daytime Thirteen, a Catalina rescue plane, was to orbit

BENTENAN ISLAND from 1015/I to 1115/I, covering our Group's strike.

c. Attack

The strike was very successful as the attack was carried out as ordered and the bombing was excellent. Five planes of this Squadron reached the primary target, dropping 36 X 100 lb parachutes in the area. Twelve bombs were accidentally jettisoned from one A/P over the target and another A/P, crowded off the small objective, dropped 12 bombs with unobserved results on small buildings 100 feet South of the large house and in the vicinity of the water tower. Nine hits were scored on the house causing flying debris and considerable bomb dust. The North end of the Eastern main section of the house was seen to collapse. All A/P's strafed the assigned installation and buildings in the immediate vicinity but with unobserved results.

Enemy opposition was limited to three flashes followed by white smoke on the ground, indicating A/A from vicinity of TSEP and NOKIAP. Although no bursts were seen, one A/P was rocked while flying over a ridge in the vicinity of these positions.

Two K-21 cameras, two K-22's and a K-2h experimental wing camera were turned on to catch the bombing run. There was no assigned fighter cover, and the Catalina rescue plane was not sighted.

One A/P, caught in prop wash on takeoff, mushed slightly after the wheels were retracted and the right prop nicked the runway. The A/P carried through the takeoff, circled the strip and landed immediately. The crew could not complete the mission because the spare plane set up for this mission had been used when one of the scheduled A/P's failed to check out.

d. Time and location of

Takeoff: 0600/I to 0603/I from MOKMER.
Attack: 1021/I to 1026/I, Langowan Vicinity.
Landing: 1325/I to 1328/I at MAR.
Takeoff: 1125/I to 1128/I at MAR.
Landing: 1620/I to 1622/I at MOKMER.

e. Route

MOKMER - Northeast Celebes - target - SANSAPOR - MOKMER.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING

a. Group

The 499th Squadron led the five A/P's of the 500th Squadron to the primary target. The 498th Squadron led the 501st to their target.

b. Squadron

The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Bissell, a very capable flight leader. The flights of two plane elements over the target were as follows:

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<td>A/P 068</td>
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<td>A/P 766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Bissell</td>
<td>Lt Symington</td>
<td>Lt Rasmussen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 051</td>
<td>A/P 669</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Bagwell</td>
<td>Lt Bagshaw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Lt Bissell, leading the Squadron, crossed the East coast of the Northeast Celebes tip near Bentenan Island and approached the target on a Northwesterly heading. After some difficulty the Squadron leader located the large house situated near the base of Kawataki Mt, on the northern western side. The attack was initiated on an approximate North heading from 150 feet altitude at 1021/2. There was no evidence of the 499th Squadron's bombing. Cameras were turned on to record the attack.

Attacking in a two plane element, Lts Bissell and Bagwell each dropped 12 parabolas at the house. Lt Bissell scored two direct hits on the Eastern main section and the North end of the portion collapsed. The Squadron leader scored again with one bomb in the passageway just east of the central main section, causing a small explosion followed by flying debris and bomb dust. The remainder of his bombs fell just North of the house. Lt Bagwell's run carried him over the extreme Eastern passageway and of the 12 bombs he dropped, two scored direct hits there, causing the passageway to collapse. His remaining demos fell just South of the building in the front yard, two being classed as near misses.

The second element, consisting of Lts Symington and Lt Bagshaw, came over the central and western sections of the house on a Northerly heading. Lt Symington's 12 bombs were accidentally jettisoned over the house and no results were observed. Lt Bagshaw, however, managed to score four direct hits on the Western-most main section of the house. His remaining eight parabolas fell short of the house in the front yard, three of them scoring near misses on the structure.

Lt Rasmussen, in the last A/P of the Squadron formation, was on the inside of a steep bank as the second element endeavored to turn on to their bombing run. As a result he could not see the other planes while he was in the turn. He steepened his bank even more and continued his turn until he felt reasonably sure it was safe to level out. When he came out of the turn he realised that he could not line up on the white house, so he dropped his 12 demos on small buildings located about 100 feet south of the main installation with unobserved results.

All A/P's strafed the white house and small buildings in the immediate vicinity with unobserved results. As our planes withdrew, the assigned objective was cloaked in bomb dust and light smoke, but crews did not report any fires.

Lt Rasmussen reported he felt his plane jump or jar as he passed over the ridge in the vicinity of TEEP and TOELLIAN VILLAGES, and it is possible that he drew medium, slight and accurate A/A fire from this point, although no bursts were seen. Flashies followed by white puffs on the ground, were seen in these villages.

After the attack the Squadron rejoined the 499th and returned to Sansapor and refueling there before continuing to Mokmer.

b. A/A

Possible medium, slight, accurate from vicinity of TOELLIAN and TEEP evidenced by flashes followed by white smoke on the ground. One A/P was rocked while going over a ridge in this vicinity.

c. Interception
   Nil

d. Personnel Casualties
   Nil

e. Damage to A/P's

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this Officer at the time of writing this report, there were no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

5. ORDNANCE AND ARMAMENT

Bombs dropped - 48 x 100 lb paradesmos.
Bombs jettisoned - 12 x 100 lb paradesmos.
Bombs returned - 12 x 100 lb paradesmos.
600 x .30 calibre and 7,650 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

6. ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS

"L" shaped building near target area, previous day's target, was completely destroyed by that strike.
Two/three trucks on road just East of target.
Livestock seen in target area.
A T/E bomber, serviceability undetermined, and a SSF, probably unserviceable, on Southwest end of LANGAN STRIP.
Five/six very long warehouses with corrugated roofs grouped in SOMAMPOE VILLAGE at 00561-121565.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

Photographs received show the large white house enveloped in a dense cloud of bomb dust and it is impossible to estimate the damage done. Parademos can be seen alighting in the area just South of the main house and water tanks. The surrounding country-side is under cultivation. Many field shacks and rice paddies dot the landscape. A few horses and cows are visible and a possible M/G emplacement is visible in one of the photos and is probably located approximately two miles North of the target on the North edge of a large rice growing area.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp.
Second over target at 100/150.
Time of attack: 1024/I to 1026/I
Bombing BFF. EX.
Crew report of bomb hits
7 Took photos.

MAP REFERENCE
Amoerang, Calabes - 1:200,000

ENLARGEMENT
OF TARGET
NO SCALE
PF0-261-A-5  7 Oct., 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp.
Time over target: 1024/1 to 1026/1
Altitude: 100 to 150 ft.

MAP REFERENCE

East Indies, west-V Bomber Command

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

   a. Objective

      The 500th Squadron was ordered to attack at minimum altitude a large white house approximately four miles Southwest of Langowan in the Northeast Celebes. Although photos of the last attack on the house show considerable damage to it, it was thought that enough of the building remained undamaged to warrant another strike. The other three squadrons of the Group were ordered to strike warehouses and personnel quarters at Kobang Village, also in the Northeast Celebes.

      As a secondary target, all four squadrons were assigned a personnel area two miles North of Tomonon approximately 12 miles NNW of Langowan.

      The six A/P's of the 500th Squadron were to carry 12 x 100 lb paradesmos each and were to make two passes at the target.

      Mil fighter cover was scheduled.

   b. Formation

      The 499th, 498th and 501st Squadrons were to take off together and proceed direct to their primary target.

      At 0615/1 the 500th was to take off from Mokmer, also proceeding direct to target. After hitting their respective primaries all squadrons were to return to Sansapor in Group formation, refueling there before returning to base. If the secondary was hit the squadrons were to return individually.

   c. Attack

      The strike was executed as planned and all six A/P's reached the primary. Sixty (60) 100 lb paradesmos were dropped at the white house scoring 15 direct hits on the building, eleven in the Southern main section and four in the northern section.

      The remaining 45 centuries exploded in the very near vicinity of the house of which 12 are considered near misses in the Northern main section. As our A/P's withdrew after a second run over the target, bomb dust and slight smoke obscured the target. One A/P experienced release malfunction on each run and jettisoned his bombs approximately 1 1/2 miles North of the target. All A/P's

strafed the house and immediate vicinity on both passes, scoring
hits on the target and subordinate shacks.
A/P's encountered medium, slight and inaccurate A/A
from LANGOAN STRIP AREA and a slight amount of light ground fire
from a position Northwest of the target.
The Catalina Rescue plane was contacted at TIFOU
ISLAND both before and after the strike. K-21 cameras were turn-
ed on during both runs.

One A/p blew a tire on landing at NOKMER but no
damage other than a shredded tire resulted and no personnel were
injured. All squadrons of the Group returned direct to SANSAPOR
and refueled before returning to NOKMER.

d. Time and location of

Takeoff: 0612/I to 0615/I from NOKMER.
Attack: 1030/I to 1037/I - LANGOAN AREA.
Landing: 1325/I to 1327/I at NOKMER.
Takeoff: 1505/I to 1508/I from NOKMER.
Landing: 1630/I to 1633/I at NOKMER.

e. Route

NOKMER - HALMAHERAS - TARGET - SANSAPOR - NOKMER.

2. PILOTS, PLANES PARTICIPATING

a. Group

The 499th, 498th and 501st Squadrons proceeded to
their primary target in formation. The 500th Squadron took off
at 0615/I and proceeded alone to their primary.

b. Squadron

The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Zimmerman, a
veteran pilot of this unit and the two ship elements in the
attack were composed as follows:

**FIRST ELEMENT**  **SECOND ELEMENT**  **THIRD ELEMENT**
A/P 048 - Lt Zimmermann  A/P 061 - Lt Symington  A/P 864 - Lt Thompson
A/P 059 - Lt Stewart       A/P 861 - Lt Reed       A/P 769 - Lt Rasmussen

3. DETAILS OF MISSION

a. Lt Zimmerman, leading our Squadron, made landfall
on the East coast of the Northeast GULF at BERTENAH ISLAND
and approached the target area on a Northwestery heading.
Then veering sharply to the right around the southern end of
MT KAWATAK, the Squadron formed into two ship elements and
attacked the target on a northerly heading at an altitude of
75/200 feet. A second pass was executed in much the same man-
ner as A/P's circled wide to the right for their second run.
Lts Zimmerman and Stewart initiated the attack. Lt Zimmerman dropped his 12 bombs on the first pass scoring two direct hits in the northern main section of the house. Lt Stewart experienced release failure on both passes and jettisoned his parades nos 1 1/2 miles north of the target. Both pilots strafed the house on each pass and observed tracers entering the structure.

Lt Symington and Lt Reed, in the second element, dropped a total of 24 parades nos in the area. Lt Symington released six bombs on his first pass, made over the northern main section but smoke obscured results. He dropped his remaining six centuries on his second pass, scoring three direct hits in the southern main section. Lt Reed dropped 12 parades nos on his second pass scoring two direct hits on the southern main section.

Lts Thompson and Rasmussen, making up the third and last element, dropped a total of 24 parades nos in the target area. Lt Thompson dropped his bombs on the first pass scoring two direct hits on the northern passageway just south of the northern main section and also registering four near misses. Lt Rasmussen dropped eight bombs on his first pass scoring six direct hits in the southern main section. On his second pass he released the remaining four bombs at the central section with unobserved results. All pilots strafed the general area and the target on both passes and many hits were scored.

The Squadron reformed, joined the Group, and returned to SANSAPOR. Lt Stewart in A/P 059 nursed an erratic engine all the way from the target to SANSAPOR. He left the A/P there for servicing and returned to MOKMER in an A/P of the 498th Squadron which had remained there from a strike several days previous. All A/P's refueled and landed safely at MOKMER after a 1605/I takeoff from MAR. Lt Reed in A/P 861 outsmarted a blow-out on landing at MOKMER and brought his plane to a halt at the end of the R/W. No damage to plane or personnel injury resulted.

b. A/A

Medium, slight, inaccurate (5-6 white bursts) from South end of LANGOH DRUMG. Light ground fire, slight, inaccurate from position approx 1 1/2 miles Northeast of target.

c. Nil interception. Nil enemy or Allied A/Ps lost.

d. Nil personnel casualties.

e. Nil damage to A/P's (excluding one blown-out tire).

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this Officer at the time of this re-

port, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 60 x 100 lb parademos, 8/16 second delay fuse.
Bombs jettisoned - 12 x 100 lb parademos, 8/16 second delay fuse.
6,800 X .50 and 300 X .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS

Five Japs in M/G position firing 11/2 miles Northeast of target.
Target building appeared to be built of glazed brick.
In the south main sections the walls were still standing but roof and interior appeared gutted by previous bombing.
Two large holes in the roof were visible and many of the windows were blown out by the previous attack.
Numerous livestock seen in area and many small grass shacks in the surrounding cultivated fields.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

K-21 photos received show numerous holes in building but most of the walls are still standing. Bombs are shown scoring near misses on one end of the building.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND

FPO 285-A-1 11 October 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp
Only planes on this target
Altitude of attack: 75/200 ft
Time of attack: 1030/1-1037/I
Crew report of bomb hits
Took photos
T Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
AMOERANG, CELEBES, 1:200,000
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND

FFO 285-A-1  11 October 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Grp
Only planes on target.
Time of attack: 1030/I - 1037/I.
Altitude of attack: 75/200 feet

MAP REFERENCE
East Indies, West
V Bomber Command

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL 2
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group (M)
APO 920

5 November, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission 308-7 (13th Air Force)
Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron November 3, 1944.
Objective: Grounded A/F's and installations, ALICANTE
and FABRICA A/F's, Northern NEGROS.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Staging out of MOROTAI under the 13th Air Force,
the 345th Group was ordered to attack ALICANTE and FABRICA A/F's
on the North tip of NEGROS ISLAND in a minimum altitude attack
3 November. All squadrons were to strafe both dromes - the 501st
and 498th were to bomb ALICANTE and the 499th and 500th were to
bomb FABRICA. Six 100 pound GP bombs were carried by each plane;
fighter cover was provided by P-38's.
(b) Lt Symington led our Squadron's take off at 0735/1
and quickly formed the 500th in the No. 4 position in the group
formation. Rendezvous with the P-38 fighter cover at RAOF ISLAND
was effected at 500 feet as scheduled.
(c) The 500th Squadron approached ALICANTE on an
approximate heading of 40°. Buildings and grounded planes there
were strafed but mostly with unobserved results. One Tojo pre-
paring to takeoff, was destroyed. Immediately after leaving AL-
ICANTE our planes were intercepted by 6/8 Tony's and Tojo's. The
Group leader, in accordance with orders given before takeoff,
turned the formation toward base instead of proceeding to FABRICA
A/F. The 499th and 500th Squadrons salvoed their bombs in the
water and all planes returned to base after a ten minute fight
with the enemy interceptors. None of our planes were damaged
either by interception or by medium A/A encountered over ALICANTE
DRONE.
(d) Time and Location of:
Takeoff: 0735/1 to 0737/1 from MOROTAI.
Rendezvous: 0800/1 with P-38's at RAOF ISLAND.
Attack: 1215/1 to 1225/1 at ALICANTE.
Landing: 1622/1 to 1625/1 at MOROTAI.
(e) Route: MOROTAI - RAOF - TALAUD - SOUTH MINDANAO -
GUIMARAS STRAIT - ALICANTE - TAMON STRAIT - MOROTAI.

2. PLANES AND PILOTS PARTICIPATING
(a) Group: The 501st Squadron led the Group followed
by the 498th, 499th and 500th in that order.
(b) Lt Symington led our Squadron composed of four
planes as follows:
A/P 035 - Lt Symington
A/P 663 - Capt Bazzle
A/P 043 - Lt Stewart
A/P 769 - Lt Landon

1
Narrative, PPO 308, 500th Sqdn, cont.

Lt Baker in A/P 059, was also scheduled for the mission but due to radio failure, A/P did not take off.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
(a) 1. Lt Symington, Squadron leader, followed the preceding three squadrons of the Group across ALICANTE pulling our four planes up into a line abreast formation just before reaching the target. He thoroughly strafed the Northwest dispersal area with nil observed results. When pulling off the drone 6/6 enemy planes intercepted. A total of three passes - one from 7 o'clock high and two from 6 o'clock - were made at Lt Symington's A/P. The enemy fighters were aggressive, one Tojo pressing his attack to within 75 yards.

2. Capt Buzzell, on Lt Symington's right wing, also strafed the dispersal area and saw his tracers enter two TF just off the strip. Enemy fighters made four passes at his A/P, all from the rear, with nil damage inflicted by either side.

3. Lt Landon on the extreme right of the four plane element strafed a Tojo with its prop turning ready for takeoff. Its pilot was seen to scramble out as our planes approached, and hide under the plane which exploded with a satisfying bang from Lt Landon's strafing. One Tojo and one Jap - definite. Two passes were made at this A/P by Tony's, one from 1 o'clock, the other from 6 o'clock. Both were pressed to almost 200 yards.

4. Lt Stewart, left wingman on the Squadron leader, strafed buildings and stacks in the area as well as two TF bombers in the dispersal area, but nil apparent damage resulted.

5. Our planes encountered medium A/A over the drone, none of it accurate.

6. The Group leader, in view of the interception, chose to skip FABRICA A/D, which was the 500th's bombing target, so our bombs were salvaged in the water off the north tip of NEGROS. Our planes poured on the coal and finally caught the Group formation in TANNON STRAIT for the return to base.

(b) A/A was medium, slight to moderate, inaccurate from ALICANTE A/D area.

(c) Interception was by 6/6 Tony's and Tojo's. Enemy pilots were aggressive and evidently experienced.

(d) Nil A/P's damaged.

(e) Nil personal injured.

4. In the opinion of this Officer, there were, at the time of submitting this report, no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
24 x 100 lb GP's, 8/15 second delay.
4,200 x .50 and 800 x .30 caliber ammo expended.

6. SIGHTING
Area appeared well developed throughout NEGROS.
A long jetty was sighted just North of ALICANTE TOWN.
Narrative, PPO 308, 500th Sqdn, cont.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATIONS
 All photos taken.

For the Squadron Commander:

CARL A. STRAUSS
Capt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
LEGEND

FFO 308-A  3 November, 44
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Gp
Last over target at 50/150;
Time of attack: 1215/1-1225/1

MAP REFERENCE

Fighter Grid Map - Fighter Command. Scale, approx
65 mi to 1 in.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

5 November, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 309-7 (15th Air Force), performed by 500th Bomb Sqdn, 4 November, 1944. Objectives: Grounded A/P's, Supplies and Installations, DALIAO and LIBBY A/D's, MINDANAO.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Staging from MOROTAI under the 15th Air Force to continue the "knocking out" of enemy dromes in the Philippines, the 345th Bomb Group was ordered to strike DALIAO and LIBBY A/D's just South of DAVAO on MINDANAO. Carrying six 100 pounders per A/P for the minimum altitude bombing and strafing attack the 500th and 499th were assigned LIBBY A/D; the 498th and 501st drew DALIAO for their target. No fighter cover was scheduled.
(b) The Group formed immediately after takeoff and proceeded direct to the target.
(c) Twenty-four (24) 100 pound GP bombs were dropped in dispersal areas of LIBBY DROME by four B-25's of the 500th squadron with unobserved results. Enemy opposition was conspicuous by its absence - not even a rock was thrown up at our planes.
(d) Time and location of:
   Takeoff: 0651/I to 0653/I from MOROTAI.
   Attack: 0925/I at 50/100 feet at LIBBY A/D.
   Landing: 1120/I to 1122/I at MOROTAI.
(e) Route: Direct.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING
(a) Group: The 500th Sqdn led the Group with the 499th, 498th and 501st following.
(b) Squadron: The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Symington with Lt Col Rosenbaum, Group Deputy Commander, as co-pilot. Squadron consisted of one flight of four planes as follows:
   A/P 033 - Lt Symington
   A/P 065 - Capt Bazzle
   A/P 043 - Lt Daker
   A/P 059 - Lt Bagwell

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
(a) Lt Symington led the Squadron overland from the DAVAO GULF several miles below DALIAO and making a sweeping turn crossed the target on an approximate heading of 90°.
(b) Flying in line abreast formation all bombs of the Squadron were dropped in the dispersal and supply area.
Narrative, FFO 309, 500th Sqdn, cont.

South of the drome. Bombs were seen to fall among shacks and small buildings but due to the delayed fuse used and tree cover, nil results of bombing other than bomb dust was observed. The area got an excellent spraying with machine gun fire, but here again results weren't observed.

(c) Nil A/A or interception.
(d) Nil A/P's damaged.
(e) Nil personnel injured.

4. CITATIONS
Nil awards recommended.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
Bombs dropped - 24 X 100 lb Gp, 8/15 second delay. 2,500 X .50 and 300 X .30 calibre ammo expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
Area appeared deserted.
A lugger and small native craft were sighted 4/5 miles North of SANTA CRUZ.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
K-21 photos were taken but at the time of submitting this report no prints have been received.

For the Squadron Commander:

CECIL G. JOHNSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Acting Intelligence Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
PPO 509-A  4 November 44
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Gp
First over target at 50/100 ft
Time of attack: 0925/1

MAP REFERENCE
Fighter Grid Map. Approx scale
65 mi to 1 in.
LEGEND
4 November, 1944
503rd Bomb Sqn, 345th Bomb Grp
First over target at 50/100 ft
Time of attack: 0925/I
\* Crew report of bomb hits
\(\_\) Took photos
\(\_\) Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
DALIAO, MINDANAO ISLAND, Target Map. Scale, 1:20,000
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

2 December, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission APO 335-D-2, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron November 30. Objective: DALIAO
and PADADA DRONES in DAVAO AREA, MINDANAO.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

   (a) Objective: As a part of the overall strategy de-
   signed at knocking out enemy airpower in the Philippines, six
   planes per squadron of the 345th Group were ordered to attack
   DALIAO and PADADA DRONES in DAVAO GULF. Both targets were to
   be strafed but DALIAO was assigned as main bombing target.
   If a plane were pushed off the first target or experienced
   release trouble, the bombs were to be dropped at PADADA.
   Bomb load consisted of 72 parafrag per plane which were to be
   dropped at minimum altitude. No fighter cover was scheduled;
   A/P's were to land at MOROTAI on return to refuel before pro-
   ceeding to base.

   (b) Rendezvous: The Group formed immediately after
   takeoff and proceeded direct to the target.

   (c) Excellent coverage of DALIAO dispersal areas and
   partial coverage of PADADA Eastern dispersal system was secured
   by six B-25J's of the 500th Squadron. A total of 256 parafrag
   drifted down on the west dispersal area at DALIAO causing an
   explosion with black smoke to 300 feet and another smaller
   black smoke fire. Bombs also hit what appeared to be a tower
   by the edge of the strip with nil observed damage. A slight
   amount of ground fire was received from the angry Nips in this
   area.

   Seventy two (72) bombs were dropped on the east
   dispersal area with unobserved results. A T/S bomber was hit
   by strafing but resulting damages are unknown. Nil opposition.
   Both targets were thoroughly strafed but due to excellent tree
   cover surrounding the dispersal lanes and revetments it was
   impossible to see any results.

   (d) Time and location of:
   Takeoff: 0525/I to 0527/I from WORKER
   Rendezvous: Group assembled South of WORKER at
   0540/I

   Attack: 1035/I at DALIAO. 1045/I at PADADA.
   Landing: 1241/I to 1244/I at WORKER.
   Takeoff: 1420/I to 1425/I from WORKER.
   Landing: 1720/I to 1723/I at WORKER.

   (e) Route: WORKER - DALIAO - PADADA - WORKER -
NARRATIVE PFO 335-D-2 - 500TH SQDN - CONT.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING
   (a) The 498th Squadron led the Group with the 499th, 500th and 501st following in that order.
   (b) The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Landon, veteran flight leader, and was composed of two flights as follows:

   **FIRST FLIGHT**                              **SECOND FLIGHT**
   A/P 179 - Lt Landon    A/P 191 - Lt Thompson
   A/P 010 - Lt Baker     A/P 171 - Lt Begwell
   A/P 187 - Lt Rasmussen A/P 127 - Capt Hazzle

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) 1. After takeoff from Morner Lt Landon quickly formed our Squadron in the No. 3 position in the Group formation. Approaching tailbud Island in Davao Gulf the Group began to space itself and our Squadron pulled into two flights of three for the target run. Swinging inside Libby Drain Lt Landon crossed Daliao on an almost due South heading with his two wingman up in line abreast. His bombs, spaced through the western dispersal area, caused an explosion with a resulting fire sending black smoke to 300 feet. Breaking over the coast Lt Landon trailed the preceding flights to just below Santa Cruz where he passed inland for the strafing run on Padada, strafing a path through the eastern dispersal area with unobserved results.

   2. Lt Baker, right wingman on Lt Landon, dropped his 72 bombs slightly to the right of the flight leader's pattern. Bombs fell near several wrecked planes on the central taxiway but no damage from any of his bombs were observed. His strafing run over Padada also failed to show any visible results.

   3. Lt Rasmussen, No. 3 man in the first flight, experienced release failure after dropping two banks - 24 bombs - on Daliao dispersal areas. He tried again to release the remaining 48 bombs over Padada but again they failed to drop. He strafed a serviceable T/E bomber in the eastern dispersal area with results unobserved.

   4. Lt Thompson, leader of the second flight, followed the first flight at a 30 second interval. Crossing Daliao on an approx 210° heading, he toggled out 36 parasages in the dispersal area East of the dome with unobserved results. Seeing nothing of value there, he held his remaining bombs for Padada, but here again they fell without observed damage.

   5. Lt Bagwell, right wingman, dropped only 12 bombs at Daliao due to paucity of targets. He dropped 36 at Padada along the eastern taxiway and dispersal area, all with unobserved results. His remaining 24 bombs hung up and were returned to base.

   6. Capt Hazzle, left wingman, toggled his 72 bombs along the west dispersal area and across the strip near the South end. A small black smoke fire was started between the north and central taxiways. At Padada his tracers started two small black smoke fires and a white smoke blaze - all subsided very shortly - just east of the most eastern taxiway.
Narrative, FPO 335-D-2, 500th Sqdn - cont.

7. All A/P's thoroughly strafed both targets as evidenced by the 14,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammo expended.
6. After landing at MSORTAI to refuel, our planes returned in squadron formation to ESSEKA.

(b) 2/A consisted of a slight amount of inaccurate ground fire.
(c) Mil interception.
(d) Mil A/P's damaged.
(e) Mil personnel injured.

4. CITATIONS
Mil awards recommended.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
Bombs dropped - 360 X 23 pound parafrags.
Bombs returned - 72 X 23 pound parafrags.
Ammo expended - 14,000 X .50 calibre. Mil .50's.

6. SIGHTINGS
DALIAO: Several wrecked A/P's in western dispersal areas.
An 8/I A/P, thought to be serviceable, in revetment with camouflage netting, just off the east end of the drone, midway of the strip.
FADADA: A T/E B-A/P burning at north end of drone.
Three T/E bombers, thought to be serviceable in dispersal by's along eastern taxiway.
A dummy 8/E A/P on east side of the southern end of the strip.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERCEPTION
Mil photos taken.

For the Commanding Officer:

CECIL G. JOHNSON
1st Lt. Air Corps
Acting Intell. Officer

2 - Incls
Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route
CONFIDENTIAL

MAP REFERENCE
DALIAO & LIBBY DROMES TGT MAP
Scale: 1:20,000

MAP REFERENCE
PADADA DROME TARGET MAP
Scale: 1:20,000

LEGEND
PPO 335-D-2 30 Nov., 1944
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Group
Third over target at 50/150
Time of attack: 1035-1045/1
Bombing efficiency: EX
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (K)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

13 December, 1944

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission PTO 347-D-2, performed by 500th Bomb Squadron (K), 12 December, 1944. Objective: Grounded A/P's and Supplies - PADADA A/B, MINDANAO.

TO: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Objective: To further discourage the use of PADADA DRONE in the DAVAO area as a "jumping off" place for nip planes against Allied installations at MOROTAI and LETIAN, 24 B-25's - six per squadron - of the 345th Group, were assigned the task of knocking out reported planes there as well as hitting personnel and supply areas in the immediate vicinity of the drones. Bombload consisted of 72 paraflugis per A/P to be dropped on two bombing-staging runs which were to be made on northerly headings. The secondary target was shipping within a 15 mile radius of PADADA. In the event DAVAO GULF was "sunk" in a tertiary target - BUAXAN DRONE and dispersal areas just inland from SARRAMANI BAY - was to be hit.

   Mill fighter cover was assigned. All A/P's were to land at MOROTAI to refuel before returning to MOROTAI. Crews were thoroughly briefed on bombing restrictions before takeoff.
   (b) Rendezvous: The Group formed immediately after takeoff and proceeded direct to the target.
   (c) Covering the dispersal areas like a wet blanket, six B-25 J's of this squadron dropped 352 X 23 lb paraflugis on grounded A/P's, personnel areas and supply areas at PADADA DRONE in a minimum altitude attack on the morning of 12 December. Making two passes to insure that no targets were left untouched, our pilots dropped 180 bombs on their first run and 252 on their second. Although bombs were seen to fall on a camouflaged plane and on or near revetments reported to contain three others, no actual results were observed. Due to the excellent tree cover and the type bombs used, our planes were too far away to catch observations of damage before the bombs went off. A large fuel fire with black smoke to 2000 feet was raging as our planes approached for their second pass and while our squadron had dropped bombs in the same spot on the first run, it is undetermined as to whether our bombs started the fire.

   The target was pelted by a total of 17,000 .50 calibres on the two passes. Tracers were seen entering the tower and a dummy A/P on the drone but no fires were started. A truck was strafed, also with unobserved results.

   The irate enemy threw up a moderate amount of light A/A and on the second pass a sharpshooter North of the drone scored a 20 mm hit on the right wing of one of our A/P's knocking a 12 inch hole in the leading edge. This A/P landed safely at MOROTAI where it was left for repairs, the crew returning to MOROTAI in other planes of the Squadron.
   (d) Time and location of:
      Takeoff: 0517Z to 0519Z from MOROTAI.
      Rendezvous: Group assembly immediately after takeoff.
2. PILOTs AND FLIGHTS PARTICIPATING
   (a) The 500th Squadron, with Major Mortensen, Squadron Commander,
       leading, led the Group with the 501st, 496th and 499th following in that
       order.
   (b) The 500th was composed of two flights of three as follows:
       FIRST FLIGHT
       A/P 763 - Maj Mortensen
       A/P 161 - Lt Schmidt
       A/P 210 - Capt Baszel
       SECOND FLIGHT
       A/P 172 - Lt Rasmussen
       A/P 191 - Lt Canning
       A/P 619 - Lt Bagshaw

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   (a) Maj Mortensen quickly assembled the Group after takeoff
       and proceeded on a direct heading to the target. At DAVAO GULF
       entrance he began spacing the Group at 30 second intervals and pulling his second
       flight up to his left to form a six ship line abreast formation he crossed
       GUAPSIN PT and swung slightly inland to approach the target on a northerly
       heading. On his first pass he released 21 paratroops through the East
       dispersal loop. Bombs were seen to fall on a serviceable camouflage A/P
       in the southernmost ravine but the extent of damage caused is unknown.
       Breaking away to the east the Group leader made a 360 in DAVAO GULF and
       seeing no shipping in the PARADA vicinity to strafe, he crossed the target
       on his second pass, again on a northerly heading. His 2 remaining bombs
       were dropped along the ravens on either side of the East Loop with un-
       observed results.
   2. Lt Schmidt, right wingman on major mortensen, dropped
       36 bombs on his first pass with most of them falling just north of the East
       taxiway along the main road. On his second pass his remaining 36 bombs
       drifted down through the area north of the PARADA RIVER along the road with
       the last one landing approximately midway of the east taxiway. He strafed
       a truck on the road about 30 yards north of the river. All results of
       bombing or strafing observed.
   3. Capt Baszel, on the squadron leader's left wing, dropped
       48 bombs across the south end of the strip and into the supply area in the
       center of the east dispersal loop. He dropped 21 bombs in the central supply
       area on his second pass. All observed results.
   4. Lt Canning, number two man in the second flight and just
       to the left of Capt Baszel in the attack formation, arrived the target over
       on his first pass seeking a good area to drop his bombs on the second run. He
       strafed the tower on this pass and observed his tracers entering the structure.
       His 72 bombs dropped on the second pass, started falling just to the
       right of the tower and extended across the north ravens where service-
       able A/P's had been reported. And again no definite results could be seen.
   5. Lt Rasmussen, second flight leader and second from the
       left, dropped his entire bombload on the first pass spacing them through the
western dispersal and supply area and, skipping the runways, through the north dispersal and slightly beyond. While no results of his bombing were observed as he left the target, a large oil fire with black smoke to 2000 feet was raging in the center of the west loop where several of his bombs fell on the first run.

6. Lt Bagshaw on the extreme left of the formation failed to drop any bombs on his first run. He strafed a dummy A/P on the north end of the strip and observing crew members saw tracers entering the "joker", but it didn't burn. On his second pass, Lt Bagshaw dropped 24 bombs in the west dispersal and 48 in the North supply and dispersal areas with nil observed results. A three gun light position just south of the BULATAKAY RIVER opened up on him as he withdrew and scored a direct hit on the leading edge of his right wing. He nursed the plane back to MOROTAI where it was left for repairs. The remaining five planes refueled there and with Lt Bagshaw's crew split up among them returned to NORMAN without incident.

All A/P's thoroughly strafed the target on both passes. Due to the tall palm trees covering the entire area it was virtually impossible to determine any definite results of either bombing or strafing although considerable damage undoubtedly resulted.

(b) A/A was light, slight to moderate, inaccurate to accurate from known positions; and a single gun position just south of the tower.

(e) Nil interception.

(d) A/P 619 received a 12 inch hole in the leading edge of the right wing. A/P left at MOROTAI for repairs.

(e) Nil personnel injured.

4. CITATION

Nil awards recommended.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 432 x 23 lb parafrag.
Ammo expended - 17,000 x .50 calibros.

6. SIGHTINGS

An estimated 30 M/T's, in compact convoy formation, on main road north of BULATAKAY RIVER, several native canoes along coast in vicinity of PARADA.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

Six K-21 photos received show bombs falling on or near camouflaged A/P's in north dispersal. Others are falling on the strip. The large black smoke column is clearly shown on two of the photos.

For the commanding officer:

CECIL G. JOHNSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Acting Intell. Officer

2 - Incls

Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
Incl 2 - Route

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 920

18 December, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   (a) Objective: As the second half of a SWPA shuttle service, six B-25J's per squadron of the 345th Bomb Group were ordered to attack dispersal, personnel and supply areas at LICANAN DROME. Taking off from MAR A/D at SANSAFAR the planes were to land at MORNER. The preceding day these A/P's had taken off from MORNER to hit the same target but were forced to turn back North of MOROTAI due to a solid front. As pre-arranged, A/P's landed at SANSAFAR for a mission the following day. Object of this shuttle service was to eliminate refueling at MOROTAI as was necessary for missions to the MINDANAO area on MORNER-target-MORNER strikes. Also, SANSAFAR was clear of a NE-SW front lying off BIAB which had turned missions back the preceding two days.

   The 500th's bombing target, to be hit at minimum altitude with 12 X 100 lb parademos per A/P, was a personnel and supply area containing numerous large barrack-type buildings immediately South of LICANAN DROME. All four strips and their dispersal areas as well as the bombing target were to be strafed. Barges, only, lying just offshore from the drome area could be strafed also.

   All crews were thoroughly briefed on bombing and strafing restrictions before takeoff.

   (b) Assembly: The Group assembled enroute to the target.

   (c) Attack: Blowing two large barrack or warehouse-type buildings and two small shacks to bits with well placed hits, six B-25J's of the 500th Squadron covered the target with 72 100 lb parademo bombs and sprayed the area with 12,500 rounds of .50 calibre ammo. Several small fires were emitting gray and grayish-black smoke to 50/150 feet as our planes withdrew. Two bombs were dropped near a serviceable T/E bomber in the center dispersal area with unobserved results. Tracers were seen entering several shacks and buildings.

   The enemy offered but slight opposition to our attack with two medium positions peppering away at our planes with very little degree of accuracy.

   (d) Time and location of:
       Takeoff: 0605/T to 0606/I from MAR A/D.
PO 352-D-2 - 500th sqdn - cont.

Attack: 0955/I to 0957/I at LICAHAN.
Landing: 1618/I to 1830/I at WORMER.
(e) Route: WAR A/D to TARGET to WORMER.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

(a) The 501st Squadron led the Group with the 498th,
499th and 500th Squadrons following in that order.
(b) The 500th Squadron composed of two flights of three
was led by Lt Bissell, veteran flight leader.

FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 204 - Lt Bissell
A/P 025 - Lt Buffington
A/P 127 - Capt Bazzel

SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 007 - Lt Landon
A/P 199 - Lt Schmidt
A/P 033 - Lt Canning

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. Lt Bissell assembled the 500th Squadron shortly
after takeoff and with good weather prevailing, soon pulled
into the No. 4 position in the Group formation, assembled loosely
to save fuel. Spacing his two flights at SMALL ISLAND he
swung inland North of LICAHAN and made his target run on an
approximate 160° heading. He dropped his 12 bombs beginning just
South of the drome through the central personnel area. Al-
though bombs were seen falling on and near buildings, results of
their subsequent explosions are unknown.

2. Lt Buffington, right wingman in the first
flight, dropped his bombs along a line to the West of the
flight leader's pattern destroying a large warehouse-type build-
ing. Other results unobserved.

3. Capt Bazzel, in line abreast to the flight
leader's left, dropped his bombs East of Lt Bissell. His last
two scored direct hits on a large barrack building just North
of the main road South of the drome - building believed totally
demolished.

4. Lt Landon, second flight leader, followed Lt
Bissell at a 30 second interval and with his wingmen pulled up
in line abreast crossed the drome area on an almost identical
heading, a little more to the East. Crossing the barracks area
slightly to the East of the first flight's path his bombs fell
among warehouse buildings and shacks, totally demolishing a
small native-type structure.

5. Lt Schmidt, No. 2 man, dropped two bombs at
a building approximately 300 yards South of the Southern end of
the West drome with unobserved results. His remaining ten para-
dromos fell farther South with results unobserved.

6. Lt Canning, left wingman, dropped two bombs
at a serviceable T/E bomber in the center of the first East-West
taxiway South of the North drome scoring near misses - resulting
damage unknown. Two of his remaining ten bombs destroyed a
small shack approximately 900 yards South of the East drome with
results of the others unknown.

7. All A/P's thoroughly strafed the target and
sent tracers hurtling into the numerous buildings in the area. Several small fires with gray and grayish-black smoke drifting to 50/150 feet were seen as our planes withdrew from the target, evidence of the excellent coverage obtained by our bombing and strafing.

(b) A/A was medium, slight to moderate from known positions in the drone area.
(c) Nil interception.
(d) Nil A/P's damaged.
(e) One radio-gunner was injured slightly during vigorous evasive action when the gun ripped into his arm leaving a fairly deep cut. He was firing the waist .50's at the time.

4. CITATIONS
   Award of the Purple Heart to T/Sgt Nelson H. Millard, radioman, is recommended. Nil other awards.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 72 X 100 lb parabomos, 6/15 second delay.
   Ammunition expended - 12,500 X .50 calibres.

6. SIGHTINGS
   A serviceable Betty in alert area just South of junction of North and West runways.
   A SSF, thought to be serviceable, on central North-South taxiway just South of the North Strip.
   A truck midway of the West strip on the west side.
   A lugger or barge tied up to shore just West of LASANG jetty.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Twelve (12) K-21 photos show very little except bomb bursts and smoke rising from the target.

   For the Commanding Officer:

   CECIL G. JOHNSON
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Acting Intell. Officer

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route
LEGEND

FFO 352-D-2 17 December, 1944
500th Bomb Sqdn., 345th Bomb Group
Fourth over target at 50 to 150 ft
Time of attack: 0955/1 to 0957/1
Bombing efficiency XX
- Crew report of bomb hits
  (Each spot represents two bombs)
  T Took photos
  T Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
LICANAN DRME TGT MAP, 1 Oct, 1:20,000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

27 December, 1944


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
(a) Objective: A mission designed to knock out A/A positions and any other targets of opportunity in the immediate MATINA A/D area as well as barges, luggers and smaller craft in the DAVAO RIVER mouth, was assigned six planes each of the 500th and 501st Squadrons. According to photo interpretations this area was heavily defended with A/A, especially medium guns. At the same time six planes of the 498th Squadron were conducting a barge sweep on the East coast of SAMAL ISLAND. The 500th Squadron was to lead the three squadron formation to the target and back to base. Our A/F's were to cross the target in line abreast formation with the two extreme left ships each loaded with 12 X 100 lb parasemos to hit shipping in the DAVAO RIVER mouth. The remaining four A/F's carried 72 X 23 lb parafraggs to be dropped in the drome area. Hill fighter cover was assigned and all planes were to refuel at MOROTAI before returning to base. Crews were thoroughly briefed on existing bombing and strafing regulations and restrictions before takeoff.

(b) In the event the weather was bad squadrons were to break down into small enough units to get through if at all possible. A rendezvous point was set at TOBI ISLAND and another at MERAMPIT ISLAND Northeast of TALAUD.

(c) Reaching the target without difficulty, six B-25J's of the 500th Squadron dropped 144 X 23 lb parafraggs through the MATINA DROME area and 24 X 100 lb parasemos at small craft in the mouth of the DAVAO RIVER. Bombing results, other than near misses on 6/8 barges and a lugger, were nil so far as crews could determine. The area and vessels were thoroughly strafed and tracers were seen entering a possibly serviceable T/E bomber in the southwest dispersal area. A camouflage net over a revetment in the same area was also strafed, but revetment's contents, if any, could not be determined. A M/G position, not firing, was strafed without apparent damage. Cockpit trouble necessitated the return of 144 X 23 lb parafraggs to base. Enemy opposition was limited to a few bursts of medium A/A from the drome area although the area was reported to have a large concentration of A/A guns.
FFO 361-D-3 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

(d) Time and location of:
  Takeoff: 0525/1 to 0530/1 from MOKMER.
  Rendezvous: Enroute to target.
  Attack: 1040/1 to 1042/1 - MATINA area.
  Landing: 1315/1 to 1317/1 at MOROTAI.
  Takeoff: 1510/1 to 1512/1 from MOROTAI.
  Landing: 1805/1 to 1807/1 at MOKMER.

(e) Route: MOKMER - TOBI - DAVAO GULF - TARGET - MOROTAI - MOKMER.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

(a) Group: The 500th Squadron, with Lt Symington, Squadron Operations Officer as its leader, led the three squadron formation with the 498th and 501st flying number two and three positions.

(b) Squadron: Lt Symington led our two flights of three planes composed as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT

A/P 204 - Lt Symington
A/P 191 - Lt Canning
A/P 179 - Lt Schmidt

SECOND FLIGHT

A/P 161 - Lt Thompson
A/P 033 - Lt Buffington
A/P 023 - Lt Landon

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) 1. Lt Symington led the Group direct to the target, fairly good weather prevailing. Just inside DAVAO GULF the 498th Squadron broke away to attack their target and the 501st dropped back approximately 30 seconds behind the 500th. As planned, Lt Symington crossed the target on an 85° heading spacing himself so that the two A/P's on the left would break out over the river mouth. He dropped 12 parafrag in the area West of the Southwest dispersal loop and his remaining 60 along the Southwestern taxiway and through the Southeast dispersal area. No results of his bombing were observed. He strafed a T/E bomber, thought to be serviceable, surrounded by 4/5 wrecked planes, and a revetment with a camouflage netting over it along the Southwest taxiway. Tracers were seen entering these objects - extent of damage unknown. Breaking to the right Lt Symington circled South of SAMAL ISLAND to assemble the Group before heading for MOROTAI.

2. Lt Canning, on the extreme right of the line abreast formation, dropped his 72 bombs through possible supply and personnel areas just South of the Southwest dispersal area and into the Southeast dispersals. Nil results observed.

3. Lt Schmidt, on Lt Symington's left wing, through failure of his copilot to turn on safety switch, failed to drop any of his 72 parafrags and all were returned to base.

4. Lt Buffington, fourth from the right and flying on Lt Symington, also experienced cockpit trouble over the target and returned his bombs to base.
5. Lt Thompson, leader of the second flight, strafed across the drome area sending a hail of lead into a silent M/G position in the Northeast dispersal area. With Lt Landon tucked in on his left wing he headed straight for the river mouth. He dropped ten 100 lb paradesmos on 6/3 small barges along the South shore of the first island inside the river mouth. His remaining two bombs came fairly close to a serviceable lugger off the South point at the mouth of the river. He strafed all these vessels with unobserved results taking extreme care to see that no bullets or bombs fell on the shore.

6. Lt Landon, on Lt Thompson's left, dropped his 12 centuries at a group of small skiffs and a barge on the North bank of the river at its mouth - nil damage noted.

7. The drome area and vessels in the river were heavily strafed with nil observed results other than above.

8. Lt Symington assembled the Group in DAVAO BULF and headed for MOROTAI to refuel before returning to MOOKMER.

(b) The surprised "sons of heaven" were slow in getting out of their sacks, for the only resistance offered was 6/3 bursts of medium A/A bursting several hundred feet behind Lt Landon's plane as he broke over the water.
(c) Nil interception.
(d) Nil A/P's damaged.
(e) Nil personnel injured.

4. Nil awards recommended.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
Bombs dropped - 144 X 23 lb parafrag and 24 X 100 lb paradesmos.
Ammo expended, 13,800 X .50 calibres.

6. SIGHTINGS
Several trucks, two moving, on roads North of drome. Entire drome area devoid of targets.
A large fire with black smoke to 1500 feet, raging on point 1½ miles North of DAVAO. Fire had evidently been going for a day as smoke from it had drifted South more than 20 miles.

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
K-21 photos received corroborate crew reports of lack of targets. Bombs are shown missing a serviceable lugger at the mouth of the river.

For the Squadron Commander:

2 - Incls
   Incl 1 - Bomb assessment
   Incl 2 - Route

CECIL G. JOHNSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Acting Intell. Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

Time of attack: 1040/1 - 1042/I
First over target at 50/200 feet
50th Bomb Squadron, 34th Bomb Group
PPO 361-D-2, 26 December, 1944
ROUTE TO AND FROM TARGET
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72
8 January 1945

CAS/jwd


Objective: CLARK FIELD AIR CENTER.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective: On the morning of 7 January, 10 A/Ps from each of four squadrons of the 345th Group were ordered to carry out a coordinated strike against the CLARK AIR CENTER. This was to be "the strike" - carried out in conjunction with the 312th and the 417th Groups, both A-20 outfits. It would thus be the heaviest concentration of attack planes yet used in the South Pacific. Our planes were each to carry 72 x 23 lb parafraze - bombing and strafing the target at minimum altitude on a single pass. There was no secondary target assigned. Fighter cover was to be provided by two squadrons of P-38s.

b. Rendezvous and Formation: Taking off from TAGOBAN, the squadrons, headed South, formed as they turned North, then joined the 312th Group, which had taken off from TANJUAN. At MINDORO rendezvous was made with the 417th Group and the fighter cover.

c. Attack:

The mission was executed as planned; i.e. forty (40) planes of the 345th Group, and twenty (20) of the 312th attacked in a 60-plane front from Northwest to Southeast. This first wave was followed by a second wave of sixty (60) A-20s which attacked from approximately North Northwest to South Southwest.

The ten (10) A/Ps of the 500th Squadron swept an area from North of CLARK No. 3 runway through DAO JUNCTION on a heading of 130 degrees. A total of 588 x 23 lb parafraze (1/2 second delay) were dropped and 40,200 x .50 calibre ammunition was expended on the bombing and strafing run. Specific observed results included two twin-engine bombers destroyed by bombs, one strafed and set airdire, two single engine fighters set airdire by strafing; bomb hits on a train of 8/10 boxers which also were strafed. Two Betty bombers were damaged by strafing and four other twin engine bombers also were damaged by strafing. In addition, tracers were seen to enter two twin engine bombers and three single engine fighters. A medium A/A position, firing, was strafed and silenced; several gun positions in haystacks were heavily strafed and a fuel and supply dump in a wooded area was strafed, starting a small black-smoke fire. Bombs were seen to fall on or near two J/R bombers, results being unobserved and 48 other parafraze were seen to fall among shacks just East of DAO JUNCTION, results unknown.

-1-
c. Attack (continued)

During the bombing-strafing run, one of our A/P's (007) was holed by medium and light, intense A/A fire, knocking out the hydraulic system, slightly damaging right engine, tail section, wing and nose sections. This A/P later made a successful crash landing at HILL FIELD, MINDORO, having been escorted there by another 500th Squadron plane. The tail gunner on the damaged A/P, Staff Sergeant J. J. Regin, was wounded in the thighs by 6/8 small A/A shell fragments and after receiving first aid at HILL FIELD, was later returned with the remainder of the crew to TACLOBAN.

Time and Location of:
Takeoff - 0655 - 0700 I - TACLOBAN.
Rendezvous - 0855 - 0900 I at Dough Point, Mindoro.
Attack - 1024 to 1029 I
Landing - 1325/1327 I at TACLOBAN.
Two A/P's landed at MINDORO at 1340 I, one crash landing.
One of these A/P's returned to TACLOBAN at 1720 I.

b. Route:
TACLOBAN - MINDORO - CABANGAN - LUZON - TARGET - SUBIC BAY
MINDORO - TACLOBAN.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING
a. Group - Lt. Col. Colthorp, Group Commander, flying with the 498th Squadron, led the wing on this attack. The group flew in the following order: 498, 499, 500, 601st.

b. Squadron - The 500th Squadron was led by Major Mortensen, the squadron commander, with flights as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
<th>THIRD FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 356 - Maj Mortensen</td>
<td>A/P 497 - Capt Bazzel</td>
<td>A/P 007 - Lt Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 6025 - Lt Reichs</td>
<td>A/P 204 - Lt Canning</td>
<td>A/P 988 - Lt Schmidt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 033 - Lt Daker</td>
<td>A/P 171 - Lt Stewart</td>
<td>A/P 025 - Lt Buffington</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/P 187 - Lt Landon</td>
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3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Maj. Mortensen, leading, in No. 3 position in Group, dropped his first bombs North of No. 1 r/w. He then strafed a T/B bomber which burnt, and 2 SEPs which started to smoke. These were located North of No. 1 r/w, where gun pits were strafed also.

Eight to ten boxcars at DAV JUNCTION were the Major's next target. Bombs were seen to explode around them, and the boxcars are considered definitely damaged.

Lt Reichs strafed an A/A position which was firing 1000 feet North of r/w No. 1. His bombs dropped in the reported dump in a wooded grove South of r/w No. 1, which area he heavily strafed also.

At the end of the run he strafed and damaged two TEBs on the North side of SAN AUGUSTINE A/P.
3. DETAILS OF MISSION (continued)

Lt Dakar dropped his bombs in revetments between r/w No. 3 and r/w No. 1, strafed and damaged a TEB on r/w No. 1, and another TEB Southeast of r/w No. 1. Several A/A positions were strafed, and bombs were seen to drop on stacks and a barrack building near DAP JUNCTION.

Lt Landen dropped bombs on a Betty bomber just North of CLARK No. 1 with unobserved results, and strafed two SSF's, damaging them.

Capt Basset's bombs laid low two H-22 TEBs - the wing falling off of one, the other seen to collapse. His tracers were seen to enter two TEBs in the revetment area Southeast of r/w No. 3.

Lt Canning damaged a Betty bomber by strafing while Lt Stewart strafed a camouflaged twin-engine and a single-engine fighter, damaging them, and started a small fire rising to 30 feet in the fuel and supply dump just South of r/w No. 1. Lt Stewart also strafed numerous haystacks which were seen to be firing.

Lt Thompson's bombs fell near two TEBs, but results were unobserved. His tracers were seen to enter 8/10 bombers and fighters with damage undetermined. Lt Thompson's plane was hit by A/A fire over the target, knocking out the hydraulic system, causing minor damage to tail, wing and nose sections and slightly damaging the right engine. Lt Thompson was forced to crash land at MILL FIELD, WINDORO after one wheel had been half downed manually. His tail gunner was injured, having been hit by shrapnel.

Lt Schmidt dropped two strings of bombs on a 20° position with unobserved results. Lt Buffinton strafed thoroughly along the run, his tracers definitely damaging two SSF's 2500 feet Northeast of the end of No. 3 r/w.

b. Opposition was fairly heavy on this target, and was the heaviest encountered so far by most of our pilots. The principal opposition was in the form of W/C fire which was moderate to intense, accurate to inaccurate. Medium, moderate and accurate was received from a 6-gun position approximately 2500 feet East-Southeast of r/w No. 3.

c. There were 6/7 HAMS at 500/1000 ft over the target. These planes are thought to have dropped the W/F aerial burst phosphorous bombs which were seen to burst just as our formation came on to the target.

d. Six A/P's were holed by A/A or V/O fire, one of these being forced to crash land at WIND RC as previously noted.

e. Three (3) crew members were injured on this strike. They were:
Corporal William F. Gerden A3N 37556029 - radio-gunner.

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions which would seem to warrant special awards.

5. APPRAISAL AND OVERSIGHT

Bombs dropped - 568 X 23 lb parafrags.
Bomb jettisoned - 72 X 23 lb parafrags.
Returned to base - 66 X 23 lb parafrags.
Ammunition expended - .50, 20 Cal bre.

CONFIDENTIAL
6. **SIGHTINGS**

   At 0515/1 from 1500 ft one TOPSY, possibly serviceable, on beach at 1515N - 12000E.

   At target: 13 to 17 serviceable, unidentified, two-engine bombers, and eight (8) serviceable, u/i SSFs, and two (2) SSFs, one burning, the other smouldering, in main dispersal area Southeast of r/w No. 3. Four (4) serviceable SSFs, and one serviceable DYNAMO 1000 feet Northeast of East end of No. 3 r/w.

   Two (2) u/i, serviceable, twin-engine bombers, painted green, and two (2) serviceable SSFs seen in dispersal area at edge of woods between CLARK FIELD No. 1 and No. 2. Four (4) SSFs, under camouflage net 4000 feet East of CLARK FIELD No. 2. Five canvas covered 2½ ton enemy trucks seen stationary at East end of r/w No. 3, headed away from r/w.

   A large yellow "H" shaped building, Red Cross on roof, seen at town 2500 feet South of r/w No. 5.

   A/F of the 499th Squadron was seen to be burning and to crash into a church building in the vicinity of ANGELES.

   At 1050/1, from 200/300 feet, at OLORAPO (1340N - 12015W) a definite radar installation was seen near shore on coast.

7. **PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION**

   Photo coverage was good, but photos did not reveal a great deal of damage, due in part to the delay on the bomb fusing and the speed over the target.

For the Commanding Officer:

CARL A. STRAUSS
Capt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

CAS/rpb

10 January, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

(a) Two squadrons of the 345th Group, the 500th and 501st, were ordered to attack TALISAY A/D in the morning of 8 January, 1945. The target was to be strafed and bombed from minimum altitude, each A/F carrying 72 X 23 lb parafrag. No fighter cover was provided.

(b) The two squadrons formed over TACLOBAN strip.

(c) Approaching the target from the South, the 500th Squadron with six planes abreast attacked on a heading Southeast to Northwest. A total of 432 X 23 lb parafrag were dropped, destroying three shacks and scoring near misses on two buildings in the barracks area. Bombs fell on a M/G position, firing Northwest of the center of the R/W. The target was thoroughly strafed as were three loaded trucks and a firing M/G position in a hedge South of the R/W. Although no fires were started, tracers were seen entering many barrack buildings and shacks. Enemy opposition consisted of ineffectual machine gun fire.

(d) Time and location of:
   Takeoff: 0708/I to 0710/I from TACLOBAN.
   Attack: 0820/I to 0822/I at TALISAY.
   Landing: 0955/I to 1003/I at TACLOBAN.

(e) Route: TACLOBAN - CEBU - TALISAY - North tip of CEBU -
    TACLOBAN.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

(a) The 501st Squadron was the leader of the two squadron formation.

(b) Lt Landon led our Squadron with flights as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/F 023 - Lt Landon</td>
<td>A/F 187 - Lt Rasmussen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F 127 - Lt Canning</td>
<td>A/F 033 - Lt Reheis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/F 191 - Lt Buffettong</td>
<td>A/F 171 - Lt Stewart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

(a) Lt Landon, Squadron leader, scored hits with his nose guns on three loaded trucks.

Lt Stewart gets credit for the destruction of two shacks in the barracks area west of the R/W. He strafed the firing M/G position in the hedge 2000 feet South of the R/W.

Lt Canning's bombs destroyed a shack also, while Lt Rasmussen's

- 1 -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
C-0-W-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FFO 8-A-4 - 500th Sqn - cont.

crew saw his bombs drop on a firing M/O position 1000 feet Northwest of the center of the R/W.

Due to rain the visibility was poor over the target and bombing as well as strafing results were generally unobserved.

(b) A/A consisted of a slight amount of machine gun fire from the target area.

(c) Nil interception.

(d) Nil A/P's damaged.

(e) Nil personnel injured.

4. CITATIONS

At the time of submitting this report there were, in the opinion of this Officer, no individual awards justified.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

Bombs dropped - 432 X 23 lb parafrag.

Ammunition expended - 8,200 X .50 calibre.

6. SIGHTINGS

Four or five white flashes from slope of CANLACON VOLCANO at 1027H 1231J3E coming at five second intervals - no bursts seen.

One serviceable camouflaged fighter in revetment on the East taxi loop at TALISAY.

Two phosphorous bursts at A/P level, 100 feet to the rear of planes of the 501st Squadron - thought to be fired from the ground.

Two columns of black smoke to 1500 feet in vicinity of FABRIGA.

Considerable dust over ALICANTE STRIP - possibly A/P's taking off.

7. PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Due to rain over the target, photos were too poor to warrant the making of any prints.

For the Commanding Officer:

CARL A. STRAUSS
Capt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

- 2 -

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   a. Objective: Four Squadrons of the 345th Bomb Group with six B-25J's per squadron, were ordered to proceed to CAMILING, LUZON on January 9, arriving there no later than 0600/1 and to circle at 2000 ft just South of the city. This orbiting was to continue until 0815/1 during which time the Group was to be listening for orders from HALIFAX, air control at LIN-CAYEN GULF. If no orders were issued between 0800/1 and 0815/1, the Group was to attack assigned sectors of the LUZON RR system. Rolling stock on the tracks was to be bombed and strafed from minimum altitude by two ships. The Group was to reassemble South of LUZON and return to base. Fighter cover was provided.
   b. Formation: The Squadrons were to takeoff from TACLOBAN at prescribed intervals beginning at 0830/1 and proceed to TALANG ISLAND for Group rendezvous before continuing to CAMILING.
   c. Attack: The secondary target was hit by the Group with marked success. Everything was carried out as planned and a final count revealed that the Group had destroyed four locomotives, six flat cars, three gondola cars, 58 boxcars and one coach - two locomotives, 12 boxcars and one coach were damaged and a SSF was destroyed at BAMBAR A/D.

   Five A/P's of the 500th Squadron reached CAMILING. One A/P failed to contact the Group while it rendezvoused at TUBANG ISLAND and this A/P returned alone. Failing to contact HALIFAX, our A/P's left CAMILING at 0815/1 and started their minimum altitude bombing and strafing run on the MANILA RR between PANQUI and MALOLOS. A total of 48 x 100 lb parabolas and 8,700 x .50 calibre ammo were expended during the attack by four A/P's returning to base. One A/P turned back Northward from the target run in the vicinity of TARRAC and has not been heard from since. A total of eighteen boxcars, four flatcars and one SSF were definitely destroyed by our Squadron. RR tracks at SANTA CRUZ were severed and the terminal building at TARRAC received a direct hit. A telephone service truck at CAPAY was strafed while bombs scored near misses on the vehicle. Three SSF's were strafed at CLARK FIELD, vicinity of No. 4 A/D and tracers were seen entering the A/P's. Boxcars at TARRAC, two trucks at SAN MIGUEL as well as a water tower, 1/5 gasoline tanks and a staff car there, a serviceable SSF and a two gun A/A position at BAMBAN, and three serviceable SSF's parked near the A/D at DAB JUNCTION were strafed with unobserved results. Four bombs missed a Sugar Baker abandoned at PUGAD on the North shore of MANILA BAY. Five large columns of black smoke were left burning in the target area as our planes withdrew.
   d. Time and location of:
      Takeoff: 0830/1 to 0832/1 from TACLOBAN.

Time of attack: 0848/I to 0915/I, Central LUSON.
Time of landing: 1150/I to 1202/I at TACLOBAN.

e. Route: TACLOBAN - LUBANG IS - CAMILING - PANQUI - MALOLOS - TACLOBAN.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

a. The group was led by the 498th Squadron followed by the 499th, 500th and 501st in that order.

b. Maj Doolittle, Group Deputy Commander, led the 500th Squadron.

Flights over the target were as follows:

**FIRST FLIGHT**

A/P 023 - Maj Doolittle
A/P 171 - Lt Canning
A/F 187 - Lt Buffington

**SECOND FLIGHT**

A/P 127 - Capt Basel
A/P 191 - Lt Schmidt

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION

a. Maj Doolittle and Lt Buffington started the attack at PANQUI at minimum altitude but in the vicinity of TARLAC, Lt Buffington executed an unexplained 1800 turn from South to North and has not been heard of since. Major Doolittle and Lt Canning dropped 20 bombs and strafed during the entire run accounting for 12 boxcars, three flatcars and one SSF destroyed. Lt Canning scored a direct bomb hit on the terminal building at TARLAC where Maj Doolittle strafed a telephone service truck, also scoring near misses on it with bombs.

Capt Basel and Lt Schmidt, the second element, destroyed six boxcars and one flatcar and severed the rails at TARLAC and strafed three SSF's in the vicinity of CLARK FIELD No. 4. Lt Schmidt strafed a two gun A/A position at SAMBAN as well as three serviceable SSF parked near the A/D there.

Returning, Lt Canning missed with four bombs dropped at a Sugar Baker at PUNGAD on the North shore of MANILA BAY. All A/P's strafed many other RR installations and equipment with unobserved results. The Squadron reformed south of LUSON and returned direct to base.

b. 21 A/A reported.

c. 21 interception.

d. A/P 187 missing, cause unknown.

e. Crew of 187 missing in action.

4. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this Officer, there were, at the time of submitting this report, no individual actions which would seem to warrant an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE

- Bombs dropped - 48 x 100 lb parademos.
- Bombs returned - 12 x 100 lb parademos (in A/F returning to base before reaching target).
- Ammunition expended - 8,700 x .50 calibres.
6. **SIGHTINGS**

A SSF, possibly serviceable and an unserviceable T/E B in small clearing at 1350N-1200E — thought to be enemy A/P's that had crash landed. A large Sugar Charlie, lying close to shore and low in the water at CARUSIPAN at 1456N-1200E.

Seven or eight serviceable A/P's at SAN MIGUEL A/D.

Ten harbor craft, approx 35 ft long with no deck or cabin, loaded on flat cars at HANABAN.

Three flat cars with two tanks on each car at ANQUILES.

7. **PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION**

Photos confirm crew reports of bomb hits and damages.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

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**Note:** Crew of A/P 187, reported as missing in action:

- **Pilot** — 2nd Lt, JAMES O. BUFFINGTON, 0-675664
- **Co-pilot** — Capt, RICHARD T. THOMPSON, 0-1427049
- **Bomb-nav** — 2nd Lt, VERNON C. BUCHANAN, 0-707222
- **Radio** — T/Sgt, WALTER J. NELSON, 20246140
- **Engineer** — Cpl, BERNARD R. DUNNAVANT, 13116869
- **Gunner** — Cpl, JOSEPH HERTZ, 32794422
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
314th Bombardment Group
APO 72

11 January 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL

a. Objective: Three squadrons of the 314th Group were ordered to strike the FLORIDA BLANCA and PORAC A/D's in Central LUZON on the morning of the second of January. The secondary target assigned was BATANGAS A/D in Southern LUZON. The target was to be strafed and bombed at minimum altitude, five A/P's each carrying 72 X 23 lb parafrags and one A/P carrying 12 X 100 lb demos with 8/11 second delay fuses. Over the target the formation was to be six planes abreast.

b. Rendezvous: The Group rendezvous was over TACLOBAN strip, since two of the squadrons were based there, while one, the 500th, was based at DULAG. Rendezvous was successfully accomplished with the fighters but contact with them was lost East of LUZON, due to weather.

c. Attack: Due to weather the primary target was not attacked. Although the planes did reach the primary target area, the Group leader did not attack there, but elected to strike the secondary - BATANGAS A/D. Five of our planes reached the target and making one pass, dropped a total of 84 X 23 lb parafrags and 12 X 100 lb demos destroying three tin roofed shacks and strafing with unobserved results.

The one A/P, which did not reach the target, turned back at 1000/I at 1500N-12200E to escort a plane of the 499th Squadron which was on single engine operation. This A/P (499th) made a water landing at 1500N-12200E, and our A/P dropped life rafts and circled until 1108/I. Four survivors were seen, one in one raft and three in the other.

d. Time and location of:

Takeoff: 0715/I to 0719/I from DULAG.
Time of attack: 1118/I to 1120/I at BATANGAS.
Landing: 1320/I to 1323/I at DULAG.

e. Route: DULAG - North tip of SAMAR - POLILLO ISLAND - FLORIDA-BLANCA AREA - BATANGAS - SIBUYAN SEA - DULAG.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING

a. Group: The 498th Squadron led the Group followed by the 499th and the 500th.

b. Squadron: The 500th Squadron was led by Capt Bazzel, with flights as follows:

FIRST FLIGHT
A/P 783 - Capt Bazzel
A/P 033 - Lt Buffington
A/P 187 - Lt Bagwell

SECOND FLIGHT
A/P 6023 Lt Lanxon
A/P 007 Lt Bentz
A/P 888 Lt Baker

- 1 -
3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   a. The attack against the BATANGAS A/D was not a very fruitful one. Many bombs were returned to base, principally due to lack of a suitable target. Those bombs dropped fell with generally unobserved results. The attack was made five ships abreast, from Southwest to Northeast. Lt Bagwell is credited with the destruction of three tin shacks while the remainder of bombs dropped by the Squadron fell in the Northeast portion of the dispersal area. The target was also strafed by all A/P's.
   b. Opposition was negligible – the only instance being M/O fire, slight and inaccurate from the Southeast edge of the strip near a large "U" shaped building.
   c. Nil interception.
   d. Nil A/P's damaged.
   e. Nil personnel injured.

4. CITATIONS
   At the time of submitting this report there are, in the opinion of this Officer, any individual actions which would seem to warrant an award.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
   Bombs dropped - 8 x 23 lb parafrag and 12 x 100 lb demos.
   Bombs returned - 14 x 23 lb parafrag.
   Bombs salvaged at sea - 132 x 23 lb parafrag (due to rack malfunction and lack of suitable targets).
   Ammunition expended - 3,700 x .5 calibres.

6. SIGHTINGS
   Four unserviceable Bettys with bright orange roundels on wings, on North side of strip at BATANGAS.
   Two radio antennas in center of BATANGAS TOWN.
   A rusty colored Fox Tare Charlie, stationary at 1205N-12335E off MASBATE ISLAND.
   A tower, approximately 100 ft high and a possible searchlight mounted on a pedestal 100 feet from the tower, on a cleared point of land near DAET at 1410N-12300E.
   A possible Sugar Baker at wharf at BULA (1325N-12310E).

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Eight K-21 photos fail to reveal any definite results of the attack other than bomb dust and smoke over the drome. Surrounding area, typical of the PHILIPPINES.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 72

11 January, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on FPO 3-A-3, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron,

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Three A/P's of the 500th Squadron took off on the morning of January 3, 1945 to bomb and strafe at minimal altitude, FABRICA, CAROLINA and ALICANTE A/D's on NEGROS ISLAND. Two A/P's reached the three A/D's dropping a total of 72 parafrags, 36 of which fell at an unknown location. Two SSF's were definitely destroyed at FABRICA; at CAROLINA a camouflaged Tony and a Betty were heavily strafed and an unidentified SSF was seen to explode. One A/P returned to base before reaching the targets because of hydraulic failure and of the two planes reaching the target, one was ditched shortly after leaving ALICANTE.

2. OBJECTIVE

The 315th Group had been ordered to sweep NEGROS A/D's from time to time to keep them under incessant attack as much as possible. This attack was ordered for the same purpose, keeping up the nuisance effect and destroying any serviceable A/P's present.

3. ATTACK

a. Two A/P's of the 500th Squadron, flying abreast at minimum altitude, executed two passes at CAROLINA A/D, three at FABRICA and one at ALICANTE, on northerly headings.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating:
   A/P 783 - Lt Symington
   A/P 6023 - Lt Bagwell
   A/P 161 - Lt Buffalo

c. Lt Symington destroyed a camouflaged SSF at the south end of FABRICA A/D by strafing and sent tracers into a camouflaged Betty at CAROLINA, probably damaging it. He dropped four bombs at CAROLINA with unobserved results. While over ALICANTE his A/P was hit by A/A fire causing an uncontrollable fire in the right engine of his ship. He immediately salvoed his remaining two bombs after crossing out to sea and ditched very successfully at 1220/1 at 1105N-12300E. No crew members were hurt and all were picked up at 1400/1 by a Catalina which returned them to base.

   Lt Bagwell dropping 12 parafrags at FABRICA definitely destroying a SSF and probably damaging two others. At CAROLINA he dropped 2h bombs scoring near misses on 3/A camouflaged T/E bombers, probably damaging them. He sent tracers into a Tony and got an SSF afire - it later exploded. He strafed an operations building and silenced a gun position north of the runway at ALICANTE. After leaving ALICANTE, Lt Bagwell escorted Lt Symington
until the latter ditched, then circled, dropping a liferaft to the survivors.
He then contacted the Cat and circled until it arrived and picked up the
ditched crew. Lt Bagwell and crew could not account for their remaining
36 parafrags. Apparently they were dropped unintentionally and un-noticed
over one of the three targets.
Lt Buffington could not retract the landing gear on A/P 161
and was forced to return to base almost immediately after takeoff.
No photos were taken.
d. Opposition: At ALICANTE enemy opposition was effective being
classed as approx 20mm, moderate to intense, from two positions on the
north side of the 8°/7°. These positions held both A/P's crossing the tar-
get, setting the engine afire on 783.

4. SIGHTINGS
At ALICANTE, four B/I 557's at 3000 ft passed over our A/P's on a
southeasterly heading. No attempt at interception was made.

5. COMMENTS
A/A at ALICANTE seems to be consistently accurate.
From all reports, Lt Symington did a superb job of ditching.

6. AWARDS
Lt Symington is being considered for an award.

7. STATISTICS
Takeoff: 1043/I from TACLOBAN.
Route out: TACLOBAN - CBU - NEGRCS - TARGETS.
Time of attack: 1127/I to 1200/I.
Route back: NEGR S - C:BU - TACLOBAN.
Landing: A/P 161 at 1115/I, A/P 6023 at 1600/I.
ORDNANCE AND ARMAMENT:
72 x 23 lb parafrags dropped and 72 returned to base.
4 x 100 lb demos, 8/11 second delay, dropped and two jettisoned
at sea.
5,000 x .50 calibre ammo expended.

For the Commanding Officer: PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

11 January, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925. Attn: A.C. of S.

1. SYNOPSIS

Two B-25J's of the 500th Squadron carried out a minimum altitude bombing-strafing attack on OPCON and LAHUG A/D's in the Central PHILIPPINIES on the morning of 3 January. The two A/P's dropped 30 parafrags at OPCON and 18 at LAHUG, all with unobserved results, and strafed the two drome setting afire two serviceable Tony's at LAHUG. Enemy opposition consisted of slight and ineffective M/O fire.

2. OBJECTIVE

On this date the 345th Group was ordered to strike A/D's on NEGROS, CEBU and MACTAN ISLANDS at frequent intervals. To accomplish this objective, various A/P elements were setup, given a target, a takeoff time and a flight designation. The two A/P's covered by this report were known as "F" flight and were ordered to strike OPCON A/D at MACTAN and LAHUG at CEBU.

3. ATTACK

Our two plane element proceeded alone to OPCON A/D where one pass was made, thence to LAHUG, making two passes, all at minimum altitude and on westerly headings, heavily strafing both drome and dropping a total of 78 parafrags.

b. Pilots, planes, participating:
   A/P 033 - Lt Rasmussen
   A/P 007 - Lt Thompson

c. Lt Rasmussen dropped 21 bombs at OPCON and strafed with unobserved results. He dropped his remaining 18 parafrags at LAHUG on the two passes. While no results of bombing were observed, his excellent strafing set the fire and destroyed two serviceable Tony's on the east-central apron.

Lt Thompson, on Lt Rasmussen's wing, dropped six bombs at OPCON and the rest of his bombs hung up and were returned to base. No results of his bombing or strafing were observed. No mission photos taken by either A/P.

d. Opposition: Enemy opposition was limited to M/O fire, slight and inaccurate from two positions South of the Northeast end of the runway.

4. COMMENTS OF L.O.

There were few signs of recent enemy activity noted at either A/D.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

In the opinion of this Officer, based on information available at this time, there are no individual actions which would justify an award.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table:
   Takeoff: 1045/1 from TOYOHAN A/D.

Group assembly: Nil
Fighter rendezvous: Nil
Attack: 1130/I - 1140/I at OPON and LAHUG A/D's.
Landing: 1240/I at TANAUAN A/D.
b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: Nil

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (N)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

11 January, 1945


1. SYNOPSIS

In a mid-day attack, four B-25's of the 500th Squadron hit an assigned area along the west side of the AGNO RIVER south at LINGAYEN GULF dropping a total of 44 X 100 lb paradesmos and expending 7,700 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition. A near miss was scored on a barge at the west shore of the AGNO RIVER near LAMARADOR TO N. Machine gun positions and the entire area as well, were strafed. X-20 and X-21 photos were taken.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was designed primarily for photographic purposes, the area along the west bank of the AGNO RIVER from LAMARADOR to SUAL being the specific target for photo coverage as well as bombing and strafing.

3. ATTACK

a. All four planes reached the target approaching from the southeast and in two planes elements bombed, strafed and photographed the target on a northwest heading at minimum altitude.

b. Planes and pilots participating:
   A/F 127 - Capt. Bazzel
   A/F 007 - Lt Bagwell
   A/F 207 - Lt Lewis
   A/F 208 - Lt Daker

c. Results: The 44 paradesmos dropped in the central part of the target in the vicinity of LAMARADOR with Capt. Bazzel scoring a near miss on a serviceable barge near the bank of the river at LAMARADOR. All pilots thoroughly strafed the entire area. Photos taken on this strike were excellent but fail to reveal definite signs of enemy activity. What are thought to be Filipinos are picture walking nonchalantly along the streets.

d. Opposition: A/F's 127 and 007 were hit by slight machine gun fire from positions at PORTUGUESE FT with minor damages resulting. No personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS

The mission was executed as planned and in an efficient manner. Crews were impressed by the long, broad beaches at LINGAYEN GULF.

5. AVM

In the opinion of this Officer, based on information available at this time, there were no individual actions which would seem to warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS

Time table:
Takeoff at 0730/1 from TRINIDAD
Crews assembled immediately after takeoff.
Fighter rendezvous over TRINIDAD.

Attack: At 1145/1 to 1150/1 at 100/300 ft - LINGAYEN GULF.
Landing: 1510/1 at TACLOBAN.

b. Route: TACLOBAN - WEST of CENTRAL LUZON - INFANTA - TARGET -
down WEST side of LUZON - TACLOBAN.

c. Navy fighter cover provided at LINGAYEN GULF.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HITCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)  
345th Bombardment Group  
APO 72  

PAH/rpb  

10 January 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   a. The 345th Group was ordered to attack drones on NEGROS ISLAND on the morning of 6 January, 1945. Five A/P's of the 500th Squadron, carrying 12 X 100 lb incendiaries, 4/5 second delay fuses, were assigned BACOLOD, SILAY and FABRICA DROPS as their minimum altitude bombing and strafing target. No fighter cover was scheduled.
   b. The Group assembled over TACLOBAN A/D.
   c. Five A/P's of the 500th reached BACOLOD dropping 6 X 100 poundsers and destroying a 30 X 20 ft building there as well as scoring near misses on buildings near the one demolished. Just after leaving BACOLOD two A/P's turned back, one because of a short in the bomb release master switch and the other to escort. The remaining three A/P's dropped a total of 20 bombs at SILAY scoring a direct hit on a building. At FABRICA, six bombs were dropped, narrowly missing a barracks building probably damaging it. All three targets were thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. One A/P was hit by A/A fire over FABRICA and was forced to make a water landing when the plane caught fire in the turret. Four survivors were picked up — the two men in the tail did not get out of the plane.
   d. Time and location of:
      Takeoff: 0628/I to 0830/I from TACLOBAN.
      Attack: 0923/I to 0955/I at BACOLOD, SILAY and FABRICA A/D's.
      Landing: Two planes at 1026/I; two planes at 1145/I.
   e. Route: TACLOBAN - GEBU ISLAND - NEGROS ISLAND - TARGETS - GEBU ISLAND - TACLOBAN.

2. PILOT AND PLANES PARTICIPATING
   a. The 494th Squadron led with the 500th in Number two position.
   b. The 500th Squadron was led by Lt Thompson with flights as follow:

   **FIRST FLIGHT**
   A/P 201 - Lt Thompson
   A/P 161 - Lt Simpson
   A/P 127 - Lt Schmidt.

   **SECOND FLIGHT**
   A/P 187 - Lt Bagwell
   A/P 171 - Lt Buffington.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   a. Lt Thompson led the Squadron direct to BACOLOD. He dropped no bombs there due to paucity of targets. At SILAY he released six, scoring a direct hit on a building and at FABRICA he dropped two, but with unobserved results. He strafed all targets thoroughly and jettisoned four bombs due to lack of targets.
Narrative, FPO 6-a-2 - 500th Sq'n - cont.

Lt Simpson dropped two 100 lb pellets at BACOLOD scoring near misses on a serviceable S/F and six at SILAY at buildings just south of the runway with unobserved results. At FABRICA he dropped four bombs on barracks in a military camp, probably damaging one building.

Lt Schmidt and Lt Suffington dropped two bombs each at BACOLOD with unobserved. A fire, which was quickly extinguished, broke out in Lt Buffington's bomb release master switch and he was unable to close his bomb bay doors. He returned to base after leaving BACOLOD, escorted by Lt Schmidt, both of whom, returned ten bombs to base.

Lt Bagwell strafed BACOLOD and dropped eight bombs at SILAY A/O damaging a building. His remaining four bombs were jettisoned in the water due to lack of targets. He strafed all three A/O targets with unobserved results.

Lt Simpson's A/P was hit by medium flak in the front causing a fire in the turret compartment. Soon the fire was out of control and Lt Simpson hurriedly ditched the aircraft at 1000/T at 11000-123500E. He was ably assisted by Lt Lewis, the co-pilot while the navigator and engineer flung open the escape hatch and stood up in it thereby forcing the wind to blow the flames back away from the pilots. Lt Lewis aided the three crewmen in the front of the plane in getting out and then swam to the tail searching for the radio operator and gunner - no trace of either was seen. The four survivors, all wounded, were picked up a Cat at 1005/1.

b. Nil interception.

c. A/G consisted of ground fire, light, accurate from BACOLOD, one A/P holed slightly. At SILAY: medium, slight, inaccurate. At FABRICA; slight, light, inaccurate and: medium, moderate, accurate from five gun position at North end of R/A. This position shot down Lt Simpson.

d. A/P 161 lost in water landing; A/P 171 received small calibre hole.

e. Personnel wounded: 2nd Lt William P. Simpson, pilot; 2nd Lt Richard J. Lewis, co-pilot; 2nd Lt Jack A. Williams, navigator and Sgt Clyde V. Kline, engineer. Personnel lost in action: Cpl Charles G. Spurlock, Jr, radio gunner and Cpl Donald G. Conner, gunner.

4. CITATIONS

Purple Hearts will be recommended for personnel wounded in action. Other awards are pending additional information from V Bomber Command.

5. ARMAMENT AND CARGO

Bomb dropped - 32 x 100 lb deoms, 1/5 second delay.

Bomb jettisoned at sea - 9 x 100 pounders.

Bomb returned - 20 x 100 lb deoms.

Ammunition expended - 5,600 X .50 calibre.

6. SIGHTINGS

At BACOLOD: Bomb crater filled with estimated 100 bombs; revetment filled with supplies along road at east river bank; a S/F, serviceability undetermined, at North end of target and a serviceable S/F in center of east dispersal area.

At SILAY: Four serviceable S/F's, including a Tony, in dispersals.

At FABRICA: Barracks buildings heavily damaged.
7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
    Photos received of BACOLOD and SILLAY A/D's reveal only bomb smoke and
dust and considerable signs of damage from previous reports.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
Subject: Narrative Report on FPO 4-4-3, Performed by 500th Bombardment Squadron, 4 January, 1945. Objective: FLORIDABLANCA, LUZON.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four B-25J's of the 500th Squadron took off to hit grounded A/P's at FLORIDABLANCA A/D. Two A/P's reached the target dropping a total of 86 parafrags across the revetments at the east side of the strip and expending 2,500 rounds of .50 calibres on the single bombing-strafing pass. Results were unobserved.

2. OBJECTIVE

Three squadrons of the 345th Group were ordered to bomb and strafe A/P's at FLORIDABLANCA A/D on a single minimum altitude pass.

3. ATTACK

a. Two A/P's of the 500th approached FLORIDABLANCA on a southerly heading at minimum altitude executing one bombing-strafing pass across the revetment area.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
   A/P 161 - Lt Landon
   A/P 127 - Lt Thompson
   A/P 171 - Lt Canning
   A/P 888 - Lt Rasmussen

c. Results: Lt Landon dropped 12 parafrags across the revetments at the east side of the strip and strafed oil drums piled in one of these revetments, all with unobserved results. The remaining 50 bombs were jettisoned at sea when cockpit co-pilot trouble over the target caused the bombs to hang up. Lt Canning dropped his 72 bombs and strafed approximately the same area as did Lt Landon, also with unobserved results.

   Lt Thompson, escorted by Lt Rasmussen, turned back before reaching the target at 0914 I at 1115N-1235E when his A/P developed engine trouble. Photos taken by the two A/P's over the target fail to reveal any damage.

d. Opposition: Nil A/A, nil interception.

e. Sightings: Seen from ten miles; at 1515N-12000E, four Sugar Bakers, underway, on heading of approx 330 degrees; two probable patrol boats flanking these vessels.

4. COMMENTS

   Enemy activity noted at the A/D was at a minimum.

5. A-N-D-5

   In the opinion of this officer no individual awards are justified.

- 1 -
6. STATISTICS

Takeoff: 0830/I from TACLOBAN
Route out: TACLOBAN - POLLILO ISLAND - West to FLORIDABLANCA.
Time of attack: 1215/I to 1216/I at 50/150 ft.
Route back: FLORIDABLANCA - MINDORO - TACLOBAN

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

12 January, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. GENERAL
   a. Four squadrons of the 345th Group were ordered to attack APARRI A/D on the morning of January 10, 1945. The target was to be strafed and bombed from minimum altitude, each A/P carrying 72 X 23 lb parafrag bombs. Three squadrons of P-38s (12 planes) were to provide fighter cover. The secondary target was rolling Railroad stock from CAMILING South to LEGASPI.
   b. The four squadrons of B-25s formed over TAGLOBAN A/D at 1500 feet.
   c. In the vicinity of APARRI at 1005/I at 1740H - 12220E the Group ran into a solid wall of weather and they were forced to choose the secondary target. Approaching the area thru the pass at DINGALAN BAY at the East coast of LUZON, the 500th squadron, with 6 A/P's in two-ship elements, initiated the attack near BONGABON on a Southeasterly heading. Swinging South, they followed the railroad down to NAIC at the South shore of MANILA BAY. A total of 288 X 23 lb parafraggs were dropped, destroying four trucks, a new sedan, two barracks, and three boxcars. Excellent bombing and strafing damaged a sizeable amount of railroad stock and vehicles. Enemy opposition was strong considering the area covered on the run. At PLARIDEL and BALARA, light, medium, moderate and accurate fire hole two of our A/P's. Intense, accurate M/G fire from a pillbox beneath the bridge at BULA RIVER South of BULUALTO hole two A/P's.
   d. Time and Location of:
      Takeoff: 0715/I from TAGLOBAN
      Attack: 1110/I to 1140/I at 50/100 feet.
      Landing: 1333/I at TAGLOBAN.
   e. Route: TAGLOBAN - POLILLO IS. - DINGALAN BAY - BONGABON - NAIC - TAGLOBAN.

2. PILOTS AND PLANES PARTICIPATING
   A/P 358 - Major Mortensen    A/P 033 - Lt Stewart
   A/P 204 - Lt Bents    A/P 888 - Lt Canning
   A/P 023 - Lt Rammussen    A/P 6023 - Lt Reheis

   The 501st Squadron led the Group, followed by 498th, 499th, and the 500th.

3. DETAILS OF THE MISSION
   Major Mortensen, squadron leader and commanding officer, strafed trucks and drivers at BONGABON and 2 trucks and a new sedan one mile South of GAPAN. The Major strafed and bombed three boxcars at GAPAN, dropping 48 parafraggs and definitely blowing the three box cars apart. At BALIUAG, the Major strafed two trucks filled with fuel drums, setting them on fire.

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3. DETAILS OF MISSION (continued)

At DILIMAN, the squadron leader strafed a truck with unobserved results. Maj. Mortensen could not drop or jettison his remaining bombs because of release malfunction and finally jettisoned the rack and 24 bombs South of MANILA BAY.

Lt Canning dropped a total of 72 parafrags, 24 at a building near a bridge at SAN ILDEFONSO and 12 at a pill box near a bridge at BULUALTO with unobserved results. Lt Canning then released a string of 12 parafrags on four trucks and five boxcars near two warehouse-type buildings, damaging all three units.

At CABANATUAN, Lt Canning bombed and strafed a truck and car and tracers were seen entering the car, while the 24 bombs dropped probably destroying the car. In the vicinity of LAMITE at the beginning of the run, Lt Canning instructed his crew to drop propaganda leaflets, and the K-21 camera was turned on to cover each bomb release.

Lt Stewart dropped 72 X 23 lb parafrags at four boxcars and unidentified equipment in a ravine at BALANGAN. Results were unobserved. At CABANTUAN he strafed six boxcars and 20 warehouse type buildings, starting fires in the warehouses, but with no visible damage to the boxcars.

Lt Rasmussen dropped 12 parafrags at three boxcars at BULUALTO, damaging two cars. At SAN ILDEFONSO he strafed a fire truck and ten enemy personnel, igniting the truck and killing or wounding the personnel. The pilot returned the remaining 60 bombs to base because of solenoid trouble in the bomb release mechanism.

Lt Rehels dropped 36 parafrags, 12 bombs missing six boxcars, but hitting small buildings at GAPAN. The pilot released 12 bombs at DILIMAN R.R. depot, scoring near misses on two boxcars and springing the tracks noticeably. At BALIUAG, Lt Rehels strafed two 8-ton trucks and they exploded. Two drivers jumped out of the vehicles too late. Lt Rehels released 12 bombs on a possible air strip at BALARA with unobserved results. He returned 36 parafrags to base because of release failure. At SAN MIGUEL Lt Rehels set afire two loaded trucks and tracers were seen entering three other trucks, as well as three passenger cars at this town.

Lt Bentz silenced a one-gun A/A position at SAN ILDEFONSO by heavy strafing and scored near misses on the position with 24 parafrags. (His crew noticed that at least 4 were duds) At JAEN the pilot released 12 bombs at three sedans and 12 other bombs were dropped along the strip and railroad at PLARIDEL as the pilot strafed seven boxcars, all with unobserved results. Lt Bentz then lashed out with .50 calibre bullets at five/six trucks at PANGINAY with no results noted.

b. Four A/P's were holed by enemy fire. Major Mortensen's and Lt Bentz's A/P's were holed by 20 MM fire from positions at PLARIDEL, and the Squadron commander's gunner and radioman were slightly injured when a 20 MM shell exploded in the rear fuselage section, ripping a large hole in the right side and damaging the tail section. Lt Bentz's A/P was holed in the right wing. Lt Canning's A/P was holed in the nose and rear fuselage section by M/G fire at BULUALTO. A fragment grazed the gunner's right arm, drawing some blood.

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Narrative Report on FFO 10-A-1

3. DETAILS OF MISSION (continued)
Medium moderate A/A at BALARA holed Lt Reheis' plane in the nose section. The remaining A/A fire was as follows: Light, slight and inaccurate from bridge at CABANTUAN; medium, slight and inaccurate from BULUALTO, and medium, moderate to intense, from BALITAG.

c. At 1155/I in the vicinity of BALARA A/D, three TOJO's, silver color, started a pass at one of our A/P's. Coming in high from 5000 feet, between six and seven o'clock, the TOJO's approached within 700/1000 yards then banked off into the clouds to the right when the gunner of our A/P opened fire. Our B-25 increased speed and headed for clouds to evade any further interception attempts.
d. Four A/P's holed, minor damage to A/P 204, 6023 and 888, and moderate damage to fuselage section of A/P 356.
e. Injured were:
   T/Sgt. James M. Dunn, ASN 18007359 - radio gunner, hospitalized for cuts on face.
   S/Sgt. William A. Caputo, ASN 32698525 - engineer-gunner, slight scratches on right arm.
   f. The above listed men are being considered for the Purple Heart award.

4. CITATIONS
In the opinion of this Officer, there were no individual actions which would seem to warrant awards other than the Purple Heart.

5. ARMAMENT AND ORDNANCE
288 x 23 lb parafrag bombs dropped.
96 x 23 lb parafrag bombs returned to base because of release malfunction.
48 x 23 lb parafrag bombs salvoed due to release malfunction.
11,250 x .50 calibre ammunition expended.

6. SIGHTINGS
At 1100/I from 1000 feet, 8/10 trucks on road at LANETE (1532N-12115E). Two or three platoons of men near LAUR at 1535N-12112E, and a 16 x 25 ft house, the side of which dropped away and is thought to have concealed a gun position, although no gun was seen.

At SALANGAN, temporary serviceable bridge around a destroyed bridge.

At 1125/I from 300 feet, two columns of black smoke and flame, one to 2000 ft from vicinity of CLARK FIELD.
One serviceable S/E fighter on strip thought to be BALARA.
At QUEZON CITY from 1000 feet, saw column of black smoke to 2000 ft, and bomb flashes or similar explosions.
At 1140/I at 3000 feet, three large oil fires, black smoke to 2000 ft, on South coast of LAGUNA DE BAY.

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Narrative Report on FFO 10-A-1

7. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
   Photos reveal a large bomb crater in the main highway. Other bomb damage is not covered by these photographs.

   For the Commanding Officer:

   PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (B)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

13 January 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Six B-25's of the 500th Squadron bombed and strafed railroad rolling stock and military vehicles in a area in Central Luzon between PARIA and MANTA on the north, and extending south to BATAAN and TANZA. A total of 60 parades and 12,500 rounds of .50-calibre were expended. The following were destroyed: Eight flat cars, four boxcars, four coal cars, one locomotive and 13 trucks. Damaged were: Five flat cars, eight boxcars, two coal cars, one locomotive, one caboose, four motorcycles, 4/5 K/T's and a water tower.

2. OBJECTIVE
   This strike was designed to harass Jap lines of communication between the BATAAN area and LINGAYEN GULF. Railroad rolling stock and military vehicles were the units assigned to be attacked. A-20's were to be in and out of this same area before our Group's time of attack.

3. ATTACK
   In Group formation, 6 B-25's of the 500th Squadron filled in the number two position with the B-25's leading the B-25's and B-25's trailing. The B-25's A/F's, in two plane elements, approached the northern sector of the assigned area on a northeasterly heading from the west side of Luzon and circled three times in the northern area of primary importance. Then they proceeded generally south continuing the attack to the vicinity of BATAAN in South-central Luzon.

   b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/F 6023 - Lt. Rasmussen
   A/F 171 - Lt. Bagwell
   A/F 203 - Lt. Baker
   A/F 033 - Lt. Bents
   A/F 191 - Lt. Stewart
   A/F 127 - Lt. Earing

   c. Results:
   Lt. Rasmussen destroyed four flat cars at TARAC and two flat cars at PANJULY dropping four parades at each location and strafing heavily. At a point four miles southeast of ANGELES he destroyed a previously damaged, stationary locomotive scoring two direct hits with four bombs released. At MEXICO, Lt. Rasmussen strafed and damaged a flat car.

   Lt. Bents spotted three boxcars and a flat car near LUJASITI but due to release malfunction was unable to drop his bombs on them although he made two passes in the attempt. He strafed rolling stock throughout the run, but with unobserved results.

   Lt. Bagwell destroyed four coal cars at Concepcion dropping four bombs and heavily strafing. He damaged four box cars at SAN MIGUEL and one box car, two coal cars, two flat cars and one caboose at HANGDILL.

- 1 -
Narrative PFO 13-4-3 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

Lt Stewart dropped four bombs at SAN MIGUEL destroying four boxcars and strafed a RR water tower scoring hits. In the vicinity of CLARK FIELD he dropped four bombs at a stationary locomotive scoring direct hits and probably destroying it.

Lt Daker strafed and bombed road traffic between TARLAC and BAMBAN setting afire ten trucks and damaging four motorcycles and 4/5 military trucks. At SAN FERNANDO he toggled out four demos destroying two flat cars and damaging three boxcars.

Lt Waring bombed and strafed three trucks on the highway just South of TARLAC, destroying all three. At GERONA he released four bombs damaging the railroad station house and two flat cars grouped alongside the building as well as the tracks.

Excellent photos covering the mission have been received and in part confirm crew estimates of mission results. All photos tend to show considerable activity along the main highways and railroads.

d. Opposition:

Enemy opposition to this attack was moderate. Three A/P's were hit by slight machine gun fire from trucks moving North on the road near SANTA CRUZ and from medium, moderate A/A fire from QUEZON CITY A/D area.

Lt Waring and Lt Daker, flying at 1000 feet, were intercepted by one of three unidentified single engine fighters at 1140/I near CANAHAN ISLAND at 1150-1200E. These A/P's hovered 3000 ft above our A/P's until one broke away for two passes, the first being pressed to within 800 yards from 7 o'clock high and the second to 1000 yards from 6 o'clock high. Enemy A/P was not observed firing but turret and tail gunners in our two A/P's opened fire on each attack causing the interceptor to break away before reaching an effective range.

4. COMMENTS

As indicated from interrogation, Jap activity on the main highways north of MANILA and in the vicinity of TARLAC has increased appreciably. The general flow seems to be northward. The use of haystacks for camouflaging gun positions and in some cases, trucks, is evident in many places throughout the area.

5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this officer, with knowledge based on available information, no individual actions on this strike seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS

Time table: Takeoff: 0930/I from TACLOBAN.
Landing: 1500/I to 1536/I at TACLOBAN.
Group assembly: 0940/I over TACLOBAN at 1500 ft.
Fighter rendezvous: Mil fighter cover scheduled.
Attack: 1220/I to 1300/I at 50/200 ft, Central LIZON.
Route: TACLOBAN-West end of LIZON-Central LIZON-BALARA-TACLOBAN.
Fighter cover: Mil

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force. APO 925.
Attention: A.C., of S., A-2.

1. GENERAL SYNOPSIS
The 346th Squadron of six A/P's bombed and strafed APARRI A/D, dropping a total of 132 parafraggs and expending 11,700 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition. One Sally was possibly destroyed and one Nick was probably damaged. Bombs fell on the Sally and very near the Nick but photos show several bombs lying on the ground with no indication of any of them exploding.

2. OBJECTIVE
With increased pressure put on the Japs in Lузон by the recent US landings at LINGAYEN GULF, it was believed that APARRI A/D was being used by the enemy a great deal more than at earlier dates. The 346th Group was the only unit striking this area on this date and were primarily interested in destroying A/P's at the drone.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation: The 346th led the Group in box formation with the 501st, 448th and 449th filling out the other three spots in that order. APARRI was approached on a northerly heading. All squadrons flew in six A/P line abreast formation with two squadrons at a time forming a twelve ship line, crossing the target on a 350° heading.

b. Pilots and Planes participating:
As crossed target:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/F 152</th>
<th>A/P 023</th>
<th>A/P 127</th>
<th>A/P 191</th>
<th>A/P 171</th>
<th>A/P 6023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Schmidt</td>
<td>Lt Haring</td>
<td>Capt Bassel (1dr)</td>
<td>Lt Symonds</td>
<td>Lt Canning</td>
<td>Lt Hebacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: Bombing was excellent with 132 parafraggs (23 pounders) covering an area 2500' x 2500' beginning at the river south of the drone and extending north across the western half of the drone to the ocean's edge. The 501st Squadron flew on our right wing covering the eastern portion of the drone. Lt Haring bombed and possibly destroyed a Sally and probably damaged a Nick parked on the South edge of the runway just west of the cemetery. Other bombs fell among shacks along the South edge of the runway, probably damaging them. Photographs of the bombing of the Sally show several of the parafraggs lying on the ground with open chutes attached. These bombs apparently have been dropped at too low an altitude.

d. Opposition: Slight W/G fire from the eastern edge of town was observed but it was absolutely ineffective.

4. COMMENTS
Crews were thoroughly impressed by the excellent cover afforded by two squadrons of P-51's.
5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this Officer at the time of writing this report, there were no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table:
   - Takeoff: 0655/1 from Tacloban.
   - Group assembly: 0715/1 at 1500 ft over Tacloban.
   - Fighter rendezvous: Same as Group assembly.
   - Attack: 1032/1 to 1034/1 at 25/200 ft at Aparrí.
   - Landing: 1110/1 to 1112/1 at Tacloban.

b. Route: Tacloban - Polillo Island - Aparrí - Tacloban.

c. Fighter cover: Fighter cover furnished by two squadrons of P-51's was excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925
   Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS

   On the afternoon of 16 January, 1945, the 500th Squadron represented by six B-25J's executed a minimum altitude bombing-strafing attack on railroad rolling stock and military vehicles in an area between CALAMBA and LUCENA in the LAGUNA DE BAY area of LUZON. A total of 432 parafrag rounds and more than 16,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammuni tion destroyed one switch engine, a water tower and at least four boxcars and probably destroying another boxcar. Extensive damage was inflicted throughout the area by intensive strafing and excellent bombing. Surrender leaflets were dropped at a small barrier on the southwest shore of LAKE NAUJAN in northeastern MINDORO. All A/P's returned safely to TagCLOBAN as ordered, the mission having originated at MINDORO where our A/P's were temporarily staging.

2. OBJECTIVE

   Recent strikes completed by the 345th Group have been particularly successful in severing or blocking the enemy lines of communication in LUZON. This strike had the same purpose to accomplish, the specific target being railroad rolling stock, subsidiary installations and military trucks on adjacent roads.

3. ATTACK

   a. Formation, approach: The 500th Squadron and the other three squadrons of the Group, each with a complement of six B-25J's, took off from MINDORO at separated intervals and proceeded to LUZON in squadron formation only. The 500th approached LAGUNA DE BAY area from the southwest, then swung to southerly heading initiating the attack at CALAMBA and carrying it through in two general directions, one due South to BATANGAS, the other South to LIPA and then West to LUCENA. A/P's attacked in single plane elements in trail formation.

   b. Pilots and planes participating:

      A/P 568 - Maj Mortensen  A/P 191 - Lt Bagwell
      A/P 171 - Lt Bents  A/P 127 - Lt Stewart
      A/P 623 - Lt Reels  A/P 033 - Lt Daker

   c. Results: Major Mortensen, Squadron Commander and leader for the day destroyed a switch engine near NAUJAN by strafing, scoring hits in the boiler causing it to explode. One mile West of SAN PABLO he destroyed four boxcars by bombing. His attack at CALAMBA damaged railroad buildings, ten boxcars, nine flatcars and two trucks and at SANDELARIA, his bombs damaged at least six railroad buildings.
Narrative, FFO 16-A-3 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

Lt Bentz bombed and strafed at CANLUBAN starting two small fires and probably damaging a roundhouse, two locomotives, four boxcars and two flatcars. At LOS BANOS he damaged two flatcars and two boxcars while at MALVAR the stationhouse and eight boxcars were damaged. Near CONCEPCION he damaged two flatcars and at LUCENA, he destroyed a water tower, damaged several buildings and fired two lumber cars.

Lt Reheis bombed and strafed at REAL damaging a large workshop, the three boxcars alongside and a flat car loaded with lumber. At LOS BANOS, he hit a locomotive with bombs leaving the unit smoking. He strafed and damaged a previously damaged locomotive standing stationary at TRANGA.

Lt Bagwell dropped the majority of his bombs at CANLUBAN, probably destroying a boxcar and at LIPA, his strafing damaged the station house and two boxcars. At BATANGAS, the leader of the second flight strafed and probably damaged three boxcars, an old locomotive, two flatcars and the local stationhouse.

Lt Stewart dropped his 72 bombs at CANLUBAN damaging two repair buildings and two boxcars. Five miles Southeast of CANLUBAN he completed five strafing passes on a stationary freight train, damaging the boiler of the locomotive and the ten flatcars and ten boxcars it was hauling. The train was pointed in a Northerly direction.

Lt Dacke bombed and strafed three warehouses near the railroad tracks at CANLUBAN, setting all three structures afire. At LUCENA, most of his bombs were released damaging two warehouses and one boxcar.

Mission photos received confirm crew reports of damage inflicted by this and previous strikes.

c. Opposition: Light, moderate, accurate A/A fire from railyards at LUCENA holed Lt Reheis's A/P, one hole in each wing, once in the nose and once in the windshield. Light, slight fire from some unknown position holed a second A/P's nose (A/P 191, flown by Lt Bagwell). Damage was of minor extent and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS

Combat crews were quite enthusiastic over the results of the mission.

5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this Officer at the time of filing this report, there were no individual actions which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table: Takeoff: 1108/I from MINDANAO.  
Attack: 1500/I to 1530/I at 50/100 feet.  
Landing: 1708/I at Tacloban.

b. Route: MINDANAO - TAGBIST - direct to Tacloban.

c. Fighter cover - Nil.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 204-5, 20 January, 1945

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, AFO-923.
Attention: A.C. of 5th, 8th.

1. SYNOPTIC

Four squadrons of the 315th Bomb Group, failing to reach their primary target because of weather, bombed and strafed the secondary area, military trucks and railroad rolling stock on Bicol Peninsula, Southeast Luzon, in the morning of 20 January. Five A/P's of the 500th Squadron dropped a total of 60 100 lb paratroons on targets of opportunity between LIPA and the peninsula's Southeast tip, destroying three boxcars at OAS Town and damaging two, one at OAS and the other at Ligao. Pilots expended 11,900 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition throughout the run but results were unobserved.

2. OBJECTIVE

Four squadrons of the 315th Group were ordered to bomb and strafe a reported troop concentration located approximately five miles northeast of Marikina in the Manila area of Luzon. The secondary assigned was railroad and road rolling stock on Bicol Peninsula. Each squadron was instructed to cover a certain section of the peninsula to assure complete and efficient coverage. Crews were instructed to strafe haystacks along the main roads, emphasizing the fact that Japs often use this type of camouflage for military trucks and tanks as well as A/A guns. The recent Japanese use of booby trap land mines against low flying aircraft was also brought to the crew's attention, and in this vein they were warned to stay clear of any suspicious looking vehicle on the roads.

3. ATTACK

a. Five B-25's of the 500th Squadron, flying the number four position in the Group formation, followed the 501st, 896th and 99th squadrons in that order, to a point near LIPA A/D in South-central Luzon. The weather had the primary socked in, forcing the Group to hit the secondary. The 500th approached their assigned section from the Southwest and at LIPA turned abruptly Southeast attacking in two A/P elements railroad and road targets to the Southeast tip of Bicol Peninsula.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

A/P 361 - Lt. Baker
A/P 558 - Lt. Schmidt
A/P 023 - Lt. Losier
A/P 033 - Lt. Sisson
A/P 171 - Lt. Waring (ret. early) A/P 191 - Lt. McInerney

c. Results: Lt. Baker, Squadron leader, bombed four boxcars at OAS, destroying three and damaging the fourth. At Ligao he damaged one of six boxcars dispersed on sidings there. Lt. Losier damaged two warehouses near a wharf at Legaspi Point. Other bombs fell in the vicinity of Ligao and Legaspi with unobserved results. All pilots strafed targets of opportunity.

along the entire run but unfortunately results were unobserved. Lt Warin
took off on the mission but returned shortly after takeoff due to a rough
right engine. Two A/F's carried K-21 cam were taking photos of the bombing.
Points received confirm crew reports but show little signs of enemy activity.
d. Opposition: Opposition to our attack was extremely weak with
only a few distant tracers seen in the vicinity of LEGASPI.

4. COMMENTS

Crew were definitely disappointed with the obvious inactivity of
their target area. However, the Group's overall report of destruction is
interesting.

5. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this officer based on the information at hand,
these seem to be no individual awards warranted.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table: Takeoff: At 0630/I from TACLOBAN
   Group assembly: At 0645/I, 1500 ft over TACLOBAN.
   Attack: 1135/I to 1210/I.
   Landing: At 1315/I at TACLOBAN.

   IRIGA – TARGET – TACLOBAN.

c. No fighter cover.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)  
315th Bombardment Group  
APO 72  

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.  

23 January, 1945

1. SYNOPSIS  
The 500th Squadron composed of five A/P's bombed and strafed on two  
passes road targets between Lima and Dinalupihan on the east coast of Ba-  
TaAN PENINSULA, LILONG, and then executed a bombing-strafing run on the  
secondary target from Los Banos south to Batangas in South-central LILONG.  
One warehouse and two barracks were destroyed and one jetty, a truck and  
two gunpits were damaged on the sweep. Photo coverage was reported as ex-  
cellent on the basis of crew observation.

2. OBJECTIVE  
Good photo coverage of the assigned area on BATAAN PENINSULA was of  
prime importance on this mission and bombing and strafing of road targets of  
opportunity was of secondary importance. The 315th Group was the only  
unit assigned BATAAN as a primary target.

3. ATTACK  
a. Formation - approach: The 500th Squadron led the Group in box  
formation with the 501st, 498th and 499th Squadrons following in that order.  
The peninsula was approached from the South and the 500th attacked in two  
plane elements at minimum altitude on a northerly heading from Cabcaben to  
CABANGAN and back again. The squadron approached the secondary area from the  
southwest a few miles south of Los Banos where they intercepted the road  
system and on a southerly heading attacked road targets to BATANGAS.

b. Pilots and planes participating:  
A/P 588 - Maj Mortensen  
A/P 361 - Lt Stewart  
A/P 191 - Lt Hill  
A/P 888 - Lt Canning  
A/P 033 - Lt Schmidt  
Lt Bents, A/P 819, sixth plane scheduled on mission did not take  
off due to mechanical trouble with the bomb bay doors.

c. Results: Forty-four (44) 100 lb paraecho bombs were dropped.  
At CABCABEN, BATAAN, Maj Mortensen damaged two gun positions while at LOKANIN  
POINT, Lt Schmidt claims destruction of a warehouse. Lt Hill bombed and  
damaged a truck near BUKAL in the secondary target south of LAGUNA DE BAY  
and Lt Canning destroyed a barracks building near a railroad station in  
SAN JOSE in the same general area. K-20, K-21 and K-22 cameras were turned  
on to cover the target area.

d. Opposition: Medium, slight, but accurate A/A was received  
from vicinity of BATANGAS A/D holing one A/P in the lower part of the left  
engine nacelle.

4. COMMENTS
   There were few signs of recent enemy activity in the area.

5. AWARDS
   Based on information available at the present time there were no
   individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table:  Takeoff:  At 0705/I from TACLOBAN.
   b. Assembly:  At 0720/I over TACLOBAN.
   c. Attack:  0910/I to 0945/I - LUZON.
   d. Landing:  1150/I at TACLOBAN.
   e. Route:  TACLOBAN - MINDORO - BATAAN - LOS BANOS - TACLOBAN.
   f. Mil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group (M)
APO 72


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925

1. SYNOPSIS
   Executing two minimum altitude passes, the first to the north and
   the second a reciprocal to the south, six B-25J's of our Squadron dropped a
   total of 67 100 pound parademo bombs in the northern two-thirds of FLORIDA-
   BLANCA TOWN. Bomb damage must have been severe but due to heavy pall of
   smoke covering the target, specific results could not be ascertained. Two
   tin buildings in the northeast section of the town were set afire by
   strafing. One A/P strafed shacks along the east side of FLORIDABLANCA A/D.

2. OBJECTIVE
   The 315th and 312th Bomb Groups were ordered to level FLORIDABLANCA
   TOWN which was reported to be 100% Jap occupied, the Filipinos having been
   evacuated.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: Our Squadron in two, three plane elements,
      number four position in Group formation, followed the 501st, 498th and 499th
      over the target in that order on both the north and the south passes.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 548 - Lt Canning            A/P 350 - Lt Rehals
      A/P 023 - Lt Herick             A/P 888 - Lt Bennett
      A/P 6023 - Lt Waring            A/P 191 - Lt Bents
   c. Results: Lt Bennett strafed two tin buildings 150' X 30' in the
      northeast corner of FLORIDABLANCA and both structures went up in flamed.
      All the 67 bombs fell square in the target and all pilots strafed the town
      heavily with some fire directed toward the A/D as well as a haystack,
      thought to be a potential 1/2 mile northeast of FLORIDABLANCA. Alto-
      gether a total of 16,200 rounds of .50's were expended. Photos of the
      attack were taken but no prints have been received at the time of writing
      this report.
   d. Opposition: Slight (M/G and 20mm), light and accurate A/A
      fire was received from unidentified positions at FLORIDABLANCA TOWN, holes
      A/P's 548, 350 and 888 causing minor damage.

4. COMMENTS
   Crews reported that there was a large fire with heavy black smoke
   at the south end of FLORIDABLANCA TOWN as they approached, and it was
   thought to be the ammunition dump reported as located in that section.
   Heavy smoke covering the town made observation of our damages impossible.
5. **AWARDS**
   In the opinion of this Officer, based on information available at this time, there seem to be no individual actions which would justify awards.

6. **STATISTICS**
   a. **Time table:**
      Takeoff - 0710/I from TACLOBAN.
      Assembly - 0720/I at 1500 ft over TACLOBAN.
      Attack - 0927/I to 0945/I at 50/150 feet.
      Landing - 1228/I at TACLOBAN.
   b. **Route:**
      TACLOBAN - AMBIL ISLAND - SUBIC BAY - FLORIDABLANCA - AMBIL ISLAND - TACLOBAN.
   c. **Fighter cover:** Nil scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

25 January, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.


1. SYNOPSIS

Four A/P's of the 500th Squadron, with A/P's of the 498th and 499th Squadrons, executed a minimum altitude bombing-strafing attack on BATAAN PENINSULA in the morning of 24 January. Our Squadron dropped 39 x 100 lb paradesmos and expended 8,500 rounds of ammunition, destroying two warehouses, two smaller buildings and further damaging a previously damaged wharf. Photo coverage was thought to be excellent. Propaganda leaflets were dropped on towns and barrios in the BATAAN area.

2. OBJECTIVE

Coastal areas of BATAAN, and GRANDE ISLAND at the mouth of SUBIC BAY were to be covered again by this Group. The mission was essentially a photographic one and our Squadron was assigned that portion of BATAAN's west coast between CABAYO TOWN and MARIVELES A/D. Trucks and other military installations were fair targets. Buildings and military road equipment between LIPA and CALINGATAN dunes in South-central LUZON, just east of LAKE TAAL, were assigned as our secondary target.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our Squadron followed the 498th and 499th in formation and approached the target from the south. Our four B-25's broke in over BATAAN's west coast at CABAYO and turning south in two A/P elements, swept over the coastal area to MARIVELES A/D on the south tip of BATAAN, where a number of passes were made.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 619 - Lt Stewart
   A/P 171 - Lt Loisel
   A/P 210 - Lt Bentz
   A/P 127 - Lt Greenstein

c. Results: The majority of the bombs dropped, fell around MARIVELES A/D area. Lt Stewart dropped two bombs east of this area destroying two warehouses near the coast. Lt Greenstein's bombs further damaged a previously damaged wharf at MARIVELES while Lt Bentz destroyed two medium sized buildings at the southern edge of the A/D. All crews strafed the coastal areas from CABAYO to MARIVELES where several strafing passes were made on the A/D area. One paradesmo hung up in A/P 127 as the last pass was executed and despite the crew's efforts, which included cutting holes in the fuselage, the fouled bomb could not be released. Lt Greenstein reached TACLOBAN where he communicated with the ground control. After a short time it was decided that the pilot could chance the landing, if he so desired. The A/P landed without incident and the bomb was removed. Photos received corroborate crew reports of bomb hits and barreness of area.
4. COMMENTS
Crews were rather disappointed with the target referring to the mission as "another milkrun."

5. AWARDS
In the opinion of this officer, based on information available at this time, there seem to be no individual action which would justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
a. Time tables: Takeoff: 0703/I from TACLOBAN.
   Assembly: Immediately after takeoff.
   Attack: 0910/I to 0925/I.
   Landing: Two A/F's at 12h0/I and two at 1350/I.
   Route: TACLOBAN - AMBIL ISLAND - TARGET - AMBIL ISLAND - TACLOBAN.
   c. Fighter cover: Area cover not seen.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HITCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYMOPSIS

Four A/P's of the 500th Squadron, with A/P's of the 498th, 499th and 501st Squadrons, executed another minimum altitude bombing-strafing attack on BATAAN PENINSULA in the morning of 25 January. Our Squadron dropped 8 100 lb parades and expended 12,000 rounds of .50 calibres, destroying one barracks, two long sheds, one probable type "G" landing craft and three orange storage tanks. Photo coverage was thought to be excellent, especially around MARIVELES A/D.

2. OBJECTIVE

Coastal areas of BATAAN were to be covered again by this Group. Our Squadron was to hit the West coast from OLONGAPO to MARIVELES A/D at the south tip of BATAAN. Trucks, haystacks and other military installations were fair targets. No secondary target was assigned.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Flying in on a northerly heading over SUBIC BAY and to the west of GRANDE ISLAND, our squadron of four B-25J's swung south and swept over BATAAN's west coast from OLONGAPO to MARIVELES attacking in two A/P elements at minimum altitude.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 562 - Lt Reheis
   A/P 350 - Lt Waring
   A/P 602 - Lt Herick
   A/P 888 - Lt Bennett

c. Results: The majority of the bombs fell either in OLONGAPO or the MARIVELES area. Lt Reheis bombed two camouflaged type "G" landing craft near the south shore of a point just North of PATSAWAN, destroying one and damaging the other. At MARIVELES he probably damaged 6/8 barracks at the east end of the strip by strafing and put tracers into a rock laden barge, stationary off shore at MARIVELES. While east of the A/D he strafed and set afire one orange storage tank and damaged two others. Lt Herick bombed small camouflaged buildings near the west edge of OLONGAPO and others one mile north of BAGAC, probably causing damage in both groups. F/O Bennett destroyed at least two of 8/10 long sheds just South of MASAYO. Photos received add little in damage assessment and reveal the general paucity of targets in the area.

d. Opposition: Two crews reported M/G fire, slight and inaccurate, from one haystack in a group of four one mile North of BAGAC. A/P 888 received two bursts of 20mm from COCINGOS PT just south of MARIVELES, one burst shattering plexiglass in the nose section.
4. COMMENTS
Once again crews report few signs of enemy activity on BATAAN.

5. CITATIONS
In the opinion of this officer based on available information, there seem to be no individual actions which would justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
a. Time table: Takeoff: 0715/I from TACLOBAN.
   Assembly: Immediately after takeoff.
   Attack: 0930/I to 1000/I at 50/150 ft.
   Landing: 1225/I at TACLOBAN.

b. Route: TACLOBAN - AMBIL ISLAND - TARGET - TACLOBAN.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four A/P's of the 500th Bomb Squadron leading four planes from the
501st Squadron, made a minimum altitude bombing-strafing attack in the
morning of 26 January, on reported coastal defense guns at CABCAEBEN A/D on
BATAAN's Southeast coast. Our Squadron dropped 21 x 250 lb parabomds and
expended more than 11,000 rounds of ammunition destroying four barracks,
damaging at least two warehouses, a jetty and some small buildings. Fires
were going in the area as our planes withdrew. Photo coverage was fairly
good.

2. OBJECTIVE

Two squadrons, the 500th and 501st, were assigned six coastal guns
reported to be at the east end of CABCAEBEN A/D next to the water's edge, as
their target. Barracks located around the drone were also fair targets.
The 498th and 499th Squadrons had a similar target, coastal defense guns
at CARABAO ISLAND on the south side of MANILA BAY entrance. No secondary
was given.

3. ATTACK - approach: Four B-25J's of our Squadron in diamond
formation led the two squadron attack force to the target. Sweeping in low
and to the east over CABCAEBEN A/D they bombad and strafed, then circled to
the north over MANILA BAY to cut across the drone once more, this time on a
southeasterly heading. Our A/P's attacked in two plane elements:

A/P 361 - Lt Earing
A/P 023 - Lt Loisel

A/P 191 - Lt Greenstein
A/P 171 - Lt Hill

Results: Bombing was excellent leaving the target covered with
smoke. However, no indication of the presence of coastal defence guns was
noted. Lt Earing, who led our squadron and the 501st to the target, claims
destruction of at least one barracks at the east end of the strip and the
damaging of more buildings near a jetty 6000 feet northeast of CABCAEBEN
where fires were started. Lt Loisel scored near misses on buildings and as
he withdrew his crew noted flames in the target. Lt Greenstein did a fine
job of destroying three barracks just north of the east end of CABCAEBEN A/D.
All pilots claim probable damage to buildings in the barracks area along
the shore at the east end of the strip. Photos received disclose smoke in
the target area without indicating specific damage.

Opposition: Opposition to our strike was slight with only one light
position firing inaccurately from a point at the Southeast end of the drone.
Narrative FFO 26-A-7 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

4. COMMENTS
   There was no fighter cover assigned to this strike.

5. CITATIONS
   In the opinion of this Officer, based on available information, there
   seem to be no individual action which would justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table:
      Takeoff: 0725/I from Tacloban.
      Assembly: Enroute.
      Attack: 0910/I to 0945/I at 50/150 feet.
      Landing: 1215/I at Tacloban.
   b. Route: Tacloban - Ambil Island - Target - Tacloban.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four A/P's of the 500th Squadron, following four planes from the 499th Squadron, made a minimum altitude bombing-strafing attack on the warehouse area at CABACANEL A/D and targets of opportunity along the East coast of BATAAN PENINSULA. Destroying three barracks, a warehouse and several smaller buildings as well as scoring hits on others, our B-25's dropped 1,000 pound parades and expended more than 44,000 rounds of ammunition during the attack. Two barges between the two jetties at CABACANEL were bombed and strafed with one believed to have been rendered unserviceable and the other damaged. Haystacks throughout target were set afire by strafing and at BALANCA, a truck was damaged.

2. OBJECTIVE

The 499th and 500th Squadrons were assigned CABACANEL and BATAAN A/D installations and targets of opportunity along the East coast of BATAAN PENINSULA. The 499th and 501st Squadrons had similar targets on the West coast of the Peninsula with emphasis on BAGAC. The secondary target, not attacked by our Squadron, was the ground installations between the two airstrips at LIPA, East of LAKE TAAL.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation-approach: The 500th proceeded to the target in diamond formation and came in low over CABACANEL after having broken up into two ship elements for the attack.

b. Pilots, planes participating:

A/P 597 - Lt Rasmussen
A/P 350 - Lt Herick
A/P 127 - Lt Reheis
A/P 033 - Lt Symonds

c. The 500th came in low over CABACANEL and continued up the coast to DINANUPILAN where they made a 180 and returned along the coast to CABACANEL with the following destruction. Lt Rasmussen blew up one barracks and seriously damaged another at CABACANEL and damaged a truck at BALANCA. Lt Herick destroyed two barracks and damaged another just South of CABACANEL A/D. Lt Reheis hit a warehouse and dropped ten bombs in barracks area at CABACANEL causing fires. Between the two jetties there he knocked out one barge and damaged a second. He also strafed steel roofed buildings in ravines West of ORION and haystacks along route as well as two rectangular pits between BAGACA and ORION and three storage tanks at MARIVELES. Lt Symonds dropped eight bombs on a warehouse at CABACANEL and reported an explosion with gray smoke up to 1000 feet and flames to 75 feet.

d. Opposition: No fighter interception. A/A was light, slight and inaccurate from vicinity of MARIVELES strip and slight, inaccurate M/G fire from rice paddies at HERMOSA.
h. CONFLICTS
   No fighter cover was scheduled for this mission. Crew members reported six large barracks, well-placed in ravines and trees, five miles northwest of the CANAL area and a 20/30 ft motor boat near MALIBU.

5. CITATIONS
   In the opinion of this officer, based on available information, there seems to be no individual action justifying an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table - Takeoff: 0830/7 from TACISIAN.
      Assembly: 0845/7 at 1500 ft over TACISIAN.
      Attack: 1025/7 to 1345/7 at 50/150 feet.
      Landing: 1315/7 at TACISIAN.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: Non-scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.G. of S, h-2.

1. SYMPTOMS
Striking in three plane elements, six B-25J's of the 500th Squadron attacked an area reportedly containing six dual purpose guns, and buildings along the east coast of SEABA PENINSULA in the CASCABEL STRIP area on the morning of 25 January, 1945. Although all gun pits were empty, the barrack area was given a good pounding by 56 X 100 lb parades and 7,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. Smoke and flames were reported in the target where buildings were hit, but smoke and dust hindered detailed observation of results.

2. Objective
a. General: The mission was flown as a part of a harassing campaign on the west coast of SEABA PENINSULA. No other group participated.

b. Specific: The 500th's target was dual purpose gun positions and buildings north and south of the west end of CASCABEL STRIP.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation-approach: Six B-25's of the 500th Squadron led the Group, which was in a diamond formation. The target was determined by the order of attack being 500th, 501st, 66th and 8th. The attack was made from south to north with planes attacking in three ship elements.

b. Pilots and Planes participating:
A/P 59s - Lt Karsmussen
A/P 603 - Lt Lenz
A/P 58s - Lt Mill
A/P 350 - Lt Loisel

2. Results: So far as observation was concerned, only mediocre results were obtained. Dust, smoke and the minimum altitude of the attack prevented an accurate assessment of damage. However, two barracks 1000 feet south of the east end of the strip were damaged by Lt Lagley. Smoke fell on and near several buildings with observed results. Empty gun pits as well as the entire area was thoroughly strafed. As A/P's withdrew, there was on fire in target area covered by light smoke and dust to 500 feet. A-2L photos received were not of much help in ascertaining damage as smoke and dust hides burst bursts from view.

d. Opposition: Light, slight, inaccurate from a position 300 ft south of the twin settees at 2400 ft. The windshield on Lt Karsmussen's A/P was cracked, but pilot thought it was caused from flying debris or empty cartridge. No personnel were injured.
Narrative, 13 ATF, FO #1 - 50th Sqdn - cont.

4. CONTENTS OF I.O.
The turret gunner on one plane reported 50 m/t's at 6 - 7000 ft but the sighting was not made by any other crew members.

5. CITATIONS
In the opinion of this officer, based on information available at the time of writing this report, no performance on this strike merits an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table:
      Takeoff: 0630/1 at TACLOBAN.
      Assembly: 0745/1 at 1500 ft over TACLOBAN.
      Attack: 0950/1 to 0955/1, at 50/150 ft.
      Landing: 1222/1 at TACLOBAN.
   b. Route: TACLOBAN - WINDORO - LUBANG - TARGET - LUBANG - BASE.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

   JOHN P. DUNES
   2nd Lt, Air Corps
   Ass't Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four B-25's of the 500th Bomb Squadron struck in two plane elements Wednesday morning at repair yards on the South side of BACOLOD, NEGROS. Sixteen 500 lb bombs - four of which were unarmed - were dropped on the target from 50/150 feet. Although target was also heavily strafed, smoke and dust prevented good observation of results.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. General: This strike was intended to harass the enemy and also to disrupt communications as destruction of repair facilities might deny him needed equipment and future repairs.

b. Specific: Our particular target was repair areas on the South side of BACOLOD just North of the river on edge of town where the railroad enters from the East.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our squadron was fourth in the Group formation which was led by the 501st with the 498th and 499th filling in the two and three position in the diamond formation. The formation approached the target from the Southeast, attacking in elements of two on a 290° heading.

b. Planes and planes participating:

- A/F 516 - Lt. Ramussen
- A/F 566 - Lt. Reheis
- A/F 702 - Lt. Bennett

C. Results: Observation of results was hampered by smoke and dust. Flares were seen and crew members felt that considerable damage was inflicted. One bomb skipped out of target area several hundred feet down a street, destroying 15/20 bamboo houses enroute. A total of 7500 rounds of ammunition as expended in strafing. Four K-21 photos received failed to add information or results although the target is covered with smoke.

4. Disposition: All A/8 or interception. All A/8's damaged or personnel injured.

5. CONCLUSION

The crew reported large building concentration just north west of the target proper. One pilot suggested dropping bombs from about 300 feet as it presents good timing and low altitude, bombs tend to skip since it does not have the time to assume a vertical attitude before hitting. Crews use earth shadow and wood lamina (as possible); aluminum smoke also very valuable.

6. P.S.

In the opinion of this officer, based on facts available at the time of writing, a performance of this kind merits a commendation.
6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0950/I from TACLOBAN.
     Group assembly: 0955/I over TACLOBAN at 1500 ft.
     Attack: 1050/I to 1055/I at BACOLOD.
     Landing: 1256/I at TACLOBAN.
   b. Route: TACLOBAN - BILIRAN - NEHRUS - BACOLOD - TACLOBAN.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.


1. SYNOPSIS
Six A/P's of the 500th Squadron completed a single minimum altitude bombing strafing pass across the float plane base at the primary target, PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN, in the morning of 1 February. A total of 72 100 pound ordnance and 5,200 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition were thrown at installations, damaging buildings, an unserviceable Tony and a serviceable truck.

2. OBJECTIVE
Recent photo coverage of the target revealed some buildings in good repair, and it was believed that the enemy is still operating on a small scale from the float plane base. Our Squadron and others from the Group were to concentrate on buildings at the float plane base. Installations at CEBU CITY, CEBU ISLAND, were assigned as a secondary target.

3. ATTACK
a. Approach formation: The 498th and 499th Squadrons followed by six F-25's of the 500th, and the last squadron the 501st, approached PUERTO PRINCESA from east-northeast and executed a single low level pass over the town, six A/P's abreast on a Southwesterly heading.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 586 - Lt Stewart
   A/P 033 - Lt Lents
   A/P 210 - Lt McKinney
   A/P 594 - Lt Zaring
   A/P 127 - Lt Bagley
   A/P 361 - Lt Symonds

c. Results: Bombing was excellent with all bombs but two falling on land in the target area. Two bombs fell in the water. Lt Symonds damaged buildings near the float plane base while his turret gunner strafed a Jap truck and saw tracers entering it. Other results were unobserved due to heavy tree cover and bomb dust. All six A/P's took K-21 photos and prints received are very little to damage assessment. Bombs are seen falling near the American Prisoner of War Camp on buildings along beach - believed to be too far away to damage float installations. Smoke covers the target.

d. Opposition: The enemy offered little resistance; only one crew member reported that he saw a few red tracers coming from the target.

e. S/Sgt George T. McKenzie, A/P 3706233, engine gunner, was wounded in the head when the Very Pistol was accidentally discharged in the navigator's compartment. Sounds not considered serious.
4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
   On the basis of interrogation, this officer can find few signs of
recent enemy activity in PUERTO PRINCESA.

5. CITATIONS
   In the opinion of this officer, based on all available information,
there were no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: At 0824/I from TACLOBAN.
      Group assembly: At 0840/I at 1500 ft over TACLOBAN.
      Attack: 1117/I to 1120/I at 50/150 ft.
      Landing: 11453/I at TACLOBAN.
   b. Route: TACLOBAN - BOHOL - NEGROS - TARGET - BOHOL - TACLOBAN.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 72

3 February, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. 38 5, A-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

Four planes from this Squadron took off in the morning to strike through the CAMUYA VALLEY to hit airbase installations, Jap river and highway traffic and targets of opportunity. A total of 32 x 100 lb para-"...

2. OBJECTIVE

a. General: Purpose of the strike was to harass the enemy and disrupt his lines of communication, no other groups participated.

b. Specific: Targets of opportunity with emphasis on A/F installations and enemy highway and river traffic was our assigned target.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our planes flew in No. 2 position in the Group into, formation with the 235th leading, the 501st in number three and the 358th in fourth position. The target run was made up CAMUYA VALLEY to the north, then formation circled and returned along same course.

c. Pilots and planes participating:

  A/F 501 - Lt. Nelson (leader)
  A/F 506 - Lt. Bennett
  A/F 502 - Lt. Hill
  A/F 358 - Lt. Hering

At 1100 A/F 502 turned back at 085° at 11-05-12h30 due to leak in water tank. They pushed course open 30° salvaged bombs before making emergency landing at base.

c. Results: Lt. Nelson scored two near misses on a beached Fox Tare Dog and two on another Fox Tare Dog's and one burning in river at CAMUYA TOWN. Lt. Hering scored two direct hits on the Fox Tare Dog sending debris high into the air. At 1100, Lt. Nelson scored near misses on a water tower and Lt. Bennett set a barracks afire by strafing. Lt. Hering further damaged an unserviceable steam roller at CAMUYA. A-21 photos reveal a serviceable 20mm in another A/F and show the hits on the Fox Tare Dog.

d. Opposition: Light, slight, inaccurate to accurate A/A was received from 3400 and CAMUYA holding A/F 350 in the tail assembly cutting the rudder control lock. Lt. intervention encountered and no personnel injured.
13 ATF, FC 5-3-6-1 - 500th SQDN - cont.

4.敵情報告

敵情活動在本區域顯得如此之小，以致於無法承認任何培訓在此任務上。

5. 事蹟

在基於可用資料的基礎上，顯然沒有單個個別行動在這個任務上，不值得進行表彰。

6. 數字

a. 時間表：

起飛：0750/時從塔洛班。

小組會合：0800/時，1500 専於塔洛班。

攻擊：1020/時至 1150/時，高度 50/500 尋

降落：一個 A/P 0840/時在塔洛班。

降落：三個 A/P's 1150/時在塔洛班。

b. 路線：

塔洛班 - 塞西赫隆薩德 - 西北穿越西納 - 塔洛班

馬德雷山脈 - 嘉坎 - 塞西赫隆薩德 - 塔洛班。

c. 戰鬥支援：無預計。

為 COMMANDING OFFICER:

J. F. WINGEES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

4 February, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission 13 ATF, PO 6-3-8-1 - 3 February.

To: Commanding General, Ear East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

The 500th Squadron, composed of four B-25J's and leading the 501st, 496th and 495th Squadrons in that order, attacked on the morning of 3 February, hitting TUGUEGARAO and APARAI A/D's and installations. Our A/P's dropped 3b X 100 lb free falling demos from minimum altitude, all at APARRI A/D and Town, and expended 9,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition in strafing APARRI and TUGUEGARAO. A serviceable single engine fighter was rendered unserviceable and several buildings were damaged at APARRI. Three barrack buildings at TUGUEGARAO were damaged.

2. OBJECTIVE

Keeping in line with recent strikes, today's strike plan was designed to cover tw airdroes in Northern LUZON which might be useful to the Japanese. Photos from our previous day's mission revealed the presence of two serviceable SF's, one Tojo intact but resting on its fuselage, and motor vehicles at APARRI A/D. These items were our specific targets, in addition to airdrome installations at TUGUEGARAO.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our Squadron followed by the other three squadrons of the Group flew to the target area in diamond formation and approached TUGUEGARAO from the South crossing the drone in a four A/P line abreast formation. After considerable maneuvering in heavy weather a pass was completed over APARRI TOWN and A/D on an east-northeast heading.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
- A/P 59 -Lt Raleigh
- A/P 20t - Lt Lents
- A/P 588 - Lt Mill
- A/P 361 - Lt Greenstein

c. Results: All pilots and crews strafed throughout the entire target runs and dropped 3b centuries at APARRI with somewhat satisfying results. Buildings were damaged in the east section of the town just west of the A/D. Small fires were started in the west section of town and bombs trailed through the boat building yards at the bend in the river in the southern part of APARRI TOWN. At TUGUEGARAO, strafing passes constituted the attack with nothing of importance resulting. Lt Greenstein in A/P 361 lost the formation in a cloud as the leader maneuvered to approach APARRI and as a result was unable to complete his attack at the drone. On return, his instruments went out, and since fuel was running low, he landed at MINDORO, refueled and continued on alone to base, landing at 1750/1.

Mission photos received confirm crews' reports of damage to buildings in APARRI TOWN and also reveal that the two SF's at the west end of the A/D...
have not been moved since last covered. The Tojo has been damaged considerably more than was apparent in the previous coverage.

d. Opposition: At APARRI, light, slight and inaccurate fire was fired from positions located near the jetty at the southwest corner of the town and from positions along the seawall just north of town. At TUGUEGARAO, light, slight and inaccurate fire was received from a single gun 20mm position 300 yards east of the north-south strip and next to the central dispersal taxiway.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.

Crews were impressed by the apparent enemy inactivity at these Northern LUZON dromes.

5. CITATIONS

In the opinion of this officer, there are at the time of submitting this report, no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table

Takeoff: 0820/I from TACLOBAN.

Group assembly: 0835/I at 1500 ft over strip.

Landing: Three A/P’s at 1540/I at TACLOBAN.

One A/P at 1750/I at TACLOBAN.

Attack: 1125/I to 1208/Y at 50/150 feet.

b. Route: TACLOBAN - South end of CAGAYAN VALLEY - TUGUEGARAO - APARRI - South end of CAGAYAN VALLEY - TACLOBAN.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON

1st Lt, Air Corps

Intelligence Officer

- 2 -
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (Y)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

6 February, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission 13 ATF, FO 8-3-8-1, 5 February, 1945.
To Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Four B-25's of the 500th Squadron made a low level barge and shipping sweep along the entire East coast of Luzon from Legaspi in the Southwest to Port San Vicente in the Northeast, during the morning and afternoon hours of 5 February. No suitable targets were discovered and all bombs and ammo were returned to base.

2. OBJECTIVE
This strike was designed to intercept any Japs trying to evade our troops in Central Luzon by barge or other shipping from the East coast of Luzon. No land targets were to be hit; only barges or larger shipping was considered a target.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - general: Four squadrons of the 345th Group participated in the attack taking off at different times and proceeding to their assigned coastal sections alone. The 458th started off first at 0730/1, followed by the 499th at 0830/1, four B-25's of the 500th at 0930/1 and last by the four planes of the 501st Squadron at 1030/1. Our squadron began their search in two A/P elements at Luanza town, about two-thirds of the way up Luzon's East coast, and continued the run North to the Northeast tip of the island near Port San Vicente where a front prevented them from reaching their Northern terminus, APARRI TOWN. At Port San Vicente, our A/Ps turned back and returned to sweep the east coast of Luzon to Legaspi, but found nothing to attack:

b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/P 594 - Lt. Faring
A/P 888 - Lt. Symonds
A/P 204 - Lt. Lents
A/P 6023 - Lt. Herick

c. Results: The search produced numerous sightings of land targets and previously destroyed and damaged shipping, but no suitable targets for this task mission were seen. No photographs were taken.
d. Opposition: Throughout the entire run no opposition in the form of ground fire or interception was noted.

4. CONTENTS OF THE I.C.O.
All activity noted along the east coast of Luzon seemed to the normal Filipino daily routine.

5. CITATIONS
In the opinion of this officer at the time of writing this report, there are no individual actions justifying awards for this mission.
6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0930/I from TACLOBAN.
      Group assembly: 0945/I over TACLOBAN.
      Over target: 1127/I to 1700/I at 100/500 feet.
      Landing: 1745/I at TACLOBAN.
   b. Route: TACLOBAN - INFANTA, East coast of LUZON - PORT SAW
      VICENTE - along coast to LEGASPI - TACLOBAN.
   c. 511 fighter cover scheduled.

   For the Commanding Officer:

   PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Four B-25s of the 500th Bomb Squadron made a low level barge and
shipping sweep along the entire East coast of Luzon from Polillo Island to
Vargas Airfield PT near the Northeast tip where weather prevented further activity. Our planes were over the target from 1020/1 to 1220/1 but scarcely any suitable targets were found and only four 500 lb bombs were dropped, and these on a fuel tank lying on a deserted beach. One barge was strafed and damaged.

2. OBJECTIVE
This strike was designed to intercept any Japs trying to evade our troops in Central Luzon by barge or other shipping from the East coast. No land targets were to be hit and only barges and larger shipping were to be considered targets.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: The four squadrons of the Group were over the target at one hour intervals. Our B-25's, taking off at 0630/1, were the second elements over the target, followed by the 501st and 498th; the 492nd led the Group. Attack was made in elements of two planes up and down the coast.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 356 - Maj Mortensen        A/P 023 - Capt Hagen
      A/P 210 - Lt McInney           A/P 598 - Lt Rasmussen
   c. Results: Four 1 500 lb bombs were dropped on a fuel tank, similar to those carried on gasoline trucks, lying on the beach at 1728-122135; near misses were scored on tank by Maj Mortensen who also strafed it with unobserved results. Maj Mortensen also strafed a medium sized serviceable barge, empty and deserted, on a bar or reef at Estacao Island, damaging it. No other suitable shipping targets were seen but several land sightings were reported. X-21 photos were taken but no prints were made.
   d. Opposition: Throughout mission no opposition, either from the ground or the air, was noted.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.G.
All activity on the East coast of Luzon seemed to be normal Filipino traffic.

5. CITATIONS
Based on available information, there are no individual actions on this mission which would seem to warrant an award.
13 ATT, FO 9-3-E-1 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff: 0830/I from TACLOBAN.
      Group assembly: Nil.
      Time over target: 1020/I to 1220/I at 50/1000 ft.
      Landing: 1535/I at TACLOBAN.
   b. Route: TACLOBAN - DEPTACADO ISLAND - DIRAHICAN PT - TARGET -
      PALAHAN PT - TACLOBAN.
   c. Fighter cover: Nil scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DUNES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer
Subject: Narrative Report on Mission 13 ATP, PO 11-3-8-1, 8 February, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYMOPSIS
In a mid-day attack, four B-25J's of the 500th Squadron damaged four barges along the East coast of LUZON, leaving three of them smoking and seriously damaging the forecastle of the fourth. Twelve 500 pound bombs were dropped and 5500 rounds of ammunition expended in the attack.

2. OBJECTIVE
Similar in all respects to the recent strikes assigned, this mission continued the daily patrol of the East coast of LUZON in search of barges or larger shipping units employed by the hard pressed Japanese.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation-approach: Once again the four squadrons of the 345th Group arrived over the target at one hour intervals. Our four B-25J's, as last squadron over the target, swept up LUZON's east coast in two plane elements from LEGASPI to PALANAN POINT, returning via the same route to LEGASPI and base.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 596 - Lt Reheis
   A/P 023 - Lt McKinney
   A/P 210 - Lt Lentz
   A/P 033 - Lt Gilmore

c. Results: Lt Reheis and Lt Lentz attacked three fifty-foot barges in a cove at HARROT TOWN, Southeast LUZON. Lt Reheis dropped four bombs there but missed all targets. Both pilots heavily strafed each barge and all three were left smoking. Lt Gilsore scored a near miss on a large barge at VIENO POINT which tore a big hole in the vessel's side. K-21 photos received nothing in damage assessment, but did show a large dredge at the mouth of a small stream near JOSE and a beached A-20 near SAIAY-SAY POINT.

d. Opposition: Slight and inaccurate W/G fire was reported coming from shore positions at HARROT.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
   Other than the mild activity noted at HARROT TOWN, the usual Filipino activity constituted the picture of the East coast as described by crews.

5. CONCLUSION
   Based on available information, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.
6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table: Takeoff: 1020/1 from TACLOBAN.
      Time over target: 1120/1 to 1458/1 at 50/1500 ft.
      Landing: 1805,1 at TACLOBAN.
   b. Route: TACLOBAN - LEGASPI - along East coast of LUZON - PALA-
      MAN PT - South along East coast - LEGASPI - TACLOBAN.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 72

8 February, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission ATF 13, FO 10-1-1-1-1 Performed on 7
February, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Two B-25J's of the 500th Bomb Squadron made a low level barge and
   shipping sweep along the East coast of LUZON, but no targets were sighted.
   Two other A/P's on mission returned to base shortly after takeoff, one due
to engine trouble, the other to escort.

2. OBJECTIVE
   This strike was designed to continue the daily patrol of East LU-
   ZON's coastal areas. No land targets were to be hit and only barges and
   larger shipping were to be considered targets.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation-approach: Four squadrons of the 345th Group were
      over the target at one hour intervals. Our B-25's, taking off at 0730/1,
      comprised the first element over the target, followed by the 501st, 408th
      and 498th squadrons. The attack was carried out in two plane elements up
      and down the East coast of LUZON.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 361 - Lt Stewart
      A/P 838 - Lt Symonds
      A/P 033 - Lt Leisle
      A/P 6023 - Lt Hart
   c. Results: All bombs were returned to base and the two A/P's
      that reached the target failed to find a shipping target along LUZON's East
      coast. The right engine in Lt Stewart's plane began to cut out periodi-
      cally, shortly after takeoff, and he was forced to return to base, en-
      serted by Lt Leisle in A/P 033. X-21 photos were taken of a downed P-38 on
      beach just South of PALAMAN BAY. Prints show the plane to be on its belly,
      but apparently in good condition otherwise.
   d. Opposition: Nil opposition of any type encountered.

4. CONTENTS OF I.O.
   All activity on the East coast of LUZON seemed to be normal Fili-
   pino traffic.

5. CITATIONS
   Based on available information, there are no individual actions on
   this mission which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable
      Takeoff: 0730/1 from TACLOBAN.
      Landing: Two A/P's at 0515/1.
      TOT: 0930/1 to 1225/1 at 50/1500 ft.
      Landing: Two A/P's at 1150/1.

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13 ATF, PO 10-3-M-1 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

b. Route: TACLOBAN - SAN ILDEFONSO PENINSULA - along East and North coast of LUCON to APARLI - North to CAQUITIN IS - return via East coast of LUCON - TACLOBAN.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. BUTCHINS
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Three planes of our squadron leading three planes of the 501st Squadron made two low level bombing-strafing passes in the afternoon at an enemy bivouac area on both sides of the BAGAC - BALANGA road at a point approximately seven (7) miles inland from BAGAC and on the Central BATAAN PENINSULA. Five 1000 pounders were dropped in the assigned area, starting six large brush fires and several smaller fires. The target and wooded areas adjacent to the BAGAC - BALANGA road were thoroughly strafed from a point one mile East of the target to a position on the road five miles West of the bivouac area, but results were unobserved. While over the target, a bomb hung up in one of our planes and subsequently the entire crew abandoned ship, bailing out over SAN MARCELINE.

2. OBJECTIVE
This strike was designed to give support to our forces on BATAAN by knocking out a bivouac area where a number of enemy were reportedly located.

3. ATTACK
a. Our two B-25Js, leading the 501st squadron, with our third A/F flying on the 501st flight leader's wing, reconnoitered the area, then executed two East-to-West passes in two-plane elements across the target.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating:
A/F 594 - Lt Thompson
A/F 204 - Lt Herick
A/F 210 - Lt Hart

c. Bombing was excellent with five out of a possible six 1000 lb demo bombs dropping in the assigned area. All pilots thoroughly strafed the area but results were generally unobserved of both the bombing and strafing. One puff, indicating ground fire was seen just East of the target.

Lt Herick and crew abandoned their A/F (#204) over SAN MARCELINE area because of a bomb which had hung up while they were over the target. All crew members parachuted successfully and returned to the squadron area for treatment of minor sprains and abrasions. The abandoned plane crashed in the valley a few miles Southwest of SAN MARCELINE strip. No photos were made because one camera motor shorted out and the supply spool on another failed to function. The third camera and film was lost in the crash.
4. COMMENTS OF THE I.G.
A burnt out bridge and an unserviceable truck were the only signs of military activity reported.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this officer, based on available information, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   Takeoff: 1220/1 to 1225/1 from SAN MARCELINO strip.
   Attack: 1310/1 to 1325/1 at 50/300 feet.
   Landing: Two A/P’s at 1500/1 at SAN MARCELINO.
   Route: SAN MARCELINO to BAGAC (West coast BATAAN, SW LUZON) to BALANGA East coast of BATAAN to target to BAGAC to SAN MARCELINO.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

18 February, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes executed three low altitude bombing-strafing passes in the late afternoon across West-Central BATAN in search of targets of opportunity along both sides of the BAGAC - PILAR road. Eleven (11) 1000 lb bombs were released in the designated area which was also subjected to heavy strafing, but thick tree cover prevented observation of results. A few grass fires were started just west of BAGAC TOWN.

2. OBJECTIVE
This strike was planned to give support to advancing U.S. troops pushing west across BATAN from the vicinity of PILAR, and guerilla reports indicated that sizable Jap concentrations were located along the BAGAC - PILAR road. Our task was to cover the enemy area, seeking out targets of opportunity and covering the area with our strafing.

3. ATTACK
(a) Our six planes, led by the 501st Squadron, attacked in two-plane elements and completed three East-to-West runs across the assigned area, approaching the target each time from the East to avoid accidental strafing of our ground forces.
(b) Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 255 - Lt Stewart A/P 588 - Lt Canning A/P 888 - Lt McGuire
A/P 361 - Lt Gilmore A/P 023 - Lt McKinney A/P 210 - Lt Bagley
(c) The bombing was excellent, with all but one of the demos carried exploding in the wooded areas adjacent to the road in the target. All pilots strafed the area on three runs, expanding almost every round of ammo their A/P's carried. Lt Bagley's crew accidentally dropped, instead of salvaged, one bomb in the sea about two miles west of BAGAC TOWN because of a misbelief that the final pass had been made. Receipt of mission photos will necessarily be delayed due to existing operational conditions characteristic of change-of-base periods.
(d) Light, slight, and inaccurate ground fire was reported from one position just East of BAGAC TOWN on BATAN'S west coast.

4. COUNTERS OF THE I.T.
All crew members were thoroughly briefed on the existing bomb lines and the care to be exercised in determining the correct target area. They were instructed to contact the local air-ground net "Zombie" before the attack and to look for the Easterncombline indicator smoke signals.

CONFIDENTIAL
5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

In the opinion of this officer, based on available information, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS

   Takeoff - 1625/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   Attack - 1715/I to 1735/I at 50/500 feet.
   Landed - 1830/I at SAN MARCELINO.

Route - SAN MARCELINO to BALANGA (East coast Bataan) along BAGAC - PILAR road to target, approximately this general approach for three passes, then returning from BAGAC to SAN MARCELINO.

Fighter cover - Nil.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925,

1. SYNOPSIS
   Nine of our planes executed a total of four low level bombing-strafing passes in the morning across West-Central BATAAN in search of targets of opportunity in an area designated by "ZOMBIE", the local ground control station. A total of 18 x 1000 lb demo bombs were dropped in the wooded areas along the BAGAC-PILAR ROAD as directed but results of both bombing and strafing were unobscured.

2. OBJECTIVE
   This strike was another in a series of recent ground support missions by this group to give support to our advancing troops on BATAAN. Our A/P's were to attack as directed by "ZOMBIE" control.

3. ATTACK
   Our nine planes, flying in two-plane elements and one three-plane element, approached the target from the east and after circling Zombie control station, executed four runs, each on a 270 degree heading. The 498th and 499th squadrons preceded our squadron's attack and the 501st followed last in order.

   (a) Planes and Pilots Participating:
       A/P 594 - Lt Reheis
       A/P 588 - Lt Ramussen
       A/P 561 - Capt Ezziel
       A/P 210 - Lt Hart
       A/P 888 - Lt Lents
       A/P 023 - Lt Bailey
       A/P 266 - Lt McGuire
       A/P 023 - Lt Lewis
       A/P 350 - Lt Gilmore

       (c) Results:
       All bombs landed in the area set apart by Zombie control station as a legitimate target. However, throughout the four passes no definite results could be determined either from the bombing or the heavy strafing attacks. Four A/P's took K-21 photos but due to existing operational difficulties, it will be sometime before prints are received by this office.

   (d) Opposition and Loss:
       Enemy defense against aircraft continues to be weak in this area. A/P 210 sustained a hit in the target canopy which shattered the glass but caused no injury to the gunner. Other evidences of light ground fire were reported throughout the area, but none indicated any important concentrations of enemy ground fire. A/P 033 landed with a bombbay door badly bent, probably caused by a falling bomb fouling the door shortly after release.
Narrative Report FFO 49-D-11 (continued)

4. COMMENTS OF THE L.O.
   Pilots had some difficulty in hearing Zombie control station clearly.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
   In the opinion of this Officer, at the time of writing this report, there seems to be no individual actions which would justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   Takeoff - 0838/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   Time over target - 0910/I to 0943/I at 100/500 feet.
   Landed - 1018/I to 1030/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   Route - SAN MARCELINO, PILAR (East coast BATAAN) to target to SAN MARCELINO.
   Fighter cover - Nil.

   For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
348th Bombardment Group
APO 73

PAH/jwd

19 February, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission 49-D-12 performed by eight B-25Js of the 500th Squadron 18 February, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Eight of our planes completed two low altitude bombing-strafing passes in the afternoon across West-Central BATAAN in search of targets of opportunity in an area defined by "ZOMBIE"—the local ground control station. A total of five (5) 1000 lb bombs were dropped on two passes, but results of both bombing and strafing were unobserved.

2. OBJECTIVE
This strike, like the morning mission, was in direct support of U.S. troops advancing West along the BAGAC-PILAR road in Central BATAAN. Zombie instructed our crews just prior to the attack, defining those areas to be hit. Considerable numbers of enemy troops were supposedly hidden by the heavy tree cover in these designated areas.

3. ATTACK
Our eight A/P's, flying in two-plane elements, approached the target from the East and, after clearing through Zombie, executed two bombing-strafing passes, each on a 270-degree heading. The 498th and 499th squadrons' attacks preceded ours and the 501st followed last in order. One A/P of the 500th Squadron failed to make a second pass because fire broke out in the wiring system and after it was extinguished the pilot chose to return to base early. Zombie ordered the remaining seven A/P's to "cease attack" after they had completed the second pass.

(b) Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 594 - Lt Reheis
A/P 588 - Lt Rasmussen
A/P 210 - Lt Hart
A/P 888 - Lt Lents
A/P 351 - Capt. Bazzel
A/P 023 - Lt Bagley
A/P 266 - Lt McGuire
A/P 350 - Lt Gilmore

(c) It was planned to make four passes over the target, staggering out the bombing, but when Zombie cut the plan short, our eight planes had dropped only five bombs in the Northern half of the target. Dust and smoke were the only observations noted. Moderate strafing by all A/P's started a few grass fires in the area. Lt Rasmussen's crew quickly extinguished a small wiring fire in A/P 588 and they returned to base after completing one pass. Four A/P's took K-2L photos but due to existing operational conditions prints will be delayed.

(d) No enemy opposition was encountered during the attack.
Narrative Report on FFO 49-D-12 (continued)

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   This mission seemed to be executed efficiently. Zombie
   was contacted prior to the attack and our planes were able to
   read the controller easily.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
   In the opinion of this officer, based on information
   available, there are no individual actions which would seem to
   justify an award.

6. STATISTICS
   Takeoff - 1405/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   Time over target - 1425/I to 1445/I at 50/300 feet.
   Landed - One A/P at 1445/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   Seven A/P's at 1500/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   Route - SAN MARCELINO to East coast BATAAN to PILAR,
   west to target thence return to SAN MARCELINO.
   Fighter cover - None scheduled.

   For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.

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To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   In the afternoon of 20 February, eight of our B-25J's, failing to reach the primary target, KAGI, because of weather, executed one minimum altitude bombing-strafing pass across the secondary target, CHOSHU TOWN, in Southwest FORMOSA. A total of 32 five hundred pounders were dropped across the target causing extensive damage to buildings in the east-central and northeast sections of the city and heavily hitting a factory group approximately one mile southwest of CHOSHU. A total of 33,500 rounds of ammunition was expended by strafing that covered the town area and southwest to the coast. Small shipping three miles southwest of FUKO was also strafed. A ninth plane on the mission returned to base early.

2. OBJECTIVE
   This strike, coordinated with the 38th Group, was planned to continue the destructive attacks against Japanese controlled industrial areas in FORMOSA. KAGI was assigned as the primary target. CHOSHU TOWN, the secondary, provided many excellent targets, one being a large railroad yard containing eight sidings and eight warehouses. However, the entire town was considered a fair target.

3. ATTACK
   Formation-approach: Our planes, leading the 501st, 498th and 499th squadrons and tailing the 38th Group, proceeded to the vicinity of KAGI TOWN, FORMOSA, where the two groups parted; the 38th apparently continuing north into weather and our group turning south toward the secondary target. Our Squadron approached CHOSHU from the north, circled once for proper alignment, then on one pass attacked from North to South, eight planes abreast.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 350 - Capt Bassel      A/P 591 - Lt Stewart      A/P 266 - Lt Canning
      A/P 210 - Lt Hart          A/P 033 - Lt Lents          A/P 888 - Lt McKinney
      A/P 361 - Lt McGuire       A/P 588 - Lt Lewis          A/P 023 - Lt Loisel
   c. Results: A/P 591, piloted by Lt Stewart, was late in taking off because of a taxing error and failing to catch the formation, returned early. The bombing done by the eight planes hitting CHOSHU was excellent although crews found it difficult to observe and spot details of destruction because of the excessive speed at which they flew over the target and the delay action bombs used. However, damage in the bombed areas was heavy as indicated by smoke, debris and scattered fires. Lts Lents and McKinney strafed two moving
trucks on a road south of the factory area causing both vehicles to run off the road and roll over in a ditch. Lt McKinney strafed a water tower in the railroad yard at CHOSHU bursting seams in several places. Lt Lewis strafed a high tension transformer just north of CHOSHU TOWN and a Fox Tare Dog anchored offshore three miles South of TOKO AREA causing the latter to burst into flame. K-21 photos were taken but due to existing operational conditions it will be some time before this office receives prints.

d. Opposition: Although the Jap was ready for the attack his A/A was only moderate and for the most part trailing our A/P's. Medium, moderate and accurate fire as well as accurate N/G fire was received from the south side of town and the nearby coastal areas. Five A/P's were holed during the attack but no personnel were injured. A/P 361, hit in the hydraulic system, landed safely after pumping landing gear down, but while taxiing to the hardstanding the brake pressure dropped to zero and the A/P went out of control, colliding with a parked A/P. The props and nose section of A/P 361 were damaged seriously - no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

Pilots and crew members were enthused with this, their first mission over FORMOSA. At CHOSHU they reported that no matter where you looked there were excellent targets in view.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

In the opinion of this Officer, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>0905/I from SAN MARCELINE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group assembly</td>
<td>0920/I at 1500 ft, offshore from SAN MARCELINE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter rendezvous</td>
<td>1200/I at South tip of FORMOSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total flight</td>
<td>1255/I to 1300/I at 50/500 feet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>One A/P at 12h0/I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seven A/P's at 1600/I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One A/P at 1700/I.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fighter cover: Good.

Route: SAN MARCELINE - South tip of FORMOSA - HEITO - CHOSHU - SAN MARCELINE.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 73

JFD/rpb

25 February 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
In a smashing attack on shipping along the East Indo-China coast, nine B-25J's of this squadron sank two 2300-ton tankers and a lugger, seriously damaged a destroyer escort, and damaged to a lesser degree another DE and a launch in the morning of 23 February. The shipping, spotted in PHAN BANG BAY at 1130W-1050E, was hit with 19 x 500 pound demo bombs and strafed with 9700 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition. Our squadron, the only one participating in the strike, encountered intense A/A from the shipping resulting in the loss of one plane and crew and the damaging of two other planes. One Tojo out of four intercepting planes, was damaged by our gunners to a noticeably degree while tracers were seen entering a Rufe.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike, flown by the 500th alone, was part of a program designed to destroy enemy lines of communication from the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore areas to the Japanese homeland.
b. Specific: Our target was shipping along the French Indo-China coast with several sightings being reported during the night previous to the strike.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation-approach: The nine planes came in on the target in elements of two, line astern at 50/150 ft. The flight circled the area once, then made their attack on a northeastly heading, some elements peeling to the right or left as individual targets presented themselves.
b. Pilots and planes participating: The A/P's attacked in two ship elements as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 6023 - Lt Hall (Sq ldr)</td>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Rasmussen</td>
<td>A/P 591 - Lt Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 121 - Lt Bagley</td>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Gilmore</td>
<td>A/P 888 - Lt McKinney</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOURTH ELEMENT</th>
<th>FIFTH ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 171 - Lt Loisel</td>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Canning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 819 - Lt Hart</td>
<td>A/P 819 - Lt Hart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: Lt Hall scored two near misses on a Sugar Charlie with nil apparent damage. None of his forward guns were functioning on the target run but he was covered by his wingman, Lt Bagley, who, although hit at the beginning of the run, thoroughly strafed a DE effectively silencing its guns. Lt Bagley's right engine was ablaze at the time he was covering his leader.

- 1 -
Lt Bagley’s A/P crashed and exploded within 50 yards of the DE narrowly clearing the top of the vessel. Lt Rasmussen and Lt Gilmore heavily strafed this DE sending personnel scampering overboard and Lt Rasmussen dropped four bombs at it scoring near misses with two, one falling on either side of the vessel. Lt Thompson dropped two bombs at another DE which was maneuvering wildly, scoring two near misses and gave it an intense strafing. As A/P’s withdrew, this vessel was going around in circles, evidently with controls destroyed or heavily damaged, had two small fires topside and was smoking with periodic explosions shaking it. Lt Loisel scored a direct hit on the aft end of a, engine aft freighter, converted to a tanker (a converted Sugar Charlie Love) and subsequent sightings plus photo interpretation shows the vessel to have sunk. Lt Canning dropped one bomb short of another converted Sugar Charlie Love of the same tonnage as the one Lt Loisel destroyed - 2300 tons - and the bomb skipped into the side of the vessel. As our planes withdrew, this vessel was ablaze with black smoke to 500 feet and only the forward part of it out of the water - definitely sunk. Lt Hart sank a lugger near the shore approximately three miles East of the convoy. Photos received confirm the sinking of the two tankers and reveal extensive damage to one DE.

d. Opposition and costs:
A/A - Light, medium and heavy A/A fire was received from the convoy. Although the fire was intense, it was for the most part, inaccurate. One plane was shot down by A/A while two others were holed with minor damage.

Interception: One Rufe, two Tojo’s and one Oscar intercepted our planes in the target area. The Rufe made two passes, one from 5 o’clock and the other from 9 o’clock high. The Rufe was definitely hit on his second pass before breaking away at 400 yds by the tail gunner on Lt Canning’s A/P. A Tojo, which came in from 6 o’clock high to within 500 yds, was hit by turret guns and broke away smoking as he left the target area. The marksmanship of the Jap pilots was poor and none of our planes were damaged in their attacks. Five phosphorous bursts were observed in the target area; three were near misses on our planes. Of these near misses, two were within 100 ft, one high and one low, and the other within 500 ft of our A/P’s. Bombs appeared to be dropped by Rufe and Tojo periodically hoving over our formation. Enemy pilots were moderately experienced and not too aggressive in their attacks.

A/P 594 received a three inch hole in the windshield from flak or small arms fire. Lt Thompson and Lt Bilyou, pilot and copilot, were scratched about their hands and forearms by glass fragments. A/P 5623 received a slug near the hub of the left prop knocking a chip off and leaving a piece of metal embedded there. A/P 191 was lost to A/A and the following crew members are carried as killed in action.
Pilot
2nd Lt JOSPEH H. BAGLEY, 0-2357095
Co-pilot
2nd Lt JACK L. LONG 0-771067
Navigator
2nd Lt ELIAS B. KEMP 0-777167
Engineer-gunner
Cpl MYRON E. NEISON 33755921
Radio-gunner
Cpl ARNOLD M. C. HALLCHOW 121523550
Armorer-gunner
Cpl ROY H. MARTIN 33832793

4. CONVENTS OF THE L.O.
A/P 191, piloted by Lt Bagley, was hit in the right engine, presumably from medium A/A from the DE it was attacking. No bombs were dropped by this plane, but the pilot strafed all during his approach to the vessel and pressed...
his attack throughout, crashing about 50 yds past his target and exploding and burning. No survivors seen.

Only 19 out of 32 bombs were dropped on this strike because it was intended to make more than one pass, but due to unexpectedly heavy opposition the plan was abandoned.

Crew comments indicate a feeling that the enemy was prepared by advance notice of this strike because of the presence of Jap fighters and disposition of the ships in the target area. Possible sources of this information to the enemy may have been communications with the B-24 used in bombing on target and the possible failure to turn off IFF equipment sufficiently far from the target.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS

Lt Bagley will be recommended for the Silver Star for the definite display of gallantry in protecting Lt Hall's A/P, no guns of which were firing, by heavily strafing and silencing all guns on a DE blasting away at Lt Hall, even after the right engine on the stricken ship was ablaze from direct hits by A/A. Lt Bagley's crew will be recommended for Distinguished Flying Crosses. The full crews of Lt Canning and Lt Loisel will be recommended for Air Medals for the sinking of the two tankers.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table
   Takeoff: Nine A/P's at 0710/I from SAN MARN-CELINE A/D.
   Attack: 11h00/I to 1150/I at 50/300 ft.
   Landing: Eight A/P's at 1635/I.

b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: P-47 cover was scheduled but was never contacted and the attack was made without fighter escort.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes completed four bombing-strafing passes across POONBATO TOWN near the West coast of Central LUZON, dropping 36 x 250 pounders, 32 of which fell in the town destroying two 25' x 25' shacks and the remaining two exploding on a ridge at the South edge of town. Six small fires and one explosion followed by a sheet of orange flames with black smoke to 100 feet, resulted from heavy strafing with 22,050 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

2. OBJECTIVE
This mission was designed for ground support of our troops in the BOTOLAN area who were preparing to move inland toward POONBATO TOWN. In the target many enemy defensive positions were reported in the town with many zigzag trenches on a ridge 100 yards west of the town. These installations were our specific targets.

3. ATTACK
Formation - approach: Our six planes followed the west coast of LUZON North to BOTOLAN, proceeding inland there to POONBATO. Four passes in two A/P elements going across to the North were made at altitudes varying from 50 to 200 feet.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
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<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Thompson</td>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Stewart</td>
<td>A/P 6023 - FO Gilmore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/P 266 - Lt McKinney</td>
<td>A/P 519 - Lt Van Scoy</td>
<td>A/P 023 - Lt Sawyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: The bombing was excellent and although definite results were difficult to ascertain because of the nature of the target, the town was left covered with smoke and bomb dust. A single A/P in the formation was designated to take pictures but the two K-21 prints received from the roll fail to reveal anything of importance.

d. Opposition: The weary Jap offered meager resistance to this strike with only a slight amount of inaccurate ground fire reported from a few positions just Southwest of POONBATO TOWN.

e. Miscellaneous: One A/P landed late because of a leaky hydraulic system.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Numerous sightings of zigzag trenches and circular foxholes around the town area were reported by all crews.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this officer there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

- 1 -
6. **STATISTICS**

   **A. Timetable:**
   - **Takeoff:** 0830/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   - **Assembly:** Over field at 0838/I.
   - **TOD:** 0905/I to 0925/I at 50/200 ft.
   - **Landing:** Five A/P's at 1000/I.
   - One A/P at 1016/I.

   **b. Route:** SAN MARCELINO - West coast of LUZON - BOTOLAN - TARGET - SAN MARCELINO.

   **c. Fighter cover:** None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

28 February, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a morning shipping search along the CHINA coast near HONG KONG, six of our planes sighted an estimated 225 Chinese junks, destroying ten of them and damaging another eight during the one hour attack in which 21 x 500 pounders were dropped and 20,250 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition were expended. A seventh A/P from our Squadron (FFO 58-D-22) acted as a Pathfinder for the P-51 fighter cover on this strike. The Pathfinder was intercepted by three Tony's near the CHINA coast with nil damage inflicted by either side.

2. OBJECTIVE

This strike was created to further disrupt the enemy's last shipping route between the Netherlands East Indies and the homeland. Destroyers, destroyer escorts, merchant vessels and Chinese junks were fair targets.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our six B-25's led the 499th Squadron to the CHINA coast and during the one hour attack period they searched the coastal waters between 111ŒE and 113ŒE in the HONG KONG area. Eight low level attacks were made by our squadron flying in two plane elements on Chinese junks.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 356 - Maj Mortensen</td>
<td>A/P 6023 - Lt Reheis</td>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Simpson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 171 - FO Gilmore</td>
<td>A/P 888 - Lt Sawyer</td>
<td>A/P 023 - Lt Lentz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pathfinder: A/P 210 - FO Hart.

c. Results: Maj Mortensen, Group Operations Officer, led our Squadron on the mission. During the attack, FO Gilmore destroyed two junks, Lt Reheis sunk two, Lt Sawyer accounted for two, Lt Simpson got another three and Lt Lentz added one more for a total of ten. All pilots strafed heavily and at least eight junks were damaged. FO Hart, flying the Pathfinder, was intercepted by three Tony's in the vicinity of HONG KONG. The Tony's came in low from eleven o'clock bearing in to 300 yards before alert P-51's broke up the attack, forcing the enemy to flip over and dive for the deck. No rounds were fired by the enemy A/P - or by our B-25 - and the Tony's were last seen headed North at low level. During the escape dive the Tony's dropped two bombs or belly tanks which exploded on hitting the water.

d. A/A: Lt Lentz's A/P was holed by light arms fire from one of the junks. No personnel were injured.

e. Photos: K-21 photos of the strike show bombs exploding near junks and in one case the print sequence shows the flight fall of a bomb through the sail of one of the junks.

-1-
Narrative - 500th Sqdn - cont.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

Intercepting Tony's were painted with the usual camouflage green with a large red horizontal stripe across the central part of both sides of the vertical stabilizer. Red roundels were painted on the lower surfaces of the wing only.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission would warrant an award.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable:

   Takeoff: Pathfinder at 0650/I.
   Six B-25's on strike at 0700/I.
   Assembly: Pathfinder with P-51 fighters at 0800/I.
   TOT: Pathfinder at 1100/I to 1200/I at 8000 ft.
   Strike at 1130/I to 1225/I at 50/500 ft.
   Landing: Pathfinder; 1520/I.
   Strike B-25's at 1635/I.

b. Route: Direct.

6. Fighter cover: Pathfinder and six P-51's failed to make contact with the striking force.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

JFD/rpb

2 March, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six 1-25J's of the 500th Squadron took off Thursday morning on a shipping sweep of the China coast between HONG KONG and SWATOW, carrying four 500 pound bombs. In a single pass our planes further damaged a Sugar Baker Sugar, which was already sinking from attacks by the 499th Squadron.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike was set up to be a part of a program to destroy Jap shipping passing between Netherland East Indies, China and Japanese homeland port. The 345th Group was the only unit participating and was to have served on a searching Liberator which was spotting targets.

b. Specific: The only target the Group found was a Sugar Baker Sugar at SWATUB, Northeast of HONG KONG.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: Our Squadron was second over the target following the 499th, and made their run from East to West in elements of two in trail.

b. Types and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Tanning</td>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Leisel</td>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt McLaughlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Jarves</td>
<td>A/P 819 - Lt Paukovitch</td>
<td>A/P 231 - Lt Simpson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: Two direct hits and three near misses were scored on the Sugar Baker Sugar with the 17 X 500 pounds dropped. The vessel was already sinking from the 499th attack and sank shortly after our planes had passed over. The striking ship was strafed with 8300 rounds of ammunition. K-21 photos received show definite destruction of this vessel.

d. Opposition: Light and medium, slight, inaccurate A/A was received from vessel - four medium guns were firing from the port side. Four bursts of inaccurate heavy A/A received from SWATUB TOWN.

One small white parachute (approx eight ft in diameter) with a four ft black cylindrical object suspended on a three ft. cord attached to the chute's shroud lines, narrowly missed the left wing of one of our A/P's just leaving the target. No explosion was noted.

There was no interception, none of our planes were damaged and no personnel injured.

2. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Many junks were seen in the search area; many carrying crates or boxes.
5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer, there were no individual actions on this mission which would justify awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0850/I from SAN MARCELINO.
      Group assembly: 0910/I enroute to target.
      Attack: 1308/I to 1312/I at 50/150 ft.
      Landing: 1705/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: Fighters led by Pathfinder to our formation. Cover provided was excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass’t Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., I-2.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a morning attack against TOYOKARA A/D in Northwestern FORMOSA, eight of our planes dropped 582 23 pound parafrags during one minimum altitude bombing-streafing pass and expended 26,600 rounds of ammunition. Two 100 ft. barracks type buildings were destroyed just East of the landing area and two small camouflaged buildings in area west of the landing area received direct hits. A violent explosion with orange flame and black smoke to 200 feet followed direct hits on buildings at the Northeast corner of the drone area. Other bombs fell among four camouflaged SSF's at the Northwest end of the concrete runway and among 6/8 SSF's, including one Tony, in the North dispersal area. A control tower and radio shack on the west side of the landing area was damaged by strafing which covered the target and areas west to the coast. One of our A/P's, hit by A/A over the target, crashed and exploded in ocean three-fourths mile offshore approximately ten miles West of TOYOKARA A/D. Late information received from fighters covering our strike, indicates that one person survived the explosion, as a single person was seen lying on a floating tire at the scene of the crash. Individual was motionless.

2. OBJECTIVE

In an all out 5th Air Force show, four squadrons of our Group were to attack TOYOKARA A/D, while other units of the Air Force hit other important areas in FORMOSA. At TOYOKARA our specific targets were dispersed A/P's parked around the landing area.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Eight B-25J's of our Squadron led the 501st, 498th and 499th Squadrons and four squadrons of the 38th Group to TOYOKARA vicinity. While the 38th Group hit TAICHU TOWN, our planes cut across FORMOSA's west coast near TAIKO, then after doubling back to the South and West, hit the target on an East-West run in squadron abreast formation.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
<th>THIRD FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 350 - Capt Baszel</td>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Stewart</td>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Schmid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 888 - Lt Hart</td>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Lents</td>
<td>A/P 819 - Lt McKinney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 265 - Lt McGuire</td>
<td>A/P 6023 - Lt Lewis</td>
<td>A/P 594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/P's crossed the target in line abreast formation as follows:

A/P 588 A/P 819 A/P 265 A/P 350 A/P 888 A/P 6023 A/P 594 A/P 210

A ninth plane scheduled for the strike turned back shortly after takeoff due to engine trouble.

CONFIDENTIAL
c. Results: The mission was executed as planned and bombing patterns covered the target satisfactorily, probably causing much more destruction and damage than could be observed by crews during the short interval of attack. A few small fires were started along the eastern and northern sides of the landing area. All pilots thoroughly strafed from a point just east of the A/O, west across the landing area to the coast but few results were noted. Lt Gilmore, ninth man in our formation, returned to base shortly after takeoff because of a bad left engine. K-21 cameras were turned on too early for photos cover the countryside East of the target drone, failing to reveal any air-drome installations. Several camouflaged buildings and factory units are shown with signs of heavy activity.

d. Opposition: Light intense and meager medium A/A was accurate from positions generally located in the Southeast and West dispersal areas. A/P's 888, 210 and 6023 were holed causing minor damage to the last named plane. A/P 210 was holed in left engine by shrapnel and plane was turned over to a service squadron at our home base for an engine change. A/P 888 received a total of 23 holes, mostly shrapnel, causing the oil to leak out of the left engine which was feathered at IYURIU ISLAND after all loose equipment in the plane had been tossed overboard. The pilot, FO Hart, made a successful landing at LINGAYEN, escorted by A/P's 266 and 588. A/P 888 was turned over to a service squadron there and crew returned to base in the two escorting A/P's. A/P 819 was apparently hit over the target and seen to crash into the sea just off the coast of FORMOSA opposite the target and approximately ten miles West of it. The plane exploded and burned on impact and the entire crew was believed to have been killed. However, a P-51 in the area reported the presence of one motionless body atop one of the A/P's tires floating in the water. A Cat was called to the scene but P-51 was forced to leave due to fuel shortage before the rescue plane arrived. Pending further information to the contrary, all crew members, as follows, are carried as killed in action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Arthur D. McKinney, Jr</th>
<th>2nd Lt</th>
<th>0-765028</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-pilot</td>
<td>Adelmo D. Lometti</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-828471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>Robert L. Vontieth</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>0-379116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Robert Hols, Jr</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>19095708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>William E. Nordby</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>11103863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunner</td>
<td>Raymond L. Oxendine</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>33041780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was nil interception on this mission and none of our crew members were injured.

1. CONVETS OF I.O.

Intense small arms fire was believed to have caused much of the damage to our planes. Enemy ground crews, alerted early, caught our A/P's in a deadly crossfire over the drome, throwing up a barrage type fire.

5. AWARDS

Based on available information, in the opinion of this officer, there were no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable: Takeoff: 9 B-25's from SAN MARCELINO at 0700/1.

Group assembly: Over CARPOSS ISLAND at 0725/1.

- 2 -
FFO 61-D-10 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

Time over target: 8 B-25's at 1110-1115/I at 100/150 feet.
Landing: One B-25 at 0740/I at SAN MARCELINO.
Four B-25's at 1510/I at SAN MARCELINO.
Three B-25's at 1505/I at LINGAYEN. Two of these A/P's took off from LINGAYEN at 1600/I, bearing all three crews, and landed at SAN MARCELINO at 1655/I.

b. Route: SAN MARCELINO - CAPONES ISLAND - direct to coast North of target, thence inland - TARGET - RIUKYU ISLAND - LINGAYEN AREA - BASE.

c. Fighter cover - excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

One Sugar Dog and one deep sea trawler were sunk and another deep sea trawler was seriously damaged in a mid-day strike by six of our A/P's, searching for shipping along the Indo-China coast. In the low level attacks, 23 X 500 pound bombs and almost 24,000 rounds of ammunition were used. Junk's were also strafed as they were encountered in groups of two or more.

2. OBJECTIVE

Continuing the plan to completely disrupt the Japanese shipping route along the Indo-China and China coasts, three squadrons of this Group were to cover separate coastal areas in search of merchant vessels. Junk's in groups of two or more were to be considered enemy and a last resort target.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: The 495th, 500th and 501st Squadrons took off from base in that order and proceeded to their respective search areas. Our six B-25's started their search as planned but were called by the 501st Squadron and told to proceed to the 501st area to attack four merchant vessels near CAPE BAPCOX. On the way North to this area a lone Sugar Dog at FIAT ROCK was attacked in two plane elements from west to east. In the vicinity of CAPE BAPCOX our planes intercepted the four merchant vessels, one of which was already burning vigorously, and attacked generally from west to east, or land to sea, executing four passes.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Lewis</td>
<td>A/P 350 - Lt Simpson</td>
<td>A/P 266 - FO Hart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 127 - Lt Faukovich</td>
<td>A/P 171 - Lt Lents</td>
<td>A/P 594 - FO Gilmore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: Considering the size of the target, bombing was excellent. Lt Lewis, Assistant Operations Officer and Squadron leader of the strike, receives credit for sinking an ocean-going steam trawler near CAPE BAPCOX. At FIAT ROCK, south of CAPE BAPCOX, Lt Lewis and Lt Faukovich, his wingman, scored two very near misses or possible hits on a heavily camouflaged Sugar Dog, which was underway, blowing the vessel apart. Lt Lewis, Lt Simpson and FO Hart seriously damaged another trawler at CAPE BAPCOX. All pilots and crews strafed these vessels scoring many hits, especially on gun positions on the bow and stern of both trawlers. X-21 photos confirm reports of near misses on the Sugar Dog and the wreckage that was left as well as near misses on both trawlers. The trawler, shown listing badly, is the one that crews reported as sinking beneath the surface shortly after the attack.

d. Opposition: Light, meager and inaccurate machine gun fire was the only defense offered by the crew on the Sugar Dog, while light, moderate and accurate fire came from positions on each trawler. Two of our planes...
were damaged slightly. A bullet hit the windshield on A/P 350, shattering it, scratching the co-pilot with a splinter of glass in his left arm.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
The Sugar Charms, which was burning near CAPE HAPUX, had been hit hard by the 501st Squadron and the crew of the ill-fated vessel was seen in life rafts near the scene. No fighter cover was provided for this mission.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Taking into consideration the size of the vessels sunk, in the opinion of this officer there were no notable actions which would seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable:
   Takeoff: Six A/F's at 0700/I.
   Assembly: At 0715/I at 1500 ft.
   TOT: 1120/I to 1220/I at 50/500 ft.
   Landing: Six A/F's at 1710/I.

b. Route: SAN MARCELINO direct to BONG SON - TARGET - SAN MARCELINO.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 73


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

In a brilliantly led and executed strike against Japanese installations at SAMAH A/D, HAINAN ISLAND, nine planes of the 500th Squadron traded punches with everything the Nips had to offer and came off with an overwhelming victory. Buildings, hangars, grounded planes, fuel dumps and A/A positions were blasted with 92 X 100 pound demo bombs and 35,000 rounds of ammunition, leaving many of the installations demolished or seriously damaged and raging fires sending smoke to heights visible more than 20 miles from the target as our planes withdrew. Opposition was as determined and fierce as any seen in the Pacific war. The A/A encountered during the four mile target run ran the gauntlet from light to heavy, all intense and deadly accurate. At least nine vessels, including three destroyers, guarded the approach to the target with a solid barrage "thick enough to walk on" and the fire from scores of positions in the target area was just as bad. Eight of our nine A/P's were damaged by the A/A, several of them seriously with one being forced to ditch after leaving the target. Five crew members were seen in a life raft but have not been picked up at the time of this report. Nine enemy planes intercepted our formation during and slightly after the target run - one of them, a Zeke, was definitely destroyed and two others damaged by our gunners. The fighter cover, scheduled to cover the entire co-ordinated strike, was met returning approximately 60 miles from the target, due to fuel shortage after covering the 38th Group strike. Our planes had no cover over the target.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. General: This strike was intended to neutralize SAMAH A/D to aid in denying fighter cover to enemy surface convoys and to reduce danger to our subs from enemy air attack. Our strike was coordinated with attacks by the 38th Bomb Group and 17th Recco Squadron.

b. Specific: The 500th was assigned grounded A/P's as a specific target, with buildings and all installations to be hit as they appeared.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our B-25's led the Group with the 501st, 498th and 499th following in that order. Approach to the target was made on a heading of approximately 250° from the East Hainan coast. The heading over the target was 290° over the intersection of the runways with each squadron flying in line abreast formation.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST FLIGHT</th>
<th>SECOND FLIGHT</th>
<th>THIRD FLIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Canning</td>
<td>A/P 350 - Lt Lochel</td>
<td>A/P 6023 - Lt Reheis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 000 - Lt Sawyer</td>
<td>A/P 171 - Lt Jensen</td>
<td>A/P 127 - Lt Barnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 588 - FO Gilmore</td>
<td>A/P 594 - FO Hart</td>
<td>A/P 190 - Lt Lents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -

C-N-E-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FFE 65-D-17 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

The formation of nine planes, line abreast across the target was as
follows:

A/P 190 A/P 6023 A/P 127 A/P 588 A/P 266 A/P 000 A/P 594 A/P 350 A/P 171

c. Results: Lt Canning led the Squadron (which was the first ele-
ment in the Group attack) squarely over the center of the target. A/A was
intense throughout. A Zeke attacked Lt Canning's plane and was shot down by
the turret gunner of his right wingman, Lt Sawyer. Lt Canning bombed in a
repair area East of the strip, damaging a large sheet metal hanger containing
three U/T A/P's and dropped the remainder of his bombs in revetment areas West
of the strip possibly destroying a SSF. Lt Sawyer hit barracks in the East
half of the target and destroyed a fuel dump West of the strip. FO Gilmore
hit buildings, destroyed an U/T A/P in the revetment area and strafed five SSFs
in the West revetment.

Lt Loisel, leader of the second flight, and his wingman bombed
and strafed the northern side of the target. FO Hart, left wingman, dropped on
3/4 barracks type buildings, blew up a fuel or ammo dump, damaged workshops,
scared hits on a sandbagged gun position and strafed a T/F bomber in a clump
of brush. Lt Loisel scored four direct hits on barracks and dropped on revet-
ments West of the strip. Lt Jensen dropped four bombs on large buildings East
of the strip and divided his other eight on small buildings and gun positions
on the West side. Lt Jensen also fired at two interceptors making head-on
attack, one of which tried to crash dive but missed as Jensen pulled up sharply.

Lt Rehbein, Squadron Operations Officer, led the third flight. Lt
Lents, left wingman, bombed buildings East of the strip scoring at least two
direct hits on a long one-story building and strafed many personnel running
wildly into the Headquarters area. His strafing also left a SSF burning in a re-
vetment near the coast. Lt Rehbein dropped all his bombs on buildings in the
East dispersal area causing fires and explosions. Lt Barnes, number two man
in this flight, was hit in the left engine over the target but was able to
climb to 7,000 feet before being forced to ditch as described below in this
report.

All pilots strafed heavily as witnessed by the expenditure of
35,000 rounds of ammo by the eight planes returning to base.

d. Opposition:

A/A: Crews reported all known positions firing from the target
area and many more besides. More than 100 guns ranging from light to heavy
poured intense and accurate fire at our A/P's as they crossed the target itself.
Our planes received medium and heavy, intense and very accurate A/A fire from
three destroyers, three destroyer escorts or large gunboats and three merchant
vessels in a harbor guarding the Eastern approach to the target at 1815H-1930H.
Known coastal defense guns were firing under our A/P's as they withdrew creating
water spouts as a hazard to our planes.

Interception: One Zeke broke through the cloud of smoke over the
target at 600 yards astern of our formation and attacked A/P 588 from 6 o'clock
level at 75 feet closing to within 300 yards. Gunners scored hits in the en-
gine and Zeke climbed to right smoking. Gunners got hits in the engine and cock-
pit areas as enemy A/P continued climb and then fell over in a dive from 1000
feet into smoke from ground fires. A/P was still in vertical dive when it dis-
appeared at 100 feet in the veil of smoke. Claimed definitely destroyed - credit
for destruction was given to S/Sgt Robert P. Manley.

Three Tojo's were over the strip at 4000 feet, one of which
attempted a crash dive coming to within 25 feet of one of our A/P's from twelve

C-0-N-O-L-1-U-K-W-I-L-L
At 10 o'clock high causing the B-25 to climb sharply to avoid a crash. Top turret gunner scored hits on this plane as it pulled out only 15 feet above the ground and proceeded north.

Another Zeke pressed a pass from 7 o'clock low to 600 yards, breaking off when our gunners opened fire. A Hamp attacked from 7 o'clock after pulling out of a dive just above the ground and pressed to within 200 yards before breaking off due to our damaging fire. Two Oscars were observed pulling away ahead of our formation, either maneuvering for later attack or possibly directing a/A fire. A Val intercepted the formation when breaking away over water. The Jap pressed his attack to 600 yards before breaking off at 11 o'clock high.

4. Loss and damage to our A/P's: All our planes except one, were holed with varying degrees of damage. A/P 127 was hit by A/A in the left engine and managed to climb to 3000 feet where the oil pressure dropped to zero and it became impossible to feather the prop. Plane began to lose altitude rapidly and ditched at 1610M-11535E at 1605/1. Five survivors, and possibly six, were seen by crews of Lt Reahe and Lt Lents's A/P's, which circled for forty minutes, dropping a life raft, dinghy radio and rations, even though the escort planes were also in damaged conditions. Escorts contacted Lingayen Cat but were unable to contact the rescue craft seen by SCARBOROUGH REEF heading toward scene.

Loss and injury to personnel: One crew member received a scratch from a particle of flying flak - nil medical attention necessary. The crew of Lt Barnes which ditched and still missing is as follows:

- Pilot: 2nd Lt Jack L. Barnes
- Co-pilot: 2nd Lt James E. Hinton
- Navigator: 2nd Lt James R. Moore
- Engineer: S/Sgt Clarence E. Pierce
- Radio: Cpl Francis J. Van Etten
- Gunner: S/Sgt Lloyd E. Kuhn, Jr

0-2057097
0-709138
0-926142
3106618
32910819
12130293

4. COMMENTS OF LEG.

Opposition on this strike was among the heaviest ever faced by this Squadron. Interception was the strongest since WEPAK and the A/A was as intense as any ever encountered. Lt Canning did a superb job of leading the Group in its approach and run over the target. All bombs were efficiently dropped and "heads-up" flying prevailed. All of this, in view of the importance of the target, the opposition met, the experience of the crews, and the heavy damage inflicted, proves the men who flew this mission deserved special commendation.

5. AWARDS

Lt Canning will be recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross and his navigator for the Distinguished Flying Cross. All other pilots will be recommended for Distinguished Flying Crosses and remaining crew members for the Air Medal.

6. STATISTICS

a. Time table: Takeoff: Nine A/P's at 0915/1 from SAN MARCELINO. Group assembly: Enroute; squadrons falling in in assigned order. Time over target: 1330/1 to 1335/1 at 20/175 feet. Landing: Six A/P's at 1805/1; two A/P's at 1855/1 at SAN MARCELINO.

b. Route: The route to the target area was direct. Lt Canning then

- 3 -

C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Feinted to the North and approached the target, overland from the East. The return to base was direct.

c. Fighter cover: When our A/P’s reached a point approximately 60 miles Southeast of the target they were notified by the fighters that their fuel was running low after covering 38th Group strike, and that they were returning to base. He had no fighter cover over the target.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt. Air Corps
Assistant Intell. Officer

- L -

C-O-N-F-I-G-S-T-I-A-L
SPOTTED AS FOLLOWS:

1. Light, medium, heavy; intense; accurate from 3 DD's
   3 DE's or PG's and 3 M/V's at 1815W-10933E.
LIGHT MEDIUM MODERATE, INTENSE: ACCURATE FROM FOLLOWING

2. Two medium positions
3. One sandbagged A/P turret with twin M/G.
4. Three/four M/G positions
5. One M/G position
6. U/I light positions
7. U/I positions
8. Light position
9. Unknown number of medium positions
10. Approx 15 M/G positions along beach
11. Known CD guns firing as planes withdrew
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND

FPO 65-D-17  6 March, 1945
500th Bomb Sq, 345th Bomb Group
First over target in group.
P  A/P's taking photos
RP is intersection of runways.

DESTROYED
1  Four large bldgs
2  Three barracks
3  Large U/I bldg
4  150 ft bldg on hillside
5  Large round tank, blazing
6  SSF in revetment

DAMAGED
7  Large sheet metal hangar containing 3 U/I A/P's.
8  Large hangar
9  Repair shack
10  6-gun light position silenced
11  One Nell in bushes
12  6 SSF's in revetments.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPTIC
   In a successful shipping strike at TOURANE BAY on the East Indo-China coast, six of our B-25's sank a large tanker of 7,000 tons and damaged smaller vessels in a late morning attack. A total of 21 x 500 pound dome bombs were dropped and 21,000 rounds of ammunition expended.

2. OBJECTIVES
   a. General: This strike was designed as part of a program to neutralize enemy shipping between East Indies supply sources and Chinese and homeland ports.
   b. Specific: Our target was shipping along the Indo-China coast from 1520H to TOURANE BAY.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation-approach: Our B-25J's were the only squadron over this target. They entered TOURANE BAY from the Northeast and attacked in two plane elements making two passes, the first one to the Southeast and the second to the Northwest and left the Bay on a Northeast heading.
   b. Pilots and planes participating: (as they attacked)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Schmidt</td>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Van Scoyck</td>
<td>A/P 590 - Lt Simpson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 171 - Lt Jensen</td>
<td>A/P 350 - Lt Sawyer</td>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Goodman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Results: A Sugar Able - 7,000-ton tanker - received four direct hits, two of them at the stern, and six near misses. Vessel was left sinking at the stern as our strike left the target area. Sightings by the 501st Squadron on a strike over the same area the following day definitely confirm the sinking. Lt Van Scoyck scored one direct hit on the stern and another very near miss or hit; Lt Jensen bounced a bomb off the hull of the vessel shaking it badly and exploding close to side of ship; Lt Goodman also scored a direct hit and a near miss. Crews of Lt's Schmidt, Sawyer and Simpson also scored near misses. Credit for the sinking goes to Lt Van Scoyck and crew. Lt Schmidt dropped two bombs on a Sugar Charlie Love - 2300 ton tanker - possibly damaging it with near misses. Four Sugar Dogs along the shore were strafed and one left smoking; 501st photos reveal no destruction. Twelve sampans and junk in the target area were strafed.

d. Opposition
   A/A: Light, meager, accurate from vessels; one A/P holed.
   Interception: Four Tojo's caught up with our formation as it left the target through the mouth of the Bay. Two came in high from 6 o'clock
closing to 800 yards before breaking away when our gunners opened fire. Another Tojo intercepted from 8 o'clock breaking off at 11 o'clock when hit by our tracers — nil visible damage resulting. One pass was made at our A/F's from ten o'clock level skimming level over tip of formation and breaking away at six o'clock. This Tojo did not fire. All enemy planes were black with no insignias or other markings. Our tactics consisted of turning slightly into Jap attack and tightening of formation.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Large tanker had gun platforms but no visible guns or lifeboats. Vessel was anchored.

5. AWARDS
The crew of Lt Van Scoyk will be recommended for the Air Medal for the sinking of the tanker.

6. STATISTICS
a. Time table:
   Takeoff: At 0705/1 from SAN MARCELINO.
   Time over target: 1115/1 to 1200/1 at 50/300 feet.
   Landing: At 1705/1 at SAN MARCELINO.

b. Route: Direct to Indo-China coast at 1520N, thence to TOURANE BAY, direct to base.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPTIC
In the morning of 15 March, six of our planes searched for shipping along the China coast from CHELANG POINT to HONG KONG area. One Sugar Baker Sugar (Stack-aft freighter of 2000 tons) exploded and sank after one direct hit with a 500 pound bomb. Two junks were heavily damaged by bombing and strafing. One of our A/P's crashed into a hill near the Sugar Baker - crew considered killed in action.

2. OBJECTIVE
This strike was planned as had been previous ones, to disrupt the enemy's shipping traffic along the China coast. Specific targets included power craft, junks in groups of two or more, merchant vessels and small warships.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: The 496th Squadron, leading our six B-25's, reached the China coast at CHELANG POINT. The lead Squadron proceeded North whereas our A/P's turned South toward HONG KONG. Two of our planes, in single A/P's in trail formation, attacked at minimum altitude the Sugar Baker anchored close to the shore of the mainland due east of TUNGKU ISLAND in the CARON RIVER mouth. The single pass was made to the East. After this attack, where one A/P was lost, the remaining five ships made a minimum altitude attack on two junks near POTAI ISLAND, flying single A/P's in trail on a southeasterly heading.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 6523 - Capt Rehais</td>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Stewart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 171 -Lt Jensen</td>
<td>A/P 350 - Lt McQuire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Sawyer</td>
<td>A/P 548 - Lt Lents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: The mission was executed as planned and Capt Rehais, Squadron Operations Officer, did an excellent job of sinking a Sugar Baker with one bomb. The hit caused an explosion amidships almost severing the bow and stern sections. The other pilots bombed and strafed two junks near POTAI ISLAND heavily damaging them. In all, five 500 pound demos and 9300 rounds of .50 calibres were expended. K-20 and K-21 prints confirm the sinking of the vessel. They also include two pictures of A/P 171 burning on a hillside, as well as prints of the strafing attack on the junks.

d. Opposition: Enemy opposition was limited to light, meager and inaccurate rifle fire from the junks. Lt Lents's plane was holed in the bomb bay door by a small piece of shrapnel, possibly from positions on land North of the Sugar Baker, where several flashes were seen.

e. Losses: Lt Jensen in A/P 171, attacking the Sugar Baker, followed
Capt Reheis in at a close interval and was caught in the explosion as the ship blew up. A/P 171 wobbled out of the smoke, the right was feathered, and a futile attempt was made to turn to the right to avoid a 75 ft hill. The plane crashed and exploded on impact on the hillside, probably killing the five crew members instantly. The crew members, carried as killed in action, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>Robert W. Jensen</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-2057160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-pilot</td>
<td>Orville Garrison</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-753338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer gunner</td>
<td>Henry W. Womley</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>18176644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio gunner</td>
<td>Frank W. Tubb</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>18109183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail gunner</td>
<td>Robert H. Wagg</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>15172003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

It is interesting to note the very heavy and complete camouflage used on the Sugar Baker. Great pains had been taken by the Japs to make this boat appear as a small wooded island.

5. AWARDS

The crew of A/P 6023, piloted by Capt Reheis, will be recommended for the Air Medal for the sinking of the 2000 ton vessel.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 B-25's at 0715/I from SAN MARCE~
LINO.
Assembly: Enroute just off shore from base.
Time over target: 1050-1200/I at 50/300 ft.
Landing: 5 B-25's at 1555/I.

b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. Six B-25J's of this Squadron took off on the morning of 20 March, for a shipping sweep of the Indo-China coast from Binh Minh (1355N), Northward. Only one of our planes reached the target area, dropping one 500 lb bomb from minimum altitude to score a direct hit and destroy a Sugar Charlie Sugar of 800 tons.

2. OBJECTIVE
   a. General: This strike was designed to destroy enemy lines of communications and was flown by the 315th Group only.
   b. Specific: Our target was any enemy vessel in the search area.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: The only plane of our squadron to reach the target followed the 499th Squadron over the target; approach and attack was made on a heading of approximately 270° in single plane formation.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:

   **FIRST ELEMENT**                        **SECOND ELEMENT**
   A/P 594 - Lt Stewart                  A/P 548 - Lt Waring
   A/P 023 - Lt Paukovich                A/P 580 - Lt Goodban
   A/P 266 - FO Gilmore                   A/P 350 - Lt Hill

   c. Results: A/P 350 turned back at 0830/1 due to malfunction of tail turret while the five remaining planes continued on course. At 0912/1, A/P 548, piloted by Lt Waring, spotted an outrigger canoe at 1327N-1150OE and left formation to investigate it. Lt Waring, after unsuccessfully trying to relocate the canoe (which was probably empty as it seemed to be half full of water), set a course to intercept the rest of the Squadron in the assigned search area. In the meantime, however, the formation had received a garbled "urgent" radio message at 0930/1. The Squadron leader attempted to contact the 499th and 501st to see if they had received the message clearly. The 501st could not be reached and the 499th had not received the message. Our four planes continued on to within 20 minutes from target area and then turned back at 1040/1 at 1330N-1102OE, because the contents of the "urgent" message were unknown. Enroute to base at 1130/1, the message was finally clarified as a convoy sighting. It was, however, too late for our four planes to go back to this sighting.

A/P 548 meanwhile hit the China coast and joined the 499th Squadron at POULO GABBR (1337N-10924E). Together they proceeded South sighting and sinking a Sugar Charlie Sugar in a small bay at 1328N-10918E. The 499th made passes first but did no appreciable damage. Lt Waring scored a direct hit on the stern causing a large explosion and fire and sinking the vessel, which was also strafed. Definite destruction claimed; verified by K-21 photos.
d. Opposition and cost:
A/A: Small arms fire, meager and accurate from uncertain location, holed two 499th A/P’s.
Interception: Nil
Our A/P was not damaged and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   When A/P 548 reached the Indo-China coast it tried to call the rest of the 500th formation which should have been searching North of DINH DINH (but had turned back short of target as explained above). Receiving no reply and correctly surmising the formation was not in the target area, our A/P decided to join the 499th Squadron and intercepted it at FUOLO GAMBIAN.

5. AWARDS
   There were no individual actions on this mission which would seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0700/I from SAN MARCELINO A/D.
   Rendezvous: At 0720/I, 1500 ft over CAPONES ISLAND.
   TOT: 1135/I to 1200/I at 50/500 ft.
   Landing: One A/P at 0900/I
   Four A/P’s at 1500/I
   One A/P at 1610/I

   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: P-51 cover was excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass’t Intell. Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

23 March, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

A heavy concentration of enemy ground forces in the NEW BOSOBOSO AREA, approximately 18 miles East of MAMITA, was given a thorough going over by nine B-25's of the 500th Squadron in the afternoon of 22 March. Eighteen half-tonners and 26,100 rounds of .50 calibres were expended in the saturation low level attack, designed to knock out strong Japanese defenses. Bombing was excellent and enemy opposition practically nil.

2. OBJECTIVE

This two squadron attack on enemy strong points in the YAMASHITA LINE was designed to pave way for our ground forces. The 500th's particular target was in the NEW BOSOBOSO area. Our Squadron leader was to contact the ground control "Stucco" for directions upon reaching target area.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: Our nine planes approached the target in three plane elements on a Northeasterly heading; attack was in two plane elements.
b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 355 - Capt Bazzel</td>
<td>A/P 518 - Lt McGuire</td>
<td>A/P 6023 - Lt Loisel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Hill</td>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Paukovitch</td>
<td>A/P 023 - Lt Lents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 350 - Lt Goodban</td>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Sawyer</td>
<td>A/P 588 - PO Gilmore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c. Attack: On the target runs, formation split up as follows:

Capt Bazzel    Lt Goodban    Lt McGuire    PO Gilmore    Lt Loisel
Lt Hill        Lt Sawyer     Lt Paukovitch   Lt Lents

Capt Bazzel contacted "Stucco" who referred him to "Snappuck" for target directions. After one dry run over target, well marked by phosphorous by the ground forces, the squadron broke into a left hand traffic pattern of two ship elements dropping all their bombs on two succeeding runs. Other than bomb bursts and small grass fires in the area, results were unobserved. Photos fail to reveal any specific damage assessment.
d. Opposition: Flashes of light arm fire seen in trees from hill surrounding target. None of our A/P's were damaged.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

Nil comments.

5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this officer, there were no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.
6. **STATISTICS**
   
a. **Timetable:**
   
   **Takeoff:** 1615/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   
   **TOT:** 1615/I to 1630/I at 50/150 ft.
   
   **Landing:** 1710/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   
   b. **Route:** Direct to target area.
   
   c. **Fighter cover:** Nil
   
   For the Squadron Commander:
   
   JOHN F. DINGES
   
   2nd Lt, Air Corps
   
   Assistant Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 73

FEB/45

23 March, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

Attention: A.C. of 3., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
   In a late morning attack, six of our planes hit a seven ship convoy off the Indo-China coast nine miles south of Nha Trang. Seventeen 500 pounders were dropped and a 1900-ton merchant vessel and a patrol craft were definitely sunk. Four large fires marked burning vessels as the 500th and 501st Squadrons left the area. Enemy planes intercepted our formation and one Oscar was shot down by our gunners.

2. OBJECTIVE
   From the previous day's sightings the location of this convoy was estimated to be near Nha Trang Bay. The 501st and our Squadron were ordered to search this area and destroy the vessels.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: Our six B-25's led the 501st Squadron to Cape Varella and together the units searched south along the coast of Indo-China to Nha Trang vicinity. Approximately seven miles south of Nha Trang, visual contact was made with the enemy convoy and our Squadron initiated the low level bombing and strafing attack on an approximate westerly heading in two plane elements. Many passes were made on various units of the convoy.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Loisel</td>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Lents</td>
<td>A/P 518 - Lt Simpson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 023 - Lt Hill</td>
<td>A/P 350 - Lt Sawyer</td>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Gooden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
   c. Results: (See attached sketch) Lt Loisel, Squadron leader, scored a direct hit with one bomb on a Sugar Baker Sugar (1900-ton) causing a violent explosion followed by a tower of flame. This vessel is claimed definitely destroyed. He also scored a near miss off the stern of a minelayer (CN) which had been previously crippled by the 501st squadron who receives credit for its destruction. Lt Hill scored strafing hits on the bow of this same vessel causing a moderate explosion. Lt Lents scored a near miss on a Patrol Craft (270 tons) causing the vessel to stop and smoke heavily. Lt Simpson scored a direct hit on a Patrol Craft of the same size causing a violent explosion, followed by dark orange flame. This vessel is claimed definitely destroyed. K-20 and K-21 photos confirm crew reports of the violent explosion and fire resulting from Lt Loisel's hit on the Sugar Baker Sugar.
   d. Opposition: The convoy defended itself very well at first with light, medium and heavy, intense, accurate to inaccurate A/A coming from all
vessels in the convoy. A destroyer reported close in to shore, but not included in the attack, covered the northern section of the convoy during the entire contact. Two of our planes were holed by A/A with minor damage and none of our crew members were injured.

Four Oscars and one Rufe which were in the convoy area, made a total of four passes on our planes but the enemy pilots were uneager breaking away at 1400 yards on the average and causing no damage. One Oscar was shot down by Cpl Norrick, tail gunner on Lt Lenta's plane. The Oscar was pressing an attack from 6 o'clock on A/P level on a 501st plane, determined later to have had the tail turret "out." Cpl Norrick fired a long burst and the Oscar pulled off smoking badly and crashed on the nearby shore. The Rufe dropped a phosphorous bomb accurately from 1500/2000 feet altitude above the target and two of our planes were forced to bank sharply and pull up in order to avoid the streamers of phosphorous.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

From interrogation, photo interpretation and confirmations by the 501st Squadron S-2, the claims made in this report must be considered accurate, and definitely conservative. Certainly considerable damage was inflicted by strafing. Many enemy personnel were seen abandoning vessels subjected to the attack.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Air Medals will be recommended for the complete crews of Lts Loisel and Simpson for their destruction of the two vessels and for Cpl Norrick for the destruction of the Oscar.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable:
   Takeoff: Six B-25's at 0710/I.
   Assembly: 500th and 501st over HAPANGIS ISLAND at 1500 feet at 0730/I.
   Time over target: 1110/I to 1120/I at 50/500 feet.
   Landing: Six B-25's at 1535/I.

b. Route: Direct to CAPI VARELLA, thence south to HMA TRANG with return to base direct.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps Intelligence Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

LEGEND

FFQ 80-D-25
21 March, 1945
500th Bomb Sqdn, 315th Bomb Group
First over target at 50 to 500 feet
Time of attack: 1110-1120/1
All A/P's took photographs

MAP REFERENCE
NINH HOA 737 D IV, 1:250,000

CHINA

SEA

BINHCANG BAY

NHA TRANG

HOST

LETRE

FOX TARE UNCLE NOT ATTACKED

Sugar Charlie Love, Strafed, Near Miss
Patrol Craft, Strafed
Sugar Baker Sugar (1907), Lt Loisel
direct hit: exploded, burning, sinking
Fox Tare Uncle, not attacked

Sure Shot, Not attacked by 500R
Patrol Craft, Lt Simpson direct hit
explosion + fire burning, sinking

MINELAYER: Near Miss + strafed;
Confirm 505R direct hit.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Six B-25's of this Squadron completed a ground support mission over the INFANTA area on the East coast of CENTRAL LUZON in the morning of the 23rd of March. Six 250 pound bombs were dropped by each of the six planes from minimum altitude, and a total of 23000 rounds of ammunition expended in strafing, resulting in considerable damage and destruction to buildings and other installations.

2. OBJECTIVE
   a. General: This strike was designed to destroy troop concentrations in rear areas supporting enemy withdrawals.
   b. Specific: Our Squadron was to bomb and strafe along a road running roughly northeast from REAL (114\textdegree\textprime 40\textquoteright W-12136\textquoteright E) to INFANTA (114\textdegree\textprime 55\textquoteright W-12139\textquoteright E). Any installations, buildings and troop concentrations that might be seen were fair game.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: The attack was made in two plane elements in four passes on a Southerly heading.

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<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
<th>THIRD ELEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 356 - Lt Schmidt</td>
<td>A/P 548 - Lt McGuire</td>
<td>A/P 236 - Lt Simpson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 023 - Lt Goodban</td>
<td>A/P 588 - FO Gilmore</td>
<td>A/P 210 - Lt Hill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. Results: Buildings in INFANTA were left burning. A probable supply dump just southeast of INFANTA received four direct hits while another supply dump farther south was demolished. Small buildings and shacks along the road southwest of INFANTA were set afire and the entire area from the beach northeast of INFANTA, through the town and to four miles south and southwest of the town was thoroughly strafed in four passes.
   d. Opposition: No A/A or interception noted. None of our planes were damaged and no personnel injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   Contrary to information received earlier, ground control told flight leader there was no critical time over target; in fact, controller was not expecting our call so early in the morning.

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.
6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 B-25's at 0615/I from SAN MARCELINO.
      TOT: 6 B-25's at 0915/I to 0935/I at 50/100 ft.
      Landing: 6 B-25's at 1015/I.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Assistant Intelligence Officer

- 2 -
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

PAH/rpb

24 March, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our A/P's bombed and strafed the MANGO RIVER gorge six miles North of BOSOBOSO as directed by ground control. Smoke and bomb dust indicated all bombs landed in the assigned target. One hut exploded after a direct bomb hit and flames belched twenty five feet high.

2. OBJECTIVE
This was essentially a ground support mission designed to wipe out strong points of enemy resistance in the mountainous areas east of MANIJA.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: After approaching the BOSOBOSO area, our six planes were directed to their target by ground control. A total of five low level bombing-strafing runs were made by each plane. The passes, in single plane elements, were made generally to the east and to the west.

b. Pilots and planes participating: (Formation to the target)
FIRST ELEMENT
A/P 356 - Lt Schmidt
A/P 023 - Lt Goodban
A/P 543 - Lt McGuire
SECOND ELEMENT
A/P 266 - Lt Simpson
A/P 210 - Lt Hill
A/P 588 - PO Gilmore
c. Results: Bombing was excellent as confirmed by ground control. All bombs landed in the target and during the five runs the squadron made, strafing was continuous. Specific results were difficult to determine because of the rugged terrain, however, one large fire was started after a direct hit caused an explosion in a 20 x 20 ft. hut. As our planes withdrew, smoke and bomb dust marked the target. K-21 photos taken failed to reveal anything of enough value to make prints.

d. Opposition: Only one machine gun position was observed firing but it was silenced by strafing. No personnel were injured and all planes returned to base undamaged.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
Crews reported a fewpillboxes located along the sides of the gorge but thought that they had been damaged by artillery fire. Artillery fire was seen by our crews while they were over the target.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this officer based on information available, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.
6. **STATISTICS**  
   a. **Timetable:**  
      Takeoff: 6 B-25J's at 1200/I from SAN MARCELINO.  
      TOT: 6 A/P's at 12r0/I to 1310/I at 50/300 ft.  
      Landing: 6 A/P's at 1355/I at SAN MARCELINO.  
   b. **Route:** Direct to ground control which directed target runs.  
   c. **Fighter cover:** None scheduled.  

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON  
1st Lt, Air Corps  
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)  
345th Bombardment Group  
APO 73  

25 March 1945

Performed by 500th Bombardment Squadron, 24 March, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.  

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our B-25J's bombed and strafed enemy troop concentrations in the MANGO RIVER gorge, two miles South-southeast of MONTALBAN in Central LUZON during the afternoon of 24 March. Small grass fires and bomb dust were the only results noted as our planes completed their seventh pass over the 1500 feet long area having dropped 36 X 250 pound bombs accurately in the target area as designated by local ground and air control. Heavy strafing by all A/P's expended 21,200 rounds of ammunition and covered both sides and the bottom of the gorge.

2. OBJECTIVE
This mission continued a series of support strikes executed by this Group intended to reduce enemy pockets of resistance encountered by our advancing infantry units in the MONTALBAN area. The specific targets to be eradicated by this attack were enemy troop concentrations, supply points and dumps.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: Our six B-25J's reached the MONTALBAN area and contacted ground control, following their instructions to attack the proper area. A/P's flew at minimum altitude so far as the rugged terrain permitted and in single plane runs completed a total of seven passes, two from north to south and the remaining five on a heading from west to east.

   b. Pilots and planes participating:

   **FIRST ELEMENT**  
   A/P 356 - Lt Lewis  
   A/P 210 - Lt Paukovich  
   A/P 350 - Lt Lents

   **SECOND ELEMENT**  
   A/P 518 - Lt Waring  
   A/P 588 - FO Gilmore  
   A/P 266 - Lt Sawyer

c. Results: Bombing was excellent although specific results could not be determined. Both sides of the gorge were heavily strafed and intense ground fire encountered on the first pass was reduced to meager intensity on all succeeding runs. K-21 photographs provide excellent views of the rugged terrain east of MONTALBAN.

d. Opposition: Light, intense to moderate becoming meager, and accurate to generally inaccurate ground fire was received during the attack. Two planes were holed but damage was minor and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
Pilots experienced some difficulty in maneuvering around the hills and report that for this reason effectiveness of strafing was somewhat impaired.
5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this officer based on available information there were no individual actions on this mission which would seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable:
   Takeoff: 6 B-25J's at 1200/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   TOT: 6 B-25J's at 1255/I to 1320/I at 100/250 ft.
   Landing: 6 B-25J's at 1350/I at SAN MARCELINO.

b. Route: Direct to ground control, MONTALBAN AREA and return.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Five planes of this Squadron completed a ground support mission on the morning of 25 March. Fifty X 100 pound demos were dropped from low level on enemy troop concentrations and supply dumps after contacting ground control station for further instruction. The nature of the terrain prohibited observation of results. A sixth plane turned back before reaching target due to engine trouble.

2. OBJECTIVES
   a. General: The mission was designed to knock out enemy troops and supplies supporting Japanese defense of Central Luzon.
   b. Specific: Our designated target was troop concentrations and supply dumps in the NEW BOSOBOSO AREA with ground control directing attacking planes to target, which was marked with white phosphorous.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: The attack was made by the 500th alone in single plane elements, line astern in three passes on a northerly heading. The initial approach to the target was to the southeasterly heading.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:

   **FIRST ELEMENT**
   - A/P 356 - Capt Bazzel
   - A/P 266 - Lt Andrews
   - A/P 350 - Lt Hill

   **SECOND ELEMENT**
   - A/P 594 - Lt Simpson
   - A/P 518 - Lt Goodban (returned early)
   - A/P 588 - Lt Paukovich

   c. Results: Most bombing and strafing was done at a hillside designated by the controller and marked by white phosphorous. Due to terrain (dense vegetation and hills) observation of results was impossible.
   d. Opposition: Nil A/A or interception encountered. None of our planes were damaged and nil personnel injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
The controller directed our planes to the target area although Squadron leader reported that ground control was not particularly expecting our strike, asking if we were to work with him - indicating the possibility that he had not had the same briefing as our crews. The controller was well satisfied with our attack. K-21 photos fail to reveal anything other than bomb dust and slight smoke.

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions which would justify awards.

- 1 -
6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff: 6 B-25J's at 0830/I.
      TOT: 5 B-25J's at 0930/I to 0945/I at 100/300 feet.
      Landing: 1 B-25J at 0930/I; 5 B-25J's at 1030/I.
   
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. HINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
315th Bombardment Group
APO 73

29 March, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 87-D-34, performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 28 March, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Seven of our airplanes, after failing to contact a 1h-ship convoy which was their primary target, hit the secondary target which was rail installations along the INDO-CHINA coast from SAIKON to TOURANE. Twenty-eight (28) 500 lb bombs were dropped at minimum altitude from 1150/1 to 1210/1, with poor to unobserved results of attacks on a radar station, buildings and bridges. Only damage to our A/P's was one hole from light A/A fire.

2. OBJECTIVES
a. General: Attack on the primary was designed to cut enemy lines of communication from the Netherlands East Indies to Japanese homeland. The secondary target was largely of harassing value and marked the squadron's first attack on the INDO-CHINA mainland.

b. Specific: Due to confusion in navigation, actual location of targets is uncertain but installations along the coastal railroad were hit.

3. ATTACK
a. Our squadron led the Group with the 501st, 496th and 499th following in that order. The attack was made Northward up the coast in three-plane elements.

b. Pilots and Planes participating:
FIRST ELEMENT
A/P 516 - Lt Canning
A/P 210 - Lt Laufel
A/P 6023 - Lt Faulkovich

SECOND ELEMENT
A/P 350 - Lt Schmidt
A/P 023 - Lt Hill
A/P 588 - Lt Lents

THIRD ELEMENT
A/P 356 - Lt Waring
A/P 888 - Lt Goodban
A/P 566 - Lt Sawyer

c. Results: A direct hit from Lt Schmidt's plane was made on a radar station on South shore of CAM HGH BAY. A water tower was destroyed and 3/4 buildings at BA NGOI (1155N-10910E). At a town 6 miles North of BA NGOI bombing resulted in: a large explosion from a direct hit on building with flames to 100 feet; a direct hit on a large stucco administration building that had a Jap flag flying on a nearby pole. One of three small bridges between BA NGOI and NHA TRANG was damaged by two near misses; a yellow R.R. shack two miles North of BA NGOI exploded violently after being strafed. A large brick building at CAU HIN (1208N-10913E) blew up with a violent explosion. A direct hit from Lt Faulkovich's plane probably destroyed a large steel single span, cantilever bridge across SONO KAI RIVER at 1216N-10910E. A near miss on a "T" shaped jetty at approx. 1225N-10913E slightly damaged a crane at the end of the jetty and a direct hit was scored on a warehouse 150' x 30' near the jetty.
3. ATTACK (concluded)
   All targets named above, as well as miscellaneous buildings along
   the railroad, were thoroughly strafed, mostly with unobserved results. K-21
   photos of this strike have been received.
   d. Opposition and Cost: Light, meagre, accurate to generally in-
   accurate A/A received from radar station at CAM RANH and small towns along
   attack route between CAM RANH BAY and MHA TRANG, and hills around red-roofed
   buildings on island at 1221N-10922E. One A/P was holed. No interception
   was encountered; no personnel lost or injured, and only A/P damage was the
   one hole mentioned.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   This strike marked the first time our planes struck land targets on
   INDO-CHINA.
   Two of the nine planes taking off did not reach the target. One had
   engine trouble about an hour out and was escorted back by another A/P. All
   planes were low on gas when returning, two of them landing at PALAWAN and
   five landing at MINDORO to re-fuel and proceeded on to SAN MARCELINO.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
   In the opinion of this Officer, based on facts available at this
   time, no personal or group actions merit special award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time Table: Takeoff 0645/I from SAN MARCELINO.
      Group assembly - 0715/I over CAPONES ISLAND.
      Attack - 1150/I to 1210/I.
      Landed - 2 B-25J's at 1040/I; 7 B-25J's at San Marcelino
      at 1855/I.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: radio control only.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN P. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Eight of our A/P's attacked a Jap convoy headed North 70 miles North-east of BONG SON on the French INDO-CHINA coast. A total of twenty-three (23) 500-pound bombs were dropped, scoring a direct hit on a 2300-ton tanker which later sank. A direct hit on a destroyer escort left the ship listing badly and burning. Near misses on two other destroyer escorts probably damaged both units.

2. OBJECTIVE
This convoy which had been sighted earlier by P-38's and B-24's, was our objective. Consistent with policy, specific units to be attacked included destroyers, minelayers, destroyer escorts and merchant vessels.

3. ATTACK
The 501st and 498th Squadrons attacked the convoy first and were followed by the 500th and 499th Squadrons. Our eight B-25J's initiated their attack on a Northernly heading, flying for the most part in two-plane elements at minimum altitude. Fog and rain squalls partially hid the convoy and our pilots had to fly on instruments frequently during the attack.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
   A/P 350 - Capt Bassel
   A/P 020 - Lt Goodman
   A/P 588 - Lt Loisel
   A/P 418 - Lt Waring
   A/P 210 - Lt Hill
   A/P 6023 - Lt Lewis
   A/P 266 - Lt McGuire
   A/P 023 - Lt Paukovitch

c. Results: Although weather prohibited complete damage assessment, it has been well established that Lt Loisel scored a direct hit on a Sugar Charlie Love (2300 tons) tanker, causing it to explode and sink. This pilot also scored a direct hit on a destructor escort vessel, leaving it listing badly and burning. Lt McGuire damaged a second destructor escort with one near miss. Lt Waring claimed a direct hit on the latter also, and reports indicate that an explosion resulted from his attack. Lt Paukovitch found a third destructor escort and his two bombs scored two near misses, resulting in probable damage. All pilots strafed on all runs and reported that enemy crew-members were abandoning the vessels during the height of the attack. K-21 photos confirm the existence of two destructor escorts, a mine layer, and a Sugar Charlie Love (2300-ton tanker) with the figure "H" painted on its stack. One print shows the bomb hit which exploded the 2300-ton tanker. Many prints were spoiled by the presence of fog and rain and cloud.
our planes reached the west side of the town intense A/A of all calibres opened up from positions generally west of the town near the pier area. A/P 888, piloted by Lt Simpson, hit by A/A during the run ditched about one mile offshore. The remaining five planes circled the four survivors dropping four rafts. Four planes then left to return to base and Lt Paukovitch lingered to complete a second circle. Failing to spot our withdrawing A/P’s, Lt Paukovitch headed westerly over the pier area west of town and strafed sporadically along an eight mile stretch to the large highway bridge where he dropped his four bombs scoring a near miss on a cement supporting pier. One of these bombs dropped early landing in a small town just west of the bridge and damaging buildings. Lt Paukovitch then returned to base alone never making visual contact with the remainder of the squadron. A total of twelve bombs were returned to base. Photos received show bombs exploding in HOI HOW TOWN and exploding in the water near the highway bridge. Three A/A positions are visible located on the river bank near the east end of the bridge. Other prints reveal a few vehicles parked in garages.

d. Opposition: The greater part of the intense A/A came from the main pier area but many light positions were firing along the river banks east of HOI HOW, in the town itself and from a flak tower located just east of the hospital in the town. Pilots reported all calibres with a predominance of light ground fire. Two planes were holed but damage was minor and no personnel were injured. There was no interception.

e. Losses: A/P 888, piloted by Lt Simpson, was hit during the run over HOI HOW. Other crews reported that fire broke out in the stricken plane’s open bomb bay and around the top turret. Lt Simpson kept his A/P under control, salvaged his bombs and finally ditched successfully, although his landing gear had fallen partially down, at a point approximately one mile offshore in HOI HOT BAY. Four survivors were seen in and around the raft. A junk was seen one mile west of the raft but it did not seem to alter its westerly heading. The crew of A/P 888, carried as missing in action, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>William P. Simpson</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>0-552551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-pilot</td>
<td>Arthur D. Blum</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-819917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>Merritt E. Lawlis</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>0-432168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Benjamin T. Muller</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>18090386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Charles L. Suey</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>16150792</td>
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4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

The search plan of this mission was not executed as ordered because this squadron followed the lead squadron who was in error on their navigation. The haze existing over HOI HOW TOWN made it extremely difficult to locate the specific target and our squadron leader did not identify it in time to readjust his approach from that of the preceding squadron. Although a second run might have been executed under normal circumstances it didn’t seem advisable after the loss of one A/P and the circling which was done to drop life rafts. Twelve P-38’s provided excellent fighter cover throughout the entire mission. A rescue Catalina was contacted and given the location and predicament of our ditched crew.

5. AWARDS

All crews circled the ditched plane and will be recommended for an appropriate award in view of the fact that they braved intense and accurate A/A fire to drop rafts and equipment to the downed crew.
3. ATTACK (cont'd)
   d. Heavy, medium, light, intense to moderate, accurate to generally
      inaccurate A/A fire was received from vessels of the convoy. A/P's 6023,
      528, and 023 were holed, causing only minor damage.
      Although our planes did not report interception, radio indicated that
      the fighter cover was busy above the convoy warding off enemy interceptors.
      A/P 528 landed with a steel cable, probably a mast stay, lodged in the
      right wing. Some damage to the right horizontal stabiliser resulted. All
      A/P's returned safely and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   Weather prevented an accurate count of the vessels in the convoy, but
   an estimated eight units is probably a conservative figure.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
   Air Medals will be recommended for the complete crew of Lt Leisel's
   A/P for their destruction of the 2300-ton tanker.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff - Eight A/P's at 0740/I from SAN MARCELINO.
      Assembly - 500th and 199th over CAPONES ISLAND at 1500 ft.
      Time over Target - 1135/I to 1200/I at 50/100 ft.
      Landing - 1600/I - 1630/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   b. Route:
      Direct to convoy 70 miles Northeast of BONG SON, French Indochina.
      Return direct to SAN MARCELINO.
   c. Fighter cover:
      Four squadrons of fighters. Radio contact was made over the target
      but no visual contact was made with the cover due to the weather.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

31 March, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 89-D-25, performed by 500th
Bomb Squadron, 30 March, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our A/P's attacked shipping in TULIN BAY, Southeastern
HAIFAN, in the late morning of 30 March. Nine (9) 500-pound bombs were
dropped from minimum altitude with poor to generally unobserved results.
Our Squadron lost one A/P and its crew of five men.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike, which was uncoordinated with any other
group, was part of the program to destroy enemy shipping between the
Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese and Japanese homeland ports.

b. Specific: Our target was shipping in TULIN BAY. On arrival our
planes found 4 to 6 destroyer escorts, 6 to 10 small craft up to 100 feet
long and a large vessel identified as a harbor gunboat.

3. ATTACK
a. Our squadron of B-25's made this attack alone, flying Northwest
over a peninsula forming the east shore of TULIN BAY to the North end of the
Bay and then made their run on a Southerly heading near the East coast of the
Bay in two-plane elements.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 356 - Capt. Reheis
A/P 210 - Lt. Andrews
A/P 266 - Lt. Sawyer
A/P 588 - Lt. Simpson
A/P 023 - Lt. Bennett
A/P 350 - Lt. McGuire

c. Results: Generally unobserved and thought to be not very damaging.
Only one direct hit was claimed and this by the Squadron leader on a possible
small stack-aft vessel at 18130W-109341E. Strafing caused a small explosion
on a harbor gunboat at 181310W-109341E; two near misses also were
scored on this vessel. A near miss was also reported on a corvette or
destroyer escort at 181240W-109341E. The other five bombs dropped on this
strike were either near or clean misses and no further destruction other than
the usual strafing damage is claimed.

Fifteen K-21 and K-20 photos have been received.

d. Opposition and Cost:
A/A was heavy, medium and light; intense, accurate to generally
inaccurate from escort and cargo vessels. Light ground fire was reported
from hills at North end of Bay. Enemy shells caused water spouts which are
hazards to low level attacks. There was nil interception.

e. Loss or Damage to our Planes:
A/P #350 was lost from A/A fire, received over the target. A/P
was hit in right wing between the engine nacelle and fuselage; flames burst
out in cockpit and turret. Pilot jettisoned bombs and tried to stretch a
shallow glide to land out of target area. Plane hit water and slid under
surface; debris seen and nil survivors.

CONFIDENTIAL
Narrative Report on FFO 89-D-25

3. ATTACK (concluded)
   B. Location of crashed A/P was at 181020N-10932E. Personnel losses
   were as follows:
   
   Last Lt McGuire, James (WMI)  0-67431h
   2nd Lt Boyce, William T     0-838051
   2nd Lt Harviell, Eugene (WMI) 0-702422
   S/Sgt Baron, Harvey (WMI)  3956791h
   Sgt Coffman, William P.       35666940
   Pilot
   Co-pilot
   Navigator
   Engineer-gunner
   Radio-gunner

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   The Squadron had been directed to investigate YULIN BAY in event of nil
   previous contact with convoy. The sightings at target were formidable: 6/6
   DE's, possibly including DD; numerous smaller craft and a harbor gunboat.
   Coastal defense positions also guard this harbor and our squadron had received
   heavy defensive fire from this area on a previous mission.
   Disregarding these threats and his relatively small attacking force, the
   Squadron leader led his flight in over a necessarily disadvantageous approach
   caused by high terrain at the harbor's edge and made one pass. Defensive fire
   was so strong that a second pass was inadvisable and not made.
   When Lt McGuire was hit, his wing man, Lt Sawyer, stayed with him to cover
   him as long as possible.
   The following sighting was made: at 1120/I from 500 ft a bow of a sinking
   vessel at 1819N-1094210E.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
   No specific recommendations are made but in view of the facts outlined
   in paragraph 4, it is felt by this Officer that some official acknowledgement
   of this exemplary devotion to duty be made for both the Squadron leader and
   his flight.

6. STATISTICS
   
   Time table:
   Takeoff - 0645/I from SAN MARCELINO.
   Group Assembly - At CABONES ISLAND at 1500 ft.
   Attack - 1125/I to 1130/I at minimum altitude.
   Landing - 1537/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   Route: Direct to HAINAN ISLAND at 1814N-11005E and proceeded South
   to YULIN BAY at 1812N-10931E.
   Fighter cover: nil contact.

   For the Commanding Officer:

   JOHN F. DINGES
   2nd Lt, Air Corps
   Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
35th Bombardment Group
APO 73

PAH/rpb

4 April, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Six of our A/P's, after completing a fruitless shipping search south along the East coast of the LOOCHOW PENINSULA, hit the secondary target at HOI HOW TOWN on the North HADIAN coast. A total of eight five hundred pounders were dropped causing some damage to buildings in the town and to a highway bridge six miles south of the town. A/P's strafed HOI HOW TOWN and an area extending six miles Southeast of the town with unobserved results. One of our planes, hit by A/A over HOI HOW, made an excellent ditching approximately one mile offshore and four survivors were reported by returning crews.

2. OBJECTIVE

Consistent with recent strikes assigned this Group, this mission, employing two squadrons, was essentially a shipping search designed to intercept any sea traffic along the west and south coast of LOOCHOW PENINSULA and along the northeastern coast of HAINAN. A small barracks area located on an island in the mouth of the HAN-TU-HO river mouth two miles east of HOI HOW was assigned as a secondary target. A small oil storage area on river bank two and one-half miles south of the barracks area was also suggested in connection with the secondary.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: The 499th Squadron leading our six B-25J's approached HAINAN from the north and attacked the secondary target at noon, flying at minimum altitude on a northwesterly heading across HAN-TU-HO river and HOI HOW TOWN. Our A/P's flew in three plane elements and completed one inaccurate run. In addition one of our planes executed a second pass covering from the main pier four miles west of the town, southeast to the large highway bridge spanning the HAN-TU-HO RIVER.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST ELEMENT</th>
<th>SECOND ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 356 - Lt Canning</td>
<td>A/P 388 - Lt Simpson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 223 - Lt Herick</td>
<td>A/P 210 - F/O Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 266 - Lt Farkovich</td>
<td>A/P 6023 - Lt Goodban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: Considerable difficulty in locating the specific barracks area accounted for the relatively poor results of this mission. Only one pilot, Lt Goodban, dropped bombs on the single pass over HOI HOW. His four bombs exploded among buildings at the East side of town causing damage. The other pilots held their bomb loads anticipating a second pass which would line them up properly on the barracks area. However, a second run never materialized. As
6. **STATISTICS**

a. **Timetable:**
   - **Takeoff:** 6 B-25's at 0645/7 from SAN MARCELINO.
   - **Time over target:** 6 B-25's at 1150-1230/7 at 50 to 500 ft.
   - **Landing:** 5 B-25's at 1705/7 at SAN MARCELINO.

b. **Route:** Direct to ST JOHN ISLAND, China coast (thru error in navigation of lead squadron), thence southwest to north tip of HAINA to target. Return was direct.

c. **Fighter cover:** P-38 cover was excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (N)
385th Bombardment Group
APO 73

6 April, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. STIOHISIS

Six of our planes in an early afternoon minimum altitude attack, hit MAKO TOWN and shipping anchored near docks in MAKO HARBOR in the PESCADORES ISLANDS. A total of 18,500 pounds were dropped during the single North to South pass, causing a violent explosion in a large warehouse on the West side of the town and destroying or damaging buildings and two-story barracks in the town's central section. A direct hit was scored on a 2000 ton tanker (Sugar Able Sugar) tied to a jetty, causing a violent explosion with flame and heavy black smoke. This fire spread across the jetty and enveloped a freighter of 2500 tons (Sugar Baker Sugar) tied to the opposite side. The Sugar Able Sugar is claimed definitely destroyed by our squadron. A Sugar Dog was probably destroyed by a near miss. A/J fire was intense and accurate - we lost one plane and crew which crashed in the harbor and four other planes were holed. Four crew members were injured.

2. OBJECTIVE

A few recent sightings indicated the presence of enemy shipping around MAKO TOWN in the PESCADORES GROUP. Two squadrons from this Group were ordered to investigate and attack any shipping sighted in this area.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: The 498th Squadron leading our six B-25J's reached the east coast of MAKO TO ISLAND, flew up the coast until opposite MAKO, then cut from the west and south approaching MAKO from the North. Our planes attacked on a single pass in two plane elements at minimum altitude on a south-southwesterly heading.

b. Pilots and Planes participating:

FIRST ELEMENT  SECOND ELEMENT  THIRD ELEMENT
A/P 356 - Lt Lewis  A/P 266 - Lt Paukovich  A/P 584 - Lt Herick
A/P 210 - FO Van Scoyk  A/P 023 - FO Hart  A/P 6023 - Lt Bennett

c. Results: Nine bombs dropped through the central part of MAKO scored hits on buildings but resulting damages were difficult to assess. Lt Herick scored a hit on a large warehouse in the west central section of town causing the structure to blow up in a violent explosion followed by heavy black smoke. Lt Lewis, Squadron leader, scored a direct hit on a 2000 ton tanker tied to a jetty just west of the small beat basin and breakwater. The tanker exploded throwing flames high into the air with black smoke to 1500 feet. Planes spread along the water and over the jetty completely enveloping a 2500 ton vessel tied to the opposite side. The tanker is claimed definitely destroyed by the accurate bombing of Lt Lewis. Lt Paukovich scored a near miss on a Sugar Dog west of the westernmost jetty, probably destroying the 150 ton vessel.

- 1 -
FFO 91-D-2h - 500th Sqn - cont.

The central section of NAHO and the two vessels were thoroughly strafed with no observed results. Photos confirm crews' reports of bombs exploding in the town and the resultant explosion caused by the direct hit on the tanker. Four small stack aft vessels and two scouts are shown in the harbor.

Opposition: All calibers, intense and accurate A/A was received holing four planes and shooting down a fifth and injuring four crew members. All known positions were firing as well as a large concentration of ground fire in the central part of town. Positions on vessels in the harbor were also firing.

Losses: A/P 023, piloted by Flight Officer Hart, was fatally hit while over the south end of NAHO TOWN. The right wing tip was blown off and the plane plunged into the harbor in an approximate ninety degree bank 200 feet south of the tanker. The crew, carried as killed in action, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Francis B. Hart</th>
<th>Flight Officer</th>
<th>T-2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-pilot</td>
<td>Carlton C. Penn, Jr</td>
<td>Second Lt.</td>
<td>0-101950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>A/de O. Post</td>
<td>Second Lt.</td>
<td>0-722563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Bortolino P. Maggi</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>31007619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Sammel Stepanow, Jr</td>
<td>5/Sgt</td>
<td>32757619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel wounded as follows:

A/P 210 - 2nd Lt Walter W. McMahan, Jr, 0-556684
Sgt Robert E. Cadbois, 31261610
A/P 266 - Sgt Malachy J. Lee, 32921069
A/P 356 - Sgt Ray A Comstock, 12165945
The first three named men were hospitalized.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

The results of this mission were gratifying but the loss of another plane over the target and the number of planes seriously holed is ample evidence of the increasing effectiveness of Japanese anti-aircraft defense tactics. A flak tower was located by one crew as being somewhere in the southeast corner of NAHO TOWN.

5. AWARDS

Lt Lewis and his crew will be recommended for the Air Medal for sinking the 2000 ton tanker. Crew members wounded will be recommended for Purple Hearts.

6. STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Timetable:</th>
<th>Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 1110/1.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly: Enroute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time over target: 1435/I to 1440/I at 50/300 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing: 5 A/P's at 1745/I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Route:</td>
<td>Direct to PESCADORES, around BOKO To to NAHO and return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
LEGEND

FFO 9h-D-2i  7 April, 1945
500th Bomb Sqdn, 345th Bomb Grp
Second over target at 50/300 ft
Time of attack: 1435/3-I-1430/I
Took photos / Other planes

MAP REFERENCE
VBC Mosaic 2068

SCALE IN FEET
Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 95-D-38, Performed by 500th Bombardment Squadron (M), 5 April, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Three of our planes left late on the morning of 5 April to attack shipping concentrations in the HONG KONG area. No contact was made with these elements and our strike attacked a freighter transport of 1000 tons, dropping four 500 pounders and expending 3,900 1.50 calibres from minimum altitudes. Photographs show this vessel to be moderately damaged by some previous strike, but 500th bombs definitely destroyed it. The primary was not hit because radio directions received enroute directed strike to a new search area and convoy was not contacted.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. General: This strike was designed as part of a program to cut off Japanese shipping between Southern and Northern ports. It was flown by six planes of the 496th Squadron and three from the 500th Squadron and was not coordinated with any other group.

b. Specific: A shipping search was made along the China coast from 2210N-11h10E to 2240N-11520E. The primary target was two convoys slightly East of the area actually searched and the actual attack was made on a freighter transport anchored close to shore at 2233N-11h53E.

3. ATTACK

a. Approach - formation: Our A/P's flying in elements of two planes followed by one, followed the 496th over the target and made two passes, both to the East.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 588 - Lt Waring
   A/P 193 - Lt Andrews
   A/P 6023 - Lt Hill

c. Results: Our Squadron leader expected the lead squadron to destroy the Fox Tare Dog, but when it was evident that none of their bombs hit, the 500th made their attack, dropping four bombs. Lt Waring scored a direct hit which ripped a large hole in the vessel at the aft hatch on the port side. Photos show the vessel to be blown almost completely in two and the hull filled with water.

d. Opposition: There was no opposition of any type and none of our planes were damaged or personnel injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.

Some question has arisen concerning the extent of previous damage to the target vessel in attacks by other units. In the opinion of this officer, based on interrogation and study of photographs, it is felt that this squadron has a valid claim to destruction of a previously damaged vessel. It is possible that this vessel was damaged in an attack on a convoy and took refuge in this anchorage.
5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
Lt Waring and crew will be recommended for the award of the Air Medal for the sinking of the freighter transport.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table
      Takeoff: Three B-25's at 1120/I from San Marcelino.
      Assembly: Enroute.
      Attack: 1513/I to 1547/I at 50/100 feet.
      Landing: Three B-25's at 1915/I.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN P. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

PAH/rpb

8 April 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes in a mid-day minimum altitude bombing and strafing attack scored three direct hits and one near miss out of a total of eight 500-pounders dropped at a temporarily repaired destroyer of the 2500-ton TAKANAMI Class. The warship was proceeding north about 70 miles East of SWATOW on the China coast. Several terrific explosions followed the hits and as our planes withdrew the vessel was smoking heavily and listing and later sank. One of our A/P's crashed near the destroyer and intense A/A holed three other planes injuring four of our personnel.

2. OBJECTIVE
Recent sightings of a convoy moving up the China coast from the HONG KONG area prompted this particular strike. The four squadrons of our Group were ordered to attack and sink this convoy. Although our attack was not closely coordinated with other groups, the convoy was to be hit during the rest of the day by other units.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: The 501st Squadron, leading the 498th, 499th and 500th in that order to the China coast in the vicinity of AMOT, turned south and followed the coast with four squadrons in line abreast. After circling two escort vessels sunk by the leading squadrons our six A/P's continued south, sighting the lone destroyer off SWATOW. Forming into two flights of three planes each, our planes attacked executing one minimum altitude pass to the east.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   
   First Element
   A/P 518 - Lt Schmidt
   A/P 193 - F/O Van Scyke
   A/P 6023 - Lt Herick
   
   Second Element
   A/P 266 - Lt Sawyer
   A/P 000 - Lt Bennett
   A/P 588 - F/O Gilmore
   
   c. Results: Lt Bennett dropped one bomb while circling an escort vessel crippled and left sinking by another squadron's attack, but his bomb missed completely. Further south the squadron attacked a destroyer about 70 miles off SWATOW. All pilots experienced some difficulty in lining up on the wildly maneuvering vessel but Lt Schmidt, although hit on the approach, scored two direct hits and a near miss. Lt Bennett scored a third hit. The destroyer burst into flame after the hits and as our planes withdrew the vessel was circling seemingly out of control and was trailing a long column of black smoke. The vessel was later attacked by another squadron. Combined efforts of the two squadrons resulting in severe damage, caused the vessel to sink. K-21 photos confirm direct hits on the destroyer and show the deck detail of the vessel.

- 1 -
e. Opposition: As our A/P's approached the destroyer they were met with heavy, medium and light, intense and accurate A/A and numbers of water spouts presented a real threat to our low flying planes. A/P 6023, piloted by Lt Herick, was hit by a burst of A/A when still approximately one mile from the destroyer. Although hit in the cockpit and right engine he continued his strafing run across the warship and was seen to drop at least one bomb before crashing Northeast of the vessel. Lt Schmidt's plane was hit by an explosive shell in the cockpit, wounding the pilot, copilot and navigator also on the approach. The crew of A/P 6023, carried as killed in action, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>1st Lt Joseph Herick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot</td>
<td>2nd Lt Dale W. McFarland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>2nd Lt Julius Cohen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>T/Sgt John F. Burke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>S/Sgt Finley C. Smith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following crew members were injured on Lt Schmidt's crew:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>1st Lt George H. Schmidt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copilot</td>
<td>2nd Lt Roger H. Rexall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>2nd Lt Neil H. Ryan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One other crew member was scratched slightly.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

This vessel attacked and crippled by our squadron is believed to be a destroyer with a temporary bow section replacing the standard section forward of the super structure. Since the vessel was seen recently in Yulin Harbor, Hainan, it was evidently making its way back to Japan, perhaps for complete repairs, when attacked by our squadron. Another possibility which cannot be overlooked is that this may be a new Jap destroyer design. The 498th Squadron hit the destroyer after our attack but when they left the area, the DD was still afloat and either proceeding at half speed or gliding through the water. Later reports from higher headquarters credit the Group with the sinking of the vessel. Individual claims for the sinking of the "demi-destroyer" cannot be made by either the 498th or our squadron as both units seriously damaged it. Therefore, each squadron is credited with one-half the total tonnage, estimated at 1,100 tons.

5. AWARDS

Pilots, Lt Schmidt and Lt Herick, will be recommended for Silver Stars for the gallantry portrayed in following through on their run even though the former's plane was seriously damaged and he himself wounded, and the latter pilot's plane was fatally hit. Their complete crews will be recommended for Distinguished Flying Crosses. Purple Hearts will be awarded the injured crew members.

6. Statistics

a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0645/1.

Rendezvous: Over coast shortly after takeoff.

Time of attack: 6 A/P's at 1200-1205/1 at 50/300 ft.

Landing: 5 A/P's at 1535/1.

b. Route: Direct to AMOY AREA - Southerly sweep - target - base.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
Squad Leader Sees Vessels #2 Sinking. So does not attack. Proceeds south on search for additional shipping.

PILOTS AND PLANES 7°00'

1st Element - A/P 518 - Lt. Schmidt
A/P 193 - FO Van Scoyk
A/p 5023 - Lt. Herick

2nd Element - A/P 266 - Lt. Sawyer
A/P 000 - Lt. Bennett
A/P 588 - FO Gilmore

LEGEND

FFO 96-D-28 6 April 1945
500th Bomb Sqdn. 345th Bomb Gp
First over DD at 50/300 ft
Time of attack: 1200/1 to 1206/1
A/P's taking photos
8 x 500 lbers dropped on DD
Later attacked by another Sqdn.
Two Sqdns. receive credit for sinking.
Scale: 1 to 1,000,000
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

JPD/rgb
10 April 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Six B-25J's of this Squadron hit the CHOMOSUI A/D area, PESCADORES ISLANDS in the early afternoon of 8 April. Twenty 500 pound bombs were dropped from minimum altitude and 13,100 rounds of .50 calibers expended. Results generally unobserved but bombs were seen to fall among buildings and to crater the runway.

2. OBJECTIVES
General: Primary and secondary target attacks were designed as part of the program to destroy enemy shipping. The tertiary attack was against a probable staging strip at CHOMOSUI for air defense of the PESCADORES and convoys in that area. The attack was made on the tertiary target because the primary (China coast shipping) was weathered in and the secondary (shipping in NAOK HARBOR) was not sufficiently lucrative.
Specific: Particular emphasis in attacking CHOMOSUI A/D was placed first on grounded A/P's and secondly on rendering the strip unserviceable.

3. ATTACK
a. Approach - formation: Our Squadron followed the 501st in with that squadron abreast and to the left of us on a 190° heading after approaching the target on a heading of approximately 180°. Attack was made in formation of six planes line abreast.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
First Element
A/P 266 - Lt Waring
A/P 177 - FO Van Scoyky
A/P 948 - Lt Goodban

Second Element
A/P 588 - Lt Paukovitch
A/P 173 - Lt Bennett
A/P 193 - Lt Sawyer

Attack formation from left to right was as follows:
A/P 588 A/P 193 A/P 173 A/P 948 A/P 266 A/P 177

c. Results: Our Squadron's most effective attack was in the west side of the target area. The strip was cratered at the North and South ends. Bombs were dropped among buildings on the west side of the strip near the north end and on a large revetted building approximately 1500 feet north-north west of the southwest corner of the strip. A/P 177, flown by FO Van Scoyky, on the extreme right of our formation attacked a radar station off the southwest corner of the strip near the shore with nil damage observed. The pilot saw a ship very close by, identified as a Sugar Baker Sugar, which he broke away to attack. He had no bombs left but strafed the vessel thoroughly. Photos received indicate the vessel to have been unserviceable and show no resulting damage to it. Other photos show bombs bursting in background and also two large radio towers North of the target.

- 1 -

C-D-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L.
Opposition and cost:
A/A: All calibres, moderate to intense and accurate A/A came from unknown number of positions along the shore west of the south end of the runway. Light, intense and accurate fire was received from positions along a road running east-west three miles north of the target. Light and medium, intense and inaccurate received from SHOTO-KARU point on island 3½ miles west of NAK TOWN. A known four gun heavy position 7800 feet East of the strip was not firing but the guns were reported on mounds approximately 20 feet high. A five inch gun, firing from the shore, hit A/P 177 in the right tail section as it crossed the Sugar Baker Sugar, seriously damaging the plane.

Loss or damage to our planes: Three planes were holed; A/P 177 seriously as follows: A total of 3½ holes throughout plane; the right rudder control cable and elevator trim tab knocked out; the right elevator control cable pulley shot out and control cable jammed; the leading edge of right stabilizer had a gash one foot deep and two feet wide from five inch gun; nose gear and bulkhead sprung when A/P made emergency landing on crash strip at LINGAYEN.

Personnel losses and injuries: Lt Walter V. Wicker, ASN 0-707 159, Navigator on A/P 173 was hit by shrapnel which entered the navigator's compartment from the floor while crossing the target. The copilot quickly administered first aid but Wicker died almost instantly from a severe shoulder wound. Sgt Ray A. Comstock, ASN 12165945, radio operator on A/P 177 was hit in the cheek by a piece of flak leaving a deep gash.

1. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

After being hit by the naval gun while making a run on the freighter, A/P 177 plunged into a dive from approximately 100 ft. Joint efforts by pilot and copilot in jockeying controls and quick thinking exemplified in the immediate use of trim tabs brought the plane out of the dive and then into a steep climb from which it was leveled off and brought on a course for LOKON. The return trip was flown at 600/900 ft with the plane vibrating badly resulting in further damage from disintegration of what was left of the control surfaces. Radio contact was made with a Catalina which trailed the plane in. A crash landing with wheels down was made on the crash strip (Honey) at LINGAYEN. When flaps were lowered for landing, ship went a dive but a quick raising of flaps coupled with combined efforts of the pilot and copilot on the control column pulled the plane up until it gradually settled for a landing and slid to a stop in smooth mud.

5. AWARDS

In view of the extraordinary skill in flying and the extreme courage and devotion to duty displayed by FO Van Scoy and his crew, this Officer feels the award of the DFC to each crew member would be justified.

6. TIMETABLE AND STATISTICS
   TOT: 6 B-25J's at 1347/I to 1349/I at 30/300 ft.
   Landing: 1 B-25J at LINGAYEN at 1735/I; 5 B-25J's at
           SAN MARCELINO at 1725/I.

b. Route: Base - CHINA COAST (S ATOW AREA) - CHOMOSUI - Base.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell. Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (H)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73
PAH/rpb
14 April, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS

Three planes of our Squadron and three of the 501st Squadron, flying as one flight, bombed and strafed TUGUENARAO TOWN and A/D (Northern LUZON) on a single minimum altitude pass on the morning of 13 April. A total of 315 23 pound parafrags were dropped across the A/D and town area effecting good coverage. Two fuel dumps were set afire along the west side of the north-south runway and black smoke rose to 500 feet from both fires. Small fires were started in a personnel and supply area just south of the A/D.

2. OBJECTIVE

This strike was designed to catch and destroy any A/P's and equipment left around the already battered TUGUENARAO A/D. Special emphasis was placed on a cave just east of the drone and pictures of this installation were to be taken. PATANAO TOWN in upper Northeastern LUZON was assigned as a secondary since Japanese troops, supplies and rolling equipment were reported there.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: The 499th Squadron led our six plane unit, the 501st and 456th Squadrons in that order up the east side of the CASAYAN VALLEY to a point above the target. Then turning south all squadrons executed one pass in three planes abreast formation on a 190° heading at minimum altitude.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 356 - Lt Canning (500th)  A/P 268 - Lt Hatcher (501st)
   A/P 264 - Lt Lackey (500th)  A/P 034 - Lt Harrah (501st)
   A/P 586 - FJ Andrews (500th)  A/P 009 - Lt Wilkerson (501st)

c. Results: There were no detailed results or specific instances of excellent bombarding by any individual. Bombing, however, was excellent from the standpoint of coverage. All A/P's strafed the A/D and town area with generally unobserved results although Lt Hatcher did set ablaze a fuel dump on the west side of the strip with his forward fifties. K-21 mission photos confirm extensive previous damage and show our bombs falling across the A/D area. A few huts have been set afire by strafing. The outline of a possible transport type vessel can be seen in the distance in the CASAYAN RIVER just south of TUGUENARAO TOWN. Many unserviceable A/P's are visible.

d. Opposition: Only opposition reported was light, meagre, accurate to mostly inaccurate ground fire from the supply and personnel area just south of the drone. A/P 009 received one hole in the right horizontal stabilizer. No personnel were injured in this attack.
4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Crew reported that TUGUEGRAN area appeared deserted and in ruins.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this Officer based on available information, there are no individual actions seeming to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0810/1.
      TOT: 6 A/P's at 1010-1012/1 at 100/250 feet.
      Landing: 6 A/P's at 1130/1.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.


1. SYNOPSIS

Six of our planes executed a minimum altitude attack on TUGUEGARAO A/D early Sunday morning dropping 396 x 23 pound parafrags with ineffective to unobserved results. The primary, LAMPSEPO A/D in Northern FORMOSA west of TAIHOKU was not hit because of weather.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. General: Objective of the secondary strike was to remove any possible threat of enemy use of TUGUEGARAO strip for strikes against our Philippine forces. Objective of the primary was to reduce the enemy's potential attacking ability against our operations in the RYUKYUS.

b. Specific: Our particular objective was to ground A/P's and next, any other objects which would disrupt enemy activity.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation-approach: Our B-25J's led the Group with the 501st, 498th and 499th Squadrons following in that order. Approach to the target was from the Northeast and the run was made at approximately 240°. The formation was six planes line abreast, echelon to the left.

b. Pilots and planes:

First element
A/P 356 - Capt Bazzel
A/1 193 - Lt Greenstein
A/P 266 - FO Van Scoyk

Second element
A/P 594 - Lt Lentz
A/P 165 - Lt Lackey
A/P 588 - Lt Bennett

c. Results: Capt Bazzel, Squadron Commander, led our Squadron and the Group. The mission was forced to abandon course to the primary at 1945H-11948E at 1033/1 when the ceiling dropped below 500 feet and a solid front with heavy rain and high thunderheads lay ahead. Our planes proceeded direct to the secondary. Results of our attack might be considered mediocre. The target is hard to locate from minimum altitude and bombs were dropped in the general target area north, west and southeast of the strip. Results were generally unobserved except for two shack set afire by FO Van Scoyk's strafing.

d. Opposition and cost: Possible mortar fire; accurate to mostly inaccurate was received from positions in a clump of bushes approximately 1½ miles due east of the airdrome.
Narrative, PFO 105-D-20 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

Observers believed this to be mortar fire because they saw no flash and they could see the projectile approach fairly slowly. There was no interception. One A/P was holed in the top turret and the turret gunner received a slight bruise on his cheek from either turret fragments or a piece of shrapnel.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
   As this target has been rather difficult to locate for low level attacks, it is suggested that in future attacks ground control might mark it with white phosphorous markers either aerially or artillery placed.

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer based on information available at this time, no individual action merits any special award or citation.

6. STATISTICS
   b. Route: Direct to 1945N-1134E where formation was forced to turn back due to weather, thence down CAGAYAN VALLEY in Northern Luzon to target. Return to base was direct.
   c. Fighter cover: Nil cover for secondary target.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGAS
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER  
500th Bombardment Squadron (W)  
345th Bombardment Group  
APO 73  

17 April 1945  

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.  

1. SYNOPSIS  
LAMPSEPO airfield and dispersal areas in Northern Formosa were thoroughly covered with 300 X 23 pound parafrags dropped by five planes of this Squadron in a mid-day minimum altitude attack designed to destroy installations and grounded planes at that base. Bomb dust and smoke obscured results both of the bombing and the strafing. Opposition was fairly effective holing three of our planes and wounding one crew member.  

2. OBJECTIVE  
The primary objective of this attack was to destroy enemy planes reported by photo reconnaissance to be scattered throughout dispersals at LAMPSEPO DROME. Any drone installations or buildings in the area were also to be hit. TUGGEYAR AO A/D in Northern LUZON was assigned as a secondary.  

3. ATTACK  
a. Formation - approach: The 500th Squadron was third in the Group formation which was led by the 498th. Approach to the target was from the north and our planes attacked in formation of five planes abreast.  
b. Pilots and planes:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Element</th>
<th>Second Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 266 - Capt Reheis</td>
<td>A/P 588 - FO Gilmore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 193 - Lt Andrews</td>
<td>A/P 165 - Lt Greenstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 594 - FO Van Scyk</td>
<td>A/P 034 - Lt Hill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lt Greenstein returned to base two hours after takeoff due to falling fuel pressure in both engines.  
c. Results: Capt Reheis, Squadron Operations Officer, led our five plane formation across the target on a heading of approximately 200 degrees. Parafrags were strung from the north revetment area, across the drone and into the south revetments with unobserved results due to the heavy dust and bomb smoke hanging over the area from preceding squadrons' attack. All pilots strafed the drone area and along their flight path west to the coast at 2503N-12103E, expending 16,400 rounds of .50 calibers.  
d. Opposition: Coastal defense guns fired a few bursts at our planes from positions near SHINCHI on the Formosa coast as they proceeded to the target and although no hits were scored some of the bursts were fairly close. A/A at the target was classified as light and medium, moderate, mostly inaccurate, coming from positions spaced in the drone area while piles of hay between the drone and coast were spouting out black puffs in a very "unhaystack like" manner.  
e. Losses: Three of our planes were holed, all with minor damage.  

- 1 -
Capt Reheis was hit in the right foot with a small calibre bullet on the approach to the target. The bullet lodged against the bone and Capt Reheis was hospitalized for necessary treatment on landing at base.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
Crews failed to note any aircraft at LAMPEPO. K-21 photographs fail to reveal anything of value but do show dust and light smoke hovering over the drone area.

5. AWARDS
Capt Herman F. Reheis will be recommended for the award of a Purple Heart for wounds received in action and for an Air Medal for the manner in which he carried on across the target after being very painfully wounded in the foot.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0810/I.
    Assembly: Group over CAPONES at 0820/I.
    TOT: 5 A/P's at 1235/I to 1237/I at 50/150 feet.
    Landing: 1 A/P at 1026/I (returned early).
             1 A/P at 1605/I (Capt Reheis).
             4 A/P's at 1600/I.

b. Route: Direct to TANSUI-KEI river mouth slightly North of target - south to target. Return to base was direct.

c. Fighter cover: Nil contact made with fighters until on return when four P-38's picked up formation off West coast of FORMOSA.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.


1. SYNOPSIS

A three-quarter mile square area along both sides of the ANGAT RIVER approximately four miles east of NOZAGARAY TOWN in central LUCON was well covered by 15 x 500 pound demo bombs and heavy strafing by six B-25's of our Squadron. As our planes withdrew from this mid-morning minimum altitude attack, the local ground controller congratulated the Squadron on its excellent bombing. Light smokes and dust hovered over the bombed area as our A/P's completed their fourth and final pass.

2. OBJECTIVE

In addition to maintaining an effective blockade against shipping sailing up the China coast this Group also provides support to our infantry units fighting on LUCON. This mission had as its purpose the extermination of a strong pocket of enemy resistance in the ANGAT RIVER GORGE. Supplies, personnel and artillery pieces were reportedly located within the target area which was to be marked by phosphorous bursts from infantry field pieces.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation - approach: The 49th Squadron led our six planes to the ANGAT RIVER area. After circling north of the target waiting for the lead squadron to finish its bombing, our B-25's executed four minimum altitude runs on an approximate 20° heading, single A/P's following in trail.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

First Element
A/P 594 - Lt Lewis
A/P 266 - Lt Andrews
A/P 193 - Lt Greenstein

Second Element
A/P 588 - Lt Lents
A/P 165 - Lt Bennett
A/P 016 - Lt Hill

c. Results: Speed over the target and the nature of the rugged tree-covered terrain restricted observations of results. However, bombing accuracy was excellent and strafing coverage was complete as was later confirmed by the local ground controller. K-21 prints reveal little in the way of military equipment and installations.

d. Opposition and losses: Enemy opposition was surprisingly meager. The crew of one A/P reported a burst of possible mortar fire which was accurate enough to shake the plane but causing no holes or damage. None of our planes were damaged and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

Pilots reported that white phosphorous markers at the target were very helpful in locating the specific area. Six bombs were dropped in addition to the 18 mentioned but they were accidently jettisoned safe in target.
5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this officer based on available information, no individual actions seem to justify awards or citations.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0950/I from SAN MARCELINO.
      TOT: 6 A/P's at 1030-1045/I at 100/500 feet.
      Landing: 6 A/P's at 1130/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   b. Route: SAN MARCELINO - SUHIC BAY - east to AGHOT RIVER target area. Return to base was direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

24 April, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

In the early afternoon five of our planes after completing an unsuccessful shipping search from YULIN BAY, HAINAN to SIFA POINT on the east coast of HAINAN, dropped 20 X 500 pound bombs on small towns and installations on HAINAN's east coast approximately 33 miles northeast of YULIN HARBOR. Three cement buildings were destroyed and buildings in three small towns damaged. A barrack typebuilding in an isolated hill area north of a town was damaged. All towns were strafed as well as a small hut and nearby observation tower and approximately 25 slit trenches staggered along one section of the coast - 12,800 rounds of fifties were expended. Two other A/P's of our squadron were forced to turn back before reaching the target, one with a bad engine and the other to escort.

2. OBJECTIVE

This mission was another in a series of recent strikes designed to blockade China coast shipping so highly prized by the enemy. Recent sightings revealed the presence of a moderate amount of merchant vessels in the HAINAN area. These units were to be our specific target. A group of heavy bombers were to coordinate with our group in the event shipping was found in YULIN HARBOR, largest and most important in Southern HAINAN. The heavies were to drop aerial burst bombs on known A/A positions in the Harbor area. In the event no shipping targets were found our planes were cleared to bomband strafe WOODY ISLAND in the PARACEL ISLAND GROUP southeast of HAINAN, which is believed to be occupied by a small Jap garrison.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation and approach: The 499th, 500th, 501st and 498th Squadrons flying in that order searched for shipping along the coast of HAINAN with nil sightings. In the vicinity of SIFA POINT the Group formation separated, the 501st and 498th continuing north of the Point and the 499th leading the 500th along the coast to a point approximately 33 miles southwest of SIFA POINT. Here the Squadrons cut in over coastal towns and trench installations. Our planes hit targets on two passes, the first on a southerly heading and the second on a northerly heading. Our squadron attacked in elements of two, one and two planes.
FFO 113-D-27 - 500th Sqn - cont.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

First Element
A/P 548 - Lt Waring
A/P 165 - Lt Fitton
Planes which turned back:
A/P 588 - F/O Gilmore
A/P 210 - Lt Hill

Second Element
A/P 594 - Lt Goodban

Third Element
A/P 266 - Lt Greenstein
A/P 194 - Lt Lackey

Results: Lt Waring, Squadron leader, destroyed an installation of three new cement buildings by bombing. Lt Fitton bombed and strafed an isolated barracks area damaging one of the buildings. Lt Goodban strafed 25 slit trenches staggered along the coast in the bombed area. All pilots strafed throughout both runs but results were generally unobserved. K-21 photos were taken but exposures revealed little that had not been previously covered by another squadron so no prints were made.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

Enemy opposition was practically nil although one crew did report a burst of heavy A/A or mortar fire in back of their A/P which missed by more than 500 yards. Lt Hill and F/O Gilmore returned to base early because the left engine in the latter's plane was running rough. Lt Hill acted as escort. Pilots and crews noted many signs of military activity within the bombed area. A hill in this locality was gutted by many foxholes.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

In the opinion of this officer based on available information, no individual actions seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable: Takeoff: 7 A/P's at 0845/I.
   TOT: 5 A/P's at 1330-1345/I at 50/500 ft.
   Landing: 2 A/P's at 1525/I.
   5 A/P's at 1725/I.

b. Route: Direct to East coast of HAINAN - search along coast - target. Return, direct.

c. Fighter cover: P-38 cover was contacted by radio but not visually.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
Target - SHIPPING SAIGON River
Date - 23 April 1945. Mission No 4F0 118-U-20
Sq. Order over Target-First
Time over Target-1118-1120/L Min. Alt.
AP Shot down over Target
Vessels Destroyed
Vessels Damaged
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 73

JPD/rpb

3 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 122-D-9, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 2 May 1945.

To : Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes hit enemy troops and installations at
the northern end of CAGAYAN VALLEY on the morning of 2 May, drop-
ing 72 X 100 pound paradesmos from minimum altitude. Results were
mostly unobserved except for a few fires in the area.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike was designed to destroy report-
ed enemy troops and their elaborate installations at MADUPAPA in
the DUMMUN RIVER VALLEY at 1805N-12144E.
b. Specific: There were 6000 troops reported with con-
siderable supplies, fuel, ammo, radio and telephone facilities and
electric power installations. These targets were in caves, dug-
couts and several large cogon huts in a narrow north-south valley.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation-approach: Our B-25J's were the second
squadron over the target. Approach to the target was on a gener-
ally northerly heading up the east side of the CAGAYAN VALLEY.
After making certain that they were in the target area, the squad-
ron made three passes to the south, flying a pattern to the right
in single ship elements.
b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/P 588 - Capt Bezzel
A/P 286 - Lt Lackey
A/P 155 - Lt Montgomery
A/P 210 - Lt Lentz
A/P 594 - P/O Van Scoyk
A/P 193 - Lt Greenstein
c. Results were generally unobserved as the location of
any particular object was impossible due to terrain. Bombs were
dropped in the target; about 15 grass shacks were seen and some of
these were set afire by the bombing and strafing. A total of
19,650 rounds of fifties were expended during the three passes.
K-21 photos were taken but contained insufficient intelligence
material to merit printing.
d. Opposition and cost: Slight, inaccurate small arms
fire was received from an unknown position in the target. Nil
personnel injured or planes damaged.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Nil
5. AWARDS
In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0820/1.
   TOT: 6 A/P's at 0945/1 to 1005/1 at 100/300 feet.
   Landing: 6 A/P's at 1131/1.

b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Assistant Intelligence O.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 919

5 May, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes hit enemy troops and installations at DUGO, in the northern end of CAGAYAN VALLEY on the morning of 4 May, dropping 72 X 100 pound paradesms from minimum altitude. Results were mostly unobserved except for considerable bomb dust covering the target.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike was designed to destroy enemy troops and their equipment located in a small area near the south end of DUGO TOWN.
   b. Specific: There were 1800 enemy troops, meager defenses, probable ammo storage and military equipment reported in the target and these were our specific targets.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: Our six B-25J's were the second and last squadron over this target. Approach to the target was on a northerly heading up the east side of the CAGAYAN RIVER. When north of DUGO TOWN the squadron turned to the south and made three single A/P minimum altitude bombing-strafing passes, each on a heading to the southwest.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 266 - Lt Waring
      A/P 193 - Lt Beswick
      A/P 165 - Lt Andrews
      A/P 588 - Lt Loisel
      A/P 210 - Lt Montgomery
      A/P 594 - Lt Lentz
   c. Results: Lt Waring, Squadron Operations Officer, led our A/P's in the attack. All bombs were dropped with excellent coverage of the assigned area reported. No specific damage was noted either from bombing or the 17,300 round strafing attack. K-21 photos reveal signs of heavy track activity but fail to add to damage assessment.
   d. Opposition and cost: Light, meager A/A from unknown positions in the target failed to bother our A/P's. Nil A/P's were damaged and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Four military trucks, their serviceability undetermined, were parked along a road just west of the target. Many vehicle tracks were visible in the target area.

-1-
Narrative, FFO 124-D-15, cont.

5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS

   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0635/I.
      Time over target: 6 A/P's at 0800/I to 0810/I at 50/150 ft.
      Landing: 6 A/P's at 0955/I.

   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the 'Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 919
PAH/rpb
5 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 124-D-17, Performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 4 May 1945.
To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes hit enemy troops and installations at CABAGAN in North LUZON on the afternoon of 4 May, dropping a total of 71 x 100 pound paraidemos from minimum altitude. Results were generally unobserved although all bombs exploded in the assigned area with one scoring a direct hit on the end of an "L" shaped building at the northwest end of the town.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike was designed to destroy enemy troops and their equipment reported to be concentrated within the town area.
   b. Specific: An estimated 500 Japs were believed to be present in the northern part of town.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation - approach: Our six B-25J's approached the target area on a northerly heading up the east side of the CAGAYAN RIVER VALLEY. North of CABAGAN our planes turned south and executed two minimum altitude bombing-strafing passes across the town, both runs being made on a southeasterly heading.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 913 - Capt Bazzel
   A/P 266 - Lt Beawick
   A/P 658 - Col Coltharp
   A/P 164 - Lt Faulkovich
   A/P 588 - Lt Montgomery
   A/P 594 - F/O Van Scoyk
   c. Results: Capt Bazzel, Squadron Commander, led our Squadron across the target. Col Coltharp, Commanding Officer of our Group, flying number three position in the first flight, scored a direct hit on a large "L" shaped building at the northwest end of town, causing debris to fly. All bombs covered the target area in an excellent manner and heavy strafing scored hits on shacks. As A/P's withdrew a few shacks were left burning and the area was covered with bomb dust. K-21 prints reveal little other than paraidemos floating down over the few town buildings left intact by previous bombings.
   d. Opposition: There was no visible enemy opposition to this attack. No A/P's were hit and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
A paraidemo hung up in the bomb bay of one of our planes but after cutting an aperture in the fuselage just behind the
Narrative, FFO 124-D-17, cont.

bomb bay a crew member was able to cut the shrouds releasing the fouled bomb.

5. AWARDS
In the opinion of this officer based on available information there were no individual actions on this mission which would seem to warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 1155/I.
   TOT: 6 A/P's at 1310-1320/I at 50/150 ft.
   Landing: 6 A/P's at 1445/I.

b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 919
PAH/rpb
7 May, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Ten of our planes and three other squadrons of our Group in a coordinated morning bombing-strafing attack with the 38th Group, hit the northern half of MATO TOWN in west-central FORMOSA, dropping 60 X 250 pound paradedmos (six of which were accidentally salvoed), all in the target. Bombing coverage was excellent and many small fires were started. The warehouse group in the center of town received at least two direct hits and debris was seen flying in the air. The town was thoroughly strafed by all A/P's.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike was conceived for a dual purpose. First, to prove to the Formosans that our air force was after all a large and powerful machine quite capable of taking care of the Japs on FORMOSA as well as those located on other islands. To sufficiently impress the Formosans, practically every group in the Fifth Air Force hit targets on FORMOSA during the day. The second, but no less important objective of this mission was to test a new type of bombing technique. The first two squadrons were to drop paradedmos through the area to be followed by the last two squadrons of our Group dropping napalm bombs.
b. Specific: Our specific targets were buildings and warehouses in the northern half of MATO TOWN. The napalm bombs carried by the last two squadrons were to be dropped on a sugar mill at the east side of the town and to be trailed on through the town itself. GARIT NORTH, a small town on the west bank of the CAGAYAN VALLEY was designated as a secondary target for this Squadron. Enemy troops were reportedly bivouaced at this point.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation-approach: Following Plan B approach method instead of Plan A (the latter calling for an inland approach up FORMOSA just along the west side of the mountain ranges), our ten B-25J's leading the 499th, 498th and 501st squadrons in that order flew up the west coast of FORMOSA in standard formation to a point just southwest of the target. Here they quickly spaced squadrons and flights turned inland to the east and circled around through to the north making the final run on MATO TOWN to the west. Our Squadron attacked in two, three A/P flights and one, four plane flight, elements in trail spaced by approximately a thirty second interval.
b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/P 164 - Capt Hall  A/P 266 - Lt Sawyer  A/P 913-Capt Bazzel
A/P 210 - Lt Beswick  A/P 668 - Lt Geyer  A/P 169-Lt Fitton
A/P 588 - Lt Andrews  A/P 594 - FO Van Scoyk  A/P 658-Lt Hill
A/P 193-Lt Greenstein

c. Results: All pilots reported excellent bombing coverage of the north half of MATO TOWN. Capt Hall, Group Assistant Operations Officer who led our Squadron the the group formation, scored direct hits on a warehouse group located in the north-central part of the town. Debris, fire and explosions resulted from these hits. Bombing done by other pilots started many small fires and scored hits on smaller civilian structures. All pilots strafed the entire town area and then strafed sporadically along their westerly withdrawal to the coast expending 55,200 rounds of .50 calibres with unobserved results. K-21 prints received were few in number and of little apparent value. Roads in the area appear to be moderately used and all fields are under cultivation.
d. Opposition: Although this target had never been attacked by any group, opposition was surprisingly meager. One burst of medium, inaccurate A/A came from a position near a canal at the east end of town. Meager M/G fire which was accurate to generally inaccurate from position in the north-central part of MATO TOWN, holed two of our A/P's, both damaged superficially. Nil personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Crews were impressed by the many fires started in the sugar mill and southern part of MATO TOWN by the 38th Group's earlier attack. General inactivity throughout the target area including the MATO landing ground somewhat surprised our crews but confirmed previous photo interpretations.

5. AWARDS
In the opinion of this officer based on available information, there are no individual actions justifying awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 10 A/P's at 0730/1.
Assembly: At 0810/1 over CAPONES IS.
TOT: 10 A/P's at 1045-1100/1 at 200 ft.
Landing: 10 A/P's at 1355/1.
b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: Area cover by four P-38's was excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
1st Lt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 919

PAH/rpb
8 May, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Seven of our planes in a late morning attack bombed and strafed enemy installations and rolling stock on the main north-south coastal railroad between CAPE VARELLA and DONG XUAN on FRENCH INDO-CHINA. A total of 26 X 250 lb paradesmos were dropped, setting afire two flat cars, destroying one large railroad signal tower, two small buildings and one large building in the marshalling yards at TUYHOA TOWN. Also destroyed were two brick buildings and a station house at PHU LONG and a small locomotive with tender attached approximately five miles north of PHU LONG as well as a small stone building nearby. A large RR bridge at TUYHOA was rendered temporarily unserviceable by several direct hits on the north end of the span. Twenty or thirty 25 X 25 ft square buildings approximately three miles south of TUYHOA A/D were damaged and set afire. A Japanese Jeep parked on a hill north of PHU LONG was thoroughly strafed as was the railroad and related buildings along the entire run. Three A/F's received minor damage from meager ack ack.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike was designed to continue the interdiction raids against lines of communications in French INDO-CHINA.

b. Specific: The primary targets were given as RR rolling stock and railroad installations. Bridges were cleared for attack as a last resort.

3. ATTACK
a. Formation-approach: After making landfall at TUYHOA TOWN our seven B-25J's split up into two flights, one made up of four A/P's and the other composed of three A/P's. The former headed north from the bridge just south of TUYHOA and the latter flight headed south along the railroad from the same point. A/P's flew in loose formation staggered along either side of the track. The flight going north covered a 28 miles stretch of railroad before breaking off over the CHINA SEA at DONG XUAN. The southern flight covered 15 miles ending their minimum altitude attack at CAPE VARELLA. Only one search run was made by each element and the flights rendezvoused after attack on course to base.

- 1 -
b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Green Flight</th>
<th>Blue Flight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/P 913 - Capt Schmidt</td>
<td>A/P 588 - Lt Lentz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 164 - Lt Montgomery</td>
<td>A/P 169 - Lt Beswick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 286 - Lt Andrews</td>
<td>A/P 594 - Lt Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/P 193 - Lt Greenstein</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Results: Green flight, composed of four A/P's, searching the railroad north of TUYHOA, accomplished the most outstanding results noted on this mission. Capt Schmidt and Lt Greenstein scored direct hits on the railway bridge at TUYHOA causing moderate damage to the north end of the structure. Capt Schmidt later scored two direct hits on the main track, severing it. Lt Andrews scored a direct hit on a locomotive and tender definitely destroying the equipment which was hiding in a small siding protected by the sides of a deep cut in the land. This flight strafed along its entire run scoring hits on houses, carts and small railroad buildings. Capt Schmidt strafed a parked jeep which was located on a small hill near the north end of the run. Blue flight composed of three A/P's searching south of TUYHOA to CAPE VARELLEA caused considerable damage. Lt Lentz scored a direct hit on a large railroad signal tower, blasting it from its foundation. The same pilot severed the tracks by a direct hit some nine miles south of TUYHOA and in addition started fires among a group of 30 uniform 25 X 25 ft buildings. A direct hit by one of Lt Hill's bombs destroyed a large building in the marshalling yards at TUYHOA. Blue flight strafed buildings, scattered rolling equipment and small bridges between TUYHOA and CAPE VARELLEA with unobserved results. K-21 prints reveal little confirmation of reported bombing results. Bomb explosions near the railroad track are visible and the tracks appear to reflect light indicating that the road is well used. A bomb blast very close to a highway bridge suggests probable damage to the structure. The highway paralleling the railroad is in good condition and several pony drawn carts are proceeding along the route.

d. Opposition: The enemy gave only meager opposition to our attacking A/P's. At TUYHOA light, meager and inaccurate A/A to generally accurate, holed A/P's 913 and 286 causing minor damage. A/P 594 was hit by light, moderate accurate to generally inaccurate A/A from positions at VUNGRO BAY near CAPE VARELLEA. Here again damage was only minor and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.

Crews hearing about the supposedly heavy use this railroad was being put to by the desperate enemy were surprised by the apparent inactivity so noticeable during their attack.

5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on the mission which would warrant awards.
6. **STATISTICS**  
   a. **Timetable**: Takeoff: 7 A/P's at 0655/I.  
      TOT: 7 A/P's at 1105/I - 1115/I at 50/200 feet.  
      Landing: 7 A/P's at 1525/I.  
   b. **Route**: Direct.  
   c. **Fighter cover**: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON  
1st Lt, Air Corps  
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74
JFD/jwd
14 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FF0 130-D-17, performed by 500th Bomb Squadron, 10 May, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six B-25Js hit KARI TOWN, Southeast Formosa, in the early afternoon of 10 May, 1945. 36 x 250-pound parademos were dropped from minimum altitude, hitting chiefly factory and mill installations throughout the town, with good results reported.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This mission was of a general nature with emphasis on destroying enemy industrial producutive capacity. The strike was coordinated with the 38th Bombardment Group.
b. Specific: Particular "attention" was to be paid the Sugar Mill central plant in North part of town.

3. ATTACK
a. Our B-25Js flew in three-plane elements on a heading of approx. 190 degrees, with the squadrons aligned as follows: 501, 498, 500 and 499th. Approach was on a heading of approx. 190 degrees after hitting the coast about four miles North of the target.
b. Pilots and Planes participating:
   A/P 169 - Lt Lewis
   A/P 594 - Lt Geyer
   A/P 266 - Lt Bennett
   A/P 164 - Lt Paukovich
   A/P 666 - Lt Andrews
   A/P 588 - Lt Hill
c. Results: The majority of our 36 bombs were dropped in the Northwest sector of town. Seven (7) good hits were scored on a factory installation with two large smokestacks in the West-Central side of town, causing fire and smoke visible as our planes withdrew over the water. A direct hit was scored on a concrete road bridge at the South end of town. Four (4) bombs dropped in a mill area in West-Central KARI, causing much smoke and flames, and three more bombs were dropped in a mill area on a canal bank in the Northern part of town. Two (2) bombs were dropped in JUSHIKYAKU town, approx. four miles Southeast of KARI. Other bombs were dropped at miscellaneous targets in KARI TOWN, including a railroad bridge and a warehouse, with unobserved results. The whole KARI area was heavily strafed.
d. Opposition: Light, meager and accurate anti aircraft fire was encountered. One A/P received one hole.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
NIL.
5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   In the light of known facts there are no recommendations offered at this time.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff - 0900/I from SAN MARCELINO.
      Attack - 1210/I to 1215/I at 100 ft.
      Landed - 1515/I at SAN MARCELINO.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: 12 P-51s. Nil contact.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
348th Bombardment Group
APO 74

15 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 131-D-16, performed
by 500th Bomb Squadron 11 May, 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our A/P's struck KAGI TOWN, Southwest Formosa, on
the morning of 11 May. 36 X 250-pound parademas were dropped
from low level on A/A installations, rolling stock and miscell-
aneous buildings in KAGI and towns to the North and Northwest of
KAGI, with good to unobserved results. Five of our A/P's were
holed, three badly enough to warrant second echelon repairs, and
three crew members of one A/P were injured.

2. OBJECTIVE
a. General: This strike, which was coordinated with two
other groups, dropping Napalm bombs and firing rockets, was to be
a grand climactic attack designed to remove the necessity for any
future missions against this target; it was a "neutralizing-plus"
mission.
b. Specific: The squadron was assigned no specific
target in the town except for 2 A/P's which were to give partic-
ular attention to two A/A positions.

3. ATTACK
a. The 500th was to have been the third squadron over
the target, following the 498th and 499th, but in the course of
events, the 500th was the first squadron over, followed by the
501st. Approach to the target was from the North while the run
was to the Southwest in three-plane elements.
b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 913 - Lt Loisel
A/P 594 - Lt Paukovich
A/P 588 - F/O Van Scoyk
A/P 164 - Lt Lackey
A/P 169 - Lt Sawyer
A/P 266 - Lt Bilyou
c. Results: For some reason, our second flight began
its attack North and West of KAGI, dropping 16 of its bombs on
towns enroute to the designated target. Results North of KAGI
included two box cars destroyed near TAIRIN TOWN (2335N-12025E)
where a direct hit also destroyed 3/4 buildings flanking a court-
yard; a second bomb fell nearby with unobserved results. Nine or
ten (9/10) caboose-type cars were strafed and left smoking
four to five miles North of KAGI. Attacks on a warehouse and
other buildings were made at TOKO (2340N-12023E) with unobserved
results. Another bomb aimed at a two story, store-type building
at CHIQ-GU-K'E fell with unobserved results.

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c. Results (cont'd): Results of two bombs dropped in an unidentified town 8 miles Southwest of KAGI AIRDROME also were unobserved.

In KAGI TOWN, the first flight scored a direct hit on an assigned A/A position in Southeast section of town. The revetment was seen to blow up. Other bombs fell on warehouses and factory buildings with unobserved results. A few K-21 photos received did not show any specific damage.

d. Opposition and Cost: A/A was light, medium, heavy, intense, and accurate to inaccurate from known positions in the Southeast part of KAGI TOWN; one of these positions was attack and presumably destroyed.

The three A/P's which failed to attack KAGI TOWN, flew over KAGI AIRDROME, encountering 10/15 20 MM positions firing from emplacements in a hillside approx. one mile North of drome; fire was intense and accurate. Middling and inaccurate fire was received from positions on the South side of the drome, the exact locations of which is unknown. Intense and accurate 20MM fire was encountered from unknown positions near TOKU TOWN (2340N-12032E) and small arms (tracer) fire received from unknown positions in TAIRIN TOWN (2336N-12027E).

b. Five A/P's were holed, three severely enough to require work in a Service Squadron. Three crew members were injured by a 20MM bursting inside the cockpit. The only serious injury was to 2nd Lt. Anton K. Kusebauch - 0823889 - co-pilot.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
Many gun positions and slit trenches were noted between target and the coast, also staggered holes in a hard-surfaced road just South of KAGI TOWN. Holes were square and about 70 ft apart. Purpose unknown unless road block against possible invasion.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
Lt. Kusebauch is recommended for the Purple Heart award. No other recommendations are made in the light of known facts at this time.

6. STATISTICS
   TOT: 1000/I to 1310/I at 75/100'.
   Landed: 1315/I - 5 B-25J's.
   1300/I - 1 B-25J.

b. Route: Direct to target area. Squadron hit coast near KAIKO (2344N-12011E) and took a Westerly heading on withdrawal from KAGI TOWN area.

b. Fighter cover: Nil scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

PAH/jwd

16 May, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925

1. SYNOPSIS
Five of our planes in a morning minimum altitude bombing-
strafing attack executed a total of three runs over a large cave
mouth in an area near MADUPAPA TOWN in Northern Luzon. After
circling for 30 minutes our crews finally found the correct area
although no one reported seeing reported cave mouth. Sixty (60)
X 100-pound demo bombs were dropped in the target area but results
were unobserved from bombing or strafing.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: Japanese infantry, their supplies and equipment,
were to be the general targets covered by this attack in MADUPAPA
area.
Specific: A large cave reportedly housing the enemy, was
to be found if possible and its mouth closed by bombing.

3. ATTACK
a. Four squadrons proceeded direct to the target in
Group formation and attacked in single plane passes, with five
B-25J's of the 500th, 501st and 498th squadrons attacking in that
order. The Group leader, the 499th Squadron, was not observed
hitting the target prior to our attack. All three passes made by
each A/F were to the West.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 913 - Lt Lackey
A/P 165 - Lt Fitton
A/P 210 - Lt Andrews
A/P 594 - F/O Van Scoyk
A/P 193 - Lt Bilyou

c. Results: Bombing as reported by crews was excellent
with all 60 demos dropped in the assigned area. There were no
outstanding cases of individual bombing or strafing. K-21 photos
taken on this mission show bomb dust rising above the tree-covered
hills in the target.

d. Opposition: Light, meager and inaccurate rifle fire
was noted coming from a hill approx. two miles North of the
target. No A/P's were damaged and no personnel were injured.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
A few foxholes and paths were the only enemy signs
observed in the bombed area.

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5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
In the opinion of this Officer there were no individual actions on the mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table:
      TO: 0720/I - 5 B-25Js - from BORAX.
      TOT: 0840/I to 0855/I - 5 B-25Js.
      Land: 1010/I - 5 B-25Js.
   b. Route: Direct to target in Group formation.
   c. Fighter cover: Nil.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. **SHEPHERD**
   Five B-25J's of this Squadron executed an interdiction strike against enemy communications in Western Formosa on the morning of 17 May, 1945. Attack was made at minimum altitude. Twenty-three (23) X 250-pound free-falling demolition bombs were dropped with good results. No rolling stock was seen in the target area so our planes attacked buildings and bridges.
   One of our A/P's is missing over the target and another received two holes.

2. **OBJECTIVES**
   General: Strike was designed to tie up communications in Western Formosa which is the area of most military importance on that island. No other Groups were operating with the 345th in this strike. Secondary targets were butanol plants at Tsuchi and at Lamesa.
   Specific: Our Squadron was divided into two three-plane elements, Kitbag 7 and 8. Both were to hit rolling stock or railroads, bridges, highways and any other communications facilities. Three A/P's of Kitbag 7 were to operate from Western extremity of SHINCHIKU CITY to the Eastern extremity of SHINCHIKU CITY. Kitbag 8's two A/P's were to attack between TONAN and SHINASHI.

3. **ATTACK**
   In view of the fact that two flights operated in separate areas, "ATTACK" will be reported separately for Kitbag 7 and 8, i.e. a, and b, and b 1.
   a. Kitbag 7 made attack alone, approaching target area along the West coast of Formosa, hitting land at Tsuchi and flying 10 miles Southeast to the beginning of target area. Target run was generally in line abreast on a South-westerly heading following the railroad.
   b. Kitbag 8, flying two A/P's abreast, attacked at minimum altitude railroads, highways and towns from coastal town of SHINKO east through KOKKO, Southeast to a second SHINKO TOWN inland, and West of KAGI, thence West and South to the coast at KOKUMO TOWN.

   b.1) Planes and Pilots Participating:
   Kitbag-7
   A/F 193 - Lt Lewis
   A/F 164 - Lt Lackey
   A/F 165 - Lt Pankovich

   a. Results:
   A direct hit was scored on a factory-type building; three other bombs, including a near miss, were dropped on two story buildings in TOWN TOWN, with unobserved results. Three bombs were dropped in KOKO TOWN with unobserved results.

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3. ATTACK (cont'd)
   c. One bomb dumped in TAKHIKI TOWN caused a column of black smoke 1000 feet high. Bombs were dropped at bridges near EOKI and TAIKO towns but with poor results. Both target areas were heavily strafed on the run. No report of damage by 4/44, missing over the target, is available. Six X-21 photos of the strike have been received and show only slight damage. The 8/15 second delay bomb fuse causes the camera to be too far from the bomb burst for good pictures to result.

   d. Opposition and cost:
      Kitbag 7 encountered heavy, moderate, inaccurate A/A from TAEHIN
      Auxiliary A/D near the start of target area. Light, medium, intense and
      inaccurate to accurate from large A/A installation in vicinity of 2452E-12110E.
      Two holes in A/F 165 believed to be from this position which was strafed by
      the same A/F. Heavy, moderate, inaccurate A/A received from KURUKU TOWN South
      of TAIKO A/B. Heavy, moderate and inaccurate received from SHINGHIKI TOWN at
      end of target area; range was good, ammunition short.
      Kitbag 8 reported small arms and machine gun fire, moderate, inaccurate
      from SHINGHIKI TOWN.
      Small arms fire, moderate and inaccurate, also was received from vicinity of
      EAGI TOWN.
      Three BE-772s were sighted at position 2310N-11955E at 1000 feet at
      1000/I. They enemy bombers turned into our A/Fs from 9 o'clock low. One of
      our tail gunners fired two short bursts at 400 yards, after which contact was
      lost.

   A/F 164 is missing. When last seen by other members of the flight, it was flying approximately four miles East of KONO TOWN (2455N-12103E).
   Cause of this A/F's loss is not known, possibly A/A or through crashing into
   tree or ground obstruction. A possible life raft was sighted just off the coast
   here and rescue procedure was initiated. The following personnel comprised
   the crew of this A/F and they are carried as missing in action:

   Lackey, J. T. - 2nd Lt - 0-809969
   Middlebrook, Carl L., Jr. - 2nd Lt - 0-831755
   Anderson, Leslie R. - 2nd Lt - 0-717268
   Shott, John (WNI) - Corporal - 3341756
   Kosak, William J. - Corporal - 13048832

   A/F 165 received two small holes in the after portion of the plane - no serious
   damage.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

   A/F 564 went on single engine shortly after leaving target, not as a
   result of enemy action.

   No sightings of highway or railroad rolling stock were made in target
   area.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS

   In the opinion of this officer, based on facts available at this
   writing, no actions merit awards or citations.

6. STATISTICS

   a. Time table: Takeoff: 0540/I
      Attack : 0910 - 0955/I
      Landed : 1250/I

   b. Route: Direct to Formosa, turning inland when abreast of targets.

   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.
For the Commanding Officer!

JOHN Y. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer.

Appended below is a list of towns and cities in the order they appear in this report, with their geographical coordinates:

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<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
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To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 928.

1. SYNOPSIS
Five of our B-25J's, in morning minimum altitude attacks, bombed and strafed three separate target areas along Formosa's western coast. A total of 50 X 250-pound free falling demo bombs were dropped. Bombing results were excellent with considerable destruction and damage reported to buildings, railroads and rolling stock. A sixth A/P taking off on this mission returned early before reaching the target because of engine trouble.

2. OBJECTIVES
   General: This strike had as its main purpose the interdiction of communication facilities along the west coast of Formosa.
   Specific: Railroads, rolling stock, highways, bridges, butanol plants, and freight or marshalling yards were a few of the specific targets to be bombed and strafed if the opportunity presented itself.

3. ATTACK
   a. Four squadrons of this group participated in the strike. Each six-plane squadron flight was split up into three flights of two planes, each two-plane element being assigned separate targets. Our squadron was composed of three two-plane elements, Kitbag 7, 8 and 9, and proceeded in squadron formation direct to the west coast of Formosa, whereupon each element broke off to the east at the proper point along the coast to hit its assigned target.
   Kitbag 7, composed of one A/P because the wingman was forced to return to base early, edged over Formosa's coast just above TOYOHARA and attacked on a northeasterly heading, continuing inland to KYORITU TOWN and then on a westerly heading back to the coast.
   Kitbag 8, 2 B-25J's, attacked at minimum altitude railroad and highway systems between TAIKO, TONAN, South to KOIHO TOWN, thence Southwest to TOSEKI TOWN, completely covering this central section of Formosa's west coast.
   Kitbag 9, 2 B-25J's, made their low altitude attack South along the main North-South road and railroad between SHINCHIKU and TAIKO on the northwestern coast of Formosa.
   The three flights mentioned above made one pass over their respective targets, then rendezvoused and returned to base.
3. ATTACK
   b. Pilots and Planes Participating:

   Kitbag 7
   A/P 913 - Lt. Sawyer
   A/P 193 - Lt. Beavik

   Kitbag 8
   A/P 694 - Lt. Hill
   A/P 155 - CWO Wagner

   Kitbag 9
   A/P 554 - F/O Van Scoyk
   A/P 149 - Lt. Malquist

   c. Results:

   Lt. Sawyer, flying alone as Kitbag 7, bombèd a railroad tunnel entrance, scoring a direct hit which strangely enough was followed by a blast and column of black smoke rising 200 feet. Other bombs dropped by Lt. Sawyer damaged small buildings scattered along his attack route, and caused probable damage to two large shop-type structures in the cane plant at HYORITZU TOWN, the assigned secondary target for Kitbag 7. Lt. Sawyer failed to hit his assigned primary target because, flying as a lone A/P, he did not feel it wise to jeopardize his crew by exposing the A/P over a long inland target run when enemy fighters were reported flying in that area.

   Lt. Hill, leading Kitbag 8, did excellent work over the target. Particularly outstanding was a direct hit on a railroad bridge near KOIKO TOWN. Another near miss on a railroad bridge South-west of KOIKO TOWN caused damage. Lt. Hill and CWO Wagner bombèd and strafèd buildings along the route, scoring hits and causing moderate damage.

   F/O Van Scoyk and Lt. Malquist, as Kitbag 9, strafèd and bombèd buildings in HYORITZU TOWN and a great deal of debris flew into the air as a result of at least two direct hits. Later during their Southward run, both pilots bombèd a long, ten-span, concrete combination railroad, highway bridge and, although crews claim direct hits, photo taken of this attack reveal no heavy damage, and shows one bomb falling late and well over the bridge.

   K-21 photos of other attacks reveal little of any apparent military importance. A large mill is shown under attack but is somewhat obliterated by heavy black smoke.

   d. Opposition and Cost:

   A/P 694 was the only A/P holed or damaged by enemy A/A, which was surprisingly meager considering the extent of the area covered by all attacks. Heavy, moderate and very inaccurate emanated from SHINCHIKU TOWN area and light, meager, inaccurate A/A was reported from positions near a railroad bridge about six miles South of the latter town. From KOBI TOWN vicinity, two A/P's drew light, meager and inaccurate fire which seemed to be coming from positions near the base of buildings of small barrios. No personnel were injured on this mission. Although no interception occurred, numerous sightings of airborne enemy A/P's in the vicinity of ROMKO on the West-Central Formosa coast were reported. A total of six enemy planes were seen, five of them being SAP's, probably TOJO'S, and the sixth a lone BETTY bomber.

   -2-
Appendix A

Appended below is a list of towns and cities in the order they appear in this report, with their geographical coordinates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOYOHARA</td>
<td>2415N-12039E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BYORITZU</td>
<td>2421N-12036E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIKO</td>
<td>2421N-12036E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONAN</td>
<td>2541N-12029E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOIKO</td>
<td>2335N-12022E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOSEKI</td>
<td>2328N-12006E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHINCHIKU</td>
<td>2448N-12057E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOBII</td>
<td>2343N-12024E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKKO</td>
<td>2404N-12025E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
These missions are enjoyed by all concerned and crews reflect enthusiasm at briefing and interrogation. Very few military trucks or convoys have been seen by crews of this squadron on Formosan interdiction raids.

5. In the opinion of this officer, based on available information, there are no individual actions which would seem to justify an award.

6. STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time table:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landed:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turned back at 0730/I - 1 A/P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landed:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kitbag 7

| Takeoff: 0635/I - 1 A/P |
| Attack: 0955/I to 1020/I - 1 A/P |
| Landed: 1410/I - 1 A/P |

Kitbag 8

| Takeoff: 0610/I - 2 A/P's |
| Attack: 0855/I to 0945/I - 2 A/P's |
| Landed: 1240/I - 2 A/P's |

Kitbag 9

| Takeoff: 0650/I - 2 A/P's |
| Attack: 0955/I to 1018/I - 2 A/P's |
| Landed: 1355/I - 2 A/P's |

b. Route: Direct to target area in Squadron formation.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
Capt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

See Appendix III
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

JPD/rpb

21 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 139-A-9, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 19 May 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Lines of communication and targets of opportunity in
   Western FORMOSA between 2418N-12052E and KOZONHO (2446N-12054E)
   were hit by five B-25J's of this Squadron in a mid-morning mini-
   mum altitude attack. Thirty X 250 lb deoms caused considerable
   damage to rolling stock rails and buildings enroute.

2. OBJECTIVE
   a. General: This strike was designed to be part of a
      program to neutralize the important chain of communication in
      Western FORMOSA. No other groups were operating with the 345th
      on this mission.
   b. Specific: Our targets were rolling stock, important
      sections of track or highways - excluding bridges - and any good
      targets of opportunity with emphasis on Butanol plants.

3. ATTACK
   a. Formation - approach: Our five B-25's were assigned
      the particular area designated in paragraph 1. They approached
      the target area from the sea and flew a southerly heading along
      the rail lines in line astern formation.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 554 - Lt Faukovich
      A/P 594 - Lt Lentz
      A/P 155 - Lt Parker
      A/P 193 - Lt Fitton
      A/P 149 - Lt Bennett
      A/P 210 - Lt Montgomery
   c. Results: Lt Montgomery in A/P 210 returned to base
      before reaching target due to engine trouble. At KAU-MONG-KUAN
      (2444N-12054E) a 200 ft long stone building was hit causing much
      smoke. Thirty to forty boxcars were heavily bombed and strafed
      at CHIKUNAN (2441N-12052E) resulting in flying debris and an ex-
      plosion with flame to 150 ft. Thirty more RR cars, including
      some oil and flat cars, at HOKUSEI (2436N-12049E) were heavily
      strafed with unobserved results. Bombs severed a RR track at
      SANSHA (2426N-12046E) and also damaged several two story build-
      ings in the town; a track a mile above here was also severed.
      Bombs in the RR junction at TAIKO TOWN (2420N-12035E) twisted
      and broke tracks and caused explosions in RR buildings. Twenty to
      twenty-five boxcars were in the area but our A/P's were not able
      to attack them due to lack of ammo. All A/Ps strafed throughout
      the target area hitting a signal tower, buildings, haystacks,
      etc with unobserved results. K-21 photos received fail to show
      much damage because of poor composition.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
d. Opposition: Heavy, moderate and accurate fire from positions near GOSEI (2415N-12032E) holed and shook one A/P which was flying at 1000 ft, three miles off coast. Heavy, meager and inaccurate (1300 ft above and 150 ft from right wing) from position near KORYU (2436N-12046E). Light, meager and inaccurate ground fire from BYORITSU (2433N-12049E); Light, meager, accurate from HOKUSEI holed one A/P. Minor damage to horizontal stabilizer of one A/P occurred when it hit tree top over target. The two A/P's holed by A/A received only minor damage. Nil personnel injured.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
One A/P turned back shortly after takeoff due to engine trouble.

5. AWARDS
In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0720/I from BORAX. TOT: 5 A/P's at 1035-1045/I at 50/200 ft Landing: 1 A/P at 1035/I. 5 A/P's at 1450/I.

b. Route: Direct to FORMOSA; up West coast, turning east at target area.

c. Nil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
2nd Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

PAH/rpb

21 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission PFC 140-C-1X, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 20 May 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Six of our B-25J's, in a morning minimum altitude bomb-
ing-strafing attack, hit the airfield at CARIT NORTE at 1639H-
1213R in the lower CAGAYAN VALLEY, LUZON. Bombs also fell in
IPIL TOWN (1642H-1214R) and ECHAGUE TOWN (1643H-1214R) start-
ing small fires in shacks at both towns. The bombing at CARIT
NORTE airdrome covered the dispersal area at the northeast end
of the runway firing small shacks and starting minor grass fires.
A total of 396 X 23 pound parafraggs were dropped and 14,500 rounds
of .50 calibres were expended in strafing the target.

2. OBJECTIVE

a. General: Recent sightings at CARIT NORTE revealed
increasing enemy activity. This strike was planned in order to
neutralize the enemies efforts in this area.

b. Specific: Specific targets to be hit were revet-
ments in the northeast dispersal loop in addition to shacks in
the immediate area which might be concealing stores and equip-
ment.

3. ATTACK

a. Formation-approach: Four squadrons of this Group
participated on the mission. Attacking single A/P's in trail,
our six B-25J's bombed and strafed on a total of three passes on
headings generally to the south. After the attack our planes
rendezvoused southwest of the target and returned direct to base.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/P 149 - Lt Waring
A/P 554 - Lt Andrews
A/P 666 - Lt McLain
A/P 658 - Lt Montgomery
A/P 594 - Lt Lents
A/P 165-Lt Seawick

c. Results: Bombing was excellent with good coverage
reported by all crews. No specific instances of outstanding in-
dividual action was noted. All pilots strafed the targets thor-
oughly with unobserved results. K-21 photos reveal many shacks
being consumed by fire and parafraggs are visible as they drift
down over the dispersal area and empty revetments at CARIT NORTE.

d. Opposition and cost: Light, meager, accurate A/A
came from hidden positions in a shack near the south side of the
northeast end of the runway at CARIT NORTE. Light, meager, in-
accurate fire came from positions along the west bank of the CA-
GAYAN RIVER due east of the CARIT NORTE runway. A/P 554 received
a hole in the right wing but damage was minor and no personnel
were injured.

- 1 -
4. COMMENTS OF I.O.

This target seemed to lack many signs of the moderate ground activity reported. The A/D appeared overgrown and deserted. Three A/F's reported serviceable on the drone were definitely unserviceable and probably destroyed by previous bombing. The presence of 30/35 oil drums in a revetment near the strip at CARIT WORTE is rather interesting, however.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable:
   Takeoff: 6 A/F's at 1015/I from BORAX.
   TOT: 6 A/F's at 1055-1125/I at 100 ft.
   Landing: 6 A/F's at 1240/I at BORAX.

b. Route: Direct.

c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
Capt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

23 May 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Six of our B-25J's hit GONZAGA TOWN, 1816N-12159E, North-east tip of LUZON in a late morning attack dropping 360 x 23-pound parafrags from minimum altitude with excellent results, as fires raged throughout the target area.

2. OBJECTIVE
   General: This was a neutralizing strike against 500 to 600 Japanese troops occupying GONZAGA. Only two squadrons were on this strike but there was evidence of activity by other groups in this part of LUZON.
   Specific: Any installations in the target area, especially billeting and storage facilities, were targets.

3. ATTACK
   a. The 500th was second over the target following the 499th. Approach to the target was from the south and the two flights of three planes abreast made their runs on north headings.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 149 - Maj Bazzel
      A/P 153 - Lt Parker
      A/P 558 - Lt Fitton
      A/P 554 - Lt Bennett
      A/P 666 - Lt Geyer
      A/P 165 - Lt Malquist
   c. Results: Two bombing and strafing passes resulted in fires throughout the entire town with nine or ten columns of smoke. Most of the buildings were of straw and bamboo; no personnel or vehicles were seen.
   d. Opposition and coat: A/A was light, meager and accurate from position on the west edge of GONZAGA, and two flashes were seen from the area just north of town. Two A/P's were holed with minor damage.

   Halfway between the target and the coast, a possible mine exploded in front of one plane (possibly detonated by strafing) in a dust colored burst with what appeared to be wood fragments. A/P was shaken but no damage resulted. Burst occurred 15 to 20 feet above the ground in front of and level with our A/P, which was forced to climb to 300/400 feet to clear top of it.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   Nil
5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   In the opinion of this Officer, based on available facts, there were no individual actions which would seem to merit awards.

6. STATISTICS
      Attack: 1115/I to 1117/I - 6 B-25J’s.
      Landing: 1250/I - 6 B-25J’s.

   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass’t Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

24 May 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Six "Rough Raider" planes of the Air Apaches Group participated in the first medium altitude mission flown by the Group in almost a year as they dropped 36 x 260 pound frags on elements of the Jap 10th Division just above BALATE PASS in North-Central LUZON at 1610N-12056E. Results of this late morning attack were unobserved but ground control appeared to be satisfied.

2. OBJECTIVE
   General: This strike, which was coordinated with the 38th and 312th Bomb Groups, was designed as part of a program to neutralize enemy ground forces holding the area attacked.
   Specific: This attack was largely pattern bombing as our A/P's were without bombsights, and bombed on a 38th Group plane equipped for medium altitude bombing. Thus, targets were any object of military value including troops, gun installations and supply dumps.

3. ATTACK
   a. Our A/P's were the second squadron over the target, following the 499th which in turn was led by the sight-equipped 38th Group plane. The run was made in tight three plane elements, line abreast, with the 501st and 498th following us in that order.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 658 - Lt Waring
      A/P 588 - Lt Fitton
      A/P 666 - Lt Bennett
      A/P 149 - Lt Van Scoyck
      A/P 594 - Lt Mclain
      A/P 169 - Lt Montgomery
   c. Results were practically unobserved due to the 5-6/10 cloud cover below the formation. Ground control, however, seemed satisfied with the results and the same type mission was scheduled for the following day. Bombs were dropped slightly west of SANTA FE TOWN at 1610N-12056E. K-21 photos show the area partially obscured by clouds and with no considerable bomb impacts.
   d. Opposition and cost: There was no opposition offered to this strike and no personnel were injured or A/P's damaged.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   NIL

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

- 1 -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0910/I from BORAX.
      Rendezvous: At 1000/I, 1000 ft over HONEY
      STRIP, LINGAYEN.
      TOT: 6 A/P's at 1050-1051/I at 9000 ft.
      Landing: 6 A/P's at 1130/I at BORAX.
   b. Route: Base to LINGAYEN to target to base.
   c. Mil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell. Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

25 May, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FPO 144-A-3, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 24 May 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six 500th planes dropped 36 X 250 lb fragmentation
bombs on Jap held FUSINA TOWN (1814N-12143E) in Northern LUZON
in a late morning medium altitude attack. Results were unob-
erved. The primary target - enemy troops in the vicinity of
SANTA FE (16100N-12057E) - was not hit because of low hanging
clouds.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: This strike was designed to destroy Japanese
troops and material and also to demoralize enemy personnel in
areas before US advances. The strike was not coordinated with
other groups except that the 345th bombed on a 38th Group air-
plane.

Specific: Attack was made on the secondary target,
enemy forces in FUSINA, near the CAGAYAN RIVER and the north
coast of LUZON. The primary attack near SANTA FE was to have
been directed against enemy forces above newly captured BALATE
PASS.

3. ATTACK
a. The 500th, following a bomb sight equipped plane
of the 38th Group, led the Air Apaches over the target with the
rest of the Group aligned as follows: 501, 498 and 499. Approach
to the target was from the southwest and the bombing run was
made on a heading of 320°. The formation over the target was
two tight formations of three planes abreast with flights in
trail.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/F 149 - Lt Pavlovich
A/F 666 - Lt Bennett
A/F 558 - Lt Montgomery
A/F 165 - Lt Lentz
A/F 268 - Lt Beswick
A/F 554 - Lt Geyer

c. Results: A/F's rendezvoused with the 38th Group
B-25 over HONEY STRIP, LINGAYEN but finding they could not hit
the primary because of weather, proceeded to the secondary
where the bombs were dropped in the town and just northwest of
it with unobserved results on one run from 8000 feet. K-21
photos taken reveal nothing of military importance.
d. There was no enemy opposition and no injury to per-
sonnel or damage to A/F's.

- 1 -
PPA 144-A-3 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
   Nil

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: At 0920/I from BORAX.
      Rendezvous: At 1005/I over HONEY STRIP.
      TOT: At 1130/I at 8000 feet.
      Landing: At 1250/I at BORAX.
   b. Route: BORAX - LINGAYEN - SANTA FE - FUSINA - BORAX.
   c. Nil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FFO 146-A-10, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 26 May 1945.

To : Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Five of our A/P's dropped 20 X 500 pound parasemos on
the marshalling yards at CHIKUNAN, FORMOSA in a late morning
minimum altitude strike. Results were largely unobserved with
a few direct hits seen on buildings and installations. All of
our Mitchells and personnel returned safely.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: This strike was part of the program to neu-
tralize Formosan lines of communications.
Our specific target was marshalling yards, CHIKUNAN at
2443N-12053E. Rolling stock in the yards was to be a choice
target with yard installations also extremely eligible for
attack.

3. ATTACK
A. The 500th made this attack alone with its five
B-25J's approaching the target on an easterly heading swinging
around to make the single ship passes on headings varying from
280° to 360°, and then proceeding to the coast.
b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 554 - Col Doolittle          A/P 142 - Lt Lentz
   A/P 913 - Lt Parker             A/P 588 - Lt McInern
   A/P 169 - Lt Montgomery         A/P 594 - Lt Fitton
   Lt Fitton in A/P 594 returned to base before reaching tar-
get due to failure of forward guns to fire.
c. Results: Lt Col Doolittle, Deputy Group Commander,
led our Squadron on this mission. Sightings by the lead plane
indicated there were 30/40 railroad cars of mixed types and one
locomotive in the yards. After Col Doolittle had attacked,
dust and smoke obscured the vision of crews following and most
of their bombs were dropped in the yards area, but at no spe-
cific target. Direct hits were scored on the yards, buildings
on the west edge of the yards and on a large iron trestle-like
affair perpendicular to and over the tracks in the central part
of the yards. A medium A/A position just south of the yards
was silenced by strafing. Much smoke and dust rose from the
target as our planes withdrew. Mission photos of the strike
reveal little of military value.
Narrative FFO 146-D-10 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

d. Opposition and cost: A/A was light, medium, meagre and inaccurate from CHIKUNAN TOWN. There was no fighter opposition and no damage to A/P's or injury to personnel.

4. COMMENT ON I.O.
Propaganda leaflets were dropped.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission warranting awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 6 A/P's at 0735/I from BORAX.
   Attack: 5 A/P's at 1119-1120/I at 75 to 200 feet.
   Landing: 1 A/P at 1020/I; 5 A/P's at 1520/I.

b. Route: Direct.
c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell. Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   A sugar alcohol plant just southeast of KOBI TOWN was the target for six of our Mitchells in a morning minimum altitude attack in which 24 x 500 pound demos were dropped in warehouse and production buildings with excellent results.

2. OBJECTIVE
   General: This strike was part of a program to destroy enemy manufacturing facilities in FORMOSA.
   Specific: The 500th's target was the south half of a sugar alcohol plant area which was divided by a series of railroad tracks at KOBI TOWN (2342N-12025E). There were two warehouse areas and a production and storage tank area.

3. ATTACK
   a. Our A/P's followed the 499th which attacked the upper half of the plant area. Approach was from the northeast to make a target run of two flights of three A/Ps on a heading of 250 degrees.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 913 - Capt Canning
      A/P 165 - Lt McLain
      A/P 193 - Lt Fitton
      A/P 169 - Lt Van Scoyk
      A/P 266 - Lt Bennett
      A/P 594 - Lt Andrews
   c. Results: Capt Canning, Squadron Commanding Officer, led the 500th in an excellent run over the target. Bombs were dropped among the east group warehouses, including two hits on a building with two tall stacks, and in the production buildings. Hits were also reported among RR tracks in the target area and on a group of buildings just south of the plant along the river bank. Explosions and raging fires were observed as A/P's withdrew from the target. Target area, including some flat cars, was strafed and strafing continued as A/P's headed off to sea away from the target. K-21 strike photos give good views of the target but show few bomb bursts due possibly to the 8/15 second delay fuse.
   d. Opposition: Light, meagre and accurate A/A came from KOBI TOWN and small arms and machine gun fire, intense and accurate from positions near 2338N-12025E in a woody area in vicinity of downed 345th Group plane. There was no contact with enemy fighters and no injury to personnel or damage to A/P's on this mission.

- 1 -
FFO 147-A-4 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

4. **COMMENTS OF THE I.O.**
   At approximately 1032/I from minimum altitude crews saw a 345th Group A/P which had apparently crash landed a few moments earlier and was starting to burn. It has been tentatively identified as a 501st plane; possibility of survivors is uncertain since, while A/P was not badly damaged, hatch covers were reported closed.

5. **AWARDS**
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual awards warranted on this mission.

6. **STATISTICS**
   a. **Timetable:** Takeoff: At 0645/I from BORAX.
      Attack: 1010/I to 1020/I at 50/200 ft.
      Landing: At 1510/I at BORAX.
   
   b. **Route:** BORAX - FORMOSA coast opposite KOBI - inland to KOBI - to approximately 2245N-12001 - direct to BORAX.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
SINKO SUGAR REFINERY near CHURYO, FORMOSA (2407N-12034E) was the target for six of our A/P's which dropped 36 250 pound general purpose bombs in a morning minimum altitude attack. Results were good and only slight damage was inflicted on our planes from light A/A and also from flying debris hitting a wing.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: Purpose of this strike was to destroy Butanol production facilities in FORMOSA.
Specific: Our target was the SINKO SUGAR REFINERY near CHURYO.

3. ATTACK
a. The 500th attacked this target alone; our B-25J's hit the FORMOSA coast at approximately 2409N-12027E, flew inland a few miles beyond and south of the target making a 180° turn to the left and then swept through the target on a heading of 280°. The attack was made in two flights of three planes line abreast, with the flights in trail.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 149 - Major Bazzel
   A/P 554 - Lt Montgomery
   A/P 165 - Lt Geyer
   A/P 169 - Lt Van Scooyk
   A/P 266 - CWO Wagner
   A/P 588 - Lt Parker

   c. Results: Bombs fell on warehouses and storage tanks and a large factory building with two stacks was reported to have exploded from direct hits. Blue explosions were seen in the target area, and as the planes withdrew fires and explosions could still be seen. It is believed that production in this plant is stopped for a considerable period and that 40-50% of the area is destroyed. The target was thoroughly strafed, silencing A/A positions in buildings and strafing was continued against other buildings on the breakaway to the coast with unobserved results. Mission photos show much destruction in the north part of the target with the long delay fuze possibly accounting for less evidence of destruction in south area.

d. Light, moderate, inaccurate to accurate A/A was received from buildings in the target and from just east of W081 (2407N-12030E). Two planes were holed, one by A/A and one from pieces of roofing tile, resulting in minor damage to both. No enemy planes were seen and no personnel injured.
4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
   This strike met considerably less A/A than expected
   from nearby danger areas (SHOKA, 2405N-12032E and a bridge two
   miles east of CHURYO).
   Photos show an estimated 250 small flat cars in the
   target area, probably used to haul sugar cane to plant.
   Propaganda leaflets were dropped.

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual
   actions which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0645/I from BORAX.
      Attack: 1009/I to 1010/I at 50/200 ft.
      Landing: 1345/I at BORAX.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN P. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell. Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

JFD/rpb

30 May, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six 500th A/P's led the Air Apaches in a well executed morning minimum altitude attack against an enemy troop concentration near MAGAPIT, LUZON (1807N-12141E). Thirty six 250 pound parademos were dropped with largely unobserved results. There was no damage or injury to 500th A/P's or personnel.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: Purpose of this strike was to destroy enemy troops in Northern LUZON as a preparation for American ground forces advances.
Specific: Our target was a designated wooded area identified by nearby terrain features in which an estimated 2000 Nips and their supplies and a few vehicles were reported. The area bordered closely on the CAGAYAN RIVER.

3. ATTACK
a. Our B-25J's led the Group with the squadrons aligned as follows; 500, 501, 498 and 499. Approach was from the northwest and the run was made on a southeast heading. Formation was two flights in trail with three planes line abreast in each flight. Two passes were made on the target.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 149 - Capt Schmidt
   A/P 913 - Lt Payton
   A/P 210 - Lt McElroy
   A/P 594 - Lt Andrews
   A/P 165 - Lt Montgomery
   A/P 193 - Lt Bennett

c. Results: Capt Schmidt led the Group over the target and crews reported very good coverage by bombing and strafing, but foliage obscured observation of results except in clearings where grass fires and a few burning shacks could be seen. K-21 strike photos verify these observations.

d. There was no apparent enemy opposition to this attack.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Crews reported seeing a huge column of flame followed by black smoke on the crest of a hill at the north edge of the target; this is presumed to have resulted from the crash of an A/P from another squadron.

- 1 -
Narrative, FPO 149-A-6VP314 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

5. AWARDS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 1010/I from BORAX.
      Attack: 1125-1135/I at 50/150 feet.
      Landing: 1300/I at BORAX.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Nil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

31 May, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Four of our A/P's in a late morning minimum altitude attack hit ammo revetments on the south edge of TAINAN (KINANSHO) airfield (approx 2257N-12012E), Western FORMOSA and a sugar and alcohol mill with warehouses and personnel facilities, 7,000 feet east of the revetment area. Results of bombing in the sugar plant were unobserved and an unknown number of an estimated 50 revetments were blown up. Two A/P's were damaged, one requiring major repairs, the other received minor holes, and one radio gunner was killed. The primary target, SHINEI marshalling yards and town (2518N-12018E) was not hit due to pilot and navigational error by lead squadron.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: Primary target strike was to be largely a harassing mission with destruction value secondary. The 38th Group was to hit the primary one minute after our attack.
Specific: The actual target was a sugar plant and the ammo revetments. Sugar plants have a high priority as FORMOSAN targets and the bomb dump is of obvious value although such targets have not recently been assigned to this unit.

3. ATTACK
a. Our A/P's were on the right side of the twelve A/P abreast formation; the 498th was on the extreme left and leading with the 499th in the center of the formation. Approach to the target was from the east and the target run was at 270 degrees.
b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/P 554 - Lt Waring
   A/P 266 - Lt Paukovich
   A/P 588 - Lt Parker
   A/P 169 - Lt Mcclain
c. Results: Results of bombs in the sugar mill, the first target attacked, were unobserved; and an unknown number of revetments were blown up. Strike photos show several explosions near the sugar mill. An estimated six gun medium A/A position in the mill area was silenced by strafing.
d. Opposition and cost: Intense and accurate fire was received from the six gun medium position in the sugar mill area. A 20mm burst that killed the radio operator on A/P 588 probably came from this area.

-1-
Light, slight and inaccurate fire was noted as our planes left the coast near 2256N-12010E.

Just off the coast at TAINAN a probable Zeke, silver color, made an "uneager" pass at our planes. The enemy A/P burst out of a cloud from 7 o'clock and peeled off at 10 o'clock when our gunners opened fire from 1000 yards. It could not be definitely determined if interceptor fired during pass or if flashes came from reflections on silver wings. The Zeke was seen occasionally through breaks in the clouds for a short time thereafter, but it did not attempt another pass.

One of our A/P's (588) received a 20mm burst in the tail causing such severe damage that a new tail assembly must be installed. The radio gunner, S/Sgt WILLIAM G. HUDAK, ASN 35053959, on this A/P was killed by the explosion and resulting shock.

4. Nil comments of I.O.

5. In the opinion of this officer at the time of writing this report there were no actions warranting an award.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: At 0850/T from BORAX.
      Rendezvous: With 38th Group at 2000 feet over GOATEE strip.
      Attack: 1147/T to 1155/T at 50/100 ft.
      Landing: At 1515/T at BORAX.

   b. Route: BORAX to FORMOSA COAST at 2220N-12040E to opposite TAINAN, turning west to target and out to sea after strike, then south to return direct to BORAX.

   c. Nil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intell. Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYMOPSIS
Six of our planes in a morning minimum altitude attack bombed and strafed on a single pass, GIRAN TOWN in Northeastern FORMOSA. Bombing and strafing coverage was excellent with a total of 70 x 100 pound dems dropped in the town area starting small fires throughout the city. A large tower in the south central sector of town was destroyed and six radio masts in the southeast part of town were damaged. Two of our A/P's were holed by ack ack but damage was minor and no personnel were injured.

2. OBJECTIVE
The general purpose of this strike was to thoroughly cover GIRAN TOWN with bombs and .50 calibres and to terrorize the native population. Propaganda leaflets were to be dropped during the attack.

Specifically, GIRAN targets included a brick plant, an unidentified industry, railroad yards, business district and navigational aid station.

3. ATTACK
a. Six of our B-25J's led six planes of the 501st along the east coast of FORMOSA to a point north of GIRAN. Here squadrons spaced and formed into line abreast formation as they turned in over the coast and started their run on a southeasterly heading. Our squadron was first over the target in the Group although the 36th Group had hit it earlier in the morning.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/P</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lt Andrews-Lt Van Scoyk-Lt Sawyer-Col Owens Lt Bennett-Lt Ceyer

c. Results: Lt Andrews' flight path on the extreme left of the formation, carried him across the northern edge of GIRAN where fires were started in the brick plant which he bombed. In the unidentified industry at the northeast edge of town his bombing and strafing caused large explosions with medium sized fires. Col Owens, of V Bomber Command flying with our Squadron, destroyed a large tower in the south central part of town and thoroughly strafed the railroad yards. Lt Van Scoyk bombed six radio masts at the east side of town scoring near misses on two of them. Lt Sawyer did an excellent job of leading the squadron and all pilots reported excellent coverage of
both bombing and strafing as is confirmed by K-21 photos of the attack. Some rolling stock, loaded for the most part with logs, is visible in the railroad yards. Bomb explosions are visible reflecting excellent coverage of the town area. Propaganda leaflets were dropped just north of GIRAN.

d. Opposition and cost: Although A/A opposition was only moderate in intensity and holed two A/P's causing minor damage, pilots reported that the overall control of fire was very good. In most instances medium bursts tracked our planes on level but were a little too short to be effective. Medium, moderate, accurate to generally inaccurate emanated from a known position, erroneously reported as light, 4300 feet west-southwest of GIRAN near the airdrome and from another position in the same vicinity. Machine gun fire, meager and accurate to generally inaccurate was encountered over the brick plant as well as over the unidentified industry. Light, moderate and inaccurate A/A was encountered five miles northwest of GIRAN when our planes were on their approach run while a four gun M/G position 3600 feet east of the center of GIRAN was firing inaccurately. A/P 913 and A/P 193 were holed but damage was minor and nil personnel were injured. There was no interception or sighting of enemy aircraft.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.

Because of the early activity at all gun pits, pilots believed that the element of surprise achieved was practically nil. It is the opinion of this officer that the 345th's attack followed too closely that of the 38th Group. Of course radar warning cannot be overlooked.

5. AWARDS

In the opinion of this officer there are no individual actions which would seem to justify awards.

6. STATISTICS

a. Timetable: Takeoff: At 0705/I from BORAX. TCT: 1046-1050/I at 50/100 feet. Landing: 1425/I at BORAX.

b. Route: BORAX - CAGAYAN VALLEY - East coast FORMOSA - GIRAN - LINGAYEN - BORAX.

c. Nil fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
Capt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74
JFD/jwd
4 June, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS

Mix of our B-25's attacked IPIL (1642N-12156E) in North Luzon in the morning of 2 June, dropping 396 x 25-pound para-
frags from minimum altitude. Results of the attack on this small town, which had previously been attacked, were reported as inconsiderable because of sheer lack of worthy targets.

There was no damage or injury to our planes or personnel on this strike.

2. OBJECTIVES

General: This strike was designed as part of a program to hinder movements of groups of 200/300 Japs from the upper parts of LUZON to the active front closer to the SANTA FE area, newly taken by our troops.

Specific: IPIL, the target town, is situated on the junction of two good roads which would be natural routes for enemy forces.

3. ATTACK

a. This squadron's planes attacked this target alone, flying two flights of three planes abreast with flights in trail. Approach was from the South; the two passes were made on a Southeasterly heading.

b. Planes and Pilots Participating:

A/P 913 - Maj. Bassel
A/P 913 - Lt Geyer
A/P 165 - Lt McLain
A/P 165 - Lt Malquist
A/P 149 - Lt Andrews
A/P 394 - Lt Bennett

c. Results:

Bomb craters were dropped throughout the target and the entire area was thoroughly strafed. At least five small fires were started from burning shacks. Crews felt target was hardly worth putting one squadron over because of its small size and the fact that it had been previously burned. No photos of value were received.

There was no enemy opposition and no personnel were injured or plane damaged.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.

MIL

-1-
5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   No individual awards are recommended on the basis of available facts at this time.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time Table:  
      Takeoff - 0830/I  
      Attack - 0920/I to 0925/I  
      Landed - 1015/I
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover - Nil scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Asst Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

13 June, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 926.

1. SYNOPSIS

Nine of our airplanes completed a morning low level attack on enemy-held areas along Highway 5 in the CAGAYAN river sector of Northern LUZON. 520 X 23 lb parafraggs were dropped with unobserved results. Damage to our squadron by enemy defenses was one hole in one A/P. The primary target, a similar area a few miles South, was not attacked on the decision of the Group leader.

2. OBJECTIVES

General: This was a harassing strike as enemy forces or installations likely to be encountered would be apt to be small and dispersed and their destruction would mean the loss of only a relatively small part of the enemy's scattered but numerous forces.

Specific: Primary target was a heavy enemy concentration and supplies at 1733N-12147E. Secondary targets of opportunity along highway 5 from ALCALA (1754-12139E) to APARRI. Attack was made in this latter area on shacks and houses along both sides of Highway 5, between and including MASSIPING (1750N-12137E), and GATTARAN TOWN (1803N-12133E). Area from MASSIPING North along Highway 5 to and including APARRI area East of town, was strafed.

3. ATTACK

a. Our B-25J's were leading the Group whose squadrons were aligned as follows: 500th, 501st, 498th, and 499th. Approach to target was from the South. Formation circled once to the right, over target area and made a single pass in two-plane elements on a North Northeast heading.

b. Pilots and Plane Participating:

A/P 913 - Capt Hall  A/P 149 - Lt Van Sooy
A/P 658 - Lt Payton  A/P 165 - Lt Malquist
A/P 366 - Lt Montgomery  A/P 210 - Lt Bennett
A/P 564 - Lt Geyer  A/P 266 - Lt Bassick
A/P 666 - Lt Parker  A/P 288 - Lt Van Sooy

Results: Unobserved. Grass shacks and houses were seen on the pass but results were not observed. The two strike photos received are equally un-revealing but show accurate bombing on likely shacks and tree clusters along the highway.

CONFIDENTIAL
3. **ATTACK (cont'd.)**  
d. Opposition and Cost: Meager, M/G fire, accurate to mostly inaccurate from GATTARAN and meager M/G fire, inaccurate, from SOLANA at 1739N-12141E. One A/P received one hole resulting in minor damage. There was no interception and no personnel injuries.

4. **COMMENTS OF THE I.C.**  
**MIL.**

5. **AWARDS AND CITATIONS**  
**MIL recommendations.**

6. **STATISTICS**  
a. Timetable:  
   - Takeoff: 0745/I  
   - Attack: 0910/I to 0916/I  
   - Landed: 1120/I  

b. Route: Direct except to avoid BALETE PASS area due to artillery fire.

c. Fighter cover: MIL scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. DINGES  
1st Lt, Air Corps  
Ass't. Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

17 June 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Five of our planes bombed and strafed enemy troop and supply concentrations in the vicinity of MASIN, North LUZON, in a morning minimum altitude attack. Sixty X 100 pound demos were dropped starting fires and destroying a few shacks in the target. None of our personnel were injured nor were any of our planes damaged on this strike.

2. OBJECTIVE
General: This strike was designed to harass enemy movements inspired by American advances up the CAGAYAN VALLEY.
Specific: Our particular target was a troop and supply concentration just east of MASIN (1755N,12140E).

3. ATTACK
a. Each squadron in the Group was assigned a different target in this area (near ALCALA on North bank of PARET RIVER) and squadrons took off at 15 minute intervals, making individual squadron attacks. Our B-25J's approached from the south, circled once to contact the ground control and then made their three single ship runs on the target on a northerly heading.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
   A/F 169 - Lt Van Scoyk
   A/F 165 - Lt Payton
   A/F 210 - Lt Montgomery
   A/F 210 piloted by Lt Montgomery blew a tire just as the takeoff run was started and he brought the A/F to a stop without further damage, leaving only five planes to complete the mission.

c. Results: On each pass the Squadron tried to cover a fresh part of the target area. Crews reported at least six small grass fires and destruction of three native dwellings. A/F's strafed on all passes with excellent coverage but unobserved results. K-21 photos reveal no further details.

d. Opposition and cost: Our planes encountered a meager amount of inaccurate ground fire from bushes in the target. There was no interception and no damage to planes or injuries to personnel.
Narrative, FFG 167-A-6 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
   NIL

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0830/I from BORAX.
      Attack: 0942-1012/I at 50/200 feet.
      Landing: 1140/I.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. NIL fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

   JOHN F. DINGES
   1st Lt, Air Corps
   Ass't Intelligence Officer
Subject: Narrative Report on Mission FF0 166-A-8, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 15 June 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Four of our planes completed a morning low-level
bombing-strafing attack on OKA TOWN and OKASEKI A/D in Northern
FORMOSA on 15 June. A total of 216 X 23 pound parafrags were
dropped destroying four single story buildings at OKA and ex-
ploding in the revetment areas at the A/D with unobserved re-
results. One of our A/P's crashed and exploded near OKASEKI A/D
with nil survivors.

2. OBJECTIVES
The general purpose of this mission was to cover OKA-
SEKI drome with parafrags and .50 calibres and to hit targets
of opportunity.

A total of twelve serviceable aircraft were reported
being present at the drome, well dispersed and hidden in near-
by woods and villages. These were our specific targets.

3. ATTACK
a. Our four B-25J's, following the 501st, 498th and
499th Squadrons over the target, approached OKA TOWN from the
Northwest, then swinging to a southwesterly heading attacked
the town and later the airdrome area in four planes abreast
formation on a single pass. After the attack our planes with-
drew due west from the A/D to the coast, thereupon turning
south and proceeding to base.

b. Pilots and planes participating:

A/P 913 - Lt Van Scooyk
A/P 266 - Lt Montgomery
A/P 149 - Lt Geyer
A/P 169 - Lt Andrews
A/P 594 - Lt Beswick
A/P 165 - Lt Bennett

Lt Andrews and Lt Bennett returned to base shortly after
takeoff, one because of mechanical trouble, the other to escort.

c. Results: Bombing coverage of OKASEKI A/D was good
but results were generally unobserved. At OKA bombs destroyed
four one story dwellings. Strafing coverage of OKA and OKASEKI
A/D was thorough and three A/P's strafed roads, woods, towns
and scattered huts enroute to the west coast on the withdrawal.
K-21 photos indicate parafrags falling along the road and cliff
just south of OKASEKI A/D. No damage can be ascertained since
the bombs are still airborne in the pictures.

d. Q position and coast: Enemy anti-aircraft defense
was meager. Sightings of large explosions on the ground

- 1 -
shooting dirt and dark smoke as high as 75 feet in the air, indicates the possible presence of mines throughout OKASEKI A/D area and at 2459N-12126E.

One burst of inaccurate medium and one burst of accurate heavy fire came from positions in or near TAIRN (2503N-12114E), with heavy, moderate and accurate A/A originating from positions at 2500N-12126E.

Around OKASEKI A/D, light, moderate and inaccurate A/A was encountered as well as from positions between the A/D and the west coast of FORMOSA. M/G fire was encountered from the cliffs south of the drome and from YOBAI (2455N-12109E), but it was meager and inaccurate.

A/P 266 received one hole - minor damage.

A/P 149, piloted by flight leader Lt Geyer, crashed and exploded in a rice paddy at 1123/I, approximately one mile southwest of OKASEKI drome at 2455N-12117E. Cause of the crash isn’t definite although pilot was flying near the drome at forty feet and was in the process of dropping his parafrags when he crashed. Crew carried as killed in action.

Pilot: James J. Geyer 1st Lt 0-822415
Co-pilot: John W. Roe 2nd Lt 0-835672
Navigator: Robert E. Woman 2nd Lt 0-713268
Engineer Gunner: Walter J. Bacher S/Sgt 32822768
Radio Gunner: Roy W. Hartmann S/Sgt 36819106

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Propaganda leaflets were dropped.

5. AWARDS
In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission warranting awards.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: 
   Takeoff: 6 A/P’s at 0725/I. 
   TOT: 4 A/P’s at 1115-1125/I at 50/200’. 
   Landing: 2 A/P’s at 1255/I; two A/P’s at 1605/I and one A/P at 1738/I. The latter A/P landed at LACAO to refuel before returning to base.

b. Route: CLARK - up west FORMOSA coast - target - direct to CLARK.

c. Fighter cover: Area cover of 16 Mustangs was excellent.

For the Squadron Commander:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
Capt, Air Corps
Intelligence Officer

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C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74
18 June, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our A/P's bombed and strafed enemy troops and supplies concentrated in the vicinity of ALCALA, North LUZON, in a morning minimum altitude attack. Seventy 100 pound demors were dropped destroying or damaging native type shacks in the area. Only damage to our A/P's was one hole from small arms fire.

2. OBJECTIVE
    General: This strike was designed to harass enemy movements in the CAGAYAN VALLEY which might be prompted by American advances in that region.
    Specific: Our target was enemy troops and supplies in an area along the north bank of the PARET RIVER at 1755N-12141E near MASIN.

3. ATTACK
    a. The 500th had this target to itself since each squadron in the Group was assigned a special area to attack. Our B-25J's approached the target from the south and made three passes to the northeast, flying single plane elements in a right hand pattern.
    b. Pilots and planes participating:
        A/P 050 - Lt Faukovich
        A/P 594 - Lt Payton
        A/P 356 - Lt Montgomery
        A/P 658 - Lt McLain
        A/P 169 - Lt Malquist
        A/P 210 - Lt Parker
    c. Results: Three shacks were seen to blow up and two or three others were left burning. Our planes started strafing just north of a bridge about a mile south of the area in which bombs were dropped, and strafed on three bombing runs with unobserved results. Terrain features presented closer observation of results, but the area was well covered by the attack. K-21 photos reveal nothing of military value.
    d. Opposition and cost: Light, meager, accurate to inaccurate ground fire was received from target vicinity, holding one A/P in rudder and resulting in minor damage. There was no interception, nil personnel injury and no other damage to aircraft.

- 1 -
Narrative Fr 166-A-4 - 500th Sqdn - cont.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
NIL

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions which would justify awards for this mission.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff: At 0830/I.
      Attack: 0940-1020/I at 50/200 ft.
      Landing: At 1145/I.
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. NIL fighter cover scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN F. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   In the opinion of this officer there were no individual actions on this mission which would warrant awards.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: At 0905/I.
      Attack: 1025-1045/I at 50/250 feet.
      Landing: At 1220/I
   b. Route: Direct to CAGAYAN VALLEY - target - base.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN P. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
AFO 74

19 June, 1945

Subject: Narrative Report on Mission PFO 189-A-5, Performed by
500th Bomb Squadron, 18 June 1945.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, AFO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our A/F's in a morning minimum altitude attack
dropped 72 X 100 lb demos on enemy concentrations in the ALCALA
region of Northern LUZON, destroying at least three native type
shacks. One of our planes was holed by ground fire.

2. OBJECTIVES
a. General: This strike was designed to disrupt ene-
my activities adopted as a defense against US advances up the
CAGAYAN VALLEY.
b. Specific: The 500th's target was 800 Nips report-
ed by Filipino forces to be concentrated along Highway 5 near
TUPANG (1755N-12138E). The area extended approximately one
mile along the road.

3. ATTACK
a. Our B-25's attacked this target alone, as each
squadron in the Group was assigned an individual target.
Approach was from the south and the three single ship passes
were made on a northerly heading.
b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/F 266 - Lt Sawyer  A/F 566 - Lt Parker
A/F 210 - Lt Reeves    A/F 165 - Lt Lawrence
A/F 595 - Lt Montgomery  A/F 169 - Lt Malquist

c. Results: At least three native type shacks were
destroyed and a fire with black smoke to 75 feet was started
by the attack. Complete results could not be observed because
of terrain features, but bombs were well distributed throughout
the target and A/F's strafed on all passes scoring hits on
shacks. One K-21 print reveals nothing of value.
d. Opposition and cost: Small arms fire, meager,
accurate to generally inaccurate, was received from positions
in the target vicinity and holed one A/P in right stabilizer.
The nose of a second A/F was dented by a glancing bullet - mi-
nor damage. There was nil other damage, nil interception and
no injury to personnel.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
Propaganda leaflets were dropped over target.
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OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APH 74

PAH/jwd

23 June, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.


1. SYNOPSIS

Six of our planes bombed and strafed barges and a few river installations along the CHU CHIANG River during a low level shipping search between HONG KONG and CANTON, China. A total of 36 X 250 lb paradesmos were dropped, destroying one 55-foot motor launch halfway between HONG KONG and CANTON in CHU CHIANG River, and exploding one 30 X 50 feet, single story building at HSIN CHOU (2305N-11324E). Remaining bombs were dropped with unobserved results at barges and installations along the CHU CHIANG River. Excellent strafing scored hits and caused damage to a radio station on LUNG-HSUEN ISLAND (2241N-11338E); 20 motor-sail junks at 2256N-11341E, which were firing at our A/F's; a Sugar Able Sugar stationary near East bank of the CHU CHIANG River at 2256N-11332E; the WHAMPSA Dock area at 2305N-11327E, scoring hits in previously damaged docks and warehouse-type buildings; one large camouflaged lugger stationary in water at 2305N-11320E; a two-story brick building at 2305N-11320E, starting a fire with black smoke to 1000 feet; two light A/A positions were silenced at 2256N-11332E and at 2253N-11335E, respectively, and finally strafing damaged a large radar screen near a large white building at 2253N-11350E. One A/F was holed by accurate M/G fire from unknown positions.

2. OBJECTIVES

Recent sightings of heavy barge traffic in the rivers around CANTON prompted this mission. Our A/F's were to search for these barges between HONG KONG and CANTON on the CHU CHIANG River, hitting only those vessels which were motorized or observed to be firing at A/F's.

3. ATTACK

a. Two squadrons participated in this strike, the 500th leading the 501st over the search area. After reaching the HONG KONG area and the mouth of the CHU CHIANG River, our six B-25J's broke up into flights of two A/F's in trail, each A/F of a flight taking one side of the river.

CONFIDENTIAL
3. ATTACK (a) Cont'd.
When near CANTON the flights turned 180 degrees and retraced their route Southeast to HONG KONG, rendezvousing there and returning to base. One A/P of our squadron became separated from the rest of the unit and after joining the 50lst flight, returned via LINGAYEN, Luzon to base.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 060 - Lt Sawyer  A/P 266 - Lt McLain  A/P 594 - Lt Lawrence
A/P 588 - Lt Malquist  A/P 165 - Lt Braid  A/P 554 - Lt Kent

c. Results:
Bombing was erratic and for the most part results were unobserved. Good shipping targets were scanty and hard to detect until our A/P's were practically over them. Strafing results, already mentioned, highlighted this mission and caused considerable damage. No individual bombing or strafing is worthy of special note here. While in the vicinity of CANTON CITY, Lt McLain in A/P 266 was separated unavoidably from our A/P's and joined up with the 50lst squadron. Shortly afterward this squadron's maneuvering endangered his A/P as their flight path came very close to CANTON CITY, a heavily defended area. Lt McLain broke off at this point and proceeded Southeast to HONG KONG vicinity where he circled with one plane of the 50lst Squadron until the rendezvous with the rest of this unit was effected. Lt McLain then proceeded to LINGAYEN, Luzon, refueling there before returning to base.

K-21 photos received confirm little damage done by our A/P's but show a well-preserved dock installation with nine (9) storage type buildings and a loading crane.

d. Opposition and Cost:
Enemy efforts of defense against this attack were extremely meager, considering the importance of the area covered. Light, meager, inaccurate fire was received from the two afore-mentioned light positions which were silenced by strafing. M/G fire, meager and inaccurate was received from one of the 20 junks attacked in the CHIANG River. A/P 165 received one hole from fire emanating from an unknown location. There was no interception. A radio operator jammed his middle finger on the right hand in the turret mechanism, causing moderate injury but not requiring immediate hospitalization.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
Pilots agreed that they were able to orientate themselves without difficulty while over the area but the lack of heavy barge traffic previously reported was noticeable and disappointing.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
Nil recommendations in the light of available facts.
6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff: 0630/I - 6 A/P's
      Takeoff Lingayen - 1745/I - 1 A/P
      Attack: 1200 - 1230/I - 6 A/P's
      Land, Clark: 1700/I - 5 A/P's
      Land, Lingayen - 1730/I - 1 A/P
      Land, Clark - 1945/I - 1 A/P

   b. Route:
      Direct.

   c. Fighter cover: Nil scheduled.

For the Commanding Officer:

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
Capt., Air Corps
Intelligence Officer.
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 74

8 July, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Nine of our planes bombed and strafed SHEK-KCTO-SHEK
ISLAND approximately 45 miles east of the southern tip of FORMOSA in a late morning combat training mission. Fifty four 100 pound general purpose bombs were dropped from minimum altitude with unobserved results. There was no enemy opposition to this strike and all of our A/P's returned safely.

2. OBJECTIVE
This mission was primarily for training purposes, i.e., to bring new crews over enemy territory under actual combat conditions. There were no personnel or installations reported in the target area and no signs of activity were seen by crews as they made their attack.

3. ATTACK
This was a Group mission with the 499th Squadron leading followed by the 498th, 500th and 501st in that order. Squadrons made their three passes nine planes abreast on a southeasterly heading.

Pilots and planes participating:
A/P 360 - Lt McLain  A/P 940 - Lt Braid  A/P 169 - WC Wagner
A/P 165 - Lt Steverson A/P 266 - Lt Fitman  A/P 213 - Lt Lawrence
A/P 568 - Lt Mitscher A/P 594 - Lt Watt  A/P 554 - Lt Van Huben

Results: As there were no installations seen, results were 'unobserved,' except for a few grass fires caused by strafing. No photos were taken. From crew members' statements, this island seems to be uninhabited.
There was no enemy opposition to this attack.

4. COMMENTS of I.O.
From an intelligence standpoint it should be interesting to learn Japanese S-2's evaluation of this strike as to purpose, etc.

5. AWARDS
Individual actions do not warrant awards.

-1-

6. **STATISTICS**
   a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0735/I from BORAX.
      TOT: 1050-1135/I at 50/500 feet.
      Landing: 1445/I at BORAX.
   b. Route: Direct except for two log legs as a navigational exercise.
   c. Fighter cover: None scheduled.

For the Squadron Commander:

JOHN E. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
   Four of our A/P's in a mid-morning strike searched for shipping along the entire length of FORMOSA's east coast without contacting any enemy units. Choosing secondary targets of opportunity a total of five 250-pounders were dropped on SANCHEO PT (2501N-12159E) scoring one direct hit on a lighthouse heavily damaging it as well as causing considerable damage to five small rock dwellings nearby. Further south along the east coast at HOKUHO-O PT at 2436N-12152E, three 250-pound demos were dropped at an A/A position with one bomb scoring a near miss which silenced the position. The other two bombs caused some damage to two small sheds nearby. Both bomb targets were thoroughly strafed. One A/P fatally hit by A/A at HOKUHO-O PT crashed and burned over the target. The remaining three A/P's were holed and four crew members received minor scratches from bullets and flying glass during the action.

2. OBJECTIVE
   Recent sightings of barges along both the east and west coasts of FORMOSA prompted this mission. Our A/P's were to thoroughly search the east coast and in the event of an unsuccessful search, hit as a secondary, targets of opportunity along the coastal plain.

3. ATTACK
   a. Two squadrons (the 500th followed by the 501st), each composed of four A/P's, proceeded north to the south tip of FORMOSA where each squadron initiated its search. The 501st continued north along the west coast of the island while our Mitchells flying in two plane elements searched north along the east coast as far as KIIRUN HARBOR. Returning by way of this same route our A/P's attacked targets at SANCHEO PT and HOKUHO-O PT flying two plane elements in trail at minimum altitude. A single pass was executed over both targets on southerly headings. After the last target run the remaining three A/P's circled the area once to observe the site of the crashed A/P, then proceeded south direct to base.
   b. Pilots and planes participating:
      A/P 162 - Major Canning
      A/P 558 - Lt. Kusebauch
      A/P 913 - Capt. Schmidt
      A/P 594 - Lt. Watt
c. Results: Of the eight bombs dropped it can be said that bombing was excellent. Captain Schmidt probably destroyed a lighthouse on SANCHO PT with a direct hit. His other three bombs exploded nearby damaging five rock dwellings or sheds. While approaching HOKUHO-0 PT, Capt Schmidt observed the A/A positions firing on MAJOR Canning's flight which was leading the attack. As soon as possible consistent with the safety of the lead aircraft Capt Schmidt brought his guns to bear on the A/A positions and then dropped his remaining two bombs, one of which scored a near miss apparently silencing the position. Lt Kusebauch and Lt Watt dropped one bomb each at HOKUHO-0 PT damaging a possible lookout tower and two small sheds. All pilots thoroughly strafed both target areas with generally unobserved results and the results of Major Canning's bombing before the crash were unobserved. No K21 photos were taken on this strike due to the present operational condition existing within the unit.

d. Opposition and cost: Enemy defense of the SUO-KO BAY area was surprisingly heavy considering the meager amount encountered there by planes of this Group on an earlier strike during the week. Light and medium, moderate to intense A/A was received from at least five light positions and one 40 mm position along a ridge on HOKUHO-0 PT. Some light fire was received from SUO TOWN in the same vicinity. A/F 169 piloted by Major Canning our Squadron Commanding Officer was fatally hit by what was believed to be 40 mm A/A from HOKUHO-0 PT and after tartwheeling in the air crashed and burned at 1145 near the shore at 2450N-12152E. No survivors thought possible. The crew and one passenger as listed below are carried as killed in action.

Pilot Maj Robert E. Canning 0-759411
Co-pilot 2nd Lt John W. Graham 0-779454
Navigator 2nd Lt Clarence E. Swallow 0-703013
Engineer S/Sgt Charles L. Vistner 37618005
Radio Op. Sgt Gordon A. Shierman 39094147
Passenger- Capt Robert Reeves 0-1946340
Observer PR Section, Fifth Air Force

The remaining three planes were holed causing minor damage to two and major damage to one which received more than forty holes. Four crew members in these planes received minor scratches from flying glass and metal.

4. COMMENTS OF I.C.
Pilots reported that there was no evidence of activity in the SUO-KO BAY area as they approached from the north. Apparently Major Canning made no effort to increase his speed or go into evasive action prior to making landfall. During briefing the fact that SUO BAY and GIRAN TOWN were defended and important enemy areas on the coast was brought to the crews' attention.

5. AWARDS
No individual actions seem to justify awards.

-2-
6. **STATISTICS**
   
   a. **Timetable:** Takeoff: 0710/I from BORAX.
      TGT: 1135-1145/I at 50/500 feet.
      Landing: 1540/I at BORAX.
   
   b. **Route:** BASE - LINGAYEN - South tip of FORMOSA -
      up east coast - TIRUN - target - BASE.
   
   c. **Fighter cover:** Nil cover scheduled.

   For the **Commanding Officer:**

   PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
   Capt, Air Corps
   Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
In the 345th's first attack on the Japanese homeland, six of our squadron's planes hit radio and radar installations on the southernmost point of KYUSHU. Twenty-two (22) X 500-pound GP bombs were dropped in a late morning, minimum altitude attack. Fires were started in the radar installation and the radio antennas were knocked down. One of our A/F's received two holes.

2. OBJECTIVES
General: This was originally a shipping strike to the Japanese Inland Sea, which the attackers could not reach because of weather. They searched areas of the Southeast coast of KYUSHU during their return and attacked their ultimate target almost as a last resort.

Specific: SADA-KI ISLAND (30°59’N-130°40’E), just off the South tip of KYUSHU, was the site of the radar target. The island was said to be about 100 feet in diameter and contained a lighthouse and a small building in which the radar equipment was located. The radio installation consisted of two 100-foot radio towers on a 500-foot hill on the Southwest tip of KYUSHU at 31°29’-130°42’E.

3. ATTACK
a. The 499th Squadron led the Group with the 500th, 501st and 498th following in that order. Our squadron leader, Capt Parker, reported the sighting to the Group leader who gave him a clearance to attack. The average number of passes at each target was three; passes were generally to the West and East.
b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
   A/P 93C - Capt Parker
   A/P 392 - Lt McNair
   A/P 380 - Lt Lawrence
   A/P 300 - Lt Malquist
   A/P 405 - Lt Braid
c. Results: A direct hit on a small concrete building near the radar installation on the island resulted in a minor explosion and a small, persistent fire. A near miss visibly shook the radio masts and the antennas cables were broken at the radio installation on the tip of KYUSHU proper. Both targets were heavily strafed with unscored results.
3. ATTACK (cont'd)
   b. Opposition and Cost:
      Opposition consisted of light, meager, accurate fire,
      holing one A/P twice, resulting in minor damage, from a hill
      near radio installation. Moderate to intense, inaccurate ground
      fire was received from SADA-MISAKI.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   NIL.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   NIL. Recommendations in light of present available facts.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Time table: Takeoff - 0715/I
      Attack - 1042 to 1100/I
      Landed - 1329/I
   b. Route: Direct.
   c. Fighter cover: Excellent by P-47's.

JOHN P. DINGES
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.

1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our A/P's, in a mid-day shipping search in the Inland Sea of JAPAN, dropped a total of 24 X 500-pound G/P bombs, sinking one 100-ton wooden merchant vessel at 3312N-13220E, one 50-foot harbor craft at 3328N-13214E, and slightly damaging a lighthouse at 3320N-13200E. All targets were heavily strafed but results were generally unobserved. Attacks were made at minimum altitude. Enemy opposition was light with A/A holing only one A/P.

2. OBJECTIVES
General: This strike was the second in a series designed to send the Japanese merchant fleet plying the Inland Sea to the bottom. NOBESKA TOWN, located on the East-Central coast of KYUSHU, was the general location of the assigned secondary target.

Specific: Our pilots were instructed to attack any enemy naval vessels the size of destroyers or smaller and all merchant vessels encountered in the blind bombing zone of the Inland Sea. A 1500' X 800' railroad yard area, 2000 yards South of NOBESKA TOWN, Kyushu, was the secondary target. A roundhouse is situated at the Northern end of the area.

3. ATTACK
The 500th Squadron, followed by the 501st, 498th and 499th, proceeded in Group formation to the Inland Sea by flying North along KYUSHU'S East coast. At 3312N-13220E our squadron broke off and initiated the attack on a 100-ton merchant vessel, each A/P executing two minimum altitude bombing-strafing runs on northerly headings. Continuing North to the Southern entrance of the Inland Sea, each A/P made one strafing pass on a defended lighthouse at 3320N-13200E. In the Inland Sea a harbor craft was attacked by our planes at 3328N-13214E as it raced toward shore. Each A/P made three low-level attacks on this craft. As our A/P's left the Inland Sea each A/P executed a second pass on the defended lighthouse at 3320N-13200E, dropping a few bombs as well as heavily strafing the installation.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 913 - Capt Waring
A/P 594 - Lt McCord
A/P 384 - Lt Kent
A/P 356 - Lt Watt
A/P 666 - Lt Reaves
A/P 940 - Lt Seliverson
3. ATTACK (cont'd)
   c. Results: To Capt Waring, Operations Officer of our
      Squadron, goes the honor of being the pilot to lead the 345th
      Bomb Group over the Inland Sea of Japan.
      Although all pilots bombed and strafed the two vessels sunk,
      definite credit is given to Lt Reaves for sinking the 100-ton
      merchant vessel which exploded and sank after his direct hit.
      Lt Kent is given credit for sinking the 50-foot harbor craft with
      a direct hit. All pilots damaged the lighthouse with strafing
      hits but bombs dropped here missed. All A/F's returned direct
      to base, landing safely. K-21 photos were taken of the bombing
      attacks, but, due to present operational conditions, a slight
      delay will ensue before prints are received.
   d. Opposition and Cost:
      Light, meager and accurate fire from the 100-ton
      merchant vessel holed one A/P in two places, causing minor damage.
      Light, meager and inaccurate fire was received from the light-
      house.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   A YANK correspondent accompanied Capt Waring on this
   mission. Weather conditions in the Inland Sea were poor and
   accounted for the relatively poor results of the search in that
   area.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   There are no recommendations in the light of available
   facts.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff - 0830/I
      Attack  - 1200/I to 1259/I
      Landed - 1600/I
   b. Route: Direct to CAPE TOI (Southeast Kyushu), North
      along East coast KYUSHU to Inland Sea, and return direct to base.
   c. Fighter cover: Fair by P-51's.

      For the Commanding Officer:

      PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON
      Capt, Air Corps
      Intelligence Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 245

JFD/jwd

1 August, 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925.


1. SYNOPSIS
Six of our planes thoroughly bombed and strafed the Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer plant at MARUSHIMA, Kyushu in a late morning low level attack. Twenty-two (22) 500-pound bombs were dropped resulting in smoke to 1000 feet and debris cascading as high as 300 feet. Two of our A/F's were holed by A/A fire, one seriously. The primary target - shipping from SASEBO, Kyushu, to HAMADA, Honshu, was not attacked due to fighter escort's lack of gasoline. They had consumed an unforeseen amount while waiting for the 345th Group which had been unavoidably delayed on takeoff.

2. OBJECTIVES
a. General: This attack was designed to reduce the enemy's power for waging war by depriving him of nitrogen products useful in producing explosives.

b. Specific: Focal point of this day's effort was the Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer plant at MARUSHIMA, Kyushu (3212N-13025E) which, according to photographs and crew reports, was quite well developed.

3. ATTACK
a. Our squadron was the last over the target, being preceded by the 501st, 498th and 499th in that order. Upon approaching the target, our two elements were split up by a narrow valley South of the target and came in over the target in two three-plane elements, slightly staggered. One pass on a Northwesterly heading was made.

b. Pilots and Planes Participating:
A/P 392 - Lt McLain
A/P 206 - CWO Wagner
A/P 554 - Lt Pease
A/P 297 - Lt Borton
A/P 308 - Lt Parrish
A/P 932 - Lt Harper

c. Results: Twenty-two bombs were dropped throughout the target area except for the Northeast portion, causing gray-black smoke to 1000 feet, and sending debris as high as 300 feet. A large explosion followed by moderate fire was reported in the Southwest sector of the target area. The target and adjacent areas were heavily strafed. Two bombs could not be dropped over the assigned target and were released over a rural village at 3208N-13010E. A steel girded building approximately 30' X 125' at 3208N-13009E was heavily damaged by strafing. K-21 photos were taken of the attack but due to local conditions cannot be processed at this time.
3. ATTACK (cont'd)
   d. Opposition and Cost:
      Medium, moderate and accurate to generally inaccurate
      A/A fire was received from target area. Medium, slight and
      accurate fire came from SHISHI JIMA at 3217N-13012E. Heavy,
      intense and possibly accurate to generally inaccurate ack ack
      was encountered from undetermined number of positions atop two
      hills flanking a narrow valley approximately a mile South of the
      target. Two of our planes were holed from undetermined source.

4. COMMENTS OF THE I.O.
   Crews reported debris from a U.S. aircraft in water at
   1117/I at 3211N-13018E. Debris included a wing with a white stripe.
   No survivors were seen after a careful investigation.
   In the same area a Sugar Dog was seen heading for shore and
   another Sugar Dog was docked at 3212N-13023E at 1115/I.

5. AWARDS AND CITATIONS
   MIL recommendations.

6. STATISTICS
   a. Timetable:
      Takeoff: - 0740/I
      Attack: - 1114/I to 1115/I
      Landed: - 1337/I
   b. Route: Direct to fighter rendezvous then direct to
      target.
   c. Fighter cover: P-47 fighter cover reported excellent.

For the Commanding Officer:

JOHN F. Dinges
1st Lt, Air Corps
Ass't Intelligence Officer
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
500th Bombardment Squadron (M)
345th Bombardment Group
APO 245

11 August 1945


To: Commanding General, Far East Air Force, APO 925
Attention: A.C. of S., A-2

1. SYNOPSIS
Ten of our A/P's hit land installations and Nip shipping off northwest KYUSHU in an early morning attack dropping 36 x 500 pound bombs from minimum altitude. Damage to the ground targets ranged from unobserved to moderate. Two Sugar Dogs and a lugger were sunk and other vessels damaged during the shipping attacks. Enemy resistance was weak resulting in one hole in one A/P causing minor damage.

2. OBJECTIVES
General: This was a maximum effort, maximum range strike calculated to intercept Nip shipping between the Asiatic mainland and JAPAN which was anticipated to have been greatly stimulated by Russia’s entry into the war. Two searching B-24's were to report sightings of shipping for targets.
Special: Shipping targets off the northern coast of KYUSHU were the subject of the Rough Raider’s attack as well as land targets on TSU SHIMA, DANJO (3200N-12822E) and on ORONO SHIMA (3352N-13002E). B-24's reported nil sightings.

3. ATTACK
a. The 500th was assigned a special search area from the north tip of TSU SHIMA to 3615N-13140E w/other squadrons of the Air Anaches assigned individual search areas. HORI SAKI (3408N-12916E) on TSU SHIMA and DANJO were approached from the north; approach to shipping was from the west. Formation on ground targets was single ship and on shipping one or two plane elements.

b. Pilots and planes participating:
A/P 308 - Lt McLain  A/P 050 - Lt Malquist  A/P 384 - Lt Harper
A/P 165 - Lt Watt  A/P 356 - Lt Reaves  A/P 940 - Lt Lawrence
A/P 666 - Lt Payton  A/P 588 - Lt Ritscher  A/P 913 - Lt McCord
c. Results: Lt Payton and crew dropped four bombs and strafed HORI SAKI with unobserved results; Lt Harper bombed and strafed a radio installation at DANJO ISLAND, destroying one-half of the main buildings in damaging a tower. Two bombs exploded among buildings in small village on the east coast of ORONO SHIMA at 3352N-13002E causing two small fires; two bombs
were dropped on barrack type buildings atop ridge saddle on the west coast of ORONO SHIMA with unobserved results.

Eight planes dropped 24 bombs on shipping. Lt. Watt sank a Sugar Dog at 3410N-1305E and strafed a fishing boat and a modified Sugar Charlie Sugar killing two gunners on the latter. Lt McLain scored near miss on a 250 ton trawler and on a salvage vessel towing a Fox Tare Dog near 3407N-13049E with results unobserved. Lt Lawrence sank a lugger with a direct hit. Two bombs and a strafing attack started fires on a 50 ft powered fishing vessel at 3406N-13049E. A Lt Sievers sank a camouflage Sugar Dog at 3353N-13025E. All the above targets were thoroughly strafed in addition to one tow boat towing a small dredge just north of ORONO SHIMA, scoring hits on both vessels. K-21 photos were too few to verify results.

d. Opposition and cost: Moderate, light and accurate to inaccurate fire was received from vessels attacked and shore positions, holing one A/P with minor damage. A possible cable throwing device to foil strafers was observed from the salvage vessel attacked. It consisted of a rocket like affair which may have trailed a cable. There was no interception and no loss or injury of personnel.

4. COMMENTS OF I.O.
A/P's 666 and 384 hit individual targets because of operational difficulties: 666 had engine trouble and turned back at rendezvous point to hit HORI SAKI; 384 experienced compass trouble and did not make rendezvous but hit DANJO. The remainder of the strike force hit euth of their assigned target area due to compass error.

5. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
All awards recommended in light of available information.

6. STATISTICS
a. Timetable: Takeoff: 0135/I.
    TOT: HORI SAKI at 0710-0715/I
    DANJO at 0842-0845/I
    Shipping at 1000-1035/I. All attacks at 50/200 feet.
    Landing: 1345/I.

c. Fighter Base - rendezvous - search - target - base.

For the Squadron Commander:

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

ELWOOD A. KALLAND
2nd Lt. A.C.
Historical Officer

JOHN P. DINDES,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't Intell Officer
SQUADRON ORDER

NUMBER 17

1. Effective this date, First Lieutenant WINELLING R. PHUELLER, O-0-1555637, is hereby appointed Squadron Transportation Officer, Vice Captain GEORGE R. SCHWITZ, O-756916, relieved.

By order of Captain TOED:

JAMES E. LUNGO,
Captain, Air Corps,
Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

JAMES E. LUNGO,
Captain, Air Corps,
Adjutant.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY.

ELWOOD A. HALJD,
Lt. Air Corps,
Historical Officer.
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Unit History

TO: Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 710 (Thru Channels)

1. In accordance with AR 345-105 and AIR Regulation No. 20-8, submit herewith the history of this organization for the month of August, 1945, which has been inspected and verified by the undersigned.

2. The material submitted was prepared by 2nd. Lt. Elwood A. Kalland, O-765006, Air Corps. Facts and observations included in the narrative and not otherwise credited are based on the personal knowledge and opinions of Lt. Kalland.

ROBERT F. TDL,
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

1 Incls:
1 - Original and 2 copies Unit History 500th Bomb Squadron.
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12
The A/P's of this squadron were very active this month. During the first fifteen days of the month ten combat missions were flown. The latter part of the month found the squadron very active in carrying out armed patrols while the peace arrangements were managed.

The first mission of the month was carried out by six planes of this squadron. Taking a mid-day minimum altitude bombing and strafing attack on their secondary target, Bo Town and Nakazaki, Kyushu, they destroyed six ships and caused one moderate explosion. The planes and quickly erupting smoke rose to an altitude of 2500 feet as our aircraft withdrew. Both targets were thoroughly strafed with generally unobserved results. The primary target, a shipping search of Korea's southern coast was not hit because of a delayed takeoff and subsequent failure to rendezvous with the fighter cover.

On 5 August 1945, seven planes of this squadron in an early afternoon minimum altitude attack dropped 500 pound demoes and 100 pound napalm on workers quarters at Tanumizao on southern Kyushu. Bombing results were excellent and the entire area was also a blazing inferno hurling black smoke 2500 feet in the air. The area was also very heavily strafed but with generally unobserved results due to clouds of heavy smoke and haze.
Opposition was light and only two aircraft were holed by A/A.

The mission of the month took place on 6 August 1945 when 13 of our A/P's engaged in a shipping strike as they searched for a 25 vessel convoy sighted by another group. The first flight of 6 B-25J's sighted an estimated 20 vessels in the Pusan area of southeast Korea. Because of the position of this squadron in the group it was in the best position to attack on a gunboat. Taking 4 passes at this vessel the squadron scored at least two direct hits and the ship was seen to roll over and disappear. The second flight of 7 B-25J's did not attack the convoy but made its search east of Pusan, where the vessels had found refuge in harbors. A Sugar Dog and a Sugar Baker love were sighted and sunk. Eight bombs were also dropped on the southern tip of Crono Shima starting many small fires. All bombed targets were thoroughly strafed with accuracy as was a 25 foot trawler anchored close to the east coast of Crono Shima. One plane and area were lost, the target and two A/P's received major damage.

On 7 August 1945 two A/P's of this squadron, in a late morning minimum altitude attack, dropped 1000 pound bombs on a small highway bridge at NatSUBase Town, Kyushu. Bombing as well as strafing results were unobserved. Results of this mission, to disrupt rail and highway communications in Kyushu, were not as expected due to the fact that twelve A/P's were scheduled for the flight. Due to an unavoidable taxi accident the other A/P's were too late in taking off and missed the rendezvous.

-1-
On 9 August 1945, 6 A/P's of this squadron were sent on a shipping search in the Sea of Japan, due west of Honshu. Due to fueling difficulties only 3 A/P's took off and due to the late hour failed to rendezvous with the group. Instead of following the group to the primary target, these A/P's proceeded to Danjo Gunto and made low-level bombing and strafing attacks against radar and radio installations installed there. Eleven 500 pound G.P. bombs and 8 rockets were expended in the attack causing the destruction of a radar screen and several related buildings. Two rockets scored direct hits on one of two radio towers causing considerable damage. These installations were heavily strafed with generally unobserved results. Two A/P's were holed by I/A. One of these suffered hydraulic failure and flat tire and was forced to crash land at base which damaged A/P beyond repair. No personnel injured. 4-7-45

On 10 August 1945, 10 of our A/P's made a low level shipping search in the Sea of Japan, just north of Kyushu. One aircraft with engine trouble turned back and bombed and strafed Yori Said with unobserved results, and joined with another airplane which bombed and strafed a radio installation at Danjo Island destroying one-half of main building and damaged the tower. The remaining 8 planes proceeded to the Sea of Japan and making bombing and strafing attacks, sank two Sugar-Dogs and a small lugger. Another Sugar-Dog, as salvage vessel, a deep sea trawler and a modified Sugar-Charlie-Sugar were attacked with bombs scoring near misses and strafing causing hits but unobserved damage. I/A was light, but accurate--one A/P was holed but no personnel injured. 4-11-45

On 11 August 1945, 6 A/P's of this squadron conducted a shipping search in the Inland Sea. Although several vessels were sighted no attacks were made due to the fact that they were all situated in harbors that were believed to be heavily defended. Finding no suitable targets the leader picked as a secondary target a factory at Akurata, Kyushu. Making a land approach to the target, 500 pound G.P. bombs and rockets were discharged causing one very large explosion and covering the entire area with smoke. Four or five secondary explosions were observed and the crew reported about 80% of the factory destroyed. The entire area was thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. I/A was light but accurate and one A/P was holed--no personnel injured. 4-12-45

A shipping search was conducted on 12 August 1945, in the Sea of Japan just north of Tsu-shima. Out of 5 A/P's assigned to this search, only 3 were in on the attack, the other A/P took off as scheduled but has not been heard from since. The five A/P's dropped the combined load of 15,000 pound G.P. bombs striking a gunboat and a sugar-Dog. Both targets were thoroughly strafed with unobserved results. I/A was light and inaccurate but one A/P was holed--nil personnel injured. 4-13-45

Six B-24's taking off on 13 August 1945, conducted a shipping search from Kyushu Island, southeast along the west coast of Tsu Shima. After searching the assigned area with no sightings the A/P's returned to base with bombs and ammo intact.

- 2 -
On 14 August 1945, four B-25J's conducted a shipping search in the Sea of Japan, along the south and east coast of Korea. There was only one vessel sighted—a 200-ton fishing vessel which was thoroughly strafed and bombed. The vessel was blown to bits by three direct hits. No A/P's or personnel hit.

On 15 August 1945, six A/P's from this squadron conducted a shipping search in the Sea of Japan. However, as the squadron was circling Danjo, for rendezvous with the fighter cover, a radio message was received instructing all A/P's to return to base as hostilities had ceased.

During the last half of August B-25J's of this squadron continued to fly almost every day. Although they were not looking for trouble, they still carried bombs and ammunition which were returned to the base unless forced to expend them in the sea because of mechanical trouble or gas shortage. The missions included almost every type of mission—sea searched for down aircraft and any survivors, sea searched for concentrations of Japanese shipping, escorting of Japanese emissaries on their way to Manila for the peace conference. On the 28th three A/P's flew to islands in the Ryukyus and dropped surrender messages to Japs stationed there. Four of our A/P's also flew war correspondents to take a look at Hiroshima, Honshu which had been devastated by an atomic bomb.

Although the missions flown during the later part of the month were not as exciting as combat missions, crew members still enjoyed flying because they knew the war they had fought so long was finally over. And so ends another month with the "Rough Raiders."

PHILIP A. HUTCHINSON,
CAPTAIN, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer
STRENGTH REPORT

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Aug.</th>
<th>31 Aug.</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crews Assigned</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Flying Personnel</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ground Personnel</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIRPLANE STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>1 Aug.</th>
<th>31 Aug.</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-25J</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

AIRPLANE LOSSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>In Combat</th>
<th>On Ground By Enemy Action</th>
<th>Through Accident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-25J</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CASUALTIES

A. On 7 August 1945, five men were killed in action (ANT) due to airplane being hit by A/A from enemy gunboat, causing the airplane to cartwheel in air and explode as it hit the water alongside gunboat, near Fusan Harbors, Korea, at 1145/I. No possible survivors.

Lorenz, Harold
Lanphier, Merlin
Fouts, Oliver E.
Peddicord, Marvin F.
Kendall, Robert G.

B. On 12 August 1945, five men missing in action due to airplane last seen on take-off from Je Shima at 0255/I on shipping mission in Sea of Japan. No visual or radio contact made with airplane after take-off.

Parker, Eugene J.
Davis, Jack G.
Buffington, Lawrence W.
Hadzor, Robert V.
McLeod, John E.

Pilot
Co-Pilot
Navigator
Engineer
Radio
SORTIES FLOWN

Type | Number
---|---
Attack | 92
Recco | 5

Weight of Bombs Carried | Average Distance | Ton-Miles of Bombing
52.5 Tons | 425 Miles | 22,312.5

BOMBS DROPPED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500# G.P.</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>37.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000# G.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# Demo</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# Napalm</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>52.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

Size | Rounds
---|---
.50 Cal. | 130,050

ROCKETS EXPENDED

Size | Number
---|---
5" Rockets | 105

PERSONNEL CITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>ASN</th>
<th>DY</th>
<th>G/O No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Award</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bane, Myron E.</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>33556253</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borton, Donald R.</td>
<td>F/O</td>
<td>T-62895</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comstock, Ray A.</td>
<td>T/Sgt</td>
<td>12165945</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>OLC-AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loisel, Cyrinque J.</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>0-817335</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>3 Aug 45</td>
<td>DFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long, Cecil L.</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-819554</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>9 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malquist, Stewart R.</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>0-2061505</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortensen, Max H.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>0-724323</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>3 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muniz, Stanley R.</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>42002314</td>
<td>RG</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>20 Aug 45</td>
<td>OLC-DFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norrik, Warner G.</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>15382848</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pease, Richard L.</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-713876</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>9 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterson, Erick, W.</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-712658</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainville, Jean A.</td>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>31287789</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>9 Aug 45</td>
<td>OLC-AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Stepanow, Samuel (NMI) Jr.</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>32757644</td>
<td>RG</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>3 Aug 45</td>
<td>OLC-AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stern, Alfred W.</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>0-712935</td>
<td>BN</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21 Aug 45</td>
<td>AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriano, Carmine J.</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>0-698391</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>3 Aug 45</td>
<td>OLC-AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, Mark A.</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>0-696175</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>9 Aug 45</td>
<td>OLC-AM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Posthumously (ANT)
Subject: Casualty Report.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.

7 August 1945

1. Battle Casualty (ADM).

   a. LOREZ, HANOLL 2d Lt. 0-786423 White.
   b. LIPPS, LEONEL 2d Lt. 0-839954 White.
   c. FOUNT, CLYDE 2d Lt. 0-696999 White.
   d. Peddicord, Marvin F. 3 Stg. 33200352 White.
   e. Kendall, Robert C. 3 Stg. 31599174 White.

2. 500th Bombardment Squadron (I) AAF, 345th Bombardment Group (I) AAF, APO 245.

   a. Pilot - 1081.
   b. Pilot - 1081.

3. Killed in action (ADM) due to airplane being hit by ack-ack from enemy gunboat causing the aircraft to cartwheel in air and explode as it hit the water alongside gunboat near Pusan Harbor, Korea, at 1045/1. No possible survivors.

4. 6 August 1945.

5. Bodies were not recovered.


7. In the line of duty. A Board of Officers will not be convened.

8. Visage status: None.


10. Yes, Pilot.

11. Yes, Navigator-Bombardier.


Casualty Report - 7 August 1945 (cont'd):

12. Award pay: None.

13. a. Mr. Chris Lorenz (Father), 305 2nd, Box 63, La Salle, Colorado.
   b. Mr. Arne G. Lamphier (Father), Roscor, Iowa.
   c. Mrs. Hazel F. Fouts (Wife), Wingen, Indiana.
   d. Mrs. Grace C. Poddinord (Mother), Glen Dale, Maryland.
   e. Mrs. Marie L. Kendall (Mother), 523 Westbrook Street, South Portland, Maine.

14. a. Protestant (Seventh Day Adventist).
   b. Protestant (Methodist).
   c. Protestant (Methodist).
   d. Protestant (Methodist).
   e. Catholic.

ROBERT F. TOLID
Captain, Air Corps,
Commanding
Subject: Battle Casualty Report.

To: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925.

13 August 1945

1. Missing in action.

2. a. PARKER, EUGENE J. Capt. 0-566687 AC White.
   b. DAVIS, JACK C. Capt. 0-398922 AC White.
   c. BUFFINGTON, LAWRENCE W. 1st Lt. 0-739223 AC White.
   d. Hadzor, Robert V. Cpl. 13041813 AC White.
   e. McLeod, John E. Pfc. 34790203 AC White.

3. 500th Bombardment Squadron (H) 457, 345th Bombardment Group (H) AAF, APO 245.

   b. Pilot - 1031.
   c. Navigator - 1031.
   d. Army Airplane Mechanic Gunner - 757.

5. Missing in action due to airplane last seen on take off from Ie Shima at 0255/1 on shipping mission in Sea of Japan. No visual or radio contact made with airplane after take off.

6. 12 August 1945.

7. Bodies were not recovered.


   b. Yes, Pilot.
   c. Yes, Navigator.
   d. Yes, Army Airplane Mechanic Gunner.
   e. Yes, Air Force Radio Operator Mechanic Gunner.

    b. None
    c. None
    d. None
    e. None
11. a. 34 missions.
   b. 5 missions.
   c. 25 missions.
   d. 2 missions.
   e. 6 missions.

12. a. Mrs. Marguerite V. Parker (Wife), 220 Greenwood Circle, Decatur, Georgia.
   b. Mr. Jack B. Davis (Father), 550 North 12th Street, Muskogee, Oklahoma.
   c. Mrs. Hilda G. Buffington (Wife), 7701 Georgia Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C.
   d. Mrs. Martha Farbaugh (Aunt), 512 South Vinebiddle Ave, Pittsburgh, Penna.
   e. Mrs. Harjorie L McLeod (Wife), Box 263, Homerville, Georgia.

13. a. Protestant (Methodist).
   b. Protestant (Methodist).
   c. Protestant (Methodist).
   d. Protestant (Methodist).
   e. Protestant (Methodist).

14. None

15. a. None
   b. None
   c. Recommendation for promotion to grade of Captain submitted 4 August 1945.

16. None.

ROBERT F. TCOO
Major, Air Corps, Commanding.
SQUADRON ORDER

NUMBER 18

EXTRACT

2. Effective this date, Staff Sergeant CHARLES K. DUSTHEERY, 5071441, is hereby appointed Squadron Armament Inspector.

3. Effective this date, Technical Sergeant JOHN E. QUIGLEY, 3636698, is hereby appointed Squadron Communications Inspector.

4. Effective this date, Master Sergeant LEWIS A. GROSE, 36237405, is hereby appointed Squadron Airplane Inspector.

5. Effective this date, Captain CURTIS R. CERNER, 0-565293, is hereby appointed Squadron Administrative Inspector in addition to his other duties.

By order of Captain TODD:

JAMES B. MCNRO
Captain, Air Corps, Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

JAMES B. MCNRO
Captain, Air Corps, Adjutant.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

EDWARD A. KILLOO
Lt., Air Corps, Historical Officer.
500TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (11) AAF
345th Bombardment Group (11) AAF
APC 245

1 August 1945

SQUADRON ORDER
NUMBER 18)

EXTRACT

6. Effective this date, First Lieutenant MILTON N. HARPER, 0-735878, is hereby appointed Squadron Operations Officer, vice Captain KENNETH B. WARDIG, 0-674873, relieved.

By order of Major TCC:

ANDREW T. LOGARRY
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

ANDREW T. LOGARRY
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Adjutant.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

ELWOOD A. KALLER
Lt., Air Corps,
HISTORICAL OFFICER.
SQUADRON ORDER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Effective this date, Captain JAMES B. LOMRO, O-566277, is hereby appointed Squadron Executive Officer, vice Captain CURTIS R. ESQUIER, O-565293, retd.

2. Effective this date, First Lieutenant ANDREW T. McGARRY, O-447204, is hereby appointed Squadron Adjutant, vice Captain JAMES B. LOMRO, O-566277, retd.

3. Effective this date, Chief Warrant Officer DONALD E. WAGNER, 7-211671, is hereby appointed Squadron liaison Officer, vice Captain JAMES B. LOMRO, O-566277, retd.

4. Effective this date, Captain JAMES B. LOMRO, O-566277, is hereby appointed Squadron Historical Officer in addition to his other duties, vice Captain CURTIS R. ESQUIER, O-565293, retd.

BY ORDER OF MAJOR TCC:

ANDREW T. McGARRY
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

ANDREW T. McGARRY
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Adjutant.

CERTIFIED BY:

EDWARD A. KILLARD
Lt., Air Corps,
Historical Officer.
SQUADRON ORDER

In effect 20)

1. Effective this date, Second Lieutenant DILL H. PAKHEAD, JR., 6-83264, is hereby appointed Squadron Athletic Director.

By order of Major TIGG:

ANDREW T. McGARRY
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Adjutant.

OFFICER:

ANDREW T. McGARRY
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Adjutant.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

ELWOOD A. HILL
Lt., Air Corps,
Historical Officer.
Morning Report
Weekly Status & Operations Report, AFR Form 38
Bombs and Munition Expenditure Report
Intelligence Narrative Mission Report
Far East Air Forces General Orders
V Bomber Command General Orders
Squadron Operations Orders
Squadron Orders